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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing Cloudflare×Penguin Solutions×Visa× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
Cloudflare NET ai moat: latest change 2026-02-26 Penguin Solutions PENG ai moat: latest change 2025-10-21 Visa V ai moat: latest change 2025-11-06
Moat rating wide

The band is earned by a measured share gap on a hard-to-rebuild asset, not asserted. W3Techs' 17 September 2026 survey (w3techs.com/technologies/overview/proxy) puts Cloudflare in front of 25.8% of all websites, an 85.0% share of the reverse-proxy market, against Amazon CloudFront at 5.5%, Fastly at 3.0% and Akamai at 2.1% - roughly fifteen times the nearest rival. The FY2025 10-K filed 2026-02-26 describes what a challenger would have to reproduce to contest that: a network that 'spans more than 330 cities in over 125 countries worldwide and interconnects with over 13,000 networks globally', architected to 'run every service on every server in every city' - capacity and peering accumulated city by city over a decade, not bought in a quarter. The position has been monetised without margin decay: SEC XBRL fundamentals on this site show GAAP gross margin inside a 74.5-78.7% band in every fiscal year from FY2017 to FY2025 while revenue grew from $134.9M to $2,167.9M, and Cloudflare's Q4/FY2025 results release of 2026-02-10 (cloudflare.com/press/press-releases/2026/cloudflare-announces-fourth-quarter-and-fiscal-year-2025-financial-results/) reports remaining performance obligations up 48% and new annual contract value up nearly 50% year over year. What stops this being a certainty rather than a judgement: the dominant share sits in application services, while SASE and developer compute are contested by vendors the 10-K itself concedes hold 'substantially greater financial, technical, and other resources.'

source: sec.gov

none

The FY2025 10-K (fiscal year ended August 29, 2025) documents design-in niches but no durable excess return. In favour: the Competition section says some large rivals 'tend to have limited customization and service capabilities and are generally focused on higher-volume memory, storage, or compute products that are manufactured to industry-standard specifications'. It says the company's 'close collaboration with customers, customer-specific designs, long-lifecycle solutions, superior products and proprietary supply chain services create significant customer loyalty that may provide an advantage when competing against large international companies'. Against: the same filing says many competitors have 'substantially greater financial, technical, marketing, distribution and other resources' and 'lower cost structures'. Sales are made 'primarily pursuant to customer purchase orders and are not based on long-term supply agreements', and 'customers are not obligated to purchase our products even if we achieve a design win'. Large customers 'have exerted' pressure for price concessions, and the ten largest were 66% of fiscal 2025 net sales. GAAP operating income was 0.6%, 1.6% and 4.2% of net sales in fiscal 2023, 2024 and 2025, and fiscal 2024 had a net loss from continuing operations of $41.8 million. The 10-Q for the quarter ended May 29, 2026 (filed 2026-07-07, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1616533/000161653326000043/peng-20260529.htm) adds that Advanced Computing nine-month sales fell 20.6%, reflecting 'both the ongoing Penguin Edge wind down and hyperscale hardware sales in 2025 that did not recur in 2026'. The filing's own advantage claim is hedged ('may provide an advantage'): design-in niches exist, but the 10-K shows no durable excess return.

source: sec.gov

wide

The FY2025 10-K prints a network comparison for calendar year 2024: Visa at $13,433B payments volume, 311B total transactions and 4,805M cards, against Mastercard's $8,014B / 204B / 3,146M and American Express's $1,750B / 12B / 147M. Footnote (1) sources the American Express, Diners Club / Discover, JCB and Mastercard data to The Nilson Report issue 1288 (June 2025); Visa's own line is Visa's own data. On that table Visa's payments volume is roughly two-thirds larger than the next network's, and the same section states 'Based on available data, Visa is one of the largest retail electronic funds transfer networks used throughout the world.' The rating is wide because the lead rests on a two-sided installed base the filing quantifies — nearly 5 billion payment credentials and more than 175 million merchant locations across more than 200 countries and territories — which an entrant would have to reassemble on both sides at once. The table is a single-year snapshot with no prior-year column, so it evidences the size of the lead, not its direction.

source: sec.gov

Moat type cost scale

The FY2025 10-K states the mechanism outright, and it is a unit-cost curve rather than a user-to-user network: 'We have chosen to utilize this idle capacity to create a free tier of service which has generated substantial global scale for us. In turn, this scale makes us attractive partners for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) globally, which reduces our co-location and bandwidth costs. As our network grows, these dynamics become even more powerful.' The same section explains why the curve applies to every line rather than one: the architecture lets Cloudflare 'deploy standard, commodity hardware' and run 'every service on every server in every city', so a new product reaches 330+ cities at near-zero incremental capital. That is what lets the filing claim Workers is offered 'at prices that are highly competitive with public cloud vendors' while FY2025 GAAP gross margin still printed 74.5%. Switching costs (traffic routed through Cloudflare, DNS delegated to it) and threat-intelligence feedback from aggregate traffic sit on top, but the filing-stated primary source is cost falling as the network grows.

source: sec.gov

none

The strongest candidate moat source in the 10-K is design-in and qualification, a switching-cost argument, and the filing limits it too far to count. The risk factors say 'Our products are often incorporated into customers' systems at the design stage', and many specialty products 'are specifically designed for our OEM customers' systems or products'. But qualification is 'both product-specific and platform-specific', so a design win covers one platform. The filing notes that customers 'sometimes require us to re-qualify our products' for new platforms, which 'can be time-consuming and cause reductions in our net sales', so each new platform reopens the socket. It also says 'customers are not obligated to purchase our products even if we achieve a design win', and warns that OEMs designing in 'standardized or commodity components' could reduce demand for its 'higher priced specialized or customized solutions'. Scale is ruled out because the filing says many competitors have lower cost structures. Patents are ruled out as a durable source. The company holds about 1,650 of them and calls intellectual property 'an important aspect of our business', but it says its patents 'do not cover all of our technologies' and that competitors 'may design around our patented technologies'. It also says some products are 'built around mature industry standards and have less patent protection', so 'we cannot prevent our competitors from reverse-engineering and duplicating those products'.

source: sec.gov

network effects

Visa itself names the two sides as the source of advantage: 'We believe our fundamental value proposition of security, convenience, speed and reliability as well as the number of payment credentials and our acceptance footprint help us to succeed.' In fiscal 2025 the 10-K counts nearly 5 billion payment credentials, which it defines as issued Visa card accounts, available at more than 175 million merchant locations, with nearly 14,500 financial institutions among the clients that build payment programs on Visa products. The two bases are joined through VisaNet in what the filing calls the 'four-party' model. Neither side is worth joining without the other, so the advantage is the mutual pull of the two installed bases rather than a patent estate or a cost curve.

source: sec.gov

Leadership clear leader

Leadership is measured, not inferred. W3Techs on 2026-09-17 records an 85.0% reverse-proxy market share against 5.5% for Amazon CloudFront and 2.1% for Akamai, and makes Cloudflare the largest authoritative-DNS provider at 18.5% of all websites versus 9.9% for the next-placed GoDaddy Group. The FY2025 10-K reports the enterprise side moving the same way - 4,298 large customers at 2025 year-end against 3,497 a year earlier and 2,756 in 2023 - and the Q4/FY2025 results release (cloudflare.com/press/press-releases/2026/cloudflare-announces-fourth-quarter-and-fiscal-year-2025-financial-results/) cites the largest annual contract value deal in company history at about $42.5M per year. The band is for the application-services core the share data covers; in SASE and in serverless compute Cloudflare is a challenger to larger incumbents, and no independent placement naming Cloudflare in those markets was obtained for this profile.

source: sec.gov

at parity

The 10-K claims no share figure or rank in any segment. It says 'Our businesses compete with numerous global and local companies'. Its HPC and AI business 'competes primarily with global manufacturers of HPC and AI products and services'. For fault-tolerant solutions it says 'we primarily compete with manufacturers of enterprise servers and industrial computers'. Its memory business competes 'against memory module providers and, to a lesser extent, large semiconductor manufacturers'. The risk factors warn that larger competitors 'may be able to respond better to new or emerging technologies, such as generative AI'. Against that, the company's stated edge is customization and service, where it says some large rivals 'tend to have limited customization and service capabilities'. Its leadership language is self-description without share figures: Cree LED 'has been a leader in LED lighting technology', Stratus Technologies is 'a global leader in simplified, protected and autonomous computing platforms and services', and the memory business is 'a primary supplier of longer-lifecycle solutions to OEM customers'. A specialist that claims no rank and faces many larger, lower-cost rivals, while neither leading nor clearly trailing in its niches, is parity.

source: sec.gov

clear leader

On the 10-K's CY2024 comparison table, Visa carried 311 billion total transactions and $13,433B of payments volume against 204 billion and $8,014B for Mastercard, the largest competitor listed. American Express is next at $1,750B and 147M cards — under a seventh of Visa's payments volume and under a thirtieth of its cards — with Diners Club / Discover ($253B, 72M cards) and JCB ($319B, 167M cards) smaller still on volume. Visa's line is its own data; the competitor lines are sourced to The Nilson Report issue 1288 (June 2025) per footnote (1).

source: sec.gov

Pricing power moderate

Evidence cuts both ways, which is why this is not the top band. For it: GAAP gross margin has never left a 74.5-78.7% band across FY2017-FY2025 (SEC XBRL fundamentals on this site) even as revenue compounded 16x, and the Q4/FY2025 results release (cloudflare.com/press/press-releases/2026/cloudflare-announces-fourth-quarter-and-fiscal-year-2025-financial-results/) shows customers committing more rather than less - RPO +48% year over year and new ACV up nearly 50%. Against it: FY2025's 74.5% is the lowest reading in that nine-year series, a large permanent free tier anchors the entry price, the 10-K positions Workers 'at prices that are highly competitive with public cloud vendors', and the competition risk factor warns that larger rivals can 'sell products and services with which we compete at zero or negative margins, offer fee waivers and reductions or other economic and non-economic concessions', with competitive pressure that 'may result in price reductions, fewer subscriptions, reduced revenue and gross margin'.

source: sec.gov

weak

The FY2025 10-K describes price as set by customers and the market. It says its large customers 'are able to exert, have exerted and we expect will continue to exert, pressure on us to make concessions on price and on terms and conditions'. It says 'The markets for our Integrated Memory products have historically been characterized by declines in average selling prices', and that 'Competitive pressure has led in the past and may continue to lead to intensified price competition resulting in lower net sales and lower profit margins'. Gross margin held in a narrow band: 28.8% in fiscal 2023, 29.1% in fiscal 2024 and 28.8% in fiscal 2025. The filing attributes each move to mix, for example higher-margin Advanced Computing service revenue in 2024, not to pricing. The 10-Q for the quarter ended May 29, 2026 (filed 2026-07-07, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1616533/000161653326000043/peng-20260529.htm) reports gross margin of 27.8% versus 29.3% a year earlier (27.7% versus 28.9% for nine months), which it attributes to the Penguin Edge wind-down and sales mix. Third-quarter Integrated Memory sales rose 111.4% (75.6% for nine months) as 'accelerating AI-driven demand drove favorable pricing and increased volume', and the 10-Q says that business has 'gross margins which are lower than the Company average'.

source: sec.gov

strong

Visa's own take is insulated from the fees regulators target: it sets default interchange rates but does not collect them — the 10-K says 'Generally, IRFs are paid by acquirers to issuers' and that 'the fees we receive from issuers and acquirers are not derived from IRFs or MDRs.' The reported margin is high but moved down in fiscal 2025: operating income of $23,994M on $40,000M of net revenue is a 60.0% operating margin, against 65.7% ($23,595M on $35,926M) in fiscal 2024. The cause is printed two lines above operating income in the same statement — the litigation provision rose from $462M to $2,562M — and the filing says litigation provisions 'do not correlate to the underlying performance of our business' and that it excludes them 'to facilitate a comparison to our past operating performance.' Adding that provision back to operating income in both years leaves 66.4% against 67.0%, so the pricing base held and the decline is a legal charge, not a fee concession. The real limits are indirect: Dodd-Frank and the EU IFR cap interchange Visa never earns, client incentives are paid back to clients and rise with payments volume, and the UK Payment Systems Regulator holds 'wide-ranging powers and authority to review our business practices, systems, rules and fees with respect to promoting competition and innovation in the UK, and ensuring payment systems take care of, and promote, the interests of service users.'

source: sec.gov

Summary

Cloudflare sells security, performance and connectivity as services delivered from one global anycast network rather than from boxes at a customer's edge. The FY2025 10-K frames the market as a consolidation away from enterprises that 'string together a diverse set of on-premises hardware boxes from different vendors' and away from 'stringing together multiple point-cloud solutions that only address specific network needs', toward one integrated provider it calls the Connectivity Cloud, and places Cloudflare as 'a leader in this Connectivity Cloud category'. The economics are unusual: idle capacity funds a free tier, the free tier buys global traffic scale, that scale makes Cloudflare a peering partner ISPs want, and peering cuts colocation and bandwidth cost - a loop the filing says 'become[s] even more powerful' as the network grows. Independent measurement confirms where that loop has already settled the market: W3Techs on 2026-09-17 shows an 85.0% reverse-proxy share and the largest authoritative-DNS footprint at 18.5% of all websites. Commercially the company ended 2025 with roughly 332,000 paying customers in more than 190 countries and 4,298 large customers, up from 2,756 two years earlier, with no customer above 10% of revenue. The contested half of the story is the growth half: the SASE platform competes with established cloud-security, email-security and SD-WAN vendors, and the developer platform competes for storage and compute against hyperscalers, markets where the 10-K's own risk factors concede rivals have greater name recognition, larger customer bases and 'more mature products and services developed for large customers'. The core is defended; the adjacencies are being fought for, and FY2025 gross margin at a nine-year low of 74.5% is the first visible cost of building GPU capacity for that fight.

Penguin Solutions (formerly SMART Global Holdings) has three reportable segments per the FY2025 10-K. Advanced Computing ($648.4 million of fiscal 2025 net sales) designs, builds, deploys and manages AI and HPC clusters under OriginAI with the ICE ClusterWare software, and sells Stratus fault-tolerant servers. Integrated Memory ($464.2 million) sells SMART Modular specialty DRAM, flash and CXL memory and supply-chain services. Optimized LED ($256.1 million) sells Cree LED chips and components. Its advantage is customization rather than size. The filing says its memory business collaborates with OEMs 'throughout their design process across multiple projects' and is 'a primary supplier of longer-lifecycle solutions to OEM customers' in industrial, government, networking and enterprise markets. Its products must pass product- and platform-specific qualification, and some large rivals focus on higher-volume, industry-standard products. The limits are just as clear. Many competitors are larger and have lower cost structures. Customers buy on purchase orders, the ten largest were 66% of fiscal 2025 sales, and they 'have exerted' pressure for price concessions. Integrated Memory has historically seen declining average selling prices. AI hardware revenue is project-driven: Advanced Computing sales fell 26.0% in fiscal 2024 on 'the unpredictable nature of large project engagements'. The 10-Q for the quarter ended May 29, 2026 (filed 2026-07-07, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1616533/000161653326000043/peng-20260529.htm) says the AI infrastructure business is 'transitioning from a hyperscaler concentration toward a more diversified non-hyperscaler customer base across enterprise, neocloud, and sovereign AI', which 'may negatively impact our net sales during the transition'. The result is a set of design-in niches rather than a franchise, with an AI business that must keep re-winning large deployments.

Visa runs the switchboard, not the bank. The FY2025 10-K is explicit that 'Visa is not a financial institution. We do not issue cards, extend credit or set rates and fees for account holders of Visa products nor do we earn revenue from or bear credit risk with respect to any of these activities.' That disclaimer is scoped to issuing and credit extension, not to risk at large — the same filing says indemnifying issuers and acquirers for one another's settlement failures 'creates settlement risk for us' because of the timing gap between a payment transaction and its settlement. What Visa earns is service, data-processing and international-transaction revenue, reduced by client incentives, for moving other people's money: 329 billion payments and cash transactions carried the Visa brand in fiscal 2025, 258 billion of them processed by Visa, an average of 901 million a day across more than 200 countries and territories on $17 trillion of total payments and cash volume. The pull between nearly 5 billion credentials and more than 175 million merchant locations is what a rival would have to buy on both sides at once. The filing is candid about what is arriving anyway: real-time payment networks have launched in at least 80 countries behind 'strong government sponsorship and regulatory initiatives' the filing names as FedNow, PIX and UPI; B2B blockchain payments including stablecoins 'can operate globally 24/7' for cross-border transactions; and Dodd-Frank and the EU IFR both cap interchange and limit network exclusivity and routing restrictions.

Chain position

Cloudflare sits between end users and whatever hosts the application - origin data centre, public cloud or SaaS - so it is a control layer in front of infrastructure rather than infrastructure a workload runs on, which the 10-K argues is the point: customers 'concerned about being locked in to any one public cloud provider' want policy enforced by 'an independent and integrated services provider'. Two AI-era roles follow from that position. As a supplier, the filing describes 'ongoing deployment of graphics processing units (GPUs) across our global network of servers' behind Workers AI, Vectorize and AI Gateway, putting inference next to the user instead of in a region. As a gatekeeper, the application-services suite now exists in part to 'easily identify, block and control access from AI crawlers and AI agents and operators' and underpins announced efforts to let content creators monetise how those crawlers reach their work - which makes Cloudflare a toll point between AI model builders and the open web.

Downstream integrator. Per the 10-K it buys memory from Samsung, Micron, SK hynix and Kioxia and processors from Intel and AMD, and turns them into specialty memory modules and managed AI/HPC clusters for OEM, enterprise, government and cloud customers.

Both a buyer and a seller of AI inside payments, not an AI infrastructure supplier: the 10-K claims 'early adoption and integration of artificial intelligence (AI) models in payment systems', sells 'risk detection and prevention solutions underpinned by real-time AI-driven scores' to issuers and acquirers, and opens its rails to third-party AI systems 'via on-demand APIs, our MCP server that enables AI systems to interface with our Visa Intelligent Commerce APIs, and fully managed solutions.'

Products (share / barrier)
  • AI and HPC infrastructure (OriginAI, ICE ClusterWare) Unknown · Low source: sec.gov
  • Cree LED chips and components (XLamp, J Series, high-brightness SMD) Unknown · Low source: sec.gov
  • SMART Modular specialty memory and storage (DRAM modules, Zefr, CXL, flash/SSD) Niche · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Stratus fault-tolerant computing (ztC Endurance, ftServer, ztC Edge, everRun) Niche · Low source: sec.gov
  • Risk and Security Solutions (Visa Protect, Featurespace) Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Stablecoin settlement and Visa Tokenized Asset Platform Niche · Low source: sec.gov
  • Tink open banking and Visa A2A Challenger · Low source: sec.gov
  • Visa Direct Leader · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Visa consumer payments network (credit, debit, prepaid) Leader · Deep source: sec.gov
Long-horizon vote +0.38 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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-0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.42 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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