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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing AppLovin×Wiwynn×Apple× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
AppLovin APP ai moat: latest change 2026-02-19 Wiwynn 6669.TW ai moat: latest change 2026-04-30 Apple AAPL ai moat: latest change 2025-10-31
Moat rating narrow

The filing's own words support a narrow moat. Auctions run 'at vast scale and at microsecond-level speeds,' revenue is earned only 'when our advertisers achieve their return on advertising spend targets,' and FY2025 adjusted EBITDA margin was 82.3%. What limits the width: clients 'are not required to enter into long-term agreements' and 'Substantially all of the Company's contracts with customers are cancelable at any time'; the solutions 'primarily operate in the mobile app ecosystem and specifically mobile gaming'; and distribution runs through 'the Apple App Store, the Google Play Store, and Meta' while AppLovin relies 'in part on IDFA.'

source: sec.gov

narrow

The 2025 annual report (published 2026-04-30) shows a real but shallow position: products deployed in "more than 750 hyperscale data centers" and, on the Company's own internally assessed shipment volume, "more than 10% of global server shipments and nearly 30% of global ODM-Direct server shipments" in 2025 — while the same report's own list of negative factors names "Excessive concentration of customers" and a market "getting more and more competitive", discloses three customers at 41.48%, 26.03% and 10.43% of 2025 net sales, and reports 2025 gross profit up 109.77% against revenue up 163.68% for an 8.3% gross margin. Defensible incumbency, not a durable one.

source: wiwynn.com

narrow

Argued, not assumed. The FY2025 10-K does evidence a real moat in margin: total gross margin percentage rose 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025) in markets the same filing describes as characterised by 'aggressive price competition, downward pressure on gross margins.' But the filing bounds the claim itself: it concedes 'a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' it discloses no retention, active-device or installed-base figure anywhere (its only 'large installed bases of active devices' reference describes competitors), and it discloses that both of the highest-margin layers are already being cut down by force -- Apple is 'currently subject to a court order preventing it from imposing any commission or fee on certain purchases' on the U.S. App Store storefront, has had to open 'alternative methods of distribution for iOS and iPadOS apps, alternative payment processing' in the EU, and warns that a reversal on appeal in the Google search case could impose remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution.' A moat that earns 46.9% gross margin but whose most profitable layer is being narrowed by two courts and a regulator is narrow, not wide.

source: sec.gov

Moat type network effects

Network effects, with a caveat. The 10-K states the loop: as more advertisers use the solutions 'we gain access to more data regarding users and user engagement,' 'further strengthening our scaled distribution,' and 'As our distribution grows, we gain better insights for Axon AI.' The mechanism is two-sided matching of advertiser demand to publisher supply, though much of the force comes from data-and-learning scale. It is not switching costs, since contracts are 'cancelable at any time,' nor intangibles or IP, since 'there can be no assurance that we will adequately protect our intellectual property or that it will provide any competitive advantage.'

source: sec.gov

switching costs

The report's "Competitive niche" section locates the advantage in the customer program rather than in IP or unit cost: "highly customized solutions for hyperscale data centers", "end-to-end technical integration capabilities ranging from server design and system integration to large-scale L10/L11 rack-level delivery", and a one-stop service "covering product design, integration, optimization, deployment, and after-sales services" across a base of more than 750 hyperscale data centers. Every advantage the section claims is about integration work and customer proximity, none about patents or proprietary silicon, and an 8.3% gross margin is not the profile of a cost advantage; what is left is the friction in an installed, co-designed rack program.

source: wiwynn.com

switching costs

The 10-K locates the durable advantage in an integrated stack and its third-party ecosystem, not in patents: it names 'a strong third-party software and accessories ecosystem' among the principal competitive factors and states the Company 'designs and develops nearly the entire solution for its products, including the hardware, operating system, numerous software applications and related services,' while explicitly disclaiming IP as the source -- 'No single intellectual property right is solely responsible for protecting the Company's products and services' and the Company 'relies primarily on the innovative skills, technical competence and marketing abilities of its personnel.' The remedies now in force confirm the diagnosis negatively: the same filing describes being required to permit alternative distribution and alternative payment processing in the EU and being barred from charging commission on certain linked-out purchases in the U.S. -- remedies aimed squarely at lowering the cost of leaving Apple's rails, which is what a switching-cost moat is.

source: sec.gov

Leadership at parity

The filing discloses no share of any market, names 'Meta, Google, Amazon, and Unity Software' as competitors, and concedes rivals 'may have greater resources' and 'better technological or data analytics capabilities, or stronger brands or competitive positions in certain product segments.' Its one positional statement is parity language: 'We believe we compete favorably with respect to these factors.' Two unquantified points cut upward: Meta and Google are also clients, and MAX is called 'the preferred in-app bidding solution for many publishers worldwide.'

source: sec.gov

co leader

The report claims "nearly 30% of global ODM-Direct server shipments" for 2025 on internally assessed volume, against an IDC Worldwide Quarterly Server Tracker base of approximately 7.7 million ODM-Direct units within roughly 16.78 million total 2025 server shipments — yet describes the Company only as "one of the major suppliers to international hyperscale data centers". Among the largest in its segment; the report makes no claim to be first.

source: wiwynn.com

fast follower

Apple leads on integration and margin rather than on units, and the filing says so: it 'has a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' while competitors have 'broad product lines, low-priced products, large installed bases of active devices, and large customer bases.' On the AI axis that defines this graph, Apple is following rather than leading -- it now licenses a rival's frontier models to power Siri (see the Apple Intelligence / Siri row and its citation) while pushing its own advantage down into silicon.

source: sec.gov

Pricing power strong

Strong, with the mechanism shown. The 10-K states that 'Advertisers are charged dynamically based on their campaign goals , rather than a simple fixed price per impression or per action.' Growth composition is the evidence: FY2025 revenue +70% with 'the volume of installations increased 3% and net revenue per installation increased 72%'; H1 2026 +56% with per-installation revenue +75% against 'a decrease in the volume of installations of 10%.' Adjusted EBITDA margin was 82.3% in FY2025 and 84.2% in H1 2026, though payment is performance-contingent and contracts cancel at will.

source: sec.gov

weak

2025 gross margin was 8.3% and operating margin 6.7%; gross profit rose 109.77% while revenue rose 163.68%, so the margin narrowed as volume grew. The report discloses three customers at 41.48%, 26.03% and 10.43% of 2025 net sales, lists "Excessive concentration of customers" among its negative factors, and explains its main-supplier table with "The suppliers are designated by customers."

source: wiwynn.com

strong

The 10-K's own gross-margin table: total gross margin percentage 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025), with Services at 75.4% versus Products at 36.8%, and iPhone net sales rising 'due to higher net sales of Pro models' -- mix moving up, not down. Held against the filing's own hedge that 'gross margins will be subject to volatility and downward pressure,' the realised trend is the stronger evidence.

source: sec.gov

Summary

One reportable segment: an AI-priced auction matching advertiser demand to publisher supply, where 'Revenue from Axon Ads Manager comprises substantially all of our revenue.' The filed flywheel is real - more advertiser spend yields more user-engagement data, 'further strengthening our scaled distribution,' which feeds Axon AI - and it converts: FY2025 revenue $5.48B, up 70%, at an 82.3% adjusted EBITDA margin, carried by price (net revenue per installation +72%) not volume (installations +3%). What the filing does not evidence is a lock. Contracts are cancelable at any time, revenue concentrates in mobile gaming, and the distribution and identifier layers belong to Apple, Google and Meta - two of whom are simultaneously named competitors and disclosed clients. Wide margins with no disclosed structural lock is narrow.

Wiwynn sells ODM-Direct — it designs and builds cloud and AI server systems to hyperscale operators' specifications rather than shipping a branded product — and the 2025 annual report grounds its edge in that relationship: "highly customized solutions", integration "from server design and system integration to large-scale L10/L11 rack-level delivery", Open Compute Project participation described as "a core competitive advantage in marketing to global hyperscale data centers", and products deployed in more than 750 hyperscale data centers as of the end of 2025. The report also says that high integration and testing abilities "increases the threshold of vendors in the assembly industry and creates entry barriers". Against that, the same report lists excessive customer concentration and an increasingly competitive market as its negative factors, discloses customers at 41.48%, 26.03% and 10.43% of 2025 net sales, explains its main-supplier table with "The suppliers are designated by customers", and reports an 8.3% gross margin on 2025 revenue of NT$950.66bn.

Apple's moat is usually asserted through the ecosystem; the FY2025 10-K neither quantifies nor claims retention, so the evidence has to be read elsewhere in the filing. Where it does show is mix and margin: Services reached $109.2B of $416.2B net sales (+14%) at a 75.4% gross margin against 36.8% on Products, so 26% of revenue delivered $82.3B of the $195.2B total gross margin, and iPhone grew 'due to higher net sales of Pro models.' That profit concentration is also the vulnerability the filing itself flags: Apple 'earns revenue from licensing arrangements with Google LLC and other companies to offer their search services on the Company's platforms,' arrangements 'currently subject to government investigations and legal proceedings' after Google was found to have violated U.S. antitrust laws on August 5, 2024 and the D.C. District Court ordered remedies on September 2, 2025 -- with the 10-K warning that a reversal on appeal could impose DOJ's proposed remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution,' which 'could materially adversely affect the Company's ability to earn revenue from such licensing arrangements.' Apple never discloses the size of that payment in the filing -- the concentration is admitted but not measured. Alongside it, the App Store toll has already been reduced in both jurisdictions. What is not in dispute is the vertical integration: Apple designs the silicon and now the cellular modem, and uses 'custom components available from only one source.' Read together: a genuine, margin-visible switching-cost moat around an integrated stack, with its two most profitable layers under active legal reduction.

Chain position

Demand-side AI ad platform: it monetizes third-party mobile-game publishers' inventory and sells outcomes to advertisers, so it sits downstream of Apple/Google app distribution and Apple's IDFA identifier layer and upstream of publisher monetization. Meta and Google are simultaneously named competitors and disclosed clients. Single reportable segment after the June 2025 Apps divestiture.

The report's cloud/AI-server value-chain diagram places system assembling in the midstream and "Direct sales from original manufacturers" downstream selling to cloud service providers; Wiwynn describes itself as providing "IT equipment and rack system integration service to hyperscale data centers". 82.12% of 2025 revenue came from America.

Applications-layer name in the AI chain: the 10-K describes designing 'nearly the entire solution' and using custom components 'available from only one source,' making Apple a large, concentrated buyer of leading-edge silicon rather than a supplier of AI compute to anyone else.

Products (share / barrier)
Long-horizon vote +0.11 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.05 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.11 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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