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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing Iron Mountain×NetApp×Flex× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
Iron Mountain IRM ai moat: latest change 2026-02-12 NetApp NTAP ai moat: latest change 2026-06-05 Flex FLEX ai moat: latest change 2026-05-20
Moat rating narrow

Iron Mountain's physical-records franchise shows a real switching-cost advantage, but the FY2025 Form 10-K also describes a slowly shrinking need for it, and the growth businesses compete in open markets. On the advantage side, an independent record: the Department of Justice complaint published in the Federal Register on 2016-04-11 (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/04/11/2016-08210/united-states-v-iron-mountain-inc-and-recall-holdings-ltd-proposed-final-judgment-and-competitive) stated that "Iron Mountain is the largest RMS company in the United States" and that "Taken together, permanent withdrawal fees and other withdrawal restrictions make it difficult for a new RMS entrant to win customers away from existing RMS vendors." The 2025 10-K reports more than 740 million cubic feet stored, says "we have consistently experienced strong customer retention levels", and shows the Global RIM segment's Adjusted EBITDA margin at 44.7% in 2025 against 44.6% in 2024. On the limiting side, Item 1A says "Our Records Management and Data Management service revenue growth is being negatively impacted by declining activity rates as stored records and tapes are becoming less active and more archival" and "A significant shift by our customers to storage of data through non-paper or non-tape-based technologies, whether now existing or developed in the future, could adversely affect our businesses." In data centres the 10-K says it competes with "numerous data center developers, owners and operators, many of whom own properties comparable to ours". A strong, regulator-documented lock-in on a physical market the company itself expects only to hold steady, plus growth arms without that lock-in, is a narrow moat rather than a wide one.

source: s204.q4cdn.com

narrow

The FY2026 10-K shows a real, durable lock but not an unassailable one. On the durable side: "Our cloud storage services are based on the same ONTAP data management software that underpins our on-premises ONTAP storage infrastructure offerings", and the same filing's income statement shows the company holding a gross margin near 71% across all three reported years - $4,433M on $6,268M in FY2024, $4,613M on $6,572M in FY2025 and $4,899M on $6,925M in FY2026 - while revenue grew from $6,268M to $6,925M and income from operations widened from 19% to 24% of net revenues. Holding that margin through the memory-cost shock the same filing discloses is the commercial evidence the lock is worth something. On the limiting side, the filing says competition "is intense", that in public cloud "customers may choose native cloud services that are consumed as operating expenses", and that "New competitors or alliances among existing competitors could emerge and quickly gain significant market share" - and IDC's 1Q26 external-storage tracker (Blocks & Files, 2026-06-16, cited on the AFF/ASA product row below) ranks NetApp second behind Dell, not first.

source: sec.gov

none

The FY2026 10-K (fiscal year ended March 31, 2026) concedes the core business is contested on every side: "Our industry is extremely competitive, many of our competitors have achieved substantial market share, and some may have lower cost structures or greater design, manufacturing, financial or other resources than we do." Customers "could in the future decide to in-source, dual-source, regionalize, or otherwise reallocate manufacturing volumes among suppliers", certain contracts "permit the customer to terminate the agreement for convenience upon prior written notice", and hyperscale customers "typically have substantial purchasing power and negotiating leverage". TradingPilot's stored fundamentals (SEC XBRL) show gross profit of $1,976 million on net sales of $28,502 million in fiscal 2023 and $2,567 million on $27,914 million in fiscal 2026: a thin margin, even after widening. The Cloud and Power Infrastructure (CPI) segment sells its own power and cooling products, but the 10-K says it must keep offering "significant price and/or performance advantages over competitive products", and Flex intends to separate it into an independent company targeted for the first quarter of calendar 2027. A large contract manufacturer whose own filing describes no protected position: no moat is claimable.

source: sec.gov

Moat type switching costs

The advantage is the cost and friction of moving stored records. The 10-K's Item 1A says that "if we are successful in winning record storage customers from competitors, the process of moving their stored records into our facilities is often costly and time consuming", and its notes record payments made "to a customer in order to terminate the customer's storage of records with its current records management vendor" as customer inducements. The DOJ complaint (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/04/11/2016-08210/united-states-v-iron-mountain-inc-and-recall-holdings-ltd-proposed-final-judgment-and-competitive) describes the mechanism: "Customer contracts also often impose a cap on the number of boxes per month that a customer may permanently remove from a RMS vendor's facility, such that a switch to a new RMS vendor may take several months to complete", and a new vendor "will have to offer to pay the fees to induce the customer to switch". Scale helps, since the 10-K says "the majority of our competitors operate in only one market or region", but the filing's own account of what keeps customers is retention and the cost of leaving, which makes switching costs the primary source.

source: s204.q4cdn.com

switching costs

The FY2026 10-K makes the source of the advantage explicit and it is the cost of leaving the data-management layer, not a network or a patent estate. The same ONTAP software runs the on-premises arrays and the cloud services ("Our cloud storage services are based on the same ONTAP data management software that underpins our on-premises ONTAP storage infrastructure offerings"), and the AFF family "allows customers to connect to clouds for more data services, data tiering, caching, and disaster recovery". A customer's volume layout, snapshot and replication workflow and operating tools therefore carry from the array into Azure, AWS and Google rather than being abandoned at the cloud boundary — the filing describes NetApp as "the only provider of enterprise-grade storage services natively embedded in the world's largest public cloud providers", so the usual moment of escape is instead the moment the relationship renews.

source: sec.gov

none

The 10-K's competitive strengths are operating capabilities, not a durable barrier: "Global Scale and Regional Strength" (more than 100 facilities across approximately 30 countries, staffed by approximately 150,000 employees), "Long-Standing, Diverse Customer Relationships", "Cross-Industry Synergies" and cost-efficient industrial parks. On intellectual property it says "we do not consider any single patent, trademark, or license to be material to our business as a whole" and that the carrying value of its intellectual property "was not material". Switching costs are limited by short commitments: "We generally do not obtain firm, long-term purchase commitments from our customers", and termination-for-convenience notice periods "may be relatively short".

source: sec.gov

Leadership clear leader

The band applies to records management, the Global RIM segment that produced $5,291,481 thousand of 2025's $6,901,737 thousand revenue. Independent evidence: the DOJ complaint published in the Federal Register on 2016-04-11 (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/04/11/2016-08210/united-states-v-iron-mountain-inc-and-recall-holdings-ltd-proposed-final-judgment-and-competitive) stated "Iron Mountain is the largest RMS company in the United States", with fiscal 2014 worldwide revenues of "approximately $3.1 billion", and called Recall, with 2014 revenues of "approximately $836.1 million", "the second-largest RMS company in the United States"; the FY2025 10-K lists property "acquired in connection with our acquisition of Recall Holdings Limited". The 2025 10-K adds, in the company's own words, that "the majority of our competitors operate in only one market or region". The independent source is from 2016 and covers the United States only. Iron Mountain did go on to acquire Recall, but the proposed final judgment in the same notice required it to divest "Recall RMS assets in all fifteen geographic markets identified in the Complaint", thirteen of them to Access CIG, which the notice called "currently the third-largest RMS provider in the United States", so Recall's business was not absorbed whole. This leadership does not extend to data centres, where the Global Data Center segment's $803,429 thousand of 2025 revenue compares with total revenue of $9,217,000,000 at Equinix (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1101239/000110123926000032/0001101239-26-000032-index.htm) and $6,112,692,000 at Digital Realty (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1297996/000110465926015365/0001104659-26-015365-index.htm) in stored fundamentals from their FY2025 10-Ks.

source: s204.q4cdn.com

co leader

IDC's 1Q26 external enterprise storage systems tracker, as reported by Blocks & Files on 2026-06-16 (cited in full on the AFF/ASA product row below), ranks NetApp second worldwide behind Dell and ahead of Everpure, Huawei and HPE, attributing the placing to "its growing all-flash business and cloud-integrated data management". Second of five ranked vendors, in a market whose leader is someone else, is a shared front rank rather than an owned one - and the distinct claim NetApp makes in the FY2026 10-K is positional rather than volumetric: being "the only provider of enterprise-grade storage services natively embedded in the world's largest public cloud providers".

source: sec.gov

at parity

EMSNOW/in4ma's "EMS&ODM Global 100" (2026-03-06, https://www.emsnow.com/?p=53535) says Wistron, Quanta and Wiwynn "plus Foxconn together account for nearly 57% of global EMS/ODM production", and groups Flex with Jabil, Celestica and Sanmina as the US "big four", "representing about 85% of the revenue base among ~20 US headquartered EMS/ODM". The FY2026 10-K claims no rank and says "many of our competitors have achieved substantial market share". One of a handful of large Western contract manufacturers, behind the Taiwanese leaders in scale: at parity with its peer group, not a leader.

source: sec.gov

Pricing power strong

In records, growth comes from price on steady volume. MD&A attributes Global RIM "organic storage rental revenue growth driven by revenue management" (organic storage rental growth of 5.4% in 2025), while Item 1A says volumes "were relatively steady in 2025" and "Our organic revenue growth has been positively impacted by our ability to effectively introduce, expand and monitor revenue management. If we are not able to continue and effectively manage pricing, our results of operations could be adversely affected". The segment's Adjusted EBITDA margin was 44.7% in 2025 against 44.6% in 2024. In data centres MD&A cites "improved pricing" and "a 620 basis point increase in Adjusted EBITDA Margin reflecting recent lease commencements, improved pricing and cost containment", to 51.8% from 45.6%. The limits: Item 1A says that on power costs "we may be limited in our ability to, or may not always choose to, pass these increased costs on to our customers", and the 2016 DOJ complaint (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/04/11/2016-08210/united-states-v-iron-mountain-inc-and-recall-holdings-ltd-proposed-final-judgment-and-competitive) found that where Iron Mountain and Recall met, they "competed aggressively against one another for customers, resulting in lower prices for RMS". Adjusted EBITDA margin is a non-GAAP measure, and the Q2 2026 release (https://s204.q4cdn.com/148941814/files/doc_financials/2026/q2/FINAL-Q2-2026-Earnings-Press-Release.pdf) shows it at 35.8% for the company against 36.7% a year earlier.

source: s204.q4cdn.com

moderate

It holds price rather than raising it. On the figures filed with the FY2026 10-K, gross margin was 70.7% of revenue in FY2024 ($4,433M on $6,268M), 70.2% in FY2025 ($4,613M on $6,572M) and 70.7% in FY2026 ($4,899M on $6,925M) - flat across three years in which revenue grew from $6,268M to $6,925M - and it held that level while absorbing a component-cost shock. It is no stronger than that because the filing's own risk factor lists "competitive pricing, customer price sensitivity" and "pricing and discounting pressures" among the drivers of gross margin, and discloses that the company "experienced inflationary pressure and supply chain constraints beginning in the second half of fiscal 2026, resulting in increased costs for memory and other components, which have affected our gross margins" - a cost shock it is absorbing rather than fully passing on.

source: sec.gov

weak

Stored fundamentals show gross profit of $1,976 million on $28,502 million of net sales in fiscal 2023 and $2,567 million on $27,914 million in fiscal 2026; on the Q1 FY2027 call (https://earningswhispers.com/transcript/FLEX/Q12027) the CFO said adjusted gross margin "improved to 9.6%, up 50 basis points from the prior year". The 10-K sets the limits: hyperscale customers have "substantial purchasing power and negotiating leverage, which they may use to obtain favorable pricing, extended payment terms, volume flexibility, or other concessions that could reduce our margins", and if CPI's competitors "adopt innovations more quickly or develop superior products, our win rates, pricing, and margins may suffer".

source: sec.gov

Summary

Iron Mountain stores and manages physical records for, per its FY2025 10-K, more than 240,000 customers in 61 countries, "including approximately 95% of the Fortune 1000", with "no single customer accounting for more than approximately 3% of revenue". Revenue was $6,901,737 thousand in 2025, of which the Global RIM segment contributed $5,291,481 thousand and the Global Data Center segment $803,429 thousand. The records business is the moat. Storage rental agreements "generally range from one to five years in length", the company says it has "consistently experienced strong customer retention levels", and a 2016 Department of Justice complaint described Iron Mountain as "the largest RMS company in the United States" and permanent withdrawal fees as a barrier to rivals winning customers. That lock-in shows up as pricing: MD&A attributes Global RIM storage growth to "revenue management" while Item 1A says volumes "were relatively steady in 2025". The threat is substitution: activity is declining as records become "less active and more archival", and a shift to non-paper storage "could adversely affect our businesses". The growth arms sit outside that moat. The company operated 31 data centers across 21 markets with 488 MW of capacity approximately 97% leased and a weighted average lease expiration of 10.3 years, counts "five of the largest global hyperscalers among our customers", and on 2026-08-05 reported data center leasing of 110 megawatts year to date and second-quarter revenue of $2.0 billion, up 18.5%. But in data centres it competes with operators owning "properties comparable to ours", and in asset lifecycle management with hyperscalers' own programmes. A durable switching-cost franchise in a market expected only to hold steady, funding growth businesses that compete on power, location and price, is a narrow moat.

NetApp sells storage hardware but the asset is ONTAP, the data-management software that has run its arrays for over three decades and now also runs inside the three largest public clouds as a first-party service. The FY2026 10-K organises the company into two segments, Hybrid Cloud (AFF and ASA all-flash arrays, AFX for AI workloads, FAS hybrid-flash, E/EF-Series, StorageGRID object storage) and Public Cloud (Azure NetApp Files, Amazon FSx for NetApp ONTAP, Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, Cloud Volumes ONTAP), and states that both rest on the same ONTAP software. That is the whole argument: an enterprise that has standardised its snapshots, replication and multiprotocol access on ONTAP carries those habits with it when it moves workloads to a hyperscaler, and NetApp is paid on both sides of the move. The evidence that the lock has commercial value is the margin's steadiness: across the three years the FY2026 10-K reports, gross margin sat at 70.7%, 70.2% and 70.7% of revenue ($4,433M on $6,268M, $4,613M on $6,572M, $4,899M on $6,925M) while revenue grew, and the filing's own percentage-of-revenue table shows no mix shift doing that work - product and services held near 46% and 54% of revenue throughout. The limits are equally in the filing. NetApp is second, not first: IDC's 1Q26 tracker puts it behind Dell in external enterprise storage, and the 10-K's competition section concedes that cloud providers are simultaneously partners and rivals, that consumption models "may reduce overall demand for our traditional on-premises offerings sold through a capital expenditure (capex) model", and that alternative architectures "may reduce or eliminate demand for some of our offerings". Component exposure is real too: the filing discloses "inflationary pressure and supply chain constraints beginning in the second half of fiscal 2026, resulting in increased costs for memory and other components, which have affected our gross margins", and names NAND among the components whose supply can tighten. This is a durable second place built on software stickiness, not a structural monopoly.

Flex designs, builds and manages products for other companies through, per its FY2026 10-K, three segments: Integrated Technology Solutions (communications, enterprise and lifestyle products), Regulated Manufacturing Solutions (industrial, automotive and healthcare) and Cloud and Power Infrastructure (integrated compute systems, liquid cooling, and utility-, facility-, rack- and board-level power). It runs more than 100 facilities in approximately 30 countries; its ten largest customers were 45% of fiscal 2026 net sales and none exceeded 10%. The data-centre business is the growth engine: on the Q1 FY2027 call (2026-07-29) the CFO said CPI revenue "totaled $2.2 billion, up 35% from the prior year, driven by strong growth in power", at a 9.7% adjusted operating margin, against 5.2% for ITS and 6.6% for RMS. Flex plans to spin CPI off as Axiom in the first quarter of calendar 2027, after funds affiliated with General Catalyst, Koch Equity Development and co-investors agreed a $2.0 billion convertible preferred investment "at an initial enterprise value for Axiom of $37.5 billion" (Flex release, 2026-10-05: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/866374/000119312526413173/d123485dex991.htm). The filing itself describes no durable barrier: the industry is "extremely competitive", rivals including Taiwanese ODM suppliers "in some cases, have a substantial share of global information technology hardware and related infrastructure production", customers can in-source or reallocate volume, and hyperscalers can use their leverage "to obtain favorable pricing". An independent tally (EMSNOW/in4ma, 2026-03-06) puts Foxconn, Wistron, Quanta and Wiwynn at "nearly 57% of global EMS/ODM production" and counts Flex among the US "big four". Scale plus a fast-growing power franchise that is about to leave the group, but no moat.

Chain position

In the AI build-out Iron Mountain is a landlord and a recycler. It leases data center capacity to hyperscale customers, with "five of the largest global hyperscalers among our customers", and its ALM business "provides hyperscale and corporate IT infrastructure managers with services and solutions that enable the decommissioning, data erasure, processing and disposition, and recycling or sale of IT hardware and component assets". Upstream, Item 1A says "We rely on third parties to provide power to our data centers" and that construction depends on "one or more design firms, general contractors, and associated subcontractors".

NetApp sits between the memory supply and the enterprise data centre. Upstream, the FY2026 10-K says "Third-party component costs make up a significant portion of our product costs" and singles out NAND as hard to manage "if supplies of certain components, including NAND, become limited relative to demand". Downstream, the hyperscalers are channel, partner and rival at once: the filing states "We both partner with and compete against cloud service providers through our cloud-based software and services offerings", while Azure NetApp Files, Amazon FSx for NetApp ONTAP and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes are delivered as those clouds' own natively embedded services. Distribution is a mix of direct sales and "an ecosystem of partners, including the leading cloud providers".

Contract designer-manufacturer across many end markets and, through CPI, a supplier of power, cooling and rack-level compute infrastructure to "a limited number of hyperscale cloud providers, colocation companies, and large enterprise data center operators" (10-K), which Flex plans to separate as Axiom in the first quarter of calendar 2027.

Products (share / barrier)
  • Cloud and cooling (rack-level compute integration and liquid cooling) Unknown · Moderate source: earningswhispers.com
  • Data-centre power (critical and embedded power) Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Integrated Technology Solutions (communications, enterprise and lifestyle manufacturing) Unknown · Low source: sec.gov
  • Regulated Manufacturing Solutions (industrial, automotive and healthcare) Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
Long-horizon vote +0.24 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

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+0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

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-0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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