Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| TE Connectivity | Alibaba Group | Qualcomm | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow The FY2025 10-K's own Competition section undercuts any claim of insulation: 'The industries in which we operate are highly competitive, and we compete with thousands of companies that range from large multinational corporations to local manufacturers', competition is 'generally based on breadth of product offering, product innovation, price, quality, delivery, and service', and TE has 'experienced, and expect[s] to continue to experience, downward pressure on prices'. The same filing explicitly disclaims IP as the basis of its position: 'we do not believe that our competitive position or our operations are dependent upon or would be materially impacted by any single patent or group of related patents.' What TE does hold is durable rather than absolute — it calls itself 'one of the leading providers of advanced automobile connectivity solutions', its Industrial segment 'a leading supplier', and it converted that position into rising profitability across the same filing's three income statements (gross margin 31.5% of net sales in FY2023, 34.4% in FY2024, 35.2% in FY2025). A position that earns expanding margins into admitted price pressure is an advantage; one held against thousands of competitors and no decisive patent is not a wide one. | wide The FY2026 20-F rests on two entrenched positions: a commerce ecosystem the filing ties to 'the world's largest online retail market' with 'over 1.1 billion Internet users,' and a cloud business whose 'Cloud Intelligence Group's external revenue growth accelerated to 40% in the final quarter of fiscal 2026, with AI-related products accounting for 30% of this revenue.' Two durable franchises under one roof is a wide moat — bounded by China regulation and US ICTS cloud controls the same filing flags. | narrow Qualcomm's advantage is real but concentrated in one segment. The FY2025 10-K (filed 2025-11-05) describes its portfolio as "the most widely and extensively licensed in the industry" and says the industry "generally recognizes that any company seeking to develop, manufacture and/or sell certain cellular products requires a license or other rights to use our patents". That licensing leg produced $5,582M of FY2025 revenue against $38,367M at QCT, where Apple, Samsung and Xiaomi are all named in the vertical-integration risk factor and Apple already "utilizes its own modem... in certain of its smartphones". The filing frames the QCT loss as expected rather than realised. |
| Moat type | switching costs The FY2025 10-K locates the advantage at the customer, not in patents. It describes 'close working relationships with many of our customers' whose 'relationships with them typically date back many years', and co-development as the mechanism: 'By working with our customers in developing new products and technologies, we believe we can identify and act on trends and leverage knowledge about next-generation technology across our products.' Roughly 75% of fiscal 2025 net sales were direct to manufacturers rather than through distribution, and the Transportation segment's products 'must withstand harsh conditions' — parts engineered in with the customer and built to survive the application, so the position sits inside the customer's design rather than in a purchase order. The filing rules the alternative out in its own words on intellectual property, so intangibles_ip is not the source; the 'thousands of companies' in Competition rules out efficient_scale. | network effects The 20-F names 'the network effects of our ecosystems' among the factors its business depends on: Taobao and Tmall, Alipay, Amap and the rest compound as buyers, sellers and services reinforce each other across one integrated ecosystem. | intangibles ip The durable asset is intellectual property accumulated since Qualcomm's founding "in 1985". The patents have "broad coverage in many countries, including Brazil, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the United States and countries in Europe" and are licensed "to hundreds of companies on industry-accepted terms", with royalties set as "a percentage of the wholesale (i.e., licensee's) selling price... subject to per unit minimums and/or per unit caps". R&D of $9,042M equalled 20% of revenues. Manufacturing is fabless "other than for certain of our RFFE modules and RF filter products", for which Qualcomm owns fabs in Germany and Singapore. |
| Leadership | co leader The FY2025 10-K claims leadership in qualified form and then names the peers who contest it. Transportation Solutions 'is a leader in connectivity and sensor technologies' and TE is 'one of the leading providers of advanced automobile connectivity solutions' — one of, not the — while the segment's 'major competitors include Yazaki, Aptiv, Sumitomo, Sensata, Honeywell, Molex, and Amphenol'. Industrial Solutions 'is a leading supplier of products that connect and distribute power, data, and signals' and 'competes primarily against Amphenol, Hubbell, Carlisle Companies, Integer Holdings, Molex, Omron, JST, and Korea Electric Terminal (KET)'. Amphenol and Molex appear on both lists, so TE shares the top of the interconnect market rather than owning it. | clear leader The 20-F claims leadership in applied AI ('strengthened our leadership in applied AI') and roots the commerce business in the world's largest online retail market; Alibaba Cloud is the leading China hyperscaler pivoting to AI, per the segment discussion — a category leader in both its home markets. | co leader Leadership is clear in licensing and contested in silicon. The 10-K names no rival licensing programme and asserts the portfolio is "the most widely and extensively licensed in the industry", while calling QCT's industries "intensely competitive" and naming eleven competitors (Broadcom, HiSilicon, MediaTek, Mobileye, Nvidia, NXP, Qorvo, Samsung, Skyworks, TI, UNISOC); "continue to be a leader in mobile" appears in a list of things future success depends on, so it reads as aspiration, not share. The band therefore rests on the licensing leg, roughly 13% of revenue. FY2025 10%-plus customers were 21%, 20% and 13%; in 9M FY2026 only two cleared 10%. |
| Pricing power | moderate The FY2025 10-K states both halves plainly: TE has 'experienced, and expect[s] to continue to experience, downward pressure on prices. However, as a result of increased costs and tariffs, certain of our businesses implemented price increases in recent years.' Pass-through, not price-setting. The realised result is margin expansion rather than erosion — gross margin of 31.5% of net sales in FY2023, 34.4% in FY2024 and 35.2% in FY2025 per the same filing's income statements, and 36.5% ($5,319M on $14,573M) for the nine months to 26 June 2026 versus 35.3% a year earlier, with Q3 FY2026 GAAP operating margin of 19%, per the 22 July 2026 results release (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385157/000110465926085589/tel-20260722xex99d1.htm). Strong would require pricing that leads rather than follows cost; weak is contradicted by three years of expanding gross margin. | moderate Ecosystem lock-in and cloud scale support pricing, but the filing warns that if 'user activity and engagement in our ecosystem may decrease … our market share and profitability may be negatively affected,' and Chinese e-commerce/cloud competition is intense — real but capped pricing power. | moderate QTL margins held at 72% in FY2025 and 73% in 9M FY2026, though Q3 FY2026 alone slipped to 69% from 71%, and the $111M revenue gain there is attributed to revenues per unit "primarily driven by favorable mix" rather than to price. At QCT, the fall to 26% from 30% is explained by "lower gross margin, primarily driven by higher product cost, partially offset by higher average selling prices" plus lower revenues, so the pressure is cost rather than price; FY2025 handsets rose $2,930M, of which $2.5B came from higher revenue per chipset. Against that, "declining average selling prices" is a standing risk-factor title, "particularly pronounced in emerging regions and China". |
| Summary | TE Connectivity sells the connectors, terminals, sensors and cable-protection parts that, in its own framing, 'enable the distribution of power, signal, and data' — a component vendor, never a system or compute vendor. The FY2025 10-K puts the two reportable segments, Transportation Solutions (54% of net sales) and Industrial Solutions (46%), against a combined served market it estimates at roughly $200 billion, which tells you immediately that no single share number governs this business: the filing discloses no market share, says 'no single customer accounted for a significant amount of our net sales in fiscal 2025, 2024, or 2023', and states that because TE is 'not organized by product or service, it is not practicable to disclose net sales by product or service'. The defensible part is entrenchment. Parts get designed in with the customer and then qualified to survive automotive, aerospace, subsea and grid conditions; TE sells about 75% of net sales direct into ~130 countries; relationships 'typically date back many years'. That is a switching-cost moat, and the filing is unusually candid that it is not a patent moat — no single patent or group of patents is material to its competitive position. The limit is equally plain in the filing: highly competitive industries, thousands of competitors, and persistent downward price pressure, with Amphenol and Molex named as competitors in BOTH segments and Yazaki, Aptiv and Sumitomo heading the Transportation segment's competitor list. The evidence that the moat is nonetheless working is margin plus mix. Gross margin ran 31.5% / 34.4% / 35.2% of net sales across FY2023-FY2025, and in the nine months to 26 June 2026 gross margin was $5,319M on $14,573M of net sales (36.5%) against $4,419M on $12,513M (35.3%) a year earlier, while Q3 FY2026 GAAP operating margin was 19% and orders hit a record $5.7 billion, up 27% year over year. Growth has also rotated: digital data networks grew 34.2% in Q3 FY2026 (34.0% organic) and 48.8% over nine months, with the CEO naming 'increased momentum in AI in both the data center and across the broader energy infrastructure' — while sensors, an end market for which the 10-K makes no leadership claim at all, shrank 2.8% organically in the quarter. Narrow, not wide: a real toll on other people's platforms, collected under admitted price pressure. | Alibaba is a commerce network and an AI cloud fused into one ecosystem. The retail side draws its moat from network effects the filing names explicitly, rooted in the world's largest online retail market; the cloud side is pivoting hard into AI — Alibaba Cloud's 'growth engine fully pivots from traditional compute and storage to models, AI compute, and agent services,' anchored by the in-house Qwen family (Qwen3.7-Max 'specifically engineered for agents') and the PAI platform. The 20-F's own framing is 'leading full-stack capabilities across the AI value chain.' The counterweights are structural rather than competitive: a Cayman VIE structure, China's regulatory environment, and the US Commerce Department's proposed ICTS cloud-computing controls the filing discloses. | Qualcomm has two legs pointing in opposite directions. QTL (FY2025 revenue $5,582M, EBT margin 72%) rests on a portfolio the 10-K calls "the most widely and extensively licensed in the industry", with royalties struck on the licensee's wholesale device price under per-unit minimums and caps; its durability is dated in the filing, since "our patent license agreements with key OEMs are generally long-term, with terms expiring at varying dates between fiscal 2027 and 2031", some with binding-arbitration renewal clauses, and Huawei's licence has already expired, removing its royalties from QTL revenue from Q2 FY2025. QCT ($38,367M, 87% of segment revenue) is the leg under pressure: its three 10%-plus customers all build their own silicon, Apple already ships its own modem, and QCT EBT margin fell to 26% in Q3 FY2026 from 30%. |
| Chain position | TE is an upstream component supplier to the AI build-out, not a participant in compute. It sells 'connectivity and sensor solutions [that] enable the distribution of power, signal, and data to advance next-generation transportation, energy networks, automated factories, data centers enabling artificial intelligence', about 75% of it direct to manufacturers across roughly 130 countries. AI exposure runs through one end market: digital data networks was 28% of Industrial Solutions, and Industrial Solutions was 46% of fiscal 2025 net sales — so the datacenter line is a minority of a company still 54% transportation. That minority is where the growth now is: digital data networks net sales rose 34.2% in Q3 FY2026 and 48.8% over the nine months, and energy rose 34.4% in the quarter, the CEO tying both to AI momentum 'in both the data center and across the broader energy infrastructure' (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385157/000110465926085589/tel-20260722xex99d1.htm). | Layer-8 hyperscaler + AI-application incumbent: Alibaba Cloud supplies AI compute and the Qwen models while the commerce ecosystem is a vast applied-AI distribution surface. | Every figure and quotation is drawn from the FY2025 10-K and the Q3 FY2026 10-Q. Where the filings state no market share, the share band is left unknown rather than inferred, and barrier bands follow the filings' own language, which states a barrier to entry only for automotive. |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.38 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish Editorial prior, not backtested. |