Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| IBM | KLA Corporation | Amphenol | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow IBM's FY2025 10-K describes "a highly competitive environment" with "hundreds of competitors" and says IBM is "regularly exposed to new competitors" as it executes its hybrid-cloud/AI strategy, while differentiating through "incumbency with enterprises" and "client relationships and trust" — a real but narrow moat, not a wide one. | wide The fiscal 2026 10-K states 'The strength of our competitive positions in many of our existing markets is primarily due to our leading technology', and frames process control as 'an essential enabler' of the yield ramp in fabs the filing says now cost 'well above $10 billion'. | narrow The FY2025 10-K describes a real, well-defended position but declines every claim that would make it structural. The strength is in how Amphenol gets designed in: it 'works closely with its customers at the design stage to create and manufacture innovative solutions', and the R&D discussion says this 'often results in the Company obtaining approved vendor status for its customers' new products and programs'. The demand side reinforces it — 'for many years, customers have generally been consolidating their lists of qualified suppliers to companies that have the ability to meet certain technical, quality, delivery and other standards while maintaining geographic flexibility and competitive prices'. Against that, the Competition section opens with 'the Company encounters competition in all areas of its business', lists price among the five bases on which it competes ('technology innovation, product quality and performance, price, customer service and delivery time'), and names thirteen primary competitors: Aptiv, Belden, Corning, Foxconn Interconnect Technology, Glenair, HUBER+SUHNER, ICT Luxshare, Jonhon, Molex, Rosenberger, Sensata, TE Connectivity and Yazaki, 'among others', plus 'a large number of smaller companies who compete in specific geographies, markets or products'. The IP section explicitly declines the patent story: 'we do not believe that our competitive position or our operations are dependent upon or would be materially impacted by the loss of any single patent or group of related patents'. Scale is real but not commanding — the filing estimates the worldwide interconnect, cable-assembly, antenna, cable and sensor market at 'approximately $500 billion in 2025' against its own $23,094.7 million of net sales, and calls the industry 'highly fragmented'. A moat that has to be re-won socket by socket in a fragmented market against named peers of comparable standing is narrow, not wide. |
| Moat type | switching costs The 10-K roots IBM's differentiation in "incumbency with enterprises" and "client relationships and trust" — installed-base lock-in across its hybrid-cloud platform (Red Hat) and enterprise software and infrastructure raises switching costs. | intangibles ip The 10-K reports over 9,100 active patents and over 3,600 pending applications with terms running through 2045, alongside proprietary process-control software (Klarity, I-PAT, aiSIGHT) that turns inspection and metrology data into yield learning. | switching costs The filing locates the advantage in the design-in relationship, not in patents or in raw scale. Its stated strategy is to 'expand the scope and number of its preferred supplier relationships with customers across its diverse end markets', achieved by working 'closely with its customers at the design stage'; the payoff named in the R&D section is 'approved vendor status for its customers' new products and programs'. The Customers section describes the resulting stickiness in structural terms — supplier lists are being consolidated to those who clear technical, quality and delivery standards, and 'our relationships with them typically date back many years' — and it says these close relationships 'allow the Company to better anticipate and respond to these customer needs when designing new products'. Amphenol itself disclaims IP dependence and instead 'rel[ies] upon trade secrets, manufacturing know-how, continuing technological innovations and licensing opportunities'. Cost_scale is a genuine reinforcement rather than the primary source: the Company manufactures 'at facilities in approximately 40 countries', states that 'global presence is an important competitive advantage', and 'has established low-cost manufacturing and assembly facilities around the world' — but that footprint serves the design-in relationship (proximity, real-time capability, supply-base consolidation for the customer) rather than standing alone. |
| Leadership | fast follower An enterprise incumbent that differentiates via "incumbency with enterprises" but is "regularly exposed to new competitors" in its hybrid-cloud/AI push (FY2025 10-K) — a follower in the current AI cycle rather than its leader. | clear leader The 10-K opens by describing KLA as a supplier of 'industry-leading equipment and services' and attributes its competitive positions 'in many of our existing markets' primarily to leading technology; named competitors are Applied Materials, ASML, Hitachi High-Tech, Lasertec and Onto Innovation. | co leader The filing claims leadership repeatedly but always in a served market, never across the industry, and always alongside named peers. In IT datacom it is unambiguous — 'Amphenol is a market leader in interconnect development for the information technology and data communications ("IT datacom") market', with 'industry-leading high-speed, power and active and passive fiber optic interconnect technologies, together with superior simulation and testing capability and cost effectiveness'. In defence it is stronger still: 'Amphenol is a world leader in the design, manufacture and supply of high-performance interconnect systems for harsh environment aerospace and defense applications', offering 'an unparalleled product breadth' and 'participating in major programs from the earliest inception across each phase of the production cycle'. Elsewhere the language is the indefinite article — 'a leading supplier' in automotive, 'a leading provider' in commercial aerospace, 'a leading global provider' in communications networks, 'a technology leader' in industrial. At the company level it says only 'one of the world's largest', and its Competition section places Molex and TE Connectivity, among others, on the same field. Roughly $23.1 billion of net sales against an estimated $500 billion market that the filing calls 'highly fragmented' is not a commanding share. |
| Pricing power | moderate Gross margin is high and rising (54.9% FY2021 to 58.2% FY2025) on a software-mix shift, but "price" is a principal method of competition per the 10-K and consulting/infrastructure remain price-competitive. | strong Services were approximately 23% of fiscal 2026 total revenues on an installed base that recurs, backlog nearly doubled to $12.57 billion, and SEC-reported net income was 35.6% of revenue in fiscal 2026 with operating income at 41.2% of revenue in fiscal 2025. | moderate Margin evidence is strong but the filing does not attribute it to price. Operating income rose to 25.4% of net sales in 2025 from 20.7% in 2024 and 20.4% in 2023 (adjusted operating margin 26.2% versus 21.7%), and the stated cause is volume and cost discipline: 'strong performance and disciplined cost control, which generated strong operating leverage on the significant growth experienced during the period'. Segment margins moved the same way for the same reason — Communications Solutions to 31.1% from 24.8%, Harsh Environment Solutions to 26.2% from 24.7%, Interconnect and Sensor Systems to 19.5% from 18.4% — each explained by 'strong operating performance on the higher sales volumes'. On the other side, price is one of the five bases the Company says it competes on, customers are consolidating supplier lists partly on 'competitive prices', and the input side is not fully controlled: difficulties obtaining raw materials 'may also negatively impact the pricing of materials and components sourced or used by the Company', with 'inflationary pressures and increased commodity prices' cited as a live cost risk. The ability to hold and expand margin through a demand surge is real; the ability to set price is not asserted anywhere in the document. |
| Summary | IBM's moat rests on deep enterprise incumbency — sticky installed-base relationships across hybrid cloud (Red Hat), enterprise software, and mission-critical infrastructure, plus brand and a large patent base. But its own FY2025 10-K frames "a highly competitive environment" with "hundreds of competitors" and says IBM is "regularly exposed to new competitors" as it pursues hybrid cloud and AI, so the moat is durable but narrow and contested in the AI/cloud growth arena. | KLA sells the inspection, metrology and yield-management layer a fab must run to reach volume production: the 10-K says accelerating the yield ramp ahead of competitors is critical to chipmakers' profitability, and backlog nearly doubled from $7.86 billion to $12.57 billion in the year to June 30, 2026 'due to strong demand driven by the AI infrastructure buildout'. | Amphenol is, in its own words, 'one of the world's largest designers, manufacturers and marketers of electrical, electronic and fiber optic connectors and interconnect systems, antennas, sensors and sensor-based products and coaxial, high-speed, fiber optic and specialty cable', selling into a market it sizes at roughly $500 billion in 2025 through three segments — Communications Solutions (52% of 2025 net sales), Harsh Environment Solutions (26%) and Interconnect and Sensor Systems (22%). The durable part of the business is the design-stage relationship that converts into approved-vendor status on customer programs, held together by manufacturing in approximately 40 countries, roughly 6,400 research, development and engineering employees at the end of 2025, and a deliberately flat structure of 'more than 140 general managers running unique, independent businesses'; diversification is real, with no single customer at 10% or more of net sales in 2025, 2024 or 2023 and about 65% of sales outside the United States. The FY2025 result shows what that position converts into under demand: net sales of $23,094.7 million, up 52% in U.S. dollars and 38% organically, with operating income at 25.4% of net sales against 20.7% in 2024 and 20.4% in 2023 — an expansion the filing attributes to 'strong performance and disciplined cost control, which generated strong operating leverage on the significant growth experienced during the period', not to price. The same filing bounds the story: it competes on price among other factors, names thirteen primary competitors, and is buying growth heavily — approximately $3.8 billion across five acquisitions in 2025, the Andrew (Outdoor Wireless Networks and Distributed Antenna Systems) business closed 31 January 2025, and CommScope's Connectivity and Cable Solutions business closed 9 January 2026 for approximately $10.5 billion, 'the largest acquisition in the Company's history' — with acquired businesses 'currently operating below the average operating margin of the Company'. |
| Chain position | A hybrid-cloud platform, enterprise-AI (watsonx), and consulting provider to large enterprises — a software/cloud layer of the AI stack. | Sits beside the process steps rather than in them — it measures and inspects what deposition, etch and lithography produce, and TSMC alone exceeded 10% of revenue in each of the last three fiscal years. | Amphenol occupies the physical interconnect layer of the AI build-out, and the filing makes that claim itself rather than leaving it inferred: it is 'a global provider of interconnect solutions to designers, manufacturers and operators of internet and artificial intelligence ("AI")-enabling systems', with products that 'enable a broad array of IT datacom systems and applications, including a growing range of systems to power AI and machine learning'. The exposure is material, not incidental. IT datacom was approximately 36% of 2025 net sales and grew by approximately $4,593.7 million on 'the continued acceleration in and strong demand for products used in next-generation AI-related applications', and backlog rose to approximately $8.9 billion at 31 December 2025 from approximately $6.1 billion a year earlier, an increase the filing says was 'primarily related to strong demand for the Company's products that support AI applications'. The AI pull also drove the segment mix — Communications Solutions net sales grew 71% organically 'with particular strength in AI-related applications'. It is nonetheless a diversified supplier, not an AI pure play: automotive (15%), industrial (19%), communications networks (10%), defense (9%), mobile devices (6%) and commercial aerospace (5%) make up the balance. |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.42 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |