Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Amphenol | Applied Digital | Apple | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow The FY2025 10-K describes a real, well-defended position but declines every claim that would make it structural. The strength is in how Amphenol gets designed in: it 'works closely with its customers at the design stage to create and manufacture innovative solutions', and the R&D discussion says this 'often results in the Company obtaining approved vendor status for its customers' new products and programs'. The demand side reinforces it — 'for many years, customers have generally been consolidating their lists of qualified suppliers to companies that have the ability to meet certain technical, quality, delivery and other standards while maintaining geographic flexibility and competitive prices'. Against that, the Competition section opens with 'the Company encounters competition in all areas of its business', lists price among the five bases on which it competes ('technology innovation, product quality and performance, price, customer service and delivery time'), and names thirteen primary competitors: Aptiv, Belden, Corning, Foxconn Interconnect Technology, Glenair, HUBER+SUHNER, ICT Luxshare, Jonhon, Molex, Rosenberger, Sensata, TE Connectivity and Yazaki, 'among others', plus 'a large number of smaller companies who compete in specific geographies, markets or products'. The IP section explicitly declines the patent story: 'we do not believe that our competitive position or our operations are dependent upon or would be materially impacted by the loss of any single patent or group of related patents'. Scale is real but not commanding — the filing estimates the worldwide interconnect, cable-assembly, antenna, cable and sensor market at 'approximately $500 billion in 2025' against its own $23,094.7 million of net sales, and calls the industry 'highly fragmented'. A moat that has to be re-won socket by socket in a fragmented market against named peers of comparable standing is narrow, not wide. | none The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage. | narrow Argued, not assumed. The FY2025 10-K does evidence a real moat in margin: total gross margin percentage rose 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025) in markets the same filing describes as characterised by 'aggressive price competition, downward pressure on gross margins.' But the filing bounds the claim itself: it concedes 'a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' it discloses no retention, active-device or installed-base figure anywhere (its only 'large installed bases of active devices' reference describes competitors), and it discloses that both of the highest-margin layers are already being cut down by force -- Apple is 'currently subject to a court order preventing it from imposing any commission or fee on certain purchases' on the U.S. App Store storefront, has had to open 'alternative methods of distribution for iOS and iPadOS apps, alternative payment processing' in the EU, and warns that a reversal on appeal in the Google search case could impose remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution.' A moat that earns 46.9% gross margin but whose most profitable layer is being narrowed by two courts and a regulator is narrow, not wide. |
| Moat type | switching costs The filing locates the advantage in the design-in relationship, not in patents or in raw scale. Its stated strategy is to 'expand the scope and number of its preferred supplier relationships with customers across its diverse end markets', achieved by working 'closely with its customers at the design stage'; the payoff named in the R&D section is 'approved vendor status for its customers' new products and programs'. The Customers section describes the resulting stickiness in structural terms — supplier lists are being consolidated to those who clear technical, quality and delivery standards, and 'our relationships with them typically date back many years' — and it says these close relationships 'allow the Company to better anticipate and respond to these customer needs when designing new products'. Amphenol itself disclaims IP dependence and instead 'rel[ies] upon trade secrets, manufacturing know-how, continuing technological innovations and licensing opportunities'. Cost_scale is a genuine reinforcement rather than the primary source: the Company manufactures 'at facilities in approximately 40 countries', states that 'global presence is an important competitive advantage', and 'has established low-cost manufacturing and assembly facilities around the world' — but that footprint serves the design-in relationship (proximity, real-time capability, supply-base consolidation for the customer) rather than standing alone. | none The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned. | switching costs The 10-K locates the durable advantage in an integrated stack and its third-party ecosystem, not in patents: it names 'a strong third-party software and accessories ecosystem' among the principal competitive factors and states the Company 'designs and develops nearly the entire solution for its products, including the hardware, operating system, numerous software applications and related services,' while explicitly disclaiming IP as the source -- 'No single intellectual property right is solely responsible for protecting the Company's products and services' and the Company 'relies primarily on the innovative skills, technical competence and marketing abilities of its personnel.' The remedies now in force confirm the diagnosis negatively: the same filing describes being required to permit alternative distribution and alternative payment processing in the EU and being barred from charging commission on certain linked-out purchases in the U.S. -- remedies aimed squarely at lowering the cost of leaving Apple's rails, which is what a switching-cost moat is. |
| Leadership | co leader The filing claims leadership repeatedly but always in a served market, never across the industry, and always alongside named peers. In IT datacom it is unambiguous — 'Amphenol is a market leader in interconnect development for the information technology and data communications ("IT datacom") market', with 'industry-leading high-speed, power and active and passive fiber optic interconnect technologies, together with superior simulation and testing capability and cost effectiveness'. In defence it is stronger still: 'Amphenol is a world leader in the design, manufacture and supply of high-performance interconnect systems for harsh environment aerospace and defense applications', offering 'an unparalleled product breadth' and 'participating in major programs from the earliest inception across each phase of the production cycle'. Elsewhere the language is the indefinite article — 'a leading supplier' in automotive, 'a leading provider' in commercial aerospace, 'a leading global provider' in communications networks, 'a technology leader' in industrial. At the company level it says only 'one of the world's largest', and its Competition section places Molex and TE Connectivity, among others, on the same field. Roughly $23.1 billion of net sales against an estimated $500 billion market that the filing calls 'highly fragmented' is not a commanding share. | behind The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA). | fast follower Apple leads on integration and margin rather than on units, and the filing says so: it 'has a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' while competitors have 'broad product lines, low-priced products, large installed bases of active devices, and large customer bases.' On the AI axis that defines this graph, Apple is following rather than leading -- it now licenses a rival's frontier models to power Siri (see the Apple Intelligence / Siri row and its citation) while pushing its own advantage down into silicon. |
| Pricing power | moderate Margin evidence is strong but the filing does not attribute it to price. Operating income rose to 25.4% of net sales in 2025 from 20.7% in 2024 and 20.4% in 2023 (adjusted operating margin 26.2% versus 21.7%), and the stated cause is volume and cost discipline: 'strong performance and disciplined cost control, which generated strong operating leverage on the significant growth experienced during the period'. Segment margins moved the same way for the same reason — Communications Solutions to 31.1% from 24.8%, Harsh Environment Solutions to 26.2% from 24.7%, Interconnect and Sensor Systems to 19.5% from 18.4% — each explained by 'strong operating performance on the higher sales volumes'. On the other side, price is one of the five bases the Company says it competes on, customers are consolidating supplier lists partly on 'competitive prices', and the input side is not fully controlled: difficulties obtaining raw materials 'may also negatively impact the pricing of materials and components sourced or used by the Company', with 'inflationary pressures and increased commodity prices' cited as a live cost risk. The ability to hold and expand margin through a demand surge is real; the ability to set price is not asserted anywhere in the document. | weak Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers. | strong The 10-K's own gross-margin table: total gross margin percentage 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025), with Services at 75.4% versus Products at 36.8%, and iPhone net sales rising 'due to higher net sales of Pro models' -- mix moving up, not down. Held against the filing's own hedge that 'gross margins will be subject to volatility and downward pressure,' the realised trend is the stronger evidence. |
| Summary | Amphenol is, in its own words, 'one of the world's largest designers, manufacturers and marketers of electrical, electronic and fiber optic connectors and interconnect systems, antennas, sensors and sensor-based products and coaxial, high-speed, fiber optic and specialty cable', selling into a market it sizes at roughly $500 billion in 2025 through three segments — Communications Solutions (52% of 2025 net sales), Harsh Environment Solutions (26%) and Interconnect and Sensor Systems (22%). The durable part of the business is the design-stage relationship that converts into approved-vendor status on customer programs, held together by manufacturing in approximately 40 countries, roughly 6,400 research, development and engineering employees at the end of 2025, and a deliberately flat structure of 'more than 140 general managers running unique, independent businesses'; diversification is real, with no single customer at 10% or more of net sales in 2025, 2024 or 2023 and about 65% of sales outside the United States. The FY2025 result shows what that position converts into under demand: net sales of $23,094.7 million, up 52% in U.S. dollars and 38% organically, with operating income at 25.4% of net sales against 20.7% in 2024 and 20.4% in 2023 — an expansion the filing attributes to 'strong performance and disciplined cost control, which generated strong operating leverage on the significant growth experienced during the period', not to price. The same filing bounds the story: it competes on price among other factors, names thirteen primary competitors, and is buying growth heavily — approximately $3.8 billion across five acquisitions in 2025, the Andrew (Outdoor Wireless Networks and Distributed Antenna Systems) business closed 31 January 2025, and CommScope's Connectivity and Cable Solutions business closed 9 January 2026 for approximately $10.5 billion, 'the largest acquisition in the Company's history' — with acquired businesses 'currently operating below the average operating margin of the Company'. | Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage. | Apple's moat is usually asserted through the ecosystem; the FY2025 10-K neither quantifies nor claims retention, so the evidence has to be read elsewhere in the filing. Where it does show is mix and margin: Services reached $109.2B of $416.2B net sales (+14%) at a 75.4% gross margin against 36.8% on Products, so 26% of revenue delivered $82.3B of the $195.2B total gross margin, and iPhone grew 'due to higher net sales of Pro models.' That profit concentration is also the vulnerability the filing itself flags: Apple 'earns revenue from licensing arrangements with Google LLC and other companies to offer their search services on the Company's platforms,' arrangements 'currently subject to government investigations and legal proceedings' after Google was found to have violated U.S. antitrust laws on August 5, 2024 and the D.C. District Court ordered remedies on September 2, 2025 -- with the 10-K warning that a reversal on appeal could impose DOJ's proposed remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution,' which 'could materially adversely affect the Company's ability to earn revenue from such licensing arrangements.' Apple never discloses the size of that payment in the filing -- the concentration is admitted but not measured. Alongside it, the App Store toll has already been reduced in both jurisdictions. What is not in dispute is the vertical integration: Apple designs the silicon and now the cellular modem, and uses 'custom components available from only one source.' Read together: a genuine, margin-visible switching-cost moat around an integrated stack, with its two most profitable layers under active legal reduction. |
| Chain position | Amphenol occupies the physical interconnect layer of the AI build-out, and the filing makes that claim itself rather than leaving it inferred: it is 'a global provider of interconnect solutions to designers, manufacturers and operators of internet and artificial intelligence ("AI")-enabling systems', with products that 'enable a broad array of IT datacom systems and applications, including a growing range of systems to power AI and machine learning'. The exposure is material, not incidental. IT datacom was approximately 36% of 2025 net sales and grew by approximately $4,593.7 million on 'the continued acceleration in and strong demand for products used in next-generation AI-related applications', and backlog rose to approximately $8.9 billion at 31 December 2025 from approximately $6.1 billion a year earlier, an increase the filing says was 'primarily related to strong demand for the Company's products that support AI applications'. The AI pull also drove the segment mix — Communications Solutions net sales grew 71% organically 'with particular strength in AI-related applications'. It is nonetheless a diversified supplier, not an AI pure play: automotive (15%), industrial (19%), communications networks (10%), defense (9%), mobile devices (6%) and commercial aerospace (5%) make up the balance. | Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. | Applications-layer name in the AI chain: the 10-K describes designing 'nearly the entire solution' and using custom components 'available from only one source,' making Apple a large, concentrated buyer of leading-edge silicon rather than a supplier of AI compute to anyone else. |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | -0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.11 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish Editorial prior, not backtested. |