Compare moats

The FY2026 10-K shows a real, durable lock but not an unassailable one. On the durable side: "Our cloud storage services are based on the same ONTAP data management software that underpins our on-premises ONTAP storage infrastructure offerings", and the same filing's income statement shows the company holding a gross margin near 71% across all three reported years - $4,433M on $6,268M in FY2024, $4,613M on $6,572M in FY2025 and $4,899M on $6,925M in FY2026 - while revenue grew from $6,268M to $6,925M and income from operations widened from 19% to 24% of net revenues. Holding that margin through the memory-cost shock the same filing discloses is the commercial evidence the lock is worth something. On the limiting side, the filing says competition "is intense", that in public cloud "customers may choose native cloud services that are consumed as operating expenses", and that "New competitors or alliances among existing competitors could emerge and quickly gain significant market share" - and IDC's 1Q26 external-storage tracker (Blocks & Files, 2026-06-16, cited on the AFF/ASA product row below) ranks NetApp second behind Dell, not first.

source: sec.gov

The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-08-27) shows IREN holds an input the industry competes on: it names 'access to secured and energized power' first among what it believes are the principal competitive factors in its industry, and reports 'executed grid connection agreements, letters of agreement or equivalents representing approximately 5GW of total power capacity' in the United States, Canada, Spain and Australia as of June 30, 2026. It does not claim an advantage over rivals in that input. It says 'Certain competitors may have access to more competitively priced power, a greater access to power and a better capacity to timely secure grid connections,' and 'Many of our competitors have greater financial, technical or commercial resources, longer cloud operating histories or larger customer bases, compared to us.' Operating AI Cloud Services capacity was approximately 40MW at June 30, 2026, and the stored XBRL fundamentals from this 10-K show an FY2026 operating loss of about $1,046.7M on revenue of about $707.0M, so no durable advantage is yet demonstrated.

source: sec.gov

The FY2025 10-K's own competitive-strengths list leads with "leading brands with high levels of consumer recognition and loyalty" and "a worldwide network of bottlers and distributors of Company products", and the trademarks behind those brands are "valid as long as they are in use and/or their registrations are properly maintained" — an IP right the filing gives no expiry. Gross margin rose 59.5% to 61.1% to 61.6% across FY2023-FY2025 on the XBRL in the same annual filings, in an industry the filing itself calls "highly competitive".

source: sec.gov

The FY2026 10-K makes the source of the advantage explicit and it is the cost of leaving the data-management layer, not a network or a patent estate. The same ONTAP software runs the on-premises arrays and the cloud services ("Our cloud storage services are based on the same ONTAP data management software that underpins our on-premises ONTAP storage infrastructure offerings"), and the AFF family "allows customers to connect to clouds for more data services, data tiering, caching, and disaster recovery". A customer's volume layout, snapshot and replication workflow and operating tools therefore carry from the array into Azure, AWS and Google rather than being abandoned at the cloud boundary — the filing describes NetApp as "the only provider of enterprise-grade storage services natively embedded in the world's largest public cloud providers", so the usual moment of escape is instead the moment the relationship renews.

source: sec.gov

The FY2026 10-K's asserted advantage is control from owning its data centers, 'including the associated land, grid connections and substations', which it believes allows it 'to benefit from more sustainable cash flows and operational flexibility relative to operators that rely upon third-party colocation services or short-term land leases'. Its only scale language is a belief that its 'procurement scale, deployment experience and direct control over the data center layer' lets it bring new compute into service 'rapidly and at scale', a deployment-speed claim, and it 'generally target[s]' regions with 'low-cost and attractive renewable energy sources', a siting target rather than a demonstrated cost position. It does not claim a cost or scale lead: it says 'Many of our competitors are larger, have longer operating histories and significantly greater resources than we do' and that certain competitors 'may have access to more competitively priced power, a greater access to power and a better capacity to timely secure grid connections.' There is no network effect or lock-in either, since existing contracts have 'terms ranging from month to month up to five years'. No enumerated moat source is grounded.

source: sec.gov

The filing locates the durable assets in intellectual property rather than scale: "our sparkling beverage and other beverage formulas are among the important trade secrets of our Company", and "We also own numerous trademarks that are very important to our business", which are "valid as long as they are in use and/or their registrations are properly maintained" — unlike a patent, no fixed term.

source: sec.gov

IDC's 1Q26 external enterprise storage systems tracker, as reported by Blocks & Files on 2026-06-16 (cited in full on the AFF/ASA product row below), ranks NetApp second worldwide behind Dell and ahead of Everpure, Huawei and HPE, attributing the placing to "its growing all-flash business and cloud-integrated data management". Second of five ranked vendors, in a market whose leader is someone else, is a shared front rank rather than an owned one - and the distinct claim NetApp makes in the FY2026 10-K is positional rather than volumetric: being "the only provider of enterprise-grade storage services natively embedded in the world's largest public cloud providers".

source: sec.gov

The 10-K lists IREN's competitors as hyperscalers (Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, Oracle Cloud) and specialized AI Cloud Services providers (CoreWeave, Nebius, Crusoe, Lambda, Nscale, SpaceX and others). It says IREN began providing AI Cloud Services in 2024 and cites its 'shorter operating history in AI Cloud Services relative to some competitors', and states 'Some of our competitors have longer operating histories, larger customer bases, more comprehensive IP portfolios and patent protections, more design wins, and greater financial, sales, marketing and distribution resources than we do.' Operating AI Cloud Services capacity was approximately 40MW at June 30, 2026. The filing describes a smaller, later entrant that trails some competitors on operating history, customer base and resources, with its progress so far resting on two anchor contracts (a ~$9.7B five-year Microsoft agreement and a ~$3.4B five-year NVIDIA contract) rather than any claimed category position.

source: sec.gov

The filing claims leading BRANDS but never category leadership, and names "PepsiCo, Inc." as "a primary competitor" in many countries, alongside Nestle S.A., Keurig Dr Pepper Inc., Danone S.A., Suntory Beverage & Food Limited, Anheuser-Busch InBev, Kirin Holdings, Heineken N.V., Diageo plc and Red Bull GmbH.

source: sec.gov

It holds price rather than raising it. On the figures filed with the FY2026 10-K, gross margin was 70.7% of revenue in FY2024 ($4,433M on $6,268M), 70.2% in FY2025 ($4,613M on $6,572M) and 70.7% in FY2026 ($4,899M on $6,925M) - flat across three years in which revenue grew from $6,268M to $6,925M - and it held that level while absorbing a component-cost shock. It is no stronger than that because the filing's own risk factor lists "competitive pricing, customer price sensitivity" and "pricing and discounting pressures" among the drivers of gross margin, and discloses that the company "experienced inflationary pressure and supply chain constraints beginning in the second half of fiscal 2026, resulting in increased costs for memory and other components, which have affected our gross margins" - a cost shock it is absorbing rather than fully passing on.

source: sec.gov

The 10-K's risk factors state 'Our competitors' products, services and technologies may be cheaper or provide better functionality or features than ours, which has resulted and may in the future result in lower-than-expected selling prices or demand for our products.' They also say long-term contract pricing 'is generally fixed or agreed at the time of contracting', so if market pricing for comparable capacity rises during a contract's term 'we will not benefit from those increases with respect to capacity already committed under our existing long-term contracts', and that if customers suffer a downturn or discontinue its services it 'may be compelled to offer more flexible terms, lower our prices or risk losing a significant customer.' The stored XBRL fundamentals from this 10-K show FY2026 revenue of about $707.0M against an operating loss of about $1,046.7M, so there is no margin record yet that evidences pricing power.

source: sec.gov

Three consecutive years of gross-margin expansion — 59.5% (FY2023), 61.1% (FY2024), 61.6% (FY2025) — through an inflationary period. The filing discloses the countervailing force itself: competitive pressures "may restrict our and our bottlers' ability to increase prices".

source: sec.gov

NetApp sits between the memory supply and the enterprise data centre. Upstream, the FY2026 10-K says "Third-party component costs make up a significant portion of our product costs" and singles out NAND as hard to manage "if supplies of certain components, including NAND, become limited relative to demand". Downstream, the hyperscalers are channel, partner and rival at once: the filing states "We both partner with and compete against cloud service providers through our cloud-based software and services offerings", while Azure NetApp Files, Amazon FSx for NetApp ONTAP and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes are delivered as those clouds' own natively embedded services. Distribution is a mix of direct sales and "an ecosystem of partners, including the leading cloud providers".

Downstream AI-cloud operator: owns grid-connected data centers and deploys NVIDIA/AMD GPU systems it rents to hyperscalers, frontier labs, AI developers and enterprises (anchor customers Microsoft and NVIDIA).

Outside this graph's supply chain: an AI-adopting incumbent whose beverage business buys AI as a tool rather than supplying it.

• AFF and ASA all-flash storage arrays Top 3 · Moderate source: blocksandfiles.com
• Amazon FSx for NetApp ONTAP Leader · Deep source: docs.aws.amazon.com
• Azure NetApp Files Leader · Deep source: learn.microsoft.com
• NetApp AFX and AI Data Engine Challenger · Moderate source: sec.gov
• NetApp Keystone Challenger · Moderate source: sec.gov
• NetApp StorageGRID Niche · Low source: sec.gov

• AI Cloud Services (bare metal and managed GPU compute) Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
• AI infrastructure software (Mirantis k0rdent AI) Unknown · Low source: sec.gov
• Bitcoin mining (in wind-down) Unknown · Low source: sec.gov
• Owned data centers and grid-connected power portfolio Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov

• Alcohol ready-to-drink Unknown · Low source: sec.gov
• Trademark Coca-Cola Unknown · Deep source: sec.gov
• Trademark Sprite, Fanta and other sparkling brands Unknown · Deep source: sec.gov
• Water, sports, coffee and tea Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov

Editorial prior, not backtested.

see exactly how it voted →

Editorial prior, not backtested.

see exactly how it voted →

Editorial prior, not backtested.

see exactly how it voted →