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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing Salesforce×TE Connectivity×Trane Technologies× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
Salesforce CRM ai moat: latest change 2026-08-05 TE Connectivity TEL ai moat: latest change 2025-11-10 Trane Technologies TT ai moat: latest change 2026-02-05
Moat rating narrow

Salesforce's own language caps this at narrow: Item 1 calls its market "highly competitive, rapidly evolving and fragmented, and subject to changing technology with low barriers to entry." What holds it above none is scale and contract duration: $72.4B total RPO at 2026-01-31 versus $63.4B (+14%), current RPO $35.1B versus $30.2B (+16%), on revenue of $41.5B (+10%). But cRPO growth "was positively impacted by three percent" by currency, and total RPO "includes approximately $2.2 billion" from Informatica, acquired November 2025. Adjusted, the contracted base still outgrows revenue, but by less than the headline implies.

source: sec.gov

narrow

The FY2025 10-K's own Competition section undercuts any claim of insulation: 'The industries in which we operate are highly competitive, and we compete with thousands of companies that range from large multinational corporations to local manufacturers', competition is 'generally based on breadth of product offering, product innovation, price, quality, delivery, and service', and TE has 'experienced, and expect[s] to continue to experience, downward pressure on prices'. The same filing explicitly disclaims IP as the basis of its position: 'we do not believe that our competitive position or our operations are dependent upon or would be materially impacted by any single patent or group of related patents.' What TE does hold is durable rather than absolute — it calls itself 'one of the leading providers of advanced automobile connectivity solutions', its Industrial segment 'a leading supplier', and it converted that position into rising profitability across the same filing's three income statements (gross margin 31.5% of net sales in FY2023, 34.4% in FY2024, 35.2% in FY2025). A position that earns expanding margins into admitted price pressure is an advantage; one held against thousands of competitors and no decisive patent is not a wide one.

source: sec.gov

narrow

Trane's FY2025 Form 10-K (filed 5 February 2026) makes exactly one rank claim about itself and it is hedged: 'We are one of the leading manufacturers in the world of HVAC systems and services and transport temperature control products and services'. It sits inside a Competitive Conditions section that opens 'Our products and services are sold in highly competitive markets throughout the world', describes 'a wide variety of competitors that vary by product line and services' including 'well-established regional or specialized competitors, as well as larger U.S. and non-U.S. corporations or divisions of larger companies', and names price first among 'the principal methods of competition in these markets', ahead of quality, delivery, service and support, technology and innovation. The risk factors push the same way: 'The markets that we serve are highly competitive', 'consolidation and new entrants (including non-traditional competitors) within our industries' 'could result in increased competition and pricing pressures', Trane competes 'with large companies and with smaller, local operators who may have customer, regulatory or economic advantages in the geographies in which they are located', and 'some of our competitors may employ pricing and other strategies that are not traditional'. What the filing does evidence is an advantage that gets paid for: 2025 net revenues of $21,321.9 million, up 7.5% from $19,838.2 million, of which the company's own bridge assigns 3.0 points to pricing; gross margin up 50 basis points to 36.2%; operating income of $3,967.4 million, 18.6% of revenues; and firm backlog up to $7,769.4 million from $6,747.7 million. But that advantage is not uniform in the same document: the EMEA pricing component was (0.3)% and its segment adjusted EBITDA margin fell 150 basis points to 18.3%, and Asia Pacific organic revenue fell 2.5% on 'lower volumes in China'. A position the company itself will only call 'one of the leading', defended in markets it calls highly competitive and priced unevenly across its three segments, is protection that is real but bounded.

source: sec.gov

Moat type switching costs

Switching costs, with a caveat: the filing's clearest lock-in sentence is about rivals' customers, not its own. "Many prospective customers have invested substantial personnel and financial resources to implement and integrate their current enterprise software... may be reluctant or unwilling to migrate away" is a headwind to Salesforce's own growth. Evidence for its own base is architectural: Data 360 unifies data into "a single, governed source of truth," Agentforce runs on existing processes "without requiring customers to remove and rebuild," behind $72.4B of contracted revenue. Contracts run "typically 12 to 36 months" with no renewal obligation.

source: sec.gov

switching costs

The FY2025 10-K locates the advantage at the customer, not in patents. It describes 'close working relationships with many of our customers' whose 'relationships with them typically date back many years', and co-development as the mechanism: 'By working with our customers in developing new products and technologies, we believe we can identify and act on trends and leverage knowledge about next-generation technology across our products.' Roughly 75% of fiscal 2025 net sales were direct to manufacturers rather than through distribution, and the Transportation segment's products 'must withstand harsh conditions' — parts engineered in with the customer and built to survive the application, so the position sits inside the customer's design rather than in a purchase order. The filing rules the alternative out in its own words on intellectual property, so intangibles_ip is not the source; the 'thousands of companies' in Competition rules out efficient_scale.

source: sec.gov

switching costs

The filing rules out the obvious alternative in its own words. Item 1's Patents and Licenses paragraph says the Company 'does not consider any single patent, trademark, copyright, trade secret, proprietary technology, technical data, business process or any other confidential information (or any related group of any such items) to be of material importance to any segment or to the business as a whole', and the matching risk factor is blunter: 'we do not believe that our business is materially dependent on a single intellectual property right or any group of them. In our opinion, engineering, production skills and experience are more responsible for our market position than our patents and/or licenses.' That is a company disclaiming an IP moat. Where the 10-K does locate durability is the installed equipment and the channel wrapped around it. The overview frames the entire growth plan that way - 'As an industry leader with an extensive global install base, our growth strategy includes expanding recurring revenue through services and rental options' - the principal products and services table carries 'Service agreements', 'Repair and maintenance services', 'Parts and supplies (aftermarket and OEM)' and 'Rental services' alongside the equipment itself, the Distribution paragraph puts U.S. sales through Trane's own 'branch sales offices, distributors and dealers across the country' and non-U.S. sales through 'numerous subsidiary sales and service companies with a supporting chain of distributors throughout the world', and the accounting policy confirms the contracts are multi-period: 'For extended warranties and long-term service agreements, revenue for these distinct performance obligations are recognized over time on a straight-line basis over the respective contract term.' Long-lived equipment serviced under term agreements by the manufacturer's own branches is the asset this filing keeps pointing at, which is why the moat is read as an installed-base tie rather than a patent estate.

source: sec.gov

Leadership clear leader

Clear leader in the category as it exists today, runner-up in the one it is being rebuilt into. Per IDC's Worldwide Semiannual Software Tracker on 2025 data, Salesforce was first in worldwide CRM applications for a thirteenth consecutive year at 20.0% share, and first in Sales (fourteenth year), Customer Service (thirteenth), Marketing (seventh), model-driven application platform (eleventh) and Integration (fourth). These come from Salesforce announcing its own IDC results via a trade outlet, in translation, not IDC primary material. In the same tracker's new Agent Build and Deploy segment it ranked second at 17.5%, albeit as fastest-growing vendor.

source: sec.gov

co leader

The FY2025 10-K claims leadership in qualified form and then names the peers who contest it. Transportation Solutions 'is a leader in connectivity and sensor technologies' and TE is 'one of the leading providers of advanced automobile connectivity solutions' — one of, not the — while the segment's 'major competitors include Yazaki, Aptiv, Sumitomo, Sensata, Honeywell, Molex, and Amphenol'. Industrial Solutions 'is a leading supplier of products that connect and distribute power, data, and signals' and 'competes primarily against Amphenol, Hubbell, Carlisle Companies, Integer Holdings, Molex, Omron, JST, and Korea Electric Terminal (KET)'. Amphenol and Molex appear on both lists, so TE shares the top of the interconnect market rather than owning it.

source: sec.gov

co leader

The company's own claim is comparative but never exclusive: 'We are one of the leading manufacturers in the world of HVAC systems and services and transport temperature control products and services' - one of, with no rank, no share figure and no competitor named anywhere in the filing. Competitive Conditions sets that against 'well-established regional or specialized competitors, as well as larger U.S. and non-U.S. corporations or divisions of larger companies', and the risk factors add that Trane competes 'with large companies and with smaller, local operators who may have customer, regulatory or economic advantages in the geographies in which they are located'. The scale behind the claim is substantial and disclosed - $21,321.9 million of 2025 net revenues, products sold in approximately 100 countries, backlog of $7,769.4 million - but the 10-K never asserts the top position in any market it serves.

source: sec.gov

Pricing power moderate

Gross margin rises across the Item 7 table — gross profit of $32,255M on $41,525M of revenue, 78% of total revenues in FY2026 against 77% in FY2025 and 75% in FY2024 — yet MD&A denies price as the cause: growth "was primarily caused by volume-driven increases from new business," and "Pricing was not a significant driver of the increase in revenues for the period." Item 1A names consumption-based pricing among attrition factors, says Agentforce and Data 360 monetization "remain relatively new and uncertain," and concedes "limited experience with determining optimal pricing for our consumption-based contracts."

source: sec.gov

moderate

The FY2025 10-K states both halves plainly: TE has 'experienced, and expect[s] to continue to experience, downward pressure on prices. However, as a result of increased costs and tariffs, certain of our businesses implemented price increases in recent years.' Pass-through, not price-setting. The realised result is margin expansion rather than erosion — gross margin of 31.5% of net sales in FY2023, 34.4% in FY2024 and 35.2% in FY2025 per the same filing's income statements, and 36.5% ($5,319M on $14,573M) for the nine months to 26 June 2026 versus 35.3% a year earlier, with Q3 FY2026 GAAP operating margin of 19%, per the 22 July 2026 results release (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385157/000110465926085589/tel-20260722xex99d1.htm). Strong would require pricing that leads rather than follows cost; weak is contradicted by three years of expanding gross margin.

source: sec.gov

moderate

Price is a separately disclosed component of growth in this filing and it is positive: of the 7.5% increase in 2025 net revenues, the company's bridge assigns 3.0% to pricing against 3.2% volume, 0.8% acquisitions and 0.5% currency, and gross margin rose 50 basis points to 36.2% 'primarily due to gross productivity and price realization, partially offset by inflation'. In the Americas the price component was 3.8% of an 8.0% revenue increase, and that segment's adjusted EBITDA margin rose 70 basis points to 21.6% 'primarily due to price realization and gross productivity, partially offset by inflation and continued business reinvestment'. What holds the band below strong is in the same bridge and the same risk factors: EMEA pricing was (0.3)% and its segment margin fell 150 basis points to 18.3%; Asia Pacific pricing was 0.4% on organic revenue down 2.5%; consolidation and new entrants 'could result in increased competition and pricing pressures'; and 'in the event there is deflation, we may experience pressure from our customers to reduce prices.' Price that sticks in the Americas, disappears in EMEA and is disclaimed as durable in the risk factors is moderate rather than strong.

source: sec.gov

Summary

Salesforce is the incumbent of record in CRM applications and is paid like one: $41.5B of FY2026 revenue (+10%), 78% gross margin, $72.4B of contracted revenue not yet recognized, and first place in worldwide CRM for a thirteenth consecutive year at 20.0% share per IDC's tracker as announced by Salesforce. Enterprise data and workflow embedded through Data 360 and Agentforce is costly to unwind, and the agentic layer is deliberately built atop existing processes rather than requiring re-implementation. The limits are the company's own: it twice describes its market as having low barriers to entry, names AI-native startups whose solutions "may bypass traditional business process workflows or displace established user interfaces," ranks second at 17.5% in IDC's new Agent Build and Deploy segment, and concedes pricing did not drive FY2026 growth.

TE Connectivity sells the connectors, terminals, sensors and cable-protection parts that, in its own framing, 'enable the distribution of power, signal, and data' — a component vendor, never a system or compute vendor. The FY2025 10-K puts the two reportable segments, Transportation Solutions (54% of net sales) and Industrial Solutions (46%), against a combined served market it estimates at roughly $200 billion, which tells you immediately that no single share number governs this business: the filing discloses no market share, says 'no single customer accounted for a significant amount of our net sales in fiscal 2025, 2024, or 2023', and states that because TE is 'not organized by product or service, it is not practicable to disclose net sales by product or service'. The defensible part is entrenchment. Parts get designed in with the customer and then qualified to survive automotive, aerospace, subsea and grid conditions; TE sells about 75% of net sales direct into ~130 countries; relationships 'typically date back many years'. That is a switching-cost moat, and the filing is unusually candid that it is not a patent moat — no single patent or group of patents is material to its competitive position. The limit is equally plain in the filing: highly competitive industries, thousands of competitors, and persistent downward price pressure, with Amphenol and Molex named as competitors in BOTH segments and Yazaki, Aptiv and Sumitomo heading the Transportation segment's competitor list. The evidence that the moat is nonetheless working is margin plus mix. Gross margin ran 31.5% / 34.4% / 35.2% of net sales across FY2023-FY2025, and in the nine months to 26 June 2026 gross margin was $5,319M on $14,573M of net sales (36.5%) against $4,419M on $12,513M (35.3%) a year earlier, while Q3 FY2026 GAAP operating margin was 19% and orders hit a record $5.7 billion, up 27% year over year. Growth has also rotated: digital data networks grew 34.2% in Q3 FY2026 (34.0% organic) and 48.8% over nine months, with the CEO naming 'increased momentum in AI in both the data center and across the broader energy infrastructure' — while sensors, an end market for which the 10-K makes no leadership claim at all, shrank 2.8% organically in the quarter. Narrow, not wide: a real toll on other people's platforms, collected under admitted price pressure.

Trane Technologies is the Trane and Thermo King equipment maker - the FY2025 10-K opens by calling it 'a global climate innovator' selling HVAC, transport refrigeration and custom refrigeration through 'our strategic brands, Trane® and Thermo King®' - organised in three regional segments that produced 2025 net revenues of $17,168.8 million (Americas), $2,802.1 million (EMEA) and $1,351.0 million (Asia Pacific), with 'Approximately 25% of our net revenues in 2025 ... derived outside the U.S.' across 'approximately 100 countries' and 'no single external customer that accounted for more than 10% of our consolidated net revenues in 2025, 2024 or 2023'. The filing is candid that the markets are contested and equally candid that its position does not rest on intellectual property: 'engineering, production skills and experience are more responsible for our market position than our patents and/or licenses.' The durable asset it does describe is the installed base and the aftermarket attached to it - an 'extensive global install base' whose monetisation through 'services and rental options' is the stated growth strategy, reached through branch sales offices, dealers and distributors, with service agreements, repair and maintenance, aftermarket and OEM parts and rental all listed among the principal products. The 2025 financials carry that signature: revenues up 7.5% to $21,321.9 million split 3.2 points volume, 3.0 points price, 0.8 points acquisitions and 0.5 points currency; gross margin up 50 basis points to 36.2% 'primarily due to gross productivity and price realization, partially offset by inflation'; and backlog of $7,769.4 million on equipment where 'orders for specialized equipment or specific customer applications are submitted with extended lead times'. The limits are in the same filing. Price contributed 3.8% in the Americas but (0.3)% in EMEA and 0.4% in Asia Pacific; EMEA's segment adjusted EBITDA margin fell 150 basis points to 18.3%; Asia Pacific organic revenue fell 2.5% on 'lower volumes in China'; the Americas' otherwise strong year was 'partially offset by weaker volume in our Residential business'; and the risk factors warn that refrigerant regulation 'could make some of our existing HVAC and refrigeration products non-compliant or obsolete', with the company 'developing and selling our next generation products that utilize lower global warming potential solutions' against $347.6 million of 2025 research and development spending. For the AI build-out specifically, the link exists in the filing but is unsized: 'Data center HVAC systems', 'Data center liquid cooling solutions', 'Data center facility controls' and 'Data center services' appear in the principal products and services table, and those four entries are the only places the phrase occurs anywhere in the 10-K - no revenue, no ranking, no share, and no mention at all in the MD&A discussion of 2025 growth.

Chain position

Applications-layer incumbent: sells enterprise CRM and agentic software to end customers across industries, consumes cloud infrastructure (third-party IaaS partners plus its own Hyperforce estate) and third-party LLMs, and sits upstream of no hardware supply chain. Exposure is to enterprise software budgets and to whether the agentic layer is captured by incumbent suites or AI-native entrants.

TE is an upstream component supplier to the AI build-out, not a participant in compute. It sells 'connectivity and sensor solutions [that] enable the distribution of power, signal, and data to advance next-generation transportation, energy networks, automated factories, data centers enabling artificial intelligence', about 75% of it direct to manufacturers across roughly 130 countries. AI exposure runs through one end market: digital data networks was 28% of Industrial Solutions, and Industrial Solutions was 46% of fiscal 2025 net sales — so the datacenter line is a minority of a company still 54% transportation. That minority is where the growth now is: digital data networks net sales rose 34.2% in Q3 FY2026 and 48.8% over the nine months, and energy rose 34.4% in the quarter, the CEO tying both to AI momentum 'in both the data center and across the broader energy infrastructure' (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385157/000110465926085589/tel-20260722xex99d1.htm).

Trane sits on the facility side of the AI build-out rather than in the compute stack. Its FY2025 10-K lists 'Data center HVAC systems', 'Data center liquid cooling solutions', 'Data center facility controls' and 'Data center services' among its principal products and services, alongside 'Thermal energy storage' and 'Smart and AI-enabled services'. Those four entries are the only occurrences of the phrase in the entire filing: there is no data center revenue figure, no ranking, no named competitor and no separate reporting - segment disclosure stops at Americas, EMEA and Asia Pacific, and the MD&A attributes the Americas' 7.4% organic growth to 'realization of price increases and higher volumes led by strong demand within our Commercial HVAC business' without naming an end market.

Products (share / barrier)
Long-horizon vote +0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

see exactly how it voted →