Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Cipher Mining | Core Scientific | Apple | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | none Cipher (renamed Cipher Digital Inc. on 20 February 2026) holds signed, credit-supported leases but has not yet shown that they amount to a durable advantage. Its 2025 Form 10-K (filed 2026-02-24) says "Through the end of 2025, our revenue has been derived from mining bitcoin". Its Q2 2026 business update (2026-08-04, Exhibit 99.1, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1819989/000181998926000038/q226_earningsxprxdraftxvf.htm) reported "Q2 2026 Revenue of $25 million", and its first HPC rent began only in August 2026 at Black Pearl. The 10-K's own risk factors describe a contested market. They say "There has been an increasing number of businesses constructing HPC data centers, which has resulted in increasing competition and pricing pressure that may cause us to reduce our pricing in order to remain competitive", that "our data centers are single-tenant properties", and that lessees "will have the right to terminate the lease if there are significant delays in the completion of construction". At Barber Lake, where the 10-K targeted Phase I delivery "by September 30, 2026", a September 2026 amendment, made "In connection with change orders and the continued evolution of tenant requirements", moved data-hall deliveries to the fourth quarter of 2026 through the first quarter of 2027. Under it, Cipher "will bear the first $359.3 million of costs in excess of the initial budgeted amount" (2026-09-25). There is real counter-evidence: a 15-year Amazon lease, a Google-backstopped Fluidstack lease whose contracted life a "leading AI lab" extended to 20 years, and a third lease with an investment-grade hyperscale tenant. Until that capacity is delivered and paying rent, though, a moat is not shown, so the band is none. | narrow Core Scientific's position rests on long-dated, take-or-pay leases of energized capacity, not on a protected market. Its 2025 Form 10-K (filed 2026-03-02) says wholesale colocation "typically involves large, long-term agreements with a limited number of customers, often with initial terms of 10 years or more". It adds that such leases are frequently paired with take-or-pay commitments "under which the customer is obligated to pay for leased customer power capacity regardless of utilization, providing operators with revenue visibility over the contract term." On the Q2 2026 call (2026-07-28, https://d1io3yog0oux5.cloudfront.net/_fda3a1f2f1890adaa7ac6c4d9d310971/corescientific/db/1085/11280/prepared_remarks/2Q26+Prepared+Remarks+Transcript+PDF.pdf) management said the company "now has approximately 1.1 gigawatts of total contracted billable capacity, representing more than $24 billion of base contracted revenue". That total combines CoreWeave's 590 MW, on what the CFO called "the 12-year lease terms", with AMD agreements for 530 MW that carry "more than $14 billion of base contracted revenue across the 15-year agreements with 2.5% annual escalators". Management also said it was "currently billing for 437 megawatts of capacity". The limits are just as clear. The 10-K says "Competitors compete on price, facility location, reputation and perceived skill with respect to performance" and that many rivals "are more established, have better brand recognition, are well capitalized". It also says "One customer, CoreWeave, currently accounts for 100% of our Colocation segment revenue." The Q2 2026 10-Q says a material weakness tied to converting mining facilities to HPC "has not been remediated". Long take-or-pay terms are the norm in wholesale colocation, so the contracts alone are contracted revenue, not an edge over rivals. What supports narrow is capacity already billing and a tenant that has expanded in place, and even that is bound to those contracts and to one customer today, so the band is narrow, not wide. | narrow Argued, not assumed. The FY2025 10-K does evidence a real moat in margin: total gross margin percentage rose 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025) in markets the same filing describes as characterised by 'aggressive price competition, downward pressure on gross margins.' But the filing bounds the claim itself: it concedes 'a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' it discloses no retention, active-device or installed-base figure anywhere (its only 'large installed bases of active devices' reference describes competitors), and it discloses that both of the highest-margin layers are already being cut down by force -- Apple is 'currently subject to a court order preventing it from imposing any commission or fee on certain purchases' on the U.S. App Store storefront, has had to open 'alternative methods of distribution for iOS and iPadOS apps, alternative payment processing' in the EU, and warns that a reversal on appeal in the Google search case could impose remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution.' A moat that earns 46.9% gross margin but whose most profitable layer is being narrowed by two courts and a regulator is narrow, not wide. |
| Moat type | none No moat source is demonstrated yet. Switching costs are the most likely candidate, since the leases are long (15 years at Black Pearl; Barber Lake now a 20-year contracted life) and each site has a single tenant. But the 10-K says tenant guarantees "will only be effective after rent commencement under such leases and are subject to certain limitations", and by August 2026 rent had begun at only one site. The advantages the 10-K claims are the company's own. It speaks of "industry-leading expertise in originating and securing industrial-scale, greenfield data center sites" and of securing West Texas land "on more favorable terms than in more established data center markets". The same document says "there is significant competition for power capacity and energized facilities". Intellectual property is modest: "four granted United States patents and one issued patent in Taiwan". With 66 full-time employees, Cipher has no scale advantage over the competitors it names: CoreWeave, Digital Realty, Equinix, Vantage Data Centers and Aligned Data Centers. | switching costs The lock-in is contractual and physical. The 10-K's description of colocation is that "Customers deploy and manage their own hardware, while the operator designs, builds and operates the underlying infrastructure", under take-or-pay leases "often with initial terms of 10 years or more". On the Q2 2026 call the COO described the AMD program as "an integrated colocation platform engineered to support AMD's Helios Rack-Scale systems" with a "close-coupled AMD design framework". Leaving would mean rebuilding that power, cooling and fit-out elsewhere. The relationship with CoreWeave shows the stickiness: it "began with a 16-megawatt lease at our Austin campus in 2024 and has since expanded to 590 megawatts of total contracted capacity". Intellectual property is not the source. The 10-K says the company has "filed over 130 patent applications" but that these laws and procedures "provide only limited protection". Scale is not the source either: the 10-K says rivals are "well capitalized" and some are organized to lower "their external cost of capital". | switching costs The 10-K locates the durable advantage in an integrated stack and its third-party ecosystem, not in patents: it names 'a strong third-party software and accessories ecosystem' among the principal competitive factors and states the Company 'designs and develops nearly the entire solution for its products, including the hardware, operating system, numerous software applications and related services,' while explicitly disclaiming IP as the source -- 'No single intellectual property right is solely responsible for protecting the Company's products and services' and the Company 'relies primarily on the innovative skills, technical competence and marketing abilities of its personnel.' The remedies now in force confirm the diagnosis negatively: the same filing describes being required to permit alternative distribution and alternative payment processing in the EU and being barred from charging commission on certain linked-out purchases in the U.S. -- remedies aimed squarely at lowering the cost of leaving Apple's rails, which is what a switching-cost moat is. |
| Leadership | fast follower No independent share or rank was found. The 10-K names CoreWeave, Digital Realty, Equinix, Vantage Data Centers and Aligned Data Centers as competitors, along with miners that have "signed leases with hyperscalers and HPC tenants": Hut 8, IREN, TeraWulf, Core Scientific and Applied Digital. Cipher has signed hyperscale-grade tenants (Amazon; Fluidstack with a Google backstop; a third investment-grade hyperscaler) but delivered its first HPC capacity only in August 2026 (Q2 2026 update). That makes it a fast follower. Its self-description as "a leading developer, owner, and operator of industrial-scale data centers" is the company's own claim and is not counted. | fast follower No independent share or rank was found. The 10-K lists Aligned Data Centers, Compass Datacenters, Equinix, Digital Realty Trust, NTT, QTS, Switch, Vantage Data Centers and CyrusOne as HDC competitors and says "Many of these competitors are more established, have better brand recognition, are well capitalized". It separately names Applied Digital, Cipher Mining, Galaxy Digital, Hut 8, IREN and TeraWulf as miners converting facilities for AI and HPC customers. Against that field Core Scientific is scaling quickly from a small base: 437 MW billing and about 1.1 GW contracted at the Q2 2026 call. That makes it a fast follower behind larger incumbents. Its press releases describe the company as "a leader in designing, building and operating large scale, purpose-built data centers", but that is the company's own claim and is not counted. | fast follower Apple leads on integration and margin rather than on units, and the filing says so: it 'has a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' while competitors have 'broad product lines, low-priced products, large installed bases of active devices, and large customer bases.' On the AI axis that defines this graph, Apple is following rather than leading -- it now licenses a rival's frontier models to power Siri (see the Apple Intelligence / Siri row and its citation) while pushing its own advantage down into silicon. |
| Pricing power | weak The 10-K says competition "has resulted in increasing competition and pricing pressure that may cause us to reduce our pricing in order to remain competitive". It adds that if customers cut usage "we may be compelled to lower our prices or risk losing a significant customer". At Barber Lake, Cipher agreed to absorb "the first $359.3 million of costs in excess of the initial budgeted amount", with the tenant reimbursing "50% of any such costs above that amount" (2026-09-25, Exhibit 99.1, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1819989/000181998926000043/barberlakeleaseamendmentpr.htm). Its one input-cost edge is specific to mining: Odessa's power costs about 2.8 c/kWh under the Luminant contract, available "until at least July 2027". A landlord that concedes cost overruns to its tenants has weak pricing power. | moderate Price is set competitively at signing and then locked in. The 10-K says "Competitors compete on price" and warns that "If we fail to accurately estimate the factors upon which we base our contract pricing, we may generate less profit than expected or incur losses on those contracts". Once signed, the AMD agreements carry "2.5% annual escalators" (Q2 2026 call), and the Q2 2026 10-Q says "power costs are passed through to our customer without markup". To win AMD, the company also gave AMD "market-priced warrants to purchase Core Scientific's common stock, subject to certain commercial conditions" (AMD release, 2026-07-28, https://investors.corescientific.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/138/core-scientific-and-amd-announce-infrastructure-partnership). In Q2 2026, colocation revenue was $136,669 thousand and the cost of colocation services was $56,686 thousand, including $35,073 thousand of power fees passed through to the customer (10-Q). Contracted escalators protect price over a 12- to 15-year term, but nothing shows a premium over rivals, so pricing power is moderate. | strong The 10-K's own gross-margin table: total gross margin percentage 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025), with Services at 75.4% versus Products at 36.8%, and iPhone net sales rising 'due to higher net sales of Pro models' -- mix moving up, not down. Held against the filing's own hedge that 'gross margins will be subject to volatility and downward pressure,' the realised trend is the stronger evidence. |
| Summary | Cipher built bitcoin mining data centres in Texas and is now developing single-tenant AI and HPC campuses for lease to hyperscalers. Its 10-K reports a portfolio of "4.2 gigawatts ("GW") of capacity across 10 sites". It lists a 15-year Amazon Web Services lease for about 300 MW of turnkey capacity at Black Pearl and a Fluidstack lease at Barber Lake (300 MW gross) under which Google "has agreed to backstop certain obligations of Fluidstack". It describes bitcoin mining at Odessa on a Luminant power contract at about 2.8 c/kWh. In 2026 it signed a third campus lease "with an investment-grade Hyperscale tenant" (Q1 2026 update, 2026-05-05), delivered first Black Pearl capacity in August "two months ahead of the original schedule" with rent commenced, and fully funded its Stingray development with a bond (Q2 2026 update). On 2026-09-25 it said Barber Lake's contracted life was extended from 10 to 20 years, taking contracted revenue at the site "from $3.8 billion to over $9 billion". The 10-K says Odessa was "the first bitcoin mining data center awarded the Management and Operations, or M&O, Stamp of Approval award from the Uptime Institute", which is independent recognition of how the company operates. Against this, the latest quarter's revenue was still bitcoin mining and fell to $25 million. The 10-K describes growing "competition and pricing pressure", single-tenant concentration, and termination rights for construction delays. The Barber Lake schedule was reset, and Cipher absorbs the first $359.3 million of cost overruns. Cipher's contracted pipeline is substantial, but a competitive advantage is not yet demonstrated, so it is rated as having no moat. That could change to narrow once its leased campuses are delivered and paying rent. | Core Scientific began as a bitcoin miner and is turning its sites into high-density colocation (HDC) data centres for AI and HPC tenants. At 31 December 2025 it owned or leased ten data centres across seven U.S. states, with "approximately 1.4 gigawatts ("GW") of gross utility power capacity, or approximately 920 megawatts ("MW") of total leasable customer power capacity", and it intends "to convert every megawatt in our portfolio to high-density colocation infrastructure over the next three years" (2025 10-K). The transition is now visible in the numbers: colocation revenue "represented 77% of total revenue" in the first half of 2026, against 12% a year earlier (Q2 2026 10-Q). By July 2026 the company was billing for 437 MW. It had about 1.1 GW contracted with two anchor customers, CoreWeave at 590 MW and AMD at 530 MW (about 380 MW leased directly to AMD and about 150 MW for a neocloud that AMD backs), and AMD holds an exclusive right, under specified conditions, to lease as much as 2 additional gigawatts (Q2 2026 call). Those long take-or-pay contracts, plus energized power at a time when the 10-K says utilities demand "significant collateral postings at contract execution" and large builds take "18 to 24 months, or longer", are the source of a narrow advantage. They do not make a protected franchise. The 10-K names nine established colocation providers and six converted miners as competitors, says competitors "compete on price", and reports that CoreWeave was 100 percent of colocation revenue. The Q2 2026 10-Q says colocation revenue "is concentrated with a single customer" and that the conversion-related material weakness is still unremediated. Build costs are "approximately $11 million to $12 million per megawatt" (Q2 2026 call), and the company expects to finance the AMD build-out through project-level bonds. Core Scientific is rated as having a narrow moat: contract-bound switching costs, with no evidence of a price premium or a scale advantage. | Apple's moat is usually asserted through the ecosystem; the FY2025 10-K neither quantifies nor claims retention, so the evidence has to be read elsewhere in the filing. Where it does show is mix and margin: Services reached $109.2B of $416.2B net sales (+14%) at a 75.4% gross margin against 36.8% on Products, so 26% of revenue delivered $82.3B of the $195.2B total gross margin, and iPhone grew 'due to higher net sales of Pro models.' That profit concentration is also the vulnerability the filing itself flags: Apple 'earns revenue from licensing arrangements with Google LLC and other companies to offer their search services on the Company's platforms,' arrangements 'currently subject to government investigations and legal proceedings' after Google was found to have violated U.S. antitrust laws on August 5, 2024 and the D.C. District Court ordered remedies on September 2, 2025 -- with the 10-K warning that a reversal on appeal could impose DOJ's proposed remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution,' which 'could materially adversely affect the Company's ability to earn revenue from such licensing arrangements.' Apple never discloses the size of that payment in the filing -- the concentration is admitted but not measured. Alongside it, the App Store toll has already been reduced in both jurisdictions. What is not in dispute is the vertical integration: Apple designs the silicon and now the cellular modem, and uses 'custom components available from only one source.' Read together: a genuine, margin-visible switching-cost moat around an integrated stack, with its two most profitable layers under active legal reduction. |
| Chain position | Cipher develops single-tenant, powered data-centre campuses for hyperscale and AI tenants: Amazon at Black Pearl, Fluidstack (backstopped by Google) at Barber Lake, and an unnamed investment-grade hyperscaler at a third campus. Meanwhile it winds down bitcoin mining. | Core Scientific leases powered, liquid-cooled data-centre capacity to AI compute providers: CoreWeave (590 MW) and AMD, including a neocloud that AMD backs (about 530 MW), per the Q2 2026 call. It sits between utilities and GPU cloud operators while it winds down bitcoin self-mining. | Applications-layer name in the AI chain: the 10-K describes designing 'nearly the entire solution' and using custom components 'available from only one source,' making Apple a large, concentrated buyer of leading-edge silicon rather than a supplier of AI compute to anyone else. |
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| Long-horizon vote | -0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.11 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish Editorial prior, not backtested. |