Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| NetApp | Salesforce | GlobalFoundries | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow The FY2026 10-K shows a real, durable lock but not an unassailable one. On the durable side: "Our cloud storage services are based on the same ONTAP data management software that underpins our on-premises ONTAP storage infrastructure offerings", and the same filing's income statement shows the company holding a gross margin near 71% across all three reported years - $4,433M on $6,268M in FY2024, $4,613M on $6,572M in FY2025 and $4,899M on $6,925M in FY2026 - while revenue grew from $6,268M to $6,925M and income from operations widened from 19% to 24% of net revenues. Holding that margin through the memory-cost shock the same filing discloses is the commercial evidence the lock is worth something. On the limiting side, the filing says competition "is intense", that in public cloud "customers may choose native cloud services that are consumed as operating expenses", and that "New competitors or alliances among existing competitors could emerge and quickly gain significant market share" - and IDC's 1Q26 external-storage tracker (Blocks & Files, 2026-06-16, cited on the AFF/ASA product row below) ranks NetApp second behind Dell, not first. | narrow Salesforce's own language caps this at narrow: Item 1 calls its market "highly competitive, rapidly evolving and fragmented, and subject to changing technology with low barriers to entry." What holds it above none is scale and contract duration: $72.4B total RPO at 2026-01-31 versus $63.4B (+14%), current RPO $35.1B versus $30.2B (+16%), on revenue of $41.5B (+10%). But cRPO growth "was positively impacted by three percent" by currency, and total RPO "includes approximately $2.2 billion" from Informatica, acquired November 2025. Adjusted, the contracted base still outgrows revenue, but by less than the headline implies. | narrow The FY2025 20-F gives a measured lock-in: approximately 63% of 2025 wafer shipment volume was single-sourced business - products GF says "can only be manufactured with our technology or cannot be manufactured elsewhere without significant customer redesigns" - and long-term agreements carried an aggregate remaining revenue commitment of approximately $11 billion at 31 December 2025, as "binding, multi-year, reciprocal minimum purchase and supply commitments". That advantage is bounded by admissions in the same filing: "some of our competitors may offer more advanced or differentiated technologies than we do and some have greater access to capital and substantially greater production capacity, research and development... including access to government subsidies"; China's mature-node "foundry capacity is expected to grow faster than expected demand at those nodes"; and GF "renegotiated a number of LTAs with certain of our customers, including in 2025, as a result of which some of our LTAs now have longer commitment periods... and some of our LTAs have lower pricing or volume commitments than originally negotiated". Gross margin of 24.9% in 2025 ($1,690m on $6,791m of net revenue) on essentially flat revenue is the economics of a position that is defended rather than uncontested. |
| Moat type | switching costs The FY2026 10-K makes the source of the advantage explicit and it is the cost of leaving the data-management layer, not a network or a patent estate. The same ONTAP software runs the on-premises arrays and the cloud services ("Our cloud storage services are based on the same ONTAP data management software that underpins our on-premises ONTAP storage infrastructure offerings"), and the AFF family "allows customers to connect to clouds for more data services, data tiering, caching, and disaster recovery". A customer's volume layout, snapshot and replication workflow and operating tools therefore carry from the array into Azure, AWS and Google rather than being abandoned at the cloud boundary — the filing describes NetApp as "the only provider of enterprise-grade storage services natively embedded in the world's largest public cloud providers", so the usual moment of escape is instead the moment the relationship renews. | switching costs Switching costs, with a caveat: the filing's clearest lock-in sentence is about rivals' customers, not its own. "Many prospective customers have invested substantial personnel and financial resources to implement and integrate their current enterprise software... may be reluctant or unwilling to migrate away" is a headwind to Salesforce's own growth. Evidence for its own base is architectural: Data 360 unifies data into "a single, governed source of truth," Agentforce runs on existing processes "without requiring customers to remove and rebuild," behind $72.4B of contracted revenue. Contracts run "typically 12 to 36 months" with no renewal obligation. | switching costs The filing rules out scale as the source: GF concedes competitors with "substantially greater production capacity, research and development" and its four fabs held roughly 2.8 million wafers per annum of installed capacity at end-2025 against a $6.8bn revenue base. The mechanism it names instead is the cost of moving a qualified design - "[g]iven the time and costs associated with moving a single-sourced product to a competitor, clients are more likely to continue awarding us single-source contracts for such products" - and it is quantified at approximately 63% of 2025 wafer shipment volume. It is contractually reinforced by the ~$11bn of remaining LTA revenue commitment, which GF says continues to matter "for certain longer term, more durable end markets, such as automotive", where 21% of 2025 net revenue ($1,410m) now sits. |
| Leadership | co leader IDC's 1Q26 external enterprise storage systems tracker, as reported by Blocks & Files on 2026-06-16 (cited in full on the AFF/ASA product row below), ranks NetApp second worldwide behind Dell and ahead of Everpure, Huawei and HPE, attributing the placing to "its growing all-flash business and cloud-integrated data management". Second of five ranked vendors, in a market whose leader is someone else, is a shared front rank rather than an owned one - and the distinct claim NetApp makes in the FY2026 10-K is positional rather than volumetric: being "the only provider of enterprise-grade storage services natively embedded in the world's largest public cloud providers". | clear leader Clear leader in the category as it exists today, runner-up in the one it is being rebuilt into. Per IDC's Worldwide Semiannual Software Tracker on 2025 data, Salesforce was first in worldwide CRM applications for a thirteenth consecutive year at 20.0% share, and first in Sales (fourteenth year), Customer Service (thirteenth), Marketing (seventh), model-driven application platform (eleventh) and Integration (fourth). These come from Salesforce announcing its own IDC results via a trade outlet, in translation, not IDC primary material. In the same tracker's new Agent Build and Deploy segment it ranked second at 17.5%, albeit as fastest-growing vendor. | fast follower The 20-F places GF inside a group of "five major foundries (including four scaled pure-play foundries) that accounted for the vast majority of worldwide foundry revenue in 2025", naming TSMC first among key competitors along with UMC and SMIC, and separately conceding competitors with "more advanced or differentiated technologies than we do" and "substantially greater production capacity, research and development, marketing and other resources". GF does not compete for the leading edge at all; its stated pillars are differentiated RF, FDX, silicon photonics, power and feature-rich CMOS plus geographic diversity. That is an established, scaled participant operating inside a pace set elsewhere, not one setting it, and not one shut out of the top tier. |
| Pricing power | moderate It holds price rather than raising it. On the figures filed with the FY2026 10-K, gross margin was 70.7% of revenue in FY2024 ($4,433M on $6,268M), 70.2% in FY2025 ($4,613M on $6,572M) and 70.7% in FY2026 ($4,899M on $6,925M) - flat across three years in which revenue grew from $6,268M to $6,925M - and it held that level while absorbing a component-cost shock. It is no stronger than that because the filing's own risk factor lists "competitive pricing, customer price sensitivity" and "pricing and discounting pressures" among the drivers of gross margin, and discloses that the company "experienced inflationary pressure and supply chain constraints beginning in the second half of fiscal 2026, resulting in increased costs for memory and other components, which have affected our gross margins" - a cost shock it is absorbing rather than fully passing on. | moderate Gross margin rises across the Item 7 table — gross profit of $32,255M on $41,525M of revenue, 78% of total revenues in FY2026 against 77% in FY2025 and 75% in FY2024 — yet MD&A denies price as the cause: growth "was primarily caused by volume-driven increases from new business," and "Pricing was not a significant driver of the increase in revenues for the period." Item 1A names consumption-based pricing among attrition factors, says Agentforce and Data 360 monetization "remain relatively new and uncertain," and concedes "limited experience with determining optimal pricing for our consumption-based contracts." | moderate Gross margin was 24.9% in 2025 ($1,690m on $6,791m) versus 24.5% in 2024 ($1,651m on $6,750m) - held, not expanded, even though average shipment utilization across the global fabs rose from 77% to 86%, so most of the volume gain was absorbed rather than dropping through. The filing states outright that "the market prices for technology and services tend to fall over time, except in times of extreme supply shortage", and discloses LTAs renegotiated in 2025 to "lower pricing or volume commitments than originally negotiated". Against that, GF says wafer price "varies significantly across technology platforms" and that devices with "richer feature sets, higher performance, better yields and greater system-level integration... generally command higher wafer prices". Price-setting inside designed-in single-sourced sockets, price-taking at the competitive margin. |
| Summary | NetApp sells storage hardware but the asset is ONTAP, the data-management software that has run its arrays for over three decades and now also runs inside the three largest public clouds as a first-party service. The FY2026 10-K organises the company into two segments, Hybrid Cloud (AFF and ASA all-flash arrays, AFX for AI workloads, FAS hybrid-flash, E/EF-Series, StorageGRID object storage) and Public Cloud (Azure NetApp Files, Amazon FSx for NetApp ONTAP, Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, Cloud Volumes ONTAP), and states that both rest on the same ONTAP software. That is the whole argument: an enterprise that has standardised its snapshots, replication and multiprotocol access on ONTAP carries those habits with it when it moves workloads to a hyperscaler, and NetApp is paid on both sides of the move. The evidence that the lock has commercial value is the margin's steadiness: across the three years the FY2026 10-K reports, gross margin sat at 70.7%, 70.2% and 70.7% of revenue ($4,433M on $6,268M, $4,613M on $6,572M, $4,899M on $6,925M) while revenue grew, and the filing's own percentage-of-revenue table shows no mix shift doing that work - product and services held near 46% and 54% of revenue throughout. The limits are equally in the filing. NetApp is second, not first: IDC's 1Q26 tracker puts it behind Dell in external enterprise storage, and the 10-K's competition section concedes that cloud providers are simultaneously partners and rivals, that consumption models "may reduce overall demand for our traditional on-premises offerings sold through a capital expenditure (capex) model", and that alternative architectures "may reduce or eliminate demand for some of our offerings". Component exposure is real too: the filing discloses "inflationary pressure and supply chain constraints beginning in the second half of fiscal 2026, resulting in increased costs for memory and other components, which have affected our gross margins", and names NAND among the components whose supply can tighten. This is a durable second place built on software stickiness, not a structural monopoly. | Salesforce is the incumbent of record in CRM applications and is paid like one: $41.5B of FY2026 revenue (+10%), 78% gross margin, $72.4B of contracted revenue not yet recognized, and first place in worldwide CRM for a thirteenth consecutive year at 20.0% share per IDC's tracker as announced by Salesforce. Enterprise data and workflow embedded through Data 360 and Agentforce is costly to unwind, and the agentic layer is deliberately built atop existing processes rather than requiring re-implementation. The limits are the company's own: it twice describes its market as having low barriers to entry, names AI-native startups whose solutions "may bypass traditional business process workflows or displace established user interfaces," ranks second at 17.5% in IDC's new Agent Build and Deploy segment, and concedes pricing did not drive FY2026 growth. | GlobalFoundries is a pure-play specialty foundry that deliberately does not contest the leading edge. Its FY2025 20-F frames the business around six differentiated technology lines - feature-rich CMOS, ultra-low-power CMOS (FinFET and FDX), silicon photonics, RF, power, and, new in 2025, processor IP via the MIPS acquisition - manufactured at four fabs in Malta NY, Burlington VT, Dresden and Singapore, which GF describes as making it "the only scaled foundry with a global manufacturing footprint spanning the United States, Europe, and Asia operating for more than a decade". The defence that shows up in the numbers is design lock-in rather than cost: approximately 63% of 2025 wafer shipment volume was single-sourced, and ~$11bn of long-term agreement revenue commitment remained at year-end. What limits it is visible in the same document - competitors with more capital, more capacity and, in some cases, more advanced technology; mature-node capacity in China expected to outgrow demand at 28nm and larger; TSMC, Samsung, Intel, Texas Instruments and UMC all building in the United States, Europe or Singapore, which erodes the geographic-diversity argument GF calls "one of our key advantages". Pricing reflects that balance: 2025 gross margin of 24.9% against 24.5% in 2024 even as shipment utilization rose from 77% to 86%, with some LTAs renegotiated to lower pricing. AI exposure is real but indirect - Communications, Infrastructure & Data Center was 11% of 2025 net revenue, and GF's AI content is optical interconnect, RF, sensing, power and edge processor IP rather than accelerator logic. |
| Chain position | NetApp sits between the memory supply and the enterprise data centre. Upstream, the FY2026 10-K says "Third-party component costs make up a significant portion of our product costs" and singles out NAND as hard to manage "if supplies of certain components, including NAND, become limited relative to demand". Downstream, the hyperscalers are channel, partner and rival at once: the filing states "We both partner with and compete against cloud service providers through our cloud-based software and services offerings", while Azure NetApp Files, Amazon FSx for NetApp ONTAP and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes are delivered as those clouds' own natively embedded services. Distribution is a mix of direct sales and "an ecosystem of partners, including the leading cloud providers". | Applications-layer incumbent: sells enterprise CRM and agentic software to end customers across industries, consumes cloud infrastructure (third-party IaaS partners plus its own Hyperforce estate) and third-party LLMs, and sits upstream of no hardware supply chain. Exposure is to enterprise software budgets and to whether the agentic layer is captured by incumbent suites or AI-native entrants. | Pure-play specialty foundry. Inputs are silicon and specialised SOI wafers bought under multiple long-term agreements with principal suppliers, "the largest of which is Soitec", plus externally sourced EDA tools and third-party IP. Output is finished semiconductor wafers, approximately 89% of 2025 net revenue, sold to fabless designers and IDMs and delivered through the GlobalSolutions ecosystem of IP providers, EDA vendors, OSAT partners and design-service firms; the remaining ~11% is photomasks, sourcing and post-fab services, and IP licence and royalty income. Manufacturing sits at four sites - Malta NY, Burlington VT, Dresden and Singapore - with roughly 239,000 square metres of clean room and about 2.8 million wafers per annum installed capacity at end-2025. Position in the AI chain is one step removed from accelerators: Communications, Infrastructure & Data Center was 11% of 2025 net revenue ($745m), with content in optical interconnect, RF front-ends, timing and power, alongside edge-AI processor IP from the MIPS acquisition. |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |