Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Digital Realty Trust | Applied Digital | Cisco Systems | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow The FY2025 10-K's own competitive record cuts both ways. Item 1 says a "high-quality, highly interconnected global portfolio such as ours could not be easily replicated today on a cost-competitive basis," yet Item 1A concedes that competitors have "significantly greater financial, marketing and other resources and more ready access to capital" and that as rivals keep developing space, "rental rates may be reduced or we may face delays in leasing." A durable advantage that its own filing says new supply can price against is bounded, not unassailable. | none The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage. | narrow The FY2025 10-K shows a moat that still pays but no longer compounds: total gross margin of 64.9% and remaining performance obligations of $43,533 million (up 6%) against a Networking product category that fell from $34,570 million in fiscal 2023 to $29,229 million in fiscal 2024 to $28,304 million in fiscal 2025, and a product gross-margin bridge in which 'Product pricing' subtracted 1.6 percentage points. All of the reported category growth came from Splunk-carrying lines - Security +59% and Observability +26%. Real and durable, but bounded: narrow, not wide. |
| Moat type | network effects Item 1 attributes the hard-to-replicate part of the portfolio to connectivity rather than to real estate: "the network density, interconnection infrastructure and connectivity-centric customers in certain of our data centers have led to the organic formation of densely connected data communities that are difficult for competitors to replicate." That community sits on over 232,000 cross connects in over 55 metros, so each network and cloud that lands makes the same building worth more to the next tenant. | none The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned. | switching costs The durable piece is the contracted annuity attached to installed equipment: total remaining performance obligations of $43,533 million, of which $21,961 million is services and $21,810 million is long-term (recognised beyond twelve months), carried at a services gross margin of 68.5% that has risen for three consecutive years from 66.4% and 68.1%. Customers keep paying for support on gear they already run. |
| Leadership | co leader Item 1 claims the title of "the largest global provider of cloud- and carrier-neutral data center, colocation and interconnection solutions," but the Competition section names Equinix and NTT as operators of properties "similar to ours in some of the same metropolitan areas," plus Global Switch and regional operators abroad — a shared top tier on the company's own telling, not a solitary one. | behind The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA). | co leader The 10-K names no competitor and discloses no market share anywhere in Management's Discussion and Analysis. The positional facts it does give are scale and direction: Networking product revenue of $28,304 million in fiscal 2025 - by far the largest of its four categories - but down $6.3 billion from fiscal 2023, with channel partner financing volume falling from $32.1 billion to $27.1 billion to $24.9 billion across fiscal 2023-2025. |
| Pricing power | strong FY2025 renewals signed re-priced upward in every bucket — +27.0% on greater-than-1 MW space ($146 to $186 per square foot), +4.6% on 0-1 MW ($268 to $280) and +43.0% on other ($49 to $71) — and MD&A expects average aggregate rental rates on 2026 renewals to be positive against the rates currently paid for the same space "on a GAAP basis and on a cash basis." On costs, the filing says utilities expense "is our largest expense category" and that "the vast majority of the expense is passed directly through to our customers," which it credits with significantly mitigating exposure to power-cost increases rather than removing it. The cap: Item 1A warns competitor development could still force rates down. | weak Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers. | moderate The product gross-margin bridge attributes fiscal 2025's 0.2-point improvement to productivity (+2.0 points) and mix (+1.1 points) while 'Product pricing' subtracted 1.6 points; a legal dispute with a supplier cost a further 0.8 points. Total gross margin of 64.9% (product 63.7%, services 68.5%) is held by cost and mix, not by price. |
| Summary | Digital Realty rents space, power and connectivity rather than compute: at 2025 year-end its portfolio held 310 data centers and roughly 57.6 million rentable square feet across more than 55 metros in over 30 countries, about 84.7% leased, serving more than 5,000 customers. Two different businesses sit inside that footprint. The greater-than-1 MW wholesale side is a capital-and-power race — 769 MW of projects underway with 64% pre-leased, and land that "could accommodate over 3,500 megawatts of additional data center capacity" — where the 10-K names Equinix, NTT, Global Switch and "various private operators" as rivals and warns that added supply can push rents down. The colocation and interconnection side is the defended half: over 232,000 cross connects and the "densely connected data communities" Item 1 says competitors cannot easily replicate, reinforced by contracts the filing describes as generally running 5-10+ years on large deployments and by improvements "installed at our customers' expense." FY2025 leasing supports that read — renewals signed re-priced +27.0% on greater-than-1 MW space and +4.6% on 0-1 MW — while customer concentration is the offsetting exposure, with the largest customer at roughly 11.7% of annualized recurring revenue. | Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage. | The installed base still switches slowly - but the filing does not claim it is winning the AI datacenter on the strength of that base. The fiscal 2025 Networking decline is attributed to 'product shipments returning to normalized levels during the first half of fiscal 2025 from the elevated levels ... in the first half of fiscal 2024', to servers, and to 'a decline in campus switching' - normalisation, not disclosed share loss, so the whitebox/Arista thesis is not something this 10-K either confirms or denies. What the filing does disclose is the shape of the AI dollar Cisco is actually winning: Americas service provider and cloud growth 'driven by AI infrastructure revenue from webscale customers', funded by additional purchase commitments 'related to manufacturing Cisco Silicon One and other products to meet demand from webscale and other customers', which 'significantly increased our supply chain exposure, which has resulted in negative impacts to our product gross margin in recent periods and may result in further negative impacts in future periods'. Enterprise switching earns 63.7% product gross margin; webscale silicon costs margin to serve. The moat is intact where the annuity is and thin where the growth is. |
| Chain position | Landlord to the AI stack — sells the space, power and interconnection that cloud, network and enterprise tenants run compute in (Oracle, IBM, Meta Platforms, AT&T, Comcast and Lumen are among the customers named in Item 1), with roughly 2.9 GW of total in-place IT capacity. | Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. | Supplies networking into AI datacenters: the 10-K ties Americas service provider and cloud growth to 'AI infrastructure revenue from webscale customers' and to Cisco Silicon One manufacturing commitments. |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.17 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | -0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |