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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing JPMorgan Chase×TE Connectivity×AMD× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
JPMorgan Chase JPM ai moat: latest change 2026-02-13 TE Connectivity TEL ai moat: latest change 2025-11-10 AMD AMD ai moat: latest change 2026-02-04
Moat rating wide

The 2025 Form 10-K opens with a balance sheet and a licensing perimeter that a new entrant cannot assemble: $4.4 trillion in assets and $362.4 billion in stockholders' equity at December 31, 2025, a principal bank subsidiary (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.) with branches in 48 states and Washington, D.C., 318,512 employees across 66 countries, and consolidated supervision as a bank and financial holding company by the Federal Reserve, layered with the OCC, FDIC, SEC, FINRA, CFTC, U.K. PRA/FCA and the ECB over its principal subsidiaries. Item 1 also notes the Bank Holding Company Act restricts holding companies to banking and closely-related activities, so the charter itself is scarce. Rated wide rather than higher because Item 1's own Competition paragraph calls the environments 'highly competitive' and names e-commerce, digital-asset and financial-technology entrants that 'disintermediate traditional banking products'.

source: sec.gov

narrow

The FY2025 10-K's own Competition section undercuts any claim of insulation: 'The industries in which we operate are highly competitive, and we compete with thousands of companies that range from large multinational corporations to local manufacturers', competition is 'generally based on breadth of product offering, product innovation, price, quality, delivery, and service', and TE has 'experienced, and expect[s] to continue to experience, downward pressure on prices'. The same filing explicitly disclaims IP as the basis of its position: 'we do not believe that our competitive position or our operations are dependent upon or would be materially impacted by any single patent or group of related patents.' What TE does hold is durable rather than absolute — it calls itself 'one of the leading providers of advanced automobile connectivity solutions', its Industrial segment 'a leading supplier', and it converted that position into rising profitability across the same filing's three income statements (gross margin 31.5% of net sales in FY2023, 34.4% in FY2024, 35.2% in FY2025). A position that earns expanding margins into admitted price pressure is an advantage; one held against thousands of competitors and no decisive patent is not a wide one.

source: sec.gov

narrow

AMD's FY2025 10-K documents real but bounded advantages: approximately 7,200 U.S. patents and roughly 18,900 patent matters worldwide, an outright claim that 'We are the market share leader in semi-custom game console products,' and gross margin of 50% on revenue up 34% to $34.6 billion. The same filing sets the ceiling: 'Some of our competitors may possess stronger market positions, larger customer bases, more design wins, and greater financial, sales, marketing, and distribution resources than us'; Nvidia is named 'the discrete GPU market share leader'; and AMD relies on TSMC 'for the production of all wafers for microprocessor and GPU products at 7 nanometer (nm) or smaller nodes.' Advantages that are genuine, contested, and dependent on a shared foundry are narrow, not wide.

source: sec.gov

Moat type cost scale

The filing's durable advantage is scale rather than a proprietary technology or a stated network effect: $4.4 trillion of assets and $362.4 billion of equity, 318,512 employees, a 48-state branch footprint and a GSIB capital and liquidity regime administered under the Basel III framework. Item 1A repeatedly frames technology as a required expenditure - 'New technologies have required and could require JPMorganChase to increase expenditures to modify its products' and possible 'significant investments in technology' for quantum-resistant encryption - which is a fixed cost the firm spreads over a base few competitors match. The filing asserts no network effect and no switching-cost lock-in.

source: sec.gov

switching costs

The FY2025 10-K locates the advantage at the customer, not in patents. It describes 'close working relationships with many of our customers' whose 'relationships with them typically date back many years', and co-development as the mechanism: 'By working with our customers in developing new products and technologies, we believe we can identify and act on trends and leverage knowledge about next-generation technology across our products.' Roughly 75% of fiscal 2025 net sales were direct to manufacturers rather than through distribution, and the Transportation segment's products 'must withstand harsh conditions' — parts engineered in with the customer and built to survive the application, so the position sits inside the customer's design rather than in a purchase order. The filing rules the alternative out in its own words on intellectual property, so intangibles_ip is not the source; the 'thousands of companies' in Competition rules out efficient_scale.

source: sec.gov

intangibles ip

The FY2025 10-K locates the durable asset in design IP rather than manufacturing: 'We rely on contracts and intellectual property rights to protect our products and technologies from unauthorized third-party copying and use,' with approximately 7,200 U.S. patents and about 18,900 patent matters worldwide spanning x86 EPYC/Ryzen CPUs, CDNA/RDNA graphics and the Versal/Zynq adaptive-SoC families, and it credits customer wins to 'our broad IP portfolio and leadership in design, integration and advanced packaging.' It is explicitly not cost_scale: AMD is fabless and 'utilize[s] Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (TSMC) for the production of wafers' — the same leading-edge foundry its merchant competitors use, so no manufacturing-scale advantage accrues to it.

source: sec.gov

Leadership co leader

Item 1 claims the firm is 'a leader' in five distinct businesses at once, and 'a leading financial services firm based in the United States' - but it claims to be 'a leader', never the leader, and names no rank or peer comparison anywhere in Item 1 or Item 1A. Scale disclosed in the filing (assets, equity, 318,512 employees, 66 countries, CCB 144,196 / CIB 94,563 / AWM 29,722 headcount) puts it in the front rank; the document itself supports a co-leader reading and not a sole-leader one.

source: sec.gov

co leader

The FY2025 10-K claims leadership in qualified form and then names the peers who contest it. Transportation Solutions 'is a leader in connectivity and sensor technologies' and TE is 'one of the leading providers of advanced automobile connectivity solutions' — one of, not the — while the segment's 'major competitors include Yazaki, Aptiv, Sumitomo, Sensata, Honeywell, Molex, and Amphenol'. Industrial Solutions 'is a leading supplier of products that connect and distribute power, data, and signals' and 'competes primarily against Amphenol, Hubbell, Carlisle Companies, Integer Holdings, Molex, Omron, JST, and Korea Electric Terminal (KET)'. Amphenol and Molex appear on both lists, so TE shares the top of the interconnect market rather than owning it.

source: sec.gov

fast follower

The FY2025 10-K itself places AMD behind the pace-setter in its two most important markets: 'Our principal competitor in the supply of discrete graphics is Nvidia, who is the discrete GPU market share leader,' and the risk factors state Nvidia 'leverages its market position in data center GPU, financial resources, and proprietary software ecosystem to promote its systems and influences customers who do business with us.' AMD is nonetheless executing 'an annual cadence of leadership for AMD Instinct solutions' and has won gigawatt-scale commitments (OpenAI, 6 GW) — following fast and closely, not setting the pace.

source: sec.gov

Pricing power moderate

Item 1 states the businesses 'generally compete on the basis of the quality and variety of the Firm's products and services, transaction execution, innovation, reputation and price' - price is one of several axes, not absent. Item 1A is explicit that 'Actions by competitors could put pressure on the pricing for JPMorganChase's products and services or could cause it to lose market share, particularly with respect to investment products and traditional banking products,' and separately that higher rates can cause 'the loss of deposits, including where customers transition to higher-yielding products.' The filing states no margin trend supporting stronger pricing power.

source: sec.gov

moderate

The FY2025 10-K states both halves plainly: TE has 'experienced, and expect[s] to continue to experience, downward pressure on prices. However, as a result of increased costs and tariffs, certain of our businesses implemented price increases in recent years.' Pass-through, not price-setting. The realised result is margin expansion rather than erosion — gross margin of 31.5% of net sales in FY2023, 34.4% in FY2024 and 35.2% in FY2025 per the same filing's income statements, and 36.5% ($5,319M on $14,573M) for the nine months to 26 June 2026 versus 35.3% a year earlier, with Q3 FY2026 GAAP operating margin of 19%, per the 22 July 2026 results release (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385157/000110465926085589/tel-20260722xex99d1.htm). Strong would require pricing that leads rather than follows cost; weak is contradicted by three years of expanding gross margin.

source: sec.gov

moderate

FY2025 gross margin was 50%, up from 49% in 2024 per the 10-K — healthy and improving — but the same filing attributes average-selling-price pressure to competitors: Intel 'uses its microprocessor market position to price its products aggressively and target our customers and channel partners with special incentives. These aggressive activities have reduced and may reduce our unit sales and average selling prices for many of our products'. Pricing power is real but contested.

source: sec.gov

Summary

Item 1 describes JPMorganChase as 'a leader in investment banking, financial services for consumers and small businesses, commercial banking, financial transaction processing and asset management' operating off a $4.4 trillion balance sheet with $362.4 billion of equity as of December 31, 2025. The protection is the combination of that scale with a regulatory perimeter - Federal Reserve consolidated supervision, a national bank charter under the OCC, and separately licensed broker-dealer and credit-institution subsidiaries in the U.K. and Germany - that bounds who may offer the same product set. The filing is candid that the perimeter is leaking at the edges: it names non-depository and internet-only entrants offering lending, payments processing, cryptocurrency and stablecoins, tokenized securities and algorithmic investment advice, and warns of 'disruption to payments processing... from the use of new technologies that may not require intermediation'.

TE Connectivity sells the connectors, terminals, sensors and cable-protection parts that, in its own framing, 'enable the distribution of power, signal, and data' — a component vendor, never a system or compute vendor. The FY2025 10-K puts the two reportable segments, Transportation Solutions (54% of net sales) and Industrial Solutions (46%), against a combined served market it estimates at roughly $200 billion, which tells you immediately that no single share number governs this business: the filing discloses no market share, says 'no single customer accounted for a significant amount of our net sales in fiscal 2025, 2024, or 2023', and states that because TE is 'not organized by product or service, it is not practicable to disclose net sales by product or service'. The defensible part is entrenchment. Parts get designed in with the customer and then qualified to survive automotive, aerospace, subsea and grid conditions; TE sells about 75% of net sales direct into ~130 countries; relationships 'typically date back many years'. That is a switching-cost moat, and the filing is unusually candid that it is not a patent moat — no single patent or group of patents is material to its competitive position. The limit is equally plain in the filing: highly competitive industries, thousands of competitors, and persistent downward price pressure, with Amphenol and Molex named as competitors in BOTH segments and Yazaki, Aptiv and Sumitomo heading the Transportation segment's competitor list. The evidence that the moat is nonetheless working is margin plus mix. Gross margin ran 31.5% / 34.4% / 35.2% of net sales across FY2023-FY2025, and in the nine months to 26 June 2026 gross margin was $5,319M on $14,573M of net sales (36.5%) against $4,419M on $12,513M (35.3%) a year earlier, while Q3 FY2026 GAAP operating margin was 19% and orders hit a record $5.7 billion, up 27% year over year. Growth has also rotated: digital data networks grew 34.2% in Q3 FY2026 (34.0% organic) and 48.8% over nine months, with the CEO naming 'increased momentum in AI in both the data center and across the broader energy infrastructure' — while sensors, an end market for which the 10-K makes no leadership claim at all, shrank 2.8% organically in the quarter. Narrow, not wide: a real toll on other people's platforms, collected under admitted price pressure.

AMD's edge is architectural design IP executed on someone else's fabs. The FY2025 10-K describes a full-stack portfolio — EPYC server CPUs, Instinct AI accelerators, Ryzen client parts where 'AMD was the first company to integrate a dedicated neural processing unit (NPU) on the same SoC as an x86 CPU for AI PCs,' Radeon graphics, Pensando networking and Versal adaptive SoCs — backed by roughly 18,900 patent matters worldwide, and it discloses gigawatt-scale customer commitments (an October 2025 agreement with OpenAI 'to deploy 6 gigawatts of AMD GPUs,' first gigawatt on Instinct MI450). The same filing bounds that moat: Nvidia is 'the discrete GPU market share leader' and 'leverages its market position in data center GPU, financial resources, and proprietary software ecosystem'; Intel 'uses its microprocessor market position to price its products aggressively'; Arm architectures and customers who 'internally develop products to support similar AI workloads' are named as encroaching; and every wafer at 7 nm or below comes from TSMC. Revenue grew 34% in FY2025 with Data Center up 32%, but the filing's own competitive framing places AMD in the challenger seat rather than the entrenched one.

Chain position

An AI adopter and a possible AI casualty, not an AI supplier: the filing books no AI revenue line and mentions no data-center or model exposure, and instead carries a dedicated risk factor on 'the development of advanced technologies such as AI' warning of 'competitive disadvantage if competitors are able to deploy AI more quickly or effectively' and of 'replacement or disintermediation of direct customer relationships if AI agents autonomously manage or intermediate financial decisions' - so its AI exposure as filed is defensive and operational rather than a supply-chain position.

TE is an upstream component supplier to the AI build-out, not a participant in compute. It sells 'connectivity and sensor solutions [that] enable the distribution of power, signal, and data to advance next-generation transportation, energy networks, automated factories, data centers enabling artificial intelligence', about 75% of it direct to manufacturers across roughly 130 countries. AI exposure runs through one end market: digital data networks was 28% of Industrial Solutions, and Industrial Solutions was 46% of fiscal 2025 net sales — so the datacenter line is a minority of a company still 54% transportation. That minority is where the growth now is: digital data networks net sales rose 34.2% in Q3 FY2026 and 48.8% over the nine months, and energy rose 34.4% in the quarter, the CEO tying both to AI momentum 'in both the data center and across the broader energy infrastructure' (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385157/000110465926085589/tel-20260722xex99d1.htm).

A fabless merchant-silicon designer sitting one layer above the foundries: the FY2025 10-K states AMD relies on TSMC 'for the production of all wafers for microprocessor and GPU products at 7 nanometer (nm) or smaller nodes' and primarily on GLOBALFOUNDRIES above 7 nm, with packaging and test performed by Asia-Pacific ATMP partners — so its cost, supply and cadence are inherited from partners it does not control.

Products (share / barrier)
Long-horizon vote +0.30 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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