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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing AMD×Equinix×Pegatron× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
AMD AMD ai moat: latest change 2026-02-04 Equinix EQIX ai moat: latest change 2026-02-11 Pegatron 4938.TW ai moat: latest change 2026-05-08
Moat rating narrow

AMD's FY2025 10-K documents real but bounded advantages: approximately 7,200 U.S. patents and roughly 18,900 patent matters worldwide, an outright claim that 'We are the market share leader in semi-custom game console products,' and gross margin of 50% on revenue up 34% to $34.6 billion. The same filing sets the ceiling: 'Some of our competitors may possess stronger market positions, larger customer bases, more design wins, and greater financial, sales, marketing, and distribution resources than us'; Nvidia is named 'the discrete GPU market share leader'; and AMD relies on TSMC 'for the production of all wafers for microprocessor and GPU products at 7 nanometer (nm) or smaller nodes.' Advantages that are genuine, contested, and dependent on a shared foundry are narrow, not wide.

source: sec.gov

wide

The FY2025 10-K (filed 2026-02-11) grounds the advantage in an asset that took 27 years to assemble and that a competitor cannot buy: "Over our 27-year history, we have curated a diverse, industry-leading ecosystem of more than 500,000 interconnections", "over 10,500 customers, including 2,000+ network service providers and a leading market share of cloud-on ramps", across "280 data centers, in 77 markets in 36 countries", with "99.9999%+ operational uptime" delivered in 2025 and no single customer at 10% of revenue. Because the value of each IBX rises with who else is already inside it, incumbency compounds rather than decays. The counterweight is real and disclosed: Item 1A says "The global multi-tenant data center market is highly fragmented. It is estimated that we are one of more than 2,400 companies that provide these offerings around the world", and warns that competitors "may adopt aggressive pricing policies". That caps the pricing that the moat converts into, not its durability — the fragmentation sits in commodity space-and-power, while the interconnection density the filing describes has no comparable substitute. FY2025 revenue of $9.217B with operating margin recovering to 20.0% from 15.2% in FY2024 is consistent with the incumbency holding.

source: sec.gov

none

The 2025 annual report (English version filed with TWSE on 2026-05-08) shows scale without a protected position. Consolidated revenue was NT$1,117.2 billion, down from NT$1,125.3 billion, at a gross margin of 3.80%, while DigiTimes put the top 20 EMS/ODM vendors' combined 2025 revenue up 23.4% in US dollars (cnyes, 2026-02-02). One coded customer ("A Company") took 57.34% of 2025 net sales (59.34% in 2024) and a second ("B Company") 9.14%, and the report lists "Intense Competition and Pricing Pressure" and "Customer Concentration and Product Cycle Risks" among its disadvantages. A DigiTimes analysis of the 2024 top 20 (2025-01-27) found Pegatron's net-profit rank six places below its revenue rank, and its net margin at 1.5% or less since 2018 with no clear sign of improvement. A large assembler whose own report and independent data describe no protected return: no moat is claimable.

source: doc.twse.com.tw

Moat type intangibles ip

The FY2025 10-K locates the durable asset in design IP rather than manufacturing: 'We rely on contracts and intellectual property rights to protect our products and technologies from unauthorized third-party copying and use,' with approximately 7,200 U.S. patents and about 18,900 patent matters worldwide spanning x86 EPYC/Ryzen CPUs, CDNA/RDNA graphics and the Versal/Zynq adaptive-SoC families, and it credits customer wins to 'our broad IP portfolio and leadership in design, integration and advanced packaging.' It is explicitly not cost_scale: AMD is fabless and 'utilize[s] Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (TSMC) for the production of wafers' — the same leading-edge foundry its merchant competitors use, so no manufacturing-scale advantage accrues to it.

source: sec.gov

network effects

The 10-K names the mechanism itself, twice and unprompted: "As more customers choose Equinix for high connectivity and performance reliability at the metro edge, it benefits their suppliers and business partners to colocate in the same data centers and connect directly with each other. This adjacency creates a network effect that attracts new customers while continuously enhancing our value proposition to existing customers", and in the Competitive Landscape section, "This ecosystem creates a network effect that improves performance and lowers the cost for our customers". The evidence is the count of participants rather than any patent or unit-cost claim — 500,000+ interconnections, 2,000+ network service providers, a leading share of cloud on-ramps, an Internet Exchange the filing calls "the largest global peering solution". Switching costs are a genuine second layer (fixed-duration contracts billed on space and power, physical cross connects into resident counterparties), but they are what holds a customer already inside the ecosystem; the reason to enter in the first place is who is already there.

source: sec.gov

none

The report's listed competitive advantages are operating capabilities that rivals also have: 4,997 R&D engineers, manufacturing sites in China, the USA, Mexico, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, India and Taiwan, a diversified product and customer base, global logistics, an experienced management team, and vertical integration across materials from metal stamping and plastic injection to light-metal technologies. R&D was 1.44% of 2025 revenue, and the supplier table notes that "partial major materials are purchased by major customers and resell to the Company for manufacturing and system assembly". Its seat in Apple's supply chain has proved contestable: DigiTimes (via Global SMT, 2025-07-24) says Chinese vendors, "most notably Luxshare, have gained ground through acquisitions and key contract wins, including major entries into Apple's supply chain via asset purchases from Merry Electronics, Lite-On, Wistron, and Pegatron". DigiTimes' analyst wrote (2025-01-27) that Pegatron, Wistron, Compal and Inventec all began as computer-system makers whose component businesses and degree of vertical integration can hardly match those of Chinese makers.

source: doc.twse.com.tw

Leadership fast follower

The FY2025 10-K itself places AMD behind the pace-setter in its two most important markets: 'Our principal competitor in the supply of discrete graphics is Nvidia, who is the discrete GPU market share leader,' and the risk factors state Nvidia 'leverages its market position in data center GPU, financial resources, and proprietary software ecosystem to promote its systems and influences customers who do business with us.' AMD is nonetheless executing 'an annual cadence of leadership for AMD Instinct solutions' and has won gigawatt-scale commitments (OpenAI, 6 GW) — following fast and closely, not setting the pace.

source: sec.gov

clear leader

Leadership is claimed on interconnection, not on square footage, and the filing's own evidence is about density: "our position is unmatched in the industry" is supported by 2,000+ resident network service providers, "a leading market share of cloud-on ramps", 500,000+ interconnections and an Internet Exchange described as "the largest global peering solution", across 36 countries. The band is read against neutral, ecosystem-dense colocation, where that footprint has no direct analogue. It is deliberately not read against total data centre capacity: the same 10-K puts Equinix among "more than 2,400 companies" in a "highly fragmented" MTDC market, and Item 1A concedes the company must compete for land and power against "new market entrants" drawn in by AI.

source: sec.gov

behind

DigiTimes' July 2025 ranking (via Global SMT, 2025-07-24) says "Pegatron had long held the second spot" until Quanta overtook it in 1H24, that "Luxshare displaced Pegatron to become the No. 3 EMS/ODM vendor in the second half of 2024", and ranks it fourth in 1H25 after Wistron's surge. DigiTimes' 2025 full-year ranking (cnyes, 2026-02-02) lists the top five in order as Foxconn, Wistron, Quanta, Luxshare and Pegatron. In notebooks, market research cited in the annual report puts Pegatron fifth of the five Taiwanese ODMs it lists, at 9.1 million units or 4.96% of worldwide volume. Its 2025 revenue fell 0.73% in NT dollars (annual report) while DigiTimes put Foxconn's up 22.4% and Quanta's up 55.6% in US dollars (cnyes), and 1H26 revenue fell again, by 3.9% to NT$518,553 million (2Q26 business review): losing ground to peers, so behind rather than at parity.

source: doc.twse.com.tw

Pricing power moderate

FY2025 gross margin was 50%, up from 49% in 2024 per the 10-K — healthy and improving — but the same filing attributes average-selling-price pressure to competitors: Intel 'uses its microprocessor market position to price its products aggressively and target our customers and channel partners with special incentives. These aggressive activities have reduced and may reduce our unit sales and average selling prices for many of our products'. Pricing power is real but contested.

source: sec.gov

moderate

Contract structure supports price: fixed-duration agreements billed on space and power plus per-connection interconnection fees, an installed base too physically entangled to move cheaply, and 99.9999%+ uptime in 2025 as the thing being paid for. FY2025 revenue of $9.217B grew about 5% on FY2024's $8.748B while operating margin recovered to 20.0% from 15.2%, so pricing and cost were at least held. But the filing itself refuses the strong band: competitors "may adopt aggressive pricing policies, especially if they are not highly leveraged or have lower return thresholds than we do. As a result, we may suffer from pricing pressure that would adversely affect our ability to generate revenues", and some rivals bundle communications or cloud services against bare colocation. Power procurement is a further pass-through risk the filing flags. Price is defended, not dictated.

source: sec.gov

weak

The annual report gives a 2025 gross margin of 3.80%, with gross profit down 7.67% on net sales down 0.73%; the 2Q26 business review shows 1H26 gross margin of 4.4% against 3.4% a year earlier. Among its disadvantages the report says "increasing competition may place pressure on pricing and profitability". DigiTimes (2025-01-27) counted Pegatron among Taiwanese makers whose net margin had been 1.5% or less since 2018, with no clear sign of improvement.

source: doc.twse.com.tw

Summary

AMD's edge is architectural design IP executed on someone else's fabs. The FY2025 10-K describes a full-stack portfolio — EPYC server CPUs, Instinct AI accelerators, Ryzen client parts where 'AMD was the first company to integrate a dedicated neural processing unit (NPU) on the same SoC as an x86 CPU for AI PCs,' Radeon graphics, Pensando networking and Versal adaptive SoCs — backed by roughly 18,900 patent matters worldwide, and it discloses gigawatt-scale customer commitments (an October 2025 agreement with OpenAI 'to deploy 6 gigawatts of AMD GPUs,' first gigawatt on Instinct MI450). The same filing bounds that moat: Nvidia is 'the discrete GPU market share leader' and 'leverages its market position in data center GPU, financial resources, and proprietary software ecosystem'; Intel 'uses its microprocessor market position to price its products aggressively'; Arm architectures and customers who 'internally develop products to support similar AI workloads' are named as encroaching; and every wafer at 7 nm or below comes from TSMC. Revenue grew 34% in FY2025 with Data Center up 32%, but the filing's own competitive framing places AMD in the challenger seat rather than the entrenched one.

Equinix is a network-neutral, multi-tenant colocation and interconnection REIT: it does not sell compute, it sells the metro-edge real estate where networks, clouds and enterprises physically meet. The FY2025 10-K describes the platform as "280 data centers, in 77 markets in 36 countries" serving "over 10,500 customers, including 2,000+ network service providers and a leading market share of cloud-on ramps", carrying "more than 500,000 interconnections" curated over 27 years, with 61% of 2025 revenue recognised outside the U.S. Revenue is structurally recurring — infrastructure offerings are "billed based on the space and power a customer consumes" under fixed-duration contracts generating MRR, interconnection is "billed based on the outbound connections from a customer" — and no customer reached 10% of 2025 revenue. AI enters the story as demand rather than as a product: the filing positions Equinix as the interconnect point for "model providers, data platforms, neoclouds and gateways", and pushes core hyperscale capacity into xScale, which is "developed and operated through our joint venture partnership arrangements". The bear case is in the company's own Item 1A. The MTDC market is "highly fragmented", Equinix being "one of more than 2,400 companies"; competitors "may adopt aggressive pricing policies"; the AI build-out invites "significant investments in the data center industry by both current competitors and new investors", after which "we could lose market share" and must "compete against certain of these competitors to secure the land and power needed for our expansion plans". Product extension has also failed before — the filing notes past offerings "have been or are being discontinued, including the Equinix Metal product". The honest reading: the interconnection ecosystem is close to unreplicable and the moat sits there; the capacity business around it is a capital race Equinix enters with scale but no immunity.

Pegatron is a Taiwanese EMS/ODM whose 2025 annual report describes three segments: computing (notebooks, desktops, motherboards, servers), communication (cable modems, set-top boxes, smartphones, switches, routers, gateways, 5G O-RAN) and consumer electronics (tablets, game consoles, wearables, smart home devices, automotive electronics). Communication remained the largest segment in 2025, and one coded customer took 57.34% of net sales. Revenue was NT$1,117.2 billion at a 3.80% gross margin. Servers are the growth line: the report cites large-scale shipments of NVIDIA GB300 NVL72 and HGX B300 systems in 2025, and the 2Q26 business review (2026-08-12) says computing revenue rose 84% year on year, "driven mostly by greater shipment from Server business", taking computing to 23% of revenue while communication fell to 52% after a double-digit decline. Independent rankings show it losing ground: DigiTimes says Pegatron "had long held the second spot" among EMS/ODM vendors by revenue until Quanta passed it in 1H24, and its 2025 full-year ranking puts it fifth behind Foxconn, Wistron, Quanta and Luxshare, with 2026 AI server and rack orders expected to concentrate in Foxconn, Wistron and Quanta. Gross margin improved to 4.4% in 1H26 from 3.4% a year earlier, still thin. A large, diversified assembler without a protected position.

Chain position

A fabless merchant-silicon designer sitting one layer above the foundries: the FY2025 10-K states AMD relies on TSMC 'for the production of all wafers for microprocessor and GPU products at 7 nanometer (nm) or smaller nodes' and primarily on GLOBALFOUNDRIES above 7 nm, with packaging and test performed by Asia-Pacific ATMP partners — so its cost, supply and cadence are inherited from partners it does not control.

Equinix is the neutral meeting point of the AI and cloud supply chain rather than a link in its manufacturing path: it houses other companies' compute and sells the adjacency between them. The 10-K places it between the network layer (2,000+ service providers), the cloud layer ("a leading market share of cloud-on ramps") and enterprise consumers who "assemble these capabilities into operational stacks", and describes an AI ecosystem "of model providers, data platforms, neoclouds and gateways" curated for enterprise AI demand. Core hyperscale training capacity sits beside that, not inside it, in xScale, built with JV partners so hyperscalers "add to their core hyperscale data center deployments and existing customer access points at Equinix". The revenue is therefore levered to AI's distribution and inference edge more than to training-cluster buildout.

Contract designer-manufacturer for brand customers in computing, communication and consumer electronics; America took 41.18% and Europe 38.79% of 2025 sales, and some major materials are bought by major customers and resold to Pegatron for assembly (annual report).

Products (share / barrier)
Long-horizon vote +0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.38 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

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-0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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