Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Dell Technologies | Applied Digital | TE Connectivity | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow The FY2026 10-K describes advantages that are real but shallow, and a revenue mix that is diluting them. It names them as 'our end-to-end solutions portfolio, go-to-market capabilities, supply chain, and global services' and calls the direct sales channel 'a significant competitive advantage', while conceding it faces 'ongoing product and price competition in all areas of our business from both branded and generic competitors' and, on components, that 'any disruption that may occur because of our dependence on single- or limited-source vendors would not disproportionately disadvantage us relative to our competitors' - i.e. no differentiated supply position. The filing's own margin table shows where the franchise actually earns: total gross margin fell from 23.8% of net revenue in Fiscal 2024 to 22.2% in Fiscal 2025 to 20.0% in Fiscal 2026, and inside that, product gross margin fell 17.5% to 15.8% to 13.7% while services gross margin rose 40.8% to 41.4% to 44.8%. Narrow rather than none, because the high-margin services and storage core is intact and its margin rate improved; narrow rather than wide, because the line that is growing carries a 13.7% product gross margin and the filing attributes the whole decline to it. | none The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage. | narrow The FY2025 10-K's own Competition section undercuts any claim of insulation: 'The industries in which we operate are highly competitive, and we compete with thousands of companies that range from large multinational corporations to local manufacturers', competition is 'generally based on breadth of product offering, product innovation, price, quality, delivery, and service', and TE has 'experienced, and expect[s] to continue to experience, downward pressure on prices'. The same filing explicitly disclaims IP as the basis of its position: 'we do not believe that our competitive position or our operations are dependent upon or would be materially impacted by any single patent or group of related patents.' What TE does hold is durable rather than absolute — it calls itself 'one of the leading providers of advanced automobile connectivity solutions', its Industrial segment 'a leading supplier', and it converted that position into rising profitability across the same filing's three income statements (gross margin 31.5% of net sales in FY2023, 34.4% in FY2024, 35.2% in FY2025). A position that earns expanding margins into admitted price pressure is an advantage; one held against thousands of competitors and no decisive patent is not a wide one. |
| Moat type | cost scale The filing locates the advantage in scale of distribution and supply, not in proprietary rights. It states 'Our world-class supply chain operates at significant scale', describes a direct sales force plus a partner network that produced 'approximately 40% of our net revenue' in Fiscal 2026, and lists supply chain and global services among its competitive advantages. The IP alternative is ruled out in the same document: with 25,859 granted patents held at January 30, 2026, Dell still says 'we are not substantially dependent on any single patent or group of related patents.' | none The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned. | switching costs The FY2025 10-K locates the advantage at the customer, not in patents. It describes 'close working relationships with many of our customers' whose 'relationships with them typically date back many years', and co-development as the mechanism: 'By working with our customers in developing new products and technologies, we believe we can identify and act on trends and leverage knowledge about next-generation technology across our products.' Roughly 75% of fiscal 2025 net sales were direct to manufacturers rather than through distribution, and the Transportation segment's products 'must withstand harsh conditions' — parts engineered in with the customer and built to survive the application, so the position sits inside the customer's design rather than in a purchase order. The filing rules the alternative out in its own words on intellectual property, so intangibles_ip is not the source; the 'thousands of companies' in Competition rules out efficient_scale. |
| Leadership | co leader The 10-K's only positioning claim is the unquantified 'Dell Technologies is a leader in the global technology industry'; it names no competitor and gives no share anywhere. The band therefore rests on disclosed absolute scale - ISG net revenue of 60,826m and CSG net revenue of 50,984m in Fiscal 2026, operations in over 170 countries - set against the filing's own admission that hyperscale Infrastructure-as-a-Service buyers 'often buy their infrastructure directly from original design manufacturers', which caps how much of the market Dell can lead at all. | behind The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA). | co leader The FY2025 10-K claims leadership in qualified form and then names the peers who contest it. Transportation Solutions 'is a leader in connectivity and sensor technologies' and TE is 'one of the leading providers of advanced automobile connectivity solutions' — one of, not the — while the segment's 'major competitors include Yazaki, Aptiv, Sumitomo, Sensata, Honeywell, Molex, and Amphenol'. Industrial Solutions 'is a leading supplier of products that connect and distribute power, data, and signals' and 'competes primarily against Amphenol, Hubbell, Carlisle Companies, Integer Holdings, Molex, Omron, JST, and Korea Electric Terminal (KET)'. Amphenol and Molex appear on both lists, so TE shares the top of the interconnect market rather than owning it. |
| Pricing power | weak The filing describes price-taking and its own tables confirm it. It reports 'ongoing product and price competition in all areas of our business from both branded and generic competitors' and says 'We closely monitor market pricing, including the effect of foreign exchange rate movements, in an effort to provide the best value for our customers.' Total gross margin fell from 23.8% of net revenue in Fiscal 2024 to 22.2% in Fiscal 2025 to 20.0% in Fiscal 2026, with product gross margin down to 13.7%; CSG operating margin fell three straight years (7.6%, 6.1%, 5.6% of segment revenue); and non-GAAP operating income as a percentage of net revenue 'decreased 10 basis points to 8.8%' even as revenue grew 19%. Consolidated operating margin did rise 70 basis points to 7.2%, but the filing credits a lower operating expense rate for that, not price. | weak Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers. | moderate The FY2025 10-K states both halves plainly: TE has 'experienced, and expect[s] to continue to experience, downward pressure on prices. However, as a result of increased costs and tariffs, certain of our businesses implemented price increases in recent years.' Pass-through, not price-setting. The realised result is margin expansion rather than erosion — gross margin of 31.5% of net sales in FY2023, 34.4% in FY2024 and 35.2% in FY2025 per the same filing's income statements, and 36.5% ($5,319M on $14,573M) for the nine months to 26 June 2026 versus 35.3% a year earlier, with Q3 FY2026 GAAP operating margin of 19%, per the 22 July 2026 results release (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385157/000110465926085589/tel-20260722xex99d1.htm). Strong would require pricing that leads rather than follows cost; weak is contradicted by three years of expanding gross margin. |
| Summary | The AI-server line is enormous and it is not a moat - the FY2026 10-K says so in its own margin bridge. AI-optimized servers net revenue went 1,873m in Fiscal 2024 to 9,286m in Fiscal 2025 to 24,683m in Fiscal 2026 (+396% then +166%), lifting total ISG revenue to 60,826m (+40%). Over the same year ISG operating income as a percentage of segment revenue fell 110 basis points to 11.7% 'due to a decline in gross margin rate that outpaced the decline in operating expense rate. Gross margin rate decreased primarily as the result of a shift in mix towards our AI-optimized servers offerings', and the Fiscal 2027 outlook repeats the expectation of 'margin rate pressure resulting from a continuing shift in mix towards our AI-optimized servers offerings'. The cleanest test of pass-through is the filing's product-versus-services split: product net revenue grew 27% to 90,405m at a 13.7% gross margin (down from 15.8% and 17.5%), while services net revenue fell 4% to 23,133m at a 44.8% gross margin. The AI boom arrived entirely as thin product revenue and did not pull the profitable services book along with it. What Dell adds is described plainly as integration: it uses contract manufacturers, buys components from suppliers and 'subsequently sell[s] those components to the manufacturer', and its own 'manufacturing process consists of assembly, software installation, functional testing, and quality control'. The bypass is named too: 'We also face competition from non-traditional IT companies, including large Infrastructure-as-a-Service providers, that often buy their infrastructure directly from original design manufacturers. Competitive pressures could increase if customers choose to move existing workloads to these providers.' What survives as a moat is the part an ODM cannot sell an enterprise: a direct sales force and account teams, a global service and support footprint whose gross margin rate is still rising, storage that held revenue within 3% of flat through the whole mix shift, and Dell Payment Solutions financing that produces multiyear recurring arrangements. | Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage. | TE Connectivity sells the connectors, terminals, sensors and cable-protection parts that, in its own framing, 'enable the distribution of power, signal, and data' — a component vendor, never a system or compute vendor. The FY2025 10-K puts the two reportable segments, Transportation Solutions (54% of net sales) and Industrial Solutions (46%), against a combined served market it estimates at roughly $200 billion, which tells you immediately that no single share number governs this business: the filing discloses no market share, says 'no single customer accounted for a significant amount of our net sales in fiscal 2025, 2024, or 2023', and states that because TE is 'not organized by product or service, it is not practicable to disclose net sales by product or service'. The defensible part is entrenchment. Parts get designed in with the customer and then qualified to survive automotive, aerospace, subsea and grid conditions; TE sells about 75% of net sales direct into ~130 countries; relationships 'typically date back many years'. That is a switching-cost moat, and the filing is unusually candid that it is not a patent moat — no single patent or group of patents is material to its competitive position. The limit is equally plain in the filing: highly competitive industries, thousands of competitors, and persistent downward price pressure, with Amphenol and Molex named as competitors in BOTH segments and Yazaki, Aptiv and Sumitomo heading the Transportation segment's competitor list. The evidence that the moat is nonetheless working is margin plus mix. Gross margin ran 31.5% / 34.4% / 35.2% of net sales across FY2023-FY2025, and in the nine months to 26 June 2026 gross margin was $5,319M on $14,573M of net sales (36.5%) against $4,419M on $12,513M (35.3%) a year earlier, while Q3 FY2026 GAAP operating margin was 19% and orders hit a record $5.7 billion, up 27% year over year. Growth has also rotated: digital data networks grew 34.2% in Q3 FY2026 (34.0% organic) and 48.8% over nine months, with the CEO naming 'increased momentum in AI in both the data center and across the broader energy infrastructure' — while sensors, an end market for which the 10-K makes no leadership claim at all, shrank 2.8% organically in the quarter. Narrow, not wide: a real toll on other people's platforms, collected under admitted price pressure. |
| Chain position | Integrator between accelerator and component suppliers and enterprise or sovereign buyers: the 10-K says Dell purchases components from suppliers, sells them on to contract manufacturers, and performs 'assembly, software installation, functional testing, and quality control', then reaches customers through a direct sales force and a partner network that generated about 40% of Fiscal 2026 net revenue. | Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. | TE is an upstream component supplier to the AI build-out, not a participant in compute. It sells 'connectivity and sensor solutions [that] enable the distribution of power, signal, and data to advance next-generation transportation, energy networks, automated factories, data centers enabling artificial intelligence', about 75% of it direct to manufacturers across roughly 130 countries. AI exposure runs through one end market: digital data networks was 28% of Industrial Solutions, and Industrial Solutions was 46% of fiscal 2025 net sales — so the datacenter line is a minority of a company still 54% transportation. That minority is where the growth now is: digital data networks net sales rose 34.2% in Q3 FY2026 and 48.8% over the nine months, and energy rose 34.4% in the quarter, the CEO tying both to AI momentum 'in both the data center and across the broader energy infrastructure' (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385157/000110465926085589/tel-20260722xex99d1.htm). |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.05 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | -0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |