Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Visa | NetApp | Everspin Technologies | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | wide The FY2025 10-K prints a network comparison for calendar year 2024: Visa at $13,433B payments volume, 311B total transactions and 4,805M cards, against Mastercard's $8,014B / 204B / 3,146M and American Express's $1,750B / 12B / 147M. Footnote (1) sources the American Express, Diners Club / Discover, JCB and Mastercard data to The Nilson Report issue 1288 (June 2025); Visa's own line is Visa's own data. On that table Visa's payments volume is roughly two-thirds larger than the next network's, and the same section states 'Based on available data, Visa is one of the largest retail electronic funds transfer networks used throughout the world.' The rating is wide because the lead rests on a two-sided installed base the filing quantifies — nearly 5 billion payment credentials and more than 175 million merchant locations across more than 200 countries and territories — which an entrant would have to reassemble on both sides at once. The table is a single-year snapshot with no prior-year column, so it evidences the size of the lead, not its direction. | narrow The FY2026 10-K shows a real, durable lock but not an unassailable one. On the durable side: "Our cloud storage services are based on the same ONTAP data management software that underpins our on-premises ONTAP storage infrastructure offerings", and the same filing's income statement shows the company holding a gross margin near 71% across all three reported years - $4,433M on $6,268M in FY2024, $4,613M on $6,572M in FY2025 and $4,899M on $6,925M in FY2026 - while revenue grew from $6,268M to $6,925M and income from operations widened from 19% to 24% of net revenues. Holding that margin through the memory-cost shock the same filing discloses is the commercial evidence the lock is worth something. On the limiting side, the filing says competition "is intense", that in public cloud "customers may choose native cloud services that are consumed as operating expenses", and that "New competitors or alliances among existing competitors could emerge and quickly gain significant market share" - and IDC's 1Q26 external-storage tracker (Blocks & Files, 2026-06-16, cited on the AFF/ASA product row below) ranks NetApp second behind Dell, not first. | narrow Everspin owns an MRAM process and IP position that buyers, including the U.S. government, pay to secure, but the business is small and its profits are thin. The FY2025 10-K cites 'over 20 years of MRAM technology and manufacturing leadership' and calls Everspin 'the leading supplier of discrete MRAM components'. That is the company's own claim, and no tracker share was found, so the rating stays modest. On 2026-04-24 Everspin signed a $40,000,000 subcontract with Amentum under a Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division prime contract. The program's objective is for the U.S. government to have 'a set of proven processes and manufacturing capability' for new Toggle MRAM for use in strategic systems (8-K). Returns are thin. The 10-K reports revenue of $55.2 million and $50.4 million, gross margin of 51.2% and 51.8%, and a net loss of $0.6 million and net income of $0.8 million for 2025 and 2024. It also warns that larger competitors 'may be better positioned to accept lower prices'. |
| Moat type | network effects Visa itself names the two sides as the source of advantage: 'We believe our fundamental value proposition of security, convenience, speed and reliability as well as the number of payment credentials and our acceptance footprint help us to succeed.' In fiscal 2025 the 10-K counts nearly 5 billion payment credentials, which it defines as issued Visa card accounts, available at more than 175 million merchant locations, with nearly 14,500 financial institutions among the clients that build payment programs on Visa products. The two bases are joined through VisaNet in what the filing calls the 'four-party' model. Neither side is worth joining without the other, so the advantage is the mutual pull of the two installed bases rather than a patent estate or a cost curve. | switching costs The FY2026 10-K makes the source of the advantage explicit and it is the cost of leaving the data-management layer, not a network or a patent estate. The same ONTAP software runs the on-premises arrays and the cloud services ("Our cloud storage services are based on the same ONTAP data management software that underpins our on-premises ONTAP storage infrastructure offerings"), and the AFF family "allows customers to connect to clouds for more data services, data tiering, caching, and disaster recovery". A customer's volume layout, snapshot and replication workflow and operating tools therefore carry from the array into Azure, AWS and Google rather than being abandoned at the cloud boundary — the filing describes NetApp as "the only provider of enterprise-grade storage services natively embedded in the world's largest public cloud providers", so the usual moment of escape is instead the moment the relationship renews. | intangibles ip The advantage is process know-how and patents, not scale. The 10-K reports 596 issued patents and 141 pending applications as of 2025-12-31, and Everspin earns money from them. GLOBALFOUNDRIES 'will pay royalties' on each wafer it sells or transfers that uses 'certain Everspin design information', and during an exclusivity period it agreed 'not to license intellectual property developed in connection with the agreement to our named competitors'. Under the Amentum subcontract (8-K, 2026-04-24), Everspin 'will provide process know-how and IP for Toggle MRAM manufacturing in case the Company exits the Toggle MRAM business'. The IP is contested. The 10-K discloses that Avalanche Technology filed a patent lawsuit in Delaware and a complaint with the U.S. International Trade Commission in January 2026. MRAM-Info (2026-02-06) reports the suit covers four STT-MRAM patents. |
| Leadership | clear leader On the 10-K's CY2024 comparison table, Visa carried 311 billion total transactions and $13,433B of payments volume against 204 billion and $8,014B for Mastercard, the largest competitor listed. American Express is next at $1,750B and 147M cards — under a seventh of Visa's payments volume and under a thirtieth of its cards — with Diners Club / Discover ($253B, 72M cards) and JCB ($319B, 167M cards) smaller still on volume. Visa's line is its own data; the competitor lines are sourced to The Nilson Report issue 1288 (June 2025) per footnote (1). | co leader IDC's 1Q26 external enterprise storage systems tracker, as reported by Blocks & Files on 2026-06-16 (cited in full on the AFF/ASA product row below), ranks NetApp second worldwide behind Dell and ahead of Everpure, Huawei and HPE, attributing the placing to "its growing all-flash business and cloud-integrated data management". Second of five ranked vendors, in a market whose leader is someone else, is a shared front rank rather than an owned one - and the distinct claim NetApp makes in the FY2026 10-K is positional rather than volumetric: being "the only provider of enterprise-grade storage services natively embedded in the world's largest public cloud providers". | fast follower The leadership claim is Everspin's own, and a rival contests it. The 10-K calls Everspin 'the leading supplier of discrete MRAM components', and the 2Q26 release calls it 'the world's leading developer and manufacturer' of MRAM persistent memory. No tracker share was found. A rival sells in the same niche: MRAM-Info (2024-03-27) reports that Avalanche Technology launched 2Gb and 8Gb space-grade STT-MRAM devices. Everspin's 10-K lists its DRAM-replacement STT-MRAM at 1Gb density. Outside MRAM, the 10-K describes Everspin as 'an emerging specialty memory product supplier' that competes with much larger SRAM, FRAM, NVSRAM, DRAM and NOR vendors. |
| Pricing power | strong Visa's own take is insulated from the fees regulators target: it sets default interchange rates but does not collect them — the 10-K says 'Generally, IRFs are paid by acquirers to issuers' and that 'the fees we receive from issuers and acquirers are not derived from IRFs or MDRs.' The reported margin is high but moved down in fiscal 2025: operating income of $23,994M on $40,000M of net revenue is a 60.0% operating margin, against 65.7% ($23,595M on $35,926M) in fiscal 2024. The cause is printed two lines above operating income in the same statement — the litigation provision rose from $462M to $2,562M — and the filing says litigation provisions 'do not correlate to the underlying performance of our business' and that it excludes them 'to facilitate a comparison to our past operating performance.' Adding that provision back to operating income in both years leaves 66.4% against 67.0%, so the pricing base held and the decline is a legal charge, not a fee concession. The real limits are indirect: Dodd-Frank and the EU IFR cap interchange Visa never earns, client incentives are paid back to clients and rise with payments volume, and the UK Payment Systems Regulator holds 'wide-ranging powers and authority to review our business practices, systems, rules and fees with respect to promoting competition and innovation in the UK, and ensuring payment systems take care of, and promote, the interests of service users.' | moderate It holds price rather than raising it. On the figures filed with the FY2026 10-K, gross margin was 70.7% of revenue in FY2024 ($4,433M on $6,268M), 70.2% in FY2025 ($4,613M on $6,572M) and 70.7% in FY2026 ($4,899M on $6,925M) - flat across three years in which revenue grew from $6,268M to $6,925M - and it held that level while absorbing a component-cost shock. It is no stronger than that because the filing's own risk factor lists "competitive pricing, customer price sensitivity" and "pricing and discounting pressures" among the drivers of gross margin, and discloses that the company "experienced inflationary pressure and supply chain constraints beginning in the second half of fiscal 2026, resulting in increased costs for memory and other components, which have affected our gross margins" - a cost shock it is absorbing rather than fully passing on. | moderate Gross margin has stayed above half of revenue. The 10-K reports 51.8% for 2024 and 51.2% for 2025, and the 2026-08-05 release reports 53.9% for 2Q26, up from 51.3% a year earlier. The premium has limits. The 10-K lists 'customer adoption of MRAM technology despite the price per bit premium of our products versus competing technologies' as a competitive factor, and its risk factors describe markets with 'declining average selling prices'. |
| Summary | Visa runs the switchboard, not the bank. The FY2025 10-K is explicit that 'Visa is not a financial institution. We do not issue cards, extend credit or set rates and fees for account holders of Visa products nor do we earn revenue from or bear credit risk with respect to any of these activities.' That disclaimer is scoped to issuing and credit extension, not to risk at large — the same filing says indemnifying issuers and acquirers for one another's settlement failures 'creates settlement risk for us' because of the timing gap between a payment transaction and its settlement. What Visa earns is service, data-processing and international-transaction revenue, reduced by client incentives, for moving other people's money: 329 billion payments and cash transactions carried the Visa brand in fiscal 2025, 258 billion of them processed by Visa, an average of 901 million a day across more than 200 countries and territories on $17 trillion of total payments and cash volume. The pull between nearly 5 billion credentials and more than 175 million merchant locations is what a rival would have to buy on both sides at once. The filing is candid about what is arriving anyway: real-time payment networks have launched in at least 80 countries behind 'strong government sponsorship and regulatory initiatives' the filing names as FedNow, PIX and UPI; B2B blockchain payments including stablecoins 'can operate globally 24/7' for cross-border transactions; and Dodd-Frank and the EU IFR both cap interchange and limit network exclusivity and routing restrictions. | NetApp sells storage hardware but the asset is ONTAP, the data-management software that has run its arrays for over three decades and now also runs inside the three largest public clouds as a first-party service. The FY2026 10-K organises the company into two segments, Hybrid Cloud (AFF and ASA all-flash arrays, AFX for AI workloads, FAS hybrid-flash, E/EF-Series, StorageGRID object storage) and Public Cloud (Azure NetApp Files, Amazon FSx for NetApp ONTAP, Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, Cloud Volumes ONTAP), and states that both rest on the same ONTAP software. That is the whole argument: an enterprise that has standardised its snapshots, replication and multiprotocol access on ONTAP carries those habits with it when it moves workloads to a hyperscaler, and NetApp is paid on both sides of the move. The evidence that the lock has commercial value is the margin's steadiness: across the three years the FY2026 10-K reports, gross margin sat at 70.7%, 70.2% and 70.7% of revenue ($4,433M on $6,268M, $4,613M on $6,572M, $4,899M on $6,925M) while revenue grew, and the filing's own percentage-of-revenue table shows no mix shift doing that work - product and services held near 46% and 54% of revenue throughout. The limits are equally in the filing. NetApp is second, not first: IDC's 1Q26 tracker puts it behind Dell in external enterprise storage, and the 10-K's competition section concedes that cloud providers are simultaneously partners and rivals, that consumption models "may reduce overall demand for our traditional on-premises offerings sold through a capital expenditure (capex) model", and that alternative architectures "may reduce or eliminate demand for some of our offerings". Component exposure is real too: the filing discloses "inflationary pressure and supply chain constraints beginning in the second half of fiscal 2026, resulting in increased costs for memory and other components, which have affected our gross margins", and names NAND among the components whose supply can tighten. This is a durable second place built on software stickiness, not a structural monopoly. | Everspin is a small specialist in MRAM, a non-volatile memory. Freescale spun it out in 2008. Its lines are Toggle MRAM (128kb to 32Mb, in production since 2008), STT-MRAM (1Gb parts with DDR3 and DDR4 derivative interfaces, plus 16Mb to 256Mb serial parts aimed at NOR replacement), TMR sensors, and IP licensing and foundry services. It adds its magnetic layers to purchased CMOS wafers on a leased 200mm line in Chandler, Arizona. Its higher-density STT-MRAM wafers come from GLOBALFOUNDRIES, its single foundry for those products. In April 2026 it signed two agreements. The first is a ten-year foundry agreement under which Microchip will make MRAM, TMR sensor and STT-MRAM wafers at its Gresham, Oregon fab, with Toggle and sensor capacity expected about 18 months after signing. The second is the $40,000,000 Amentum subcontract to develop on-shore Toggle MRAM production for U.S. strategic systems. In 2025 revenue was $55.2 million at a 51.2% gross margin, and more than 1,405 end customers bought its products. The two largest end customers took 33% of revenue. In 2Q26 revenue reached a record $18.7 million and gross margin was 53.9%. GAAP operating expenses rose to $14.5 million from $8.7 million, giving a GAAP net loss of $(3.6) million. Avalanche Technology is suing over four STT-MRAM patents. The verdict is a narrow moat. Everspin holds a defensible MRAM process and IP niche that the U.S. government is paying to secure. But the business is small, its profits are thin, and its higher-density line faces a patent challenge and much larger memory rivals. |
| Chain position | Both a buyer and a seller of AI inside payments, not an AI infrastructure supplier: the 10-K claims 'early adoption and integration of artificial intelligence (AI) models in payment systems', sells 'risk detection and prevention solutions underpinned by real-time AI-driven scores' to issuers and acquirers, and opens its rails to third-party AI systems 'via on-demand APIs, our MCP server that enables AI systems to interface with our Visa Intelligent Commerce APIs, and fully managed solutions.' | NetApp sits between the memory supply and the enterprise data centre. Upstream, the FY2026 10-K says "Third-party component costs make up a significant portion of our product costs" and singles out NAND as hard to manage "if supplies of certain components, including NAND, become limited relative to demand". Downstream, the hyperscalers are channel, partner and rival at once: the filing states "We both partner with and compete against cloud service providers through our cloud-based software and services offerings", while Azure NetApp Files, Amazon FSx for NetApp ONTAP and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes are delivered as those clouds' own natively embedded services. Distribution is a mix of direct sales and "an ecosystem of partners, including the leading cloud providers". | Upstream supplier of persistent memory to makers of industrial, medical, automotive and transportation, aerospace and defense, and data-center equipment. GLOBALFOUNDRIES makes its 300mm STT-MRAM wafers, its Chandler line adds the magnetic layers for Toggle, and Microchip's Gresham fab is contracted for future capacity. |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.42 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |