Compare moats

Wide: the CUDA software platform and its developer installed base create high switching costs across the AI-training stack, defended by $76.7B cumulative R&D and reinforced by ~71% FY2026 gross margins and Data Center revenue (~90% of total) up 68% YoY — durable, hard-to-replicate advantages per the FY2026 10-K.

source: sec.gov

The FY2025 20-F Competition section cuts both ways: UMC calls itself "one of the world's largest independent semiconductor foundries" with production capacity "currently among the largest of all semiconductor foundries in the world" and says it believes it competes favorably with competitors on each principal element of foundry competition, yet in the same section concedes that "[s]ome of our competitors have substantially greater production, financial, research and development and marketing resources than we have" and that "several new dedicated foundries have commenced operations and compete directly with us," whose entry is "likely to initiate a trend of competitive pricing and create potential overcapacity in legacy technology" that "may erode our profit margins." A real but bounded advantage, not a durable wide one.

source: sec.gov

Corning's FY2025 Form 10-K (filed 12 February 2026) documents real protection in two places and hedges everywhere else. In Display it states flatly that 'We are the largest worldwide producer of glass substrates for flat panel displays' and credits a 'proprietary fusion manufacturing process, which we invented and is the cornerstone of our technology leadership in the display glass industry'; in Optical Communications it says 'We maintain a leadership position in the segment's principal product groups, which include carrier and enterprise networks'. But the Competition section opens on a company-wide concession - 'Some of these competitors are larger than we are, and some have broader product lines' - and closes that opening paragraph with 'There is no assurance that we will be able to maintain or improve our market position or competitive advantage', a hedge set over the five per-segment paragraphs that follow, the last of which has Life Sciences facing 'competition from large distributors that have pursued backward integration or introduced private label products'. In optical it expects 'industry consolidation, pricing pressure and competition for the innovation of new products' to persist. The risk factors add that Optical Communications and Display 'generate a significant amount of the Company's profits and cash flow' and are 'subject to pricing pressure', while the customer base is concentrated enough that customers 'may possess substantial leverage in negotiating contractual obligations' - the filing's own table puts two combined end customers at 28% of 2025 Optical Communications segment net sales, three at 59% of Display, two at 43% of Specialty Materials and three at 61% of Automotive. Protection that is genuine but confined to part of the portfolio, held against named larger rivals and customers with that much leverage, is narrow rather than wide.

source: sec.gov

The durable edge rests on proprietary IP and software: the full-stack CUDA development platform running on all NVIDIA GPUs plus hundreds of proprietary domain libraries/SDKs/APIs, and $76.7B cumulative R&D yielding "inventions that are essential to modern computing" (NVIDIA invented the GPU in 1999). This is reinforced by developer-ecosystem network effects and CUDA switching costs, per the FY2026 10-K Business section.

source: sec.gov

The 20-F states plainly that "Our success depends on our ability to obtain patents, licenses and other intellectual property (IP) rights covering our production processes and activities," and reports more than 16,700 patents worldwide as of December 31, 2025, of which more than 7,490 are in the U.S., 623 domestic and foreign patents granted in 2025 alone, NT$17,725 million of R&D (7.5% of operating revenues) and 1,591 R&D professionals. The Competition section names where UMC believes it wins: it competes favorably "particularly [on] our technical competence and research and development capabilities." The proprietary specialty-process library, not scale or a network, is the cited source of the advantage.

source: sec.gov

What the filing keeps pointing at is invented process technology and the patent estate fencing it, not a network and not raw size. The FY2025 10-K repeats 'Patent protection is important to the segment's operations' word for word in four of its five reportable segments - Optical Communications, Specialty Materials, Automotive and Life Sciences - and gives Display a stronger variant, 'Patent protection and proprietary trade secrets are important to the Display segment's operations'. It reports about 11,375 unexpired patents owned worldwide at the end of 2025 (about 4,015 of them U.S.), about 370 U.S. and over 970 non-U.S. grants during 2025 and about 5,650 applications in process, and states 'We have historically enforced, and will continue to enforce, our intellectual property rights.' The single clearest asset is a process rather than a product - the fusion draw Corning says it invented and calls the cornerstone of its display-glass technology leadership, guarded in Display by 'proprietary trade secrets'. Even the cost advantage the filing claims in optical is sourced back to the same place: 'Our large-scale manufacturing experience, fiber process, technology leadership and intellectual property provide cost advantages relative to several of our competitors' - scale is described there as a consequence of the process, not the origin of the advantage, which is why this is an IP-and-know-how moat rather than a cost-scale one. The estate is broad rather than cliff-edged: 'no one patent is considered material to any segment', and about 740 worldwide patents, 6.5% of the portfolio, expire between 2026 and 2028.

source: sec.gov

FY2026 Data Center revenue was $193.7B (~90% of the $215.9B total), up 68% YoY on the Blackwell ramp, and NVIDIA describes itself as "a data center scale AI infrastructure company reshaping all industries." The 10-K frames named rivals as parties who "provide or intend to provide" GPUs/accelerators — incumbent-leader positioning.

source: sec.gov

UMC describes a deliberate follow strategy in the 20-F: it intends "to avoid investments in technologies that do not present commercial potential for volume production" and believes "it is beneficial to defer investment in premature equipment needed to claim the earliest advanced technology and instead to purchase more advanced and less expensive versions of such equipment from vendors who design this equipment based on pre-production lessons learned from the earliest technology." The node ladder bears this out: the most advanced process in production in 2025 is Fab 12A's 0.014 micron, wafers at 14 nanometers and under rounded to 0.0% of wafer sales in each of 2023, 2024 and 2025, and the next rung — UMC's own 12nm FinFET process, which Intel replicated in 2025 "based on our electrical design rules and UMC-verified process" for manufacture at its Arizona fab — is only "expected to begin in 2027."

source: sec.gov

The FY2025 10-K makes exactly one unqualified rank claim and it is Display: 'We are the largest worldwide producer of glass substrates for flat panel displays', with only AGC Inc. and Nippon Electric Glass Co., Ltd. named as principal competitors. The second-strongest claim is Optical Communications' - 'We maintain a leadership position in the segment's principal product groups, which include carrier and enterprise networks' - asserted against Amphenol, Fujikura and its subsidiary America Fujikura Ltd., Sumitomo and Prysmian Group S.p.A. Those two lines carry the company: Optical Communications was 38% of total segment net sales in 2025 and Display 23%, and the segment table credits them with $1,048 million and $993 million respectively of the $2,747 million of reportable-segment net income. The band is a company-level judgment weighted to them, and it does not extend across the portfolio - Automotive claims only 'a strong market position', and Life Sciences describes itself as 'a leading developer, manufacturer and global supplier of laboratory products for over 110 years' while competing against the much larger Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. and Danaher Corporation on $972 million of 2025 sales.

source: sec.gov

FY2026 gross margin was 71.1% (75.0% in FY2025); per the 10-K MD&A the ~3.9pt decline reflects the Hopper HGX→Blackwell full-system mix shift and a one-time $4.5B H20 excess-inventory/purchase-obligation charge, not competitive price erosion. A low-70s% hardware gross margin evidences strong pricing power.

source: sec.gov

The 20-F claims no premium — "our current level of pricing is comparable to that of other leading foundries in each respective geometry" — and reports that 2025 average selling price declined 5.4%, driving gross margin down from 32.6% in 2024 to 29.0% in 2025 even as 12-inch-equivalent wafer shipments rose from 3,446 thousand to 3,870 thousand and average capacity utilization improved from 68.7% to 75.2%. It also notes that "[p]rices for wafers of a given level of technology generally decline over the processing technology life cycle."

source: sec.gov

The FY2025 10-K shows prices being raised and sticking, and in the same breath shows what caps them. The results table puts gross margin at 36% of net sales in 2025 against 33% in 2024, and MD&A attributes the three-point gain to 'higher volume and the impact of actions taken by management to improve profitability, including raising prices, reducing costs and increasing productivity.' Display is the cleanest case: after resetting its core rate from 107 to 120 Japanese yen to the dollar, 'we implemented pricing actions in the second half of 2024', and 'The effects of the price increases on slightly higher volumes in 2025, compared to the prior period, substantially offset the impact of resetting the core rate.' The ceiling is disclosed in the same document: Optical Communications and Display are 'subject to pricing pressure', concentrated customers 'may possess substantial leverage in negotiating contractual obligations', and a risk factor warns that 'Increasing our prices to our customers may cause certain of our customers to push out, cancel or refrain from purchasing our products'. Price that holds on the back of rising volume, against customers that concentrated, is moderate rather than strong.

source: sec.gov

Upstream compute-platform supplier: NVIDIA sells full-stack data-center systems (GPU + Arm CPU + DPU + NVLink/InfiniBand networking + CUDA software) to cloud providers and enterprises, and relies on third-party foundry/assembly-test-packaging partners (e.g., SPIL, Amkor, Wistron, Fabrinet). Per the FY2026 10-K, several of its largest customers (hyperscalers such as Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft) are simultaneously customers and emerging competitors developing internal accelerated-computing silicon.

Mature- and specialty-node wafer supplier: 2025 wafer sales were 41.4% communication, 30.6% consumer and 11.6% computer, with the AI tie indirect — 2.5D silicon interposers with deep-trench capacitors shipped to major customers for HPC, cloud computing and LLM applications.

Corning sits a layer beneath the AI build-out, supplying the glass and fiber rather than the compute. The FY2025 10-K describes 'optical fiber, cable and connectivity solutions for advanced communications networks, such as fiber to the home and data centers, enabling artificial intelligence', and says 'the rapid acceleration of artificial intelligence ("AI") is driving strong demand for fiber and connectivity products inside and between data centers', citing purpose-built parts such as the SMF-28e Contour fiber, 'a 40% smaller fiber', and the Contour Flow Cable 'which can fit double the fiber into the same cable diameter'. It also sells into chipmaking, through HPFS Fused Silica, ULE Ultra-Low Expansion Glass and the EXTREME ULE Glass introduced in 2024 to 'support chip manufacturers in meeting the rapidly growing demand for advanced and intelligent technologies'. The exposure is already in the numbers: Optical Communications net sales rose 35% to $6,274 million in 2025, which the filing attributes first to 'continued growth in our Enterprise business driven by strong demand for our Generative AI products'.

• CUDA accelerated-computing software platform (CUDA-X, NVIDIA AI Enterprise) Leader · Deep source: sec.gov
• Data Center AI accelerators (GPU — Blackwell/Hopper) Leader · Deep source: sec.gov
• Data-center networking / interconnect (NVLink, InfiniBand, Spectrum Ethernet, DPUs) Top 3 · Moderate source: sec.gov

• 12-inch 28nm/22nm logic and specialty foundry Challenger · Moderate source: sec.gov
• 12-inch silicon photonics Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
• 2.5D silicon interposer and 3D hybrid bonding Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
• 8-inch and legacy-node foundry (0.11 micron and above) Challenger · Moderate source: sec.gov
• Embedded non-volatile memory platforms (eFlash, RRAM, MRAM) Unknown · Deep source: sec.gov
• Specialty mixed-signal platforms (eHV, BCD, BSI-CSI, RF-SOI) Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov

• Automotive ceramic substrates and particulate filters Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
• Corning Gorilla Glass cover materials Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
• Display glass substrates Leader · Deep source: sec.gov
• Hemlock hyper-pure polysilicon and solar products Unknown · Low source: sec.gov
• Life Sciences labware and consumables Unknown · Low source: sec.gov
• Optical fiber, cable and connectivity solutions Leader · Moderate source: sec.gov
• Semiconductor and precision optics Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov

Editorial prior, not backtested.

see exactly how it voted →

Editorial prior, not backtested.

see exactly how it voted →

Editorial prior, not backtested.

see exactly how it voted →