Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Applied Digital | Apple | Pfizer | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | none The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage. | narrow Argued, not assumed. The FY2025 10-K does evidence a real moat in margin: total gross margin percentage rose 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025) in markets the same filing describes as characterised by 'aggressive price competition, downward pressure on gross margins.' But the filing bounds the claim itself: it concedes 'a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' it discloses no retention, active-device or installed-base figure anywhere (its only 'large installed bases of active devices' reference describes competitors), and it discloses that both of the highest-margin layers are already being cut down by force -- Apple is 'currently subject to a court order preventing it from imposing any commission or fee on certain purchases' on the U.S. App Store storefront, has had to open 'alternative methods of distribution for iOS and iPadOS apps, alternative payment processing' in the EU, and warns that a reversal on appeal in the Google search case could impose remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution.' A moat that earns 46.9% gross margin but whose most profitable layer is being narrowed by two courts and a regulator is narrow, not wide. | eroding The FY2025 10-K publishes the expiry schedule of its own protection. The Patents table dates the basic U.S. product patent on Eliquis ($7,961 million of 2025 revenue) to 2027, the Prevnar family's Prevnar 13 ($6,494 million for the family) to 2026, the Vyndaqel family ($6,380 million) to 2026 with a 2028 extension only pending, Ibrance ($4,122 million) to 2027, Xtandi ($2,194 million) to 2027 and Xeljanz ($1,087 million) to 2026 - against Total revenues of $62,579 million. The filing then states it anticipates 'a significant reduction of revenue from patent-based or regulatory exclusivity expiries in 2026 through 2030 as several of our in-line products experience these expirations, with the rate of the reduction of revenues from patent-based or regulatory exclusivity expiries expected to significantly accelerate over the next few years', and puts the 2026 instalment at $1.5 billion. A protection whose end dates the issuer tabulates product by product, and whose revenue effect it forecasts as accelerating, is being consumed on a clock it has already disclosed. |
| Moat type | none The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned. | switching costs The 10-K locates the durable advantage in an integrated stack and its third-party ecosystem, not in patents: it names 'a strong third-party software and accessories ecosystem' among the principal competitive factors and states the Company 'designs and develops nearly the entire solution for its products, including the hardware, operating system, numerous software applications and related services,' while explicitly disclaiming IP as the source -- 'No single intellectual property right is solely responsible for protecting the Company's products and services' and the Company 'relies primarily on the innovative skills, technical competence and marketing abilities of its personnel.' The remedies now in force confirm the diagnosis negatively: the same filing describes being required to permit alternative distribution and alternative payment processing in the EU and being barred from charging commission on certain linked-out purchases in the U.S. -- remedies aimed squarely at lowering the cost of leaving Apple's rails, which is what a switching-cost moat is. | intangibles ip The filing locates the protection in the patent estate, not anywhere else. The Patents and Other Intellectual Property Rights section tabulates 'the patent rights we consider most significant in relation to our business as a whole, together with the year in which the basic product patent expires', and states that once protection is lost 'we typically lose market exclusivity on these products, and generic and biosimilar pharmaceutical manufacturers generally produce identical or highly similar products and sell them for a lower price.' The Competition section names patents as the thing rivals attack: 'several of our competitors operate without large R&D expenses and make a regular practice of challenging our product patents before their expiration', and 'Generic pharmaceutical manufacturers pose one of the biggest competitive challenges to our branded small molecule products because they can market a competing version of our product after the expiration or loss of our patent protection.' No network, switching cost or cost-curve advantage is claimed anywhere in the section. |
| Leadership | behind The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA). | fast follower Apple leads on integration and margin rather than on units, and the filing says so: it 'has a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' while competitors have 'broad product lines, low-priced products, large installed bases of active devices, and large customer bases.' On the AI axis that defines this graph, Apple is following rather than leading -- it now licenses a rival's frontier models to power Siri (see the Apple Intelligence / Siri row and its citation) while pushing its own advantage down into silicon. | co leader The 2026 Pharma 50 (Drug Discovery & Development, published 31 March 2026, ranking pharmaceutical revenue only) places Pfizer third at $62.58 billion of FY2025 revenue inside a five-company band that runs from Johnson & Johnson's Innovative Medicine at $60.40 billion to Eli Lilly's $65.18 billion, with Merck & Co. at $65.01 billion and AbbVie at $61.16 billion in between - scale-equal to its nearest peers rather than ahead of them. The same piece attributes the top slot to Lilly's tirzepatide franchise, which it puts at $36.5 billion combined and says passed Keytruda as the world's best-selling drug; Pfizer's 10-K names no comparable single franchise, discloses no market-share position for any product, and concedes in Item 1A that 'some of our competitors may have competitive, technical or other advantages over us' and that it faces 'an increasing number of potential competitors worldwide, including from China, that have expanded R&D capabilities.' |
| Pricing power | weak Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers. | strong The 10-K's own gross-margin table: total gross margin percentage 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025), with Services at 75.4% versus Products at 36.8%, and iPhone net sales rising 'due to higher net sales of Pro models' -- mix moving up, not down. Held against the filing's own hedge that 'gross margins will be subject to volatility and downward pressure,' the realised trend is the stronger evidence. | weak Price is the lever the filing shows moving against it. CMS selected Eliquis - which the 10-K says 'accounted for 13% of Total revenues in 2025' - for the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program, and 'its government-set Maximum Fair Price became effective January 1, 2026', with Ibrance and Xtandi following in 2027 and Xeljanz in 2028. In September 2025 Pfizer 'voluntarily agreed' with the U.S. administration to make certain U.S. prices 'more comparable to those in other developed countries' and to sell through the TrumpRx.gov platform 'at significant discounts to current retail prices'. Gross-to-net product revenue deductions rose to $36,374 million in 2025 from $30,048 million in 2023 while Total revenues fell to $62,579 million, and the IRA Medicare Part D Redesign alone 'negatively impacted our 2025 revenues by approximately $1 billion'. Lower U.S. net price is named as a drag on Vyndaqel, Ibrance, Xeljanz, Nurtec ODT and Lorbrena; every 2025 growth line the filing explains is attributed to demand, patient share or launch uptake, none to price. Cost of sales at 25.7% of revenues shows the manufactured margin is intact - what is not intact is the ability to set the price. |
| Summary | Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage. | Apple's moat is usually asserted through the ecosystem; the FY2025 10-K neither quantifies nor claims retention, so the evidence has to be read elsewhere in the filing. Where it does show is mix and margin: Services reached $109.2B of $416.2B net sales (+14%) at a 75.4% gross margin against 36.8% on Products, so 26% of revenue delivered $82.3B of the $195.2B total gross margin, and iPhone grew 'due to higher net sales of Pro models.' That profit concentration is also the vulnerability the filing itself flags: Apple 'earns revenue from licensing arrangements with Google LLC and other companies to offer their search services on the Company's platforms,' arrangements 'currently subject to government investigations and legal proceedings' after Google was found to have violated U.S. antitrust laws on August 5, 2024 and the D.C. District Court ordered remedies on September 2, 2025 -- with the 10-K warning that a reversal on appeal could impose DOJ's proposed remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution,' which 'could materially adversely affect the Company's ability to earn revenue from such licensing arrangements.' Apple never discloses the size of that payment in the filing -- the concentration is admitted but not measured. Alongside it, the App Store toll has already been reduced in both jurisdictions. What is not in dispute is the vertical integration: Apple designs the silicon and now the cellular modem, and uses 'custom components available from only one source.' Read together: a genuine, margin-visible switching-cost moat around an integrated stack, with its two most profitable layers under active legal reduction. | Two clocks run in opposite directions inside the same company. The revenue base is near-dated: Eliquis, the Prevnar family, the Vyndaqel family, Ibrance, Xtandi and Xeljanz all carry U.S. basic product patents expiring 2026 or 2027 in the 10-K's own table, and the filing warns the resulting revenue loss will 'significantly accelerate over the next few years'. The replacement book is later-dated - Padcev and Lorbrena to 2033, Nurtec ODT and Litfulo to 2034, Prevnar 20 to 2035, Abrysvo, Cibinqo and Elrexfio to 2036, Comirnaty and Paxlovid to 2041 - but in 2025 it was still much smaller, and the two products with the longest patent runway are the two the filing says are shrinking fastest (Comirnaty down 20% and Paxlovid down 59% operationally). The 10-K's answer is purchased pipeline rather than defended position: it cites the Seagen and Metsera acquisitions as 'significant investments in obesity and oncology, respectively, which are extremely competitive therapeutic areas', while R&D expense itself fell 4% to $10,437 million. Excluding Comirnaty and Paxlovid the remaining business grew 6% operationally in 2025, which is the honest measure of what is being rebuilt underneath the expiries. A third pressure sits on top of the patent clock and is independent of it: government price-setting now reaches the largest product in the book. |
| Chain position | Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. | Applications-layer name in the AI chain: the 10-K describes designing 'nearly the entire solution' and using custom components 'available from only one source,' making Apple a large, concentrated buyer of leading-edge silicon rather than a supplier of AI compute to anyone else. | Demand side of the AI chain, not a supplier into it. The 10-K lists 'Scale AI across our business' as one of four 2026 key priorities and describes 'expanding automation, data-driven decision making, and enterprise AI solutions', crediting 'enhanced digital enablement, including automation and AI' for part of the savings in its cost-realignment and R&D-simplification programs. It describes no AI model, tool or platform that Pfizer sells. |
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| Long-horizon vote | -0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.11 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish Editorial prior, not backtested. | -0.17 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish Editorial prior, not backtested. |