Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| IREN | Duolingo | Salesforce | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | none The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-08-27) shows IREN holds an input the industry competes on: it names 'access to secured and energized power' first among what it believes are the principal competitive factors in its industry, and reports 'executed grid connection agreements, letters of agreement or equivalents representing approximately 5GW of total power capacity' in the United States, Canada, Spain and Australia as of June 30, 2026. It does not claim an advantage over rivals in that input. It says 'Certain competitors may have access to more competitively priced power, a greater access to power and a better capacity to timely secure grid connections,' and 'Many of our competitors have greater financial, technical or commercial resources, longer cloud operating histories or larger customer bases, compared to us.' Operating AI Cloud Services capacity was approximately 40MW at June 30, 2026, and the stored XBRL fundamentals from this 10-K show an FY2026 operating loss of about $1,046.7M on revenue of about $707.0M, so no durable advantage is yet demonstrated. | narrow Wide is ruled out by the company's own Item 1A, which concedes "low switching costs" and that "Low barriers to entry allow start-up companies with lower costs and less pressure for profitability to compete with us." It sits well above none because Q4 DAUs grew 30% to 52.7M, DAU/MAU rose to 39.6% from 34.7%, and marketing took only 12% of FY2025 revenue, though that ratio was flat versus FY2024 and gross margin fell to 72.2% from 72.8%. It stays narrow rather than eroding because Q1 FY2026 DAUs and paid subscribers each grew 21%. | narrow Salesforce's own language caps this at narrow: Item 1 calls its market "highly competitive, rapidly evolving and fragmented, and subject to changing technology with low barriers to entry." What holds it above none is scale and contract duration: $72.4B total RPO at 2026-01-31 versus $63.4B (+14%), current RPO $35.1B versus $30.2B (+16%), on revenue of $41.5B (+10%). But cRPO growth "was positively impacted by three percent" by currency, and total RPO "includes approximately $2.2 billion" from Informatica, acquired November 2025. Adjusted, the contracted base still outgrows revenue, but by less than the headline implies. |
| Moat type | none The FY2026 10-K's asserted advantage is control from owning its data centers, 'including the associated land, grid connections and substations', which it believes allows it 'to benefit from more sustainable cash flows and operational flexibility relative to operators that rely upon third-party colocation services or short-term land leases'. Its only scale language is a belief that its 'procurement scale, deployment experience and direct control over the data center layer' lets it bring new compute into service 'rapidly and at scale', a deployment-speed claim, and it 'generally target[s]' regions with 'low-cost and attractive renewable energy sources', a siting target rather than a demonstrated cost position. It does not claim a cost or scale lead: it says 'Many of our competitors are larger, have longer operating histories and significantly greater resources than we do' and that certain competitors 'may have access to more competitively priced power, a greater access to power and a better capacity to timely secure grid connections.' There is no network effect or lock-in either, since existing contracts have 'terms ranging from month to month up to five years'. No enumerated moat source is grounded. | intangibles ip The intangible is the consumer brand, not patents: Item 1 says "For many, Duolingo has become synonymous with language learning" and that growth is "organic, primarily driven by word-of-mouth and brand buzz," while the IP section discloses only "two patent applications." Switching costs are ruled out by the filing's own "low switching costs" caption. The data-scale support is the filing's own characterisation, and the brand is admittedly damageable: an April 2025 AI memo "may have contributed to unfavorable publicity, adverse impacts on the Company's brand and social media presence, and a deceleration in user growth." | switching costs Switching costs, with a caveat: the filing's clearest lock-in sentence is about rivals' customers, not its own. "Many prospective customers have invested substantial personnel and financial resources to implement and integrate their current enterprise software... may be reluctant or unwilling to migrate away" is a headwind to Salesforce's own growth. Evidence for its own base is architectural: Data 360 unifies data into "a single, governed source of truth," Agentforce runs on existing processes "without requiring customers to remove and rebuild," behind $72.4B of contracted revenue. Contracts run "typically 12 to 36 months" with no renewal obligation. |
| Leadership | behind The 10-K lists IREN's competitors as hyperscalers (Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, Oracle Cloud) and specialized AI Cloud Services providers (CoreWeave, Nebius, Crusoe, Lambda, Nscale, SpaceX and others). It says IREN began providing AI Cloud Services in 2024 and cites its 'shorter operating history in AI Cloud Services relative to some competitors', and states 'Some of our competitors have longer operating histories, larger customer bases, more comprehensive IP portfolios and patent protections, more design wins, and greater financial, sales, marketing and distribution resources than we do.' Operating AI Cloud Services capacity was approximately 40MW at June 30, 2026. The filing describes a smaller, later entrant that trails some competitors on operating history, customer base and resources, with its progress so far resting on two anchor contracts (a ~$9.7B five-year Microsoft agreement and a ~$3.4B five-year NVIDIA contract) rather than any claimed category position. | clear leader Leadership holds within consumer app-based language learning, anchored on one externally checkable claim in Item 1: the app "is also the top-grossing app globally in the Education category on both Google Play and the Apple App Store," with "over 250 total language courses to more than 130 million monthly active users" as of 2025-12-31. The broader "leading market position" claim is the filing's own characterisation, and no third-party share statistic appears anywhere in the 10-K, so a band is recorded and no percentage transcribed. The band does not extend to assessment, literacy, math, music, chess or offline learning, where the filing claims no position. | clear leader Clear leader in the category as it exists today, runner-up in the one it is being rebuilt into. Per IDC's Worldwide Semiannual Software Tracker on 2025 data, Salesforce was first in worldwide CRM applications for a thirteenth consecutive year at 20.0% share, and first in Sales (fourteenth year), Customer Service (thirteenth), Marketing (seventh), model-driven application platform (eleventh) and Integration (fourth). These come from Salesforce announcing its own IDC results via a trade outlet, in translation, not IDC primary material. In the same tracker's new Agent Build and Deploy segment it ranked second at 17.5%, albeit as fastest-growing vendor. |
| Pricing power | weak The 10-K's risk factors state 'Our competitors' products, services and technologies may be cheaper or provide better functionality or features than ours, which has resulted and may in the future result in lower-than-expected selling prices or demand for our products.' They also say long-term contract pricing 'is generally fixed or agreed at the time of contracting', so if market pricing for comparable capacity rises during a contract's term 'we will not benefit from those increases with respect to capacity already committed under our existing long-term contracts', and that if customers suffer a downturn or discontinue its services it 'may be compelled to offer more flexible terms, lower our prices or risk losing a significant customer.' The stored XBRL fundamentals from this 10-K show FY2026 revenue of about $707.0M against an operating loss of about $1,046.7M, so there is no margin record yet that evidences pricing power. | weak Every mechanism is cost, mix or volume, never price. FY2025 gross margin fell to 72.2% from 72.8% on "increased AI costs used in features like Video Call" and an advertising mix shift; the Q1 FY2026 gain to 73.0% came from "continued reductions in per-unit AI costs," with margin guided to about 71.0% in Q2 and "approximately 69.0% by Q4." The filing concedes it "may not be able to fully offset such higher costs through price increases." Subscription revenue rose 44% to $873.4 million "primarily due to an increase in the average number of paid subscribers," and the cap is self-imposed: "We intentionally do not put our learning content behind a paywall." | moderate Gross margin rises across the Item 7 table — gross profit of $32,255M on $41,525M of revenue, 78% of total revenues in FY2026 against 77% in FY2025 and 75% in FY2024 — yet MD&A denies price as the cause: growth "was primarily caused by volume-driven increases from new business," and "Pricing was not a significant driver of the increase in revenues for the period." Item 1A names consumption-based pricing among attrition factors, says Agentforce and Data 360 monetization "remain relatively new and uncertain," and concedes "limited experience with determining optimal pricing for our consumption-based contracts." |
| Summary | Per its FY2026 10-K, IREN is a vertically integrated AI Cloud Services platform that owns the data center, compute and software layers, underpinned by executed grid connection agreements, letters of agreement or equivalents representing ~5GW and a further multi-GW development pipeline. Its commercial record is concentrated: a five-year Microsoft agreement (~$9.7B total contract value, Horizon 1 delivered and accepted in August 2026, Horizons 2-4 targeted for delivery in phases in calendar Q4 2026) and a five-year ~$3.4B NVIDIA cloud contract together make up a substantial majority of contracted revenue. It holds NVIDIA Preferred Partner and Exemplar Cloud status (HGX B300 and GB300 NVL72) and a strategic partnership intended to support the deployment over time of up to 5GW of NVIDIA DSX-aligned infrastructure, which the filing cites among arrangements that are non-binding or subject to conditions, with no assurance as to the extent of deployments. Against that, the filing names hyperscaler and specialized competitors (AWS, Google Cloud, Azure, Oracle, CoreWeave, Nebius, Crusoe, Lambda, Nscale, SpaceX), many of which it says have greater resources, customers that can use or develop their own solutions, and possible delays to Texas energization from changes to ERCOT's Batch Zero procedures, so the power position is not a demonstrated advantage over rivals and its value depends on execution. | Duolingo's moat is essentially one asset — a consumer brand strong enough that the filing claims people "search for the term 'Duolingo' much more often than 'learn Spanish'" — sitting on real but not defensive scale. It converts into economics through organic acquisition: sales and marketing took 12% of FY2025 revenue while Q4 DAUs grew 30% to 52.7 million and DAU/MAU rose to 39.6% from 34.7%. It is not wide, because the company supplies both disqualifiers itself: "low switching costs" and "Low barriers to entry allow start-up companies with lower costs and less pressure for profitability to compete with us." Width and pricing power diverge: Duolingo will not price against its own free product, grows subscription revenue by adding subscribers ($873.4 million, up 44%), and guides gross margin down to roughly 69% by Q4 FY2026 "as AI feature use expands in our products." | Salesforce is the incumbent of record in CRM applications and is paid like one: $41.5B of FY2026 revenue (+10%), 78% gross margin, $72.4B of contracted revenue not yet recognized, and first place in worldwide CRM for a thirteenth consecutive year at 20.0% share per IDC's tracker as announced by Salesforce. Enterprise data and workflow embedded through Data 360 and Agentforce is costly to unwind, and the agentic layer is deliberately built atop existing processes rather than requiring re-implementation. The limits are the company's own: it twice describes its market as having low barriers to entry, names AI-native startups whose solutions "may bypass traditional business process workflows or displace established user interfaces," ranks second at 17.5% in IDC's new Agent Build and Deploy segment, and concedes pricing did not drive FY2026 growth. |
| Chain position | Downstream AI-cloud operator: owns grid-connected data centers and deploys NVIDIA/AMD GPU systems it rents to hyperscalers, frontier labs, AI developers and enterprises (anchor customers Microsoft and NVIDIA). | A consumer AI application and net buyer of model inference. The filing ties its margin line directly to inference cost, attributing the FY2025 subscription gross-margin decline to "increased AI costs used in features like Video Call" and guiding margin to approximately 69.0% by Q4 FY2026 "as AI feature use expands," while the Q1 FY2026 beat came from "reductions in per-unit AI costs." | Applications-layer incumbent: sells enterprise CRM and agentic software to end customers across industries, consumes cloud infrastructure (third-party IaaS partners plus its own Hyperforce estate) and third-party LLMs, and sits upstream of no hardware supply chain. Exposure is to enterprise software budgets and to whether the agentic layer is captured by incumbent suites or AI-native entrants. |
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| Long-horizon vote | -0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |