Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| NetApp | Apple | Baidu | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow The FY2026 10-K shows a real, durable lock but not an unassailable one. On the durable side: "Our cloud storage services are based on the same ONTAP data management software that underpins our on-premises ONTAP storage infrastructure offerings", and the same filing's income statement shows the company holding a gross margin near 71% across all three reported years - $4,433M on $6,268M in FY2024, $4,613M on $6,572M in FY2025 and $4,899M on $6,925M in FY2026 - while revenue grew from $6,268M to $6,925M and income from operations widened from 19% to 24% of net revenues. Holding that margin through the memory-cost shock the same filing discloses is the commercial evidence the lock is worth something. On the limiting side, the filing says competition "is intense", that in public cloud "customers may choose native cloud services that are consumed as operating expenses", and that "New competitors or alliances among existing competitors could emerge and quickly gain significant market share" - and IDC's 1Q26 external-storage tracker (Blocks & Files, 2026-06-16, cited on the AFF/ASA product row below) ranks NetApp second behind Dell, not first. | narrow Argued, not assumed. The FY2025 10-K does evidence a real moat in margin: total gross margin percentage rose 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025) in markets the same filing describes as characterised by 'aggressive price competition, downward pressure on gross margins.' But the filing bounds the claim itself: it concedes 'a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' it discloses no retention, active-device or installed-base figure anywhere (its only 'large installed bases of active devices' reference describes competitors), and it discloses that both of the highest-margin layers are already being cut down by force -- Apple is 'currently subject to a court order preventing it from imposing any commission or fee on certain purchases' on the U.S. App Store storefront, has had to open 'alternative methods of distribution for iOS and iPadOS apps, alternative payment processing' in the EU, and warns that a reversal on appeal in the Google search case could impose remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution.' A moat that earns 46.9% gross margin but whose most profitable layer is being narrowed by two courts and a regulator is narrow, not wide. | eroding Baidu's search franchise still leads, but it earns less each year and the company has written part of it down. Its 2025 annual report on Form 20-F (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526109289/d38065d20f.htm) says revenue from online marketing services "declined in 2024 and 2025, primarily due to our ongoing AI transformation, which impacted the monetization approach, as well as unfavorable macroeconomic conditions", and that "the increasing prevalence of AI-powered search engines and virtual assistants is fundamentally altering user behavior", so that users "may have less need to click on traditional search results or sponsored links". In 2025 it recognised RMB16.2 billion of impairment losses on its Core asset group after a recoverability test it attributes to "fluctuations in the external environment, in particular the rapid iteration of AI technology, and changes in our internal operations", and reported an operating loss of RMB5.8 billion (operating income of RMB10.4 billion excluding the impairment). The decline continued into 2026: the second-quarter results (https://ir.baidu.com/news-releases/news-release-details/baidu-announces-second-quarter-2026-results, 2026-08-18) show what Baidu calls Legacy Business revenue at RMB10.4 billion, down 23% year over year, and the CEO says "our online marketing business remains under pressure". The lead itself is still large by an independent count, with StatCounter putting Baidu at 46.65% of China's search engine market in September 2026. A lead that monetises less each year, and has needed an impairment, is an eroding moat. |
| Moat type | switching costs The FY2026 10-K makes the source of the advantage explicit and it is the cost of leaving the data-management layer, not a network or a patent estate. The same ONTAP software runs the on-premises arrays and the cloud services ("Our cloud storage services are based on the same ONTAP data management software that underpins our on-premises ONTAP storage infrastructure offerings"), and the AFF family "allows customers to connect to clouds for more data services, data tiering, caching, and disaster recovery". A customer's volume layout, snapshot and replication workflow and operating tools therefore carry from the array into Azure, AWS and Google rather than being abandoned at the cloud boundary — the filing describes NetApp as "the only provider of enterprise-grade storage services natively embedded in the world's largest public cloud providers", so the usual moment of escape is instead the moment the relationship renews. | switching costs The 10-K locates the durable advantage in an integrated stack and its third-party ecosystem, not in patents: it names 'a strong third-party software and accessories ecosystem' among the principal competitive factors and states the Company 'designs and develops nearly the entire solution for its products, including the hardware, operating system, numerous software applications and related services,' while explicitly disclaiming IP as the source -- 'No single intellectual property right is solely responsible for protecting the Company's products and services' and the Company 'relies primarily on the innovative skills, technical competence and marketing abilities of its personnel.' The remedies now in force confirm the diagnosis negatively: the same filing describes being required to permit alternative distribution and alternative payment processing in the EU and being barred from charging commission on certain linked-out purchases in the U.S. -- remedies aimed squarely at lowering the cost of leaving Apple's rails, which is what a switching-cost moat is. | network effects The moat Baidu is losing is a traffic-driven network. The 20-F says it competes for users and customers "on the basis of user traffic, cyber security, quality (relevance) of search (and other marketing and advertising) results, availability and user experience of products and services, distribution channels and the number of associated third-party websites", and that its content ecosystem depends on attracting creators "by leveraging our user traffic and enhance user engagement through the provision of attractive content, so as to create a virtuous cycle". Advertisers use its P4P platform "to bid for priority placement of paid sponsored links and reach users who search for information related to their products or services", and Baidu Union partners carry its search engine and ads on their own properties. AI answers are weakening that loop: the same filing warns that conversational tools risk "reducing traffic to our platforms and diminishing the inventory and effectiveness of our search-based advertising", and Baidu App's monthly active users were 644 million in June 2026 (second-quarter results) against 679 million in December 2025 (20-F). |
| Leadership | co leader IDC's 1Q26 external enterprise storage systems tracker, as reported by Blocks & Files on 2026-06-16 (cited in full on the AFF/ASA product row below), ranks NetApp second worldwide behind Dell and ahead of Everpure, Huawei and HPE, attributing the placing to "its growing all-flash business and cloud-integrated data management". Second of five ranked vendors, in a market whose leader is someone else, is a shared front rank rather than an owned one - and the distinct claim NetApp makes in the FY2026 10-K is positional rather than volumetric: being "the only provider of enterprise-grade storage services natively embedded in the world's largest public cloud providers". | fast follower Apple leads on integration and margin rather than on units, and the filing says so: it 'has a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' while competitors have 'broad product lines, low-priced products, large installed bases of active devices, and large customer bases.' On the AI axis that defines this graph, Apple is following rather than leading -- it now licenses a rival's frontier models to power Siri (see the Apple Intelligence / Siri row and its citation) while pushing its own advantage down into silicon. | co leader Baidu leads search by an independent count, but not the AI businesses that now make up half of its core revenue. StatCounter (https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/all/china, September 2026 figures) puts Baidu at 46.65% of China's search engine market across all platforms, against 21.76% for Bing, and at 60.15% on mobile, though on desktop it shows Bing ahead at 41.27% to Baidu's 28.32%. In AI cloud, the 20-F cites IDC's ranking of Baidu AI Cloud as "the No.1 AI cloud provider for the sixth consecutive year" in China's AI public cloud market for 2024, but that figure is relayed by Baidu and covers 2024, and IDC data reported by KrASIA (https://kr-asia.com/how-bytedances-volcano-engine-holds-nearly-half-of-chinas-maas-market, 2026-05-13) put ByteDance's Volcano Engine at 49.5% of China's model-as-a-service market in 2025. In models, Artificial Analysis's leaderboard (https://artificialanalysis.ai/leaderboards/models, read 2026-10-10) gives ERNIE 5.0 Thinking Preview an estimated Intelligence Index of 14, against 45 for Alibaba's Qwen3.8 Max (0902) and Z AI's GLM-5.3 (max). A clear lead in search alongside a contested AI cloud position and a lagging model family makes Baidu a co-leader rather than a clear leader. |
| Pricing power | moderate It holds price rather than raising it. On the figures filed with the FY2026 10-K, gross margin was 70.7% of revenue in FY2024 ($4,433M on $6,268M), 70.2% in FY2025 ($4,613M on $6,572M) and 70.7% in FY2026 ($4,899M on $6,925M) - flat across three years in which revenue grew from $6,268M to $6,925M - and it held that level while absorbing a component-cost shock. It is no stronger than that because the filing's own risk factor lists "competitive pricing, customer price sensitivity" and "pricing and discounting pressures" among the drivers of gross margin, and discloses that the company "experienced inflationary pressure and supply chain constraints beginning in the second half of fiscal 2026, resulting in increased costs for memory and other components, which have affected our gross margins" - a cost shock it is absorbing rather than fully passing on. | strong The 10-K's own gross-margin table: total gross margin percentage 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025), with Services at 75.4% versus Products at 36.8%, and iPhone net sales rising 'due to higher net sales of Pro models' -- mix moving up, not down. Held against the filing's own hedge that 'gross margins will be subject to volatility and downward pressure,' the realised trend is the stronger evidence. | weak Costs are rising faster than revenue, and Baidu has been cutting model prices. In 2025, per the 20-F, Baidu General Business revenue fell 2% to RMB102.5 billion while its cost of revenues rose 15% from RMB44.8 billion to RMB51.5 billion, "mainly related to development of cloud services", and the filing warns of "downward pressure on our operating margin". Online marketing revenue fell in both 2024 and 2025, and Legacy Business revenue was down 23% year over year in the second quarter of 2026. Baidu says it released ERNIE 4.5 Turbo and ERNIE X1 Turbo "delivering improved performance at significantly lower pricing, making them among the most cost-effective options on the market", and IDC data reported by KrASIA says the model-as-a-service leader Volcano Engine's "per-token price was below the industry average". The one premium claim, that AI-native marketing customers are "willing to pay a premium", is Baidu's own, and that line's revenue was "approximately flat year over year" in the second quarter of 2026. |
| Summary | NetApp sells storage hardware but the asset is ONTAP, the data-management software that has run its arrays for over three decades and now also runs inside the three largest public clouds as a first-party service. The FY2026 10-K organises the company into two segments, Hybrid Cloud (AFF and ASA all-flash arrays, AFX for AI workloads, FAS hybrid-flash, E/EF-Series, StorageGRID object storage) and Public Cloud (Azure NetApp Files, Amazon FSx for NetApp ONTAP, Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, Cloud Volumes ONTAP), and states that both rest on the same ONTAP software. That is the whole argument: an enterprise that has standardised its snapshots, replication and multiprotocol access on ONTAP carries those habits with it when it moves workloads to a hyperscaler, and NetApp is paid on both sides of the move. The evidence that the lock has commercial value is the margin's steadiness: across the three years the FY2026 10-K reports, gross margin sat at 70.7%, 70.2% and 70.7% of revenue ($4,433M on $6,268M, $4,613M on $6,572M, $4,899M on $6,925M) while revenue grew, and the filing's own percentage-of-revenue table shows no mix shift doing that work - product and services held near 46% and 54% of revenue throughout. The limits are equally in the filing. NetApp is second, not first: IDC's 1Q26 tracker puts it behind Dell in external enterprise storage, and the 10-K's competition section concedes that cloud providers are simultaneously partners and rivals, that consumption models "may reduce overall demand for our traditional on-premises offerings sold through a capital expenditure (capex) model", and that alternative architectures "may reduce or eliminate demand for some of our offerings". Component exposure is real too: the filing discloses "inflationary pressure and supply chain constraints beginning in the second half of fiscal 2026, resulting in increased costs for memory and other components, which have affected our gross margins", and names NAND among the components whose supply can tighten. This is a durable second place built on software stickiness, not a structural monopoly. | Apple's moat is usually asserted through the ecosystem; the FY2025 10-K neither quantifies nor claims retention, so the evidence has to be read elsewhere in the filing. Where it does show is mix and margin: Services reached $109.2B of $416.2B net sales (+14%) at a 75.4% gross margin against 36.8% on Products, so 26% of revenue delivered $82.3B of the $195.2B total gross margin, and iPhone grew 'due to higher net sales of Pro models.' That profit concentration is also the vulnerability the filing itself flags: Apple 'earns revenue from licensing arrangements with Google LLC and other companies to offer their search services on the Company's platforms,' arrangements 'currently subject to government investigations and legal proceedings' after Google was found to have violated U.S. antitrust laws on August 5, 2024 and the D.C. District Court ordered remedies on September 2, 2025 -- with the 10-K warning that a reversal on appeal could impose DOJ's proposed remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution,' which 'could materially adversely affect the Company's ability to earn revenue from such licensing arrangements.' Apple never discloses the size of that payment in the filing -- the concentration is admitted but not measured. Alongside it, the App Store toll has already been reduced in both jurisdictions. What is not in dispute is the vertical integration: Apple designs the silicon and now the cellular modem, and uses 'custom components available from only one source.' Read together: a genuine, margin-visible switching-cost moat around an integrated stack, with its two most profitable layers under active legal reduction. | Baidu was founded as a search engine business in 2000 and now describes itself as "a leading AI company with strong Internet foundation". Its 2025 revenue was RMB129.1 billion, down 3%, as online marketing revenue fell and cloud revenue grew (20-F); Baidu General Business revenue fell 2% to RMB102.5 billion and iQIYI's fell 7% to RMB27.3 billion. By the second quarter of 2026 (results, 2026-08-18), Baidu Core AI-powered Business revenue of RMB12.5 billion was half of Baidu General Business revenue: AI Cloud Infra grew 50% to RMB7.3 billion, with GPU Cloud revenue up 283%, while Legacy Business revenue fell 23% to RMB10.4 billion and Baidu General Business revenue fell 4% to RMB25.2 billion. The search position is still large by an independent count, at 46.65% of China's search engine market in September 2026 per StatCounter, but it is earning less: online marketing revenue fell in 2024 and 2025, Baidu booked RMB16.2 billion of impairment on its Core asset group in 2025 citing "fluctuations in the external environment, in particular the rapid iteration of AI technology, and changes in our internal operations", and Baidu App's monthly active users went from 679 million in December 2025 to 644 million in June 2026. The growth businesses face strong rivals. IDC, as cited in the 20-F, ranked Baidu AI Cloud first in China's AI public cloud market for 2024, but IDC data reported by KrASIA put ByteDance's Volcano Engine at 49.5% of China's model-as-a-service market in 2025, and Artificial Analysis's leaderboard, as read 2026-10-10, gives the newest ERNIE model it lists an estimated Intelligence Index of 14, against 45 for the latest models from Z AI and Alibaba. Apollo Go runs a fully driverless ride-hailing service and had reached 28 cities by the second-quarter results. Baidu's search moat is real but eroding, and its AI businesses are growing without, as yet, a moat of their own. |
| Chain position | NetApp sits between the memory supply and the enterprise data centre. Upstream, the FY2026 10-K says "Third-party component costs make up a significant portion of our product costs" and singles out NAND as hard to manage "if supplies of certain components, including NAND, become limited relative to demand". Downstream, the hyperscalers are channel, partner and rival at once: the filing states "We both partner with and compete against cloud service providers through our cloud-based software and services offerings", while Azure NetApp Files, Amazon FSx for NetApp ONTAP and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes are delivered as those clouds' own natively embedded services. Distribution is a mix of direct sales and "an ecosystem of partners, including the leading cloud providers". | Applications-layer name in the AI chain: the 10-K describes designing 'nearly the entire solution' and using custom components 'available from only one source,' making Apple a large, concentrated buyer of leading-edge silicon rather than a supplier of AI compute to anyone else. | Baidu spans several layers of China's AI stack. Its 20-F describes "a full AI stack of four layers, including cloud infrastructure, deep learning framework developed in-house, foundation models, and applications", with AI infrastructure "powered by a diverse mix of domestic and international high-performance computing resources, including our own self-developed AI computing architecture" and its own Baidu AI Chip. It sells GPU Cloud capacity and Qianfan model services to enterprises and the public sector, with a Qianfan model library that includes "leading third-party and open-sourced models" as well as ERNIE, and it funds this largely from online marketing sold to advertisers through search and feed. |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.11 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish Editorial prior, not backtested. | -0.17 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish Editorial prior, not backtested. |