Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Apple | Applied Digital | Hewlett Packard Enterprise | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow Argued, not assumed. The FY2025 10-K does evidence a real moat in margin: total gross margin percentage rose 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025) in markets the same filing describes as characterised by 'aggressive price competition, downward pressure on gross margins.' But the filing bounds the claim itself: it concedes 'a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' it discloses no retention, active-device or installed-base figure anywhere (its only 'large installed bases of active devices' reference describes competitors), and it discloses that both of the highest-margin layers are already being cut down by force -- Apple is 'currently subject to a court order preventing it from imposing any commission or fee on certain purchases' on the U.S. App Store storefront, has had to open 'alternative methods of distribution for iOS and iPadOS apps, alternative payment processing' in the EU, and warns that a reversal on appeal in the Google search case could impose remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution.' A moat that earns 46.9% gross margin but whose most profitable layer is being narrowed by two courts and a regulator is narrow, not wide. | none The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage. | narrow The FY2025 10-K describes strong but bounded advantages. On the positive side it cites ~21,000 issued and pending patents as of October 31, 2025, Hewlett Packard Labs research in AI, networking and fabrics, novel accelerators and quantum computing, a claimed 'long-term sustained market leadership in supercomputing', a global manufacturing services footprint, and a large channel/partner ecosystem. Against that, the filing names a crowded set of large incumbents in every segment (Dell, Super Micro, Cisco, Lenovo in servers; Broadcom, Cisco, Dell, IBM, NetApp, Nutanix, Pure Storage plus AWS/Google Cloud/Azure in hybrid cloud; Cisco, Arista, Nokia, Huawei, Ciena, NVIDIA, Extreme, Palo Alto, Fortinet, Zscaler and others in networking), concedes competition from 'generically branded or white-box manufacturers' in certain regions, states 'we anticipate that we will have to continue to adjust prices on many of our products and services to stay competitive', and adds that 'no single patent is in itself essential to our company as a whole or to any of our business segments'. That is a durable franchise, not a wide one. |
| Moat type | switching costs The 10-K locates the durable advantage in an integrated stack and its third-party ecosystem, not in patents: it names 'a strong third-party software and accessories ecosystem' among the principal competitive factors and states the Company 'designs and develops nearly the entire solution for its products, including the hardware, operating system, numerous software applications and related services,' while explicitly disclaiming IP as the source -- 'No single intellectual property right is solely responsible for protecting the Company's products and services' and the Company 'relies primarily on the innovative skills, technical competence and marketing abilities of its personnel.' The remedies now in force confirm the diagnosis negatively: the same filing describes being required to permit alternative distribution and alternative payment processing in the EU and being barred from charging commission on certain linked-out purchases in the U.S. -- remedies aimed squarely at lowering the cost of leaving Apple's rails, which is what a switching-cost moat is. | none The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned. | intangibles ip The filing's own competitive-advantage language is repeated near-verbatim for both the Server and Networking segments: 'our broad end-to-end solutions portfolio, supported by our strong intellectual property portfolio and research and development capabilities, coupled with our global reach and partner ecosystem.' It grounds that in ~21,000 worldwide issued and pending patents, decades of large-scale infrastructure engineering (it names fanless direct liquid cooling as an example), and Hewlett Packard Labs. Switching costs are the natural alternative given GreenLake consumption contracts, but the filing explicitly disclaims lock-in as a strategy: 'the cloud experience should be open and seamless across all our customers' clouds, rather than requiring customers to be locked into a cloud stack.' Accumulated engineering IP and brand, not customer captivity, is the source the document actually asserts. |
| Leadership | fast follower Apple leads on integration and margin rather than on units, and the filing says so: it 'has a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' while competitors have 'broad product lines, low-priced products, large installed bases of active devices, and large customer bases.' On the AI axis that defines this graph, Apple is following rather than leading -- it now licenses a rival's frontier models to power Siri (see the Apple Intelligence / Siri row and its citation) while pushing its own advantage down into silicon. | behind The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA). | co leader The filing claims specific leadership only in narrow places — 'long-term sustained market leadership in supercomputing' and 'AI-native networking leadership' after the Juniper Networks acquisition — while describing every market it serves as 'characterized by strong competition among major corporations with long-established positions and a large number of new and rapidly growing firms.' It names itself alongside, not above, Dell, Super Micro, Cisco and Lenovo in data-center infrastructure and alongside Cisco, Arista, Nokia, Huawei and NVIDIA in networking, and frames AI data-center networking as a market it 'aims to capture' rather than one it holds. One of a handful of scaled incumbents, not the clear leader. |
| Pricing power | strong The 10-K's own gross-margin table: total gross margin percentage 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025), with Services at 75.4% versus Products at 36.8%, and iPhone net sales rising 'due to higher net sales of Pro models' -- mix moving up, not down. Held against the filing's own hedge that 'gross margins will be subject to volatility and downward pressure,' the realised trend is the stronger evidence. | weak Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers. | weak The 10-K is unusually explicit on this. It states 'We face aggressive price competition'; that competitors with a greater presence in lower-cost markets or better component allocation 'may be able to offer lower prices than we are able to offer'; that 'to maintain our competitive position, from time-to-time we take pricing actions to offer heavier than normal discounts or elect not to pass on cost increases to customers ... which has had and could have a negative impact on our financial results'; and that 'we anticipate that we will have to continue to adjust prices on many of our products and services to stay competitive.' Its AI-systems orders are called out as 'generally subject to intense competition and pricing pressure, which can have an impact on our margins', and a separate risk factor warns that failure to sustain gross margins would reduce profitability. The filing states no gross-margin trend figure in these sections; the qualitative direction it does state is defensive. |
| Summary | Apple's moat is usually asserted through the ecosystem; the FY2025 10-K neither quantifies nor claims retention, so the evidence has to be read elsewhere in the filing. Where it does show is mix and margin: Services reached $109.2B of $416.2B net sales (+14%) at a 75.4% gross margin against 36.8% on Products, so 26% of revenue delivered $82.3B of the $195.2B total gross margin, and iPhone grew 'due to higher net sales of Pro models.' That profit concentration is also the vulnerability the filing itself flags: Apple 'earns revenue from licensing arrangements with Google LLC and other companies to offer their search services on the Company's platforms,' arrangements 'currently subject to government investigations and legal proceedings' after Google was found to have violated U.S. antitrust laws on August 5, 2024 and the D.C. District Court ordered remedies on September 2, 2025 -- with the 10-K warning that a reversal on appeal could impose DOJ's proposed remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution,' which 'could materially adversely affect the Company's ability to earn revenue from such licensing arrangements.' Apple never discloses the size of that payment in the filing -- the concentration is admitted but not measured. Alongside it, the App Store toll has already been reduced in both jurisdictions. What is not in dispute is the vertical integration: Apple designs the silicon and now the cellular modem, and uses 'custom components available from only one source.' Read together: a genuine, margin-visible switching-cost moat around an integrated stack, with its two most profitable layers under active legal reduction. | Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage. | HPE's FY2025 10-K positions the company around three stated megatrends — networking, cloud and AI — delivered through five segments (Server, Hybrid Cloud, Networking, Financial Services, Corporate Investments and Other), with Server products and Networking products each exceeding 10% of consolidated net revenue in fiscal 2025. Its defensibility rests on an accumulated intellectual-property and engineering base (~21,000 issued and pending patents as of October 31, 2025), a claimed sustained leadership position in supercomputing via HPE Cray EX, a full networking stack acquired with Juniper Networks in July 2025 spanning campus, data-center switching, WAN routing and SASE, and a captive Financial Services arm that funds consumption-based deployments. The same filing bounds that moat: it warns of 'aggressive price competition', notes that AI systems have historically been bought 'primarily by a small number of larger customers and cloud service providers' and that such orders are 'generally subject to intense competition and pricing pressure, which can have an impact on our margins', and lists a long roster of well-capitalized competitors in every market it serves. |
| Chain position | Applications-layer name in the AI chain: the 10-K describes designing 'nearly the entire solution' and using custom components 'available from only one source,' making Apple a large, concentrated buyer of leading-edge silicon rather than a supplier of AI compute to anyone else. | Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. | Downstream AI-infrastructure integrator and networking supplier: HPE assembles and sells the AI servers and rack-scale systems (ProLiant, Cray EX/XD), turnkey AI-factory stacks (HPE Private Cloud AI) and the data-center/AI networking fabric that sit between silicon vendors and enterprise, sovereign and cloud-service-provider buyers. The AI exposure is central rather than incidental — the filing's strategy section, a dedicated AI risk factor and the AI-systems order-concentration disclosure all address it — but HPE is a buyer of accelerators and components, not a designer of them, and it names NVIDIA as a competitor in networking rather than only as a supplier. |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.11 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish Editorial prior, not backtested. | -0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.05 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |