Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Apple | Applied Digital | Applied Materials | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow Argued, not assumed. The FY2025 10-K does evidence a real moat in margin: total gross margin percentage rose 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025) in markets the same filing describes as characterised by 'aggressive price competition, downward pressure on gross margins.' But the filing bounds the claim itself: it concedes 'a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' it discloses no retention, active-device or installed-base figure anywhere (its only 'large installed bases of active devices' reference describes competitors), and it discloses that both of the highest-margin layers are already being cut down by force -- Apple is 'currently subject to a court order preventing it from imposing any commission or fee on certain purchases' on the U.S. App Store storefront, has had to open 'alternative methods of distribution for iOS and iPadOS apps, alternative payment processing' in the EU, and warns that a reversal on appeal in the Google search case could impose remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution.' A moat that earns 46.9% gross margin but whose most profitable layer is being narrowed by two courts and a regulator is narrow, not wide. | none The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage. | wide The FY2025 10-K (filed 2025-12-12) grounds a wide moat on three reinforcing pillars: (1) scale IP — 'more than 23,500 active patents in the United States and other countries' and $3.57B of fiscal 2025 RD&E spend that 'must generally enable us to deliver new products and technologies before the emergence of strong demand'; (2) portfolio breadth — 'the semiconductor capital equipment industry's most comprehensive portfolio of products', letting Applied 'combine, co-optimize and integrate our technologies to develop highly differentiated solutions'; (3) an installed-base annuity — the AGS segment monetizes 'our large, global installed base of semiconductor and other equipment' with transactional and subscription services, spares and factory automation software, carrying a $7,141M backlog (48% of the company's $15,002M total) at fiscal year-end 2025. Company gross margin expanded three straight years (46.7% FY2023, 47.5% FY2024, 48.7% FY2025) while this played out. |
| Moat type | switching costs The 10-K locates the durable advantage in an integrated stack and its third-party ecosystem, not in patents: it names 'a strong third-party software and accessories ecosystem' among the principal competitive factors and states the Company 'designs and develops nearly the entire solution for its products, including the hardware, operating system, numerous software applications and related services,' while explicitly disclaiming IP as the source -- 'No single intellectual property right is solely responsible for protecting the Company's products and services' and the Company 'relies primarily on the innovative skills, technical competence and marketing abilities of its personnel.' The remedies now in force confirm the diagnosis negatively: the same filing describes being required to permit alternative distribution and alternative payment processing in the EU and being barred from charging commission on certain linked-out purchases in the U.S. -- remedies aimed squarely at lowering the cost of leaving Apple's rails, which is what a switching-cost moat is. | none The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned. | intangibles ip The 10-K itself names IP as the competitive foundation: 'Protection of our technology assets through enforcement of our intellectual property rights, including patents, is important for our competitive position', backed by 'more than 23,500 active patents' plus trademarks, know-how, trade secrets and copyrights, and $3,570M of fiscal 2025 RD&E ($3,042M inside Semiconductor Systems alone). A strong secondary switching-cost layer is also documented: the risk factors cite the difficulty of 'securing development-tool-of-record (DTOR) and production-tool-of-record (PTOR) positions with customers' as a decisive competitive factor — once a tool is the record tool for a node, displacement is the exception — and AGS service/spares revenue is tied to the installed base. |
| Leadership | fast follower Apple leads on integration and margin rather than on units, and the filing says so: it 'has a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' while competitors have 'broad product lines, low-priced products, large installed bases of active devices, and large customer bases.' On the AI axis that defines this graph, Apple is following rather than leading -- it now licenses a rival's frontier models to power Siri (see the Apple Intelligence / Siri row and its citation) while pushing its own advantage down into silicon. | behind The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA). | clear leader Self-declared basis, not an independent rank: the 10-K's opening sentence claims Applied 'is the leader in the materials engineering solutions used to produce virtually every semiconductor in the world' and repeatedly claims 'the semiconductor capital equipment industry's most comprehensive portfolio'. The filing names no competitor and states no market-share figure — it acknowledges rivals ranging 'from small companies that compete in a single region... to global, diversified companies' and says only that 'many of our products have strong competitive positions'. Leadership claim is scoped to materials engineering (Applied sells no lithography). |
| Pricing power | strong The 10-K's own gross-margin table: total gross margin percentage 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025), with Services at 75.4% versus Products at 36.8%, and iPhone net sales rising 'due to higher net sales of Pro models' -- mix moving up, not down. Held against the filing's own hedge that 'gross margins will be subject to volatility and downward pressure,' the realised trend is the stronger evidence. | weak Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers. | strong MD&A attributes the FY2025 gross-margin expansion explicitly to price: margin rose 1.2 points to 48.7% 'primarily driven by higher net revenue, favorable changes in customer and product mix, an increase in average selling prices, and lower material and manufacturing costs' — the third consecutive annual increase (46.7% FY2023, 47.5% FY2024, 48.7% FY2025), with Semiconductor Systems segment gross margin at 54.2%. Counterweight from the same filing: a 'highly concentrated customer base' (two customers ~19% and ~15% of net revenue) whose members 'may seek pricing, payment, intellectual property-related, or other commercial terms that are less favorable to us'. |
| Summary | Apple's moat is usually asserted through the ecosystem; the FY2025 10-K neither quantifies nor claims retention, so the evidence has to be read elsewhere in the filing. Where it does show is mix and margin: Services reached $109.2B of $416.2B net sales (+14%) at a 75.4% gross margin against 36.8% on Products, so 26% of revenue delivered $82.3B of the $195.2B total gross margin, and iPhone grew 'due to higher net sales of Pro models.' That profit concentration is also the vulnerability the filing itself flags: Apple 'earns revenue from licensing arrangements with Google LLC and other companies to offer their search services on the Company's platforms,' arrangements 'currently subject to government investigations and legal proceedings' after Google was found to have violated U.S. antitrust laws on August 5, 2024 and the D.C. District Court ordered remedies on September 2, 2025 -- with the 10-K warning that a reversal on appeal could impose DOJ's proposed remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution,' which 'could materially adversely affect the Company's ability to earn revenue from such licensing arrangements.' Apple never discloses the size of that payment in the filing -- the concentration is admitted but not measured. Alongside it, the App Store toll has already been reduced in both jurisdictions. What is not in dispute is the vertical integration: Apple designs the silicon and now the cellular modem, and uses 'custom components available from only one source.' Read together: a genuine, margin-visible switching-cost moat around an integrated stack, with its two most profitable layers under active legal reduction. | Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage. | Applied Materials describes itself in its FY2025 10-K as 'the leader in the materials engineering solutions used to produce virtually every semiconductor in the world', selling wafer-fab equipment across patterning, transistor and interconnect fabrication (deposition/etch for 3D transistors), optical and eBeam process control, and advanced packaging. Fiscal 2025 net revenue was $28,368M: Semiconductor Systems $20,798M at a 54.2% gross margin (up from 52.9% FY2024 and 52.0% FY2023), AGS services $6,385M, and Corporate and Other (including display equipment) $1,185M. Within Semiconductor Systems, foundry/logic was 67% of revenue, DRAM 26%, NAND 7%. The moat mechanics the filing documents: 23,500+ active patents and $3.57B annual RD&E that must land tools with customers 'during early-stage technology selection'; DTOR/PTOR tool-of-record incumbency (cited in risk factors as the hard-to-win competitive position); and an AGS installed-base annuity whose backlog ($7,141M) now rivals the equipment backlog. The filing is equally clear about the moat's edges: 'Substantial competition exists across all the segments of our business'; two customers were approximately 19% and 15% of fiscal 2025 net revenue; ~89% of revenue is from outside the United States; and U.S. export controls on China 'have limited the market for certain of our products and services, adversely impacted our revenues and increased our exposure to foreign and Chinese domestic competition'. |
| Chain position | Applications-layer name in the AI chain: the 10-K describes designing 'nearly the entire solution' and using custom components 'available from only one source,' making Apple a large, concentrated buyer of leading-edge silicon rather than a supplier of AI compute to anyone else. | Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. | Upstream chokepoint of the AI-compute supply chain: Applied's tools fabricate chips for 'artificial intelligence (AI) and data center servers' among other end markets, selling into foundry/logic (67% of Semiconductor Systems revenue), DRAM (26%) and NAND (7%). Concentration cuts both ways — two customers were ~19% and ~15% of FY2025 net revenue, ~89% of revenue is non-U.S., and the customer base is 'geographically concentrated, particularly in China, Taiwan and Korea', with U.S. export controls on China constraining the addressable market and feeding Chinese domestic-equipment competition (all per the FY2025 10-K). |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.11 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish Editorial prior, not backtested. | -0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.42 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish Editorial prior, not backtested. |