Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| MediaTek | Vistra | AMD | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow Counterpoint's public quarterly AP-SoC table, published 8 September 2026, shows MediaTek first in all ten quarters it covers (Q1 2024 through Q2 2026), never below 31%, with the nearest rival never above 30% -- a sustained position, not one good quarter. What the same table does not show is a widening one: the share oscillates inside a 31% to 41% band, the Q1 readings step down 41% (2024), 38% (2025), 33% (2026), and the 31% of Q2 2026 matches the lows already set in Q4 2024 and Q4 2025 rather than breaking them; Q2-on-Q2 the series runs 34%, 36%, 31%. Counterpoint also records MediaTek's shipments down more than 30% year-over-year in the quarter, the mainstream and entry tiers hit by the memory shortage and the premium tier by a 'slowdown in sales of Dimensity 9000 series powered devices.' MediaTek's own 2Q26 remarks show the gross line holding and the operating line not: gross margin 46.2%, down only 0.1 percentage points sequentially and guided at 46% plus or minus 1.5 for Q3, while operating income fell 22.2% year-over-year on revenue up 1.2% as operating expenses rose to NT$47.4 billion from NT$44.5 billion. A first place held for ten quarters without extending it, and earning less on it, is defensible rather than compounding. | narrow The 10-K states that "the majority of our facilities operate as “merchant” facilities without long-term power sales agreements" and that Vistra is "not guaranteed any rate of return on our capital investments". Against that, the scarcity is real: six NRC-licensed nuclear units totalling 6,448 MW, licences running 2036-2053, inside a 43,641 MW fleet, plus 20-year PPAs with AWS (1,200 MW) and Meta (2,609 MW). The 2025 gas additions - Lotus (2,600 MW, closed October 2025) and pending Cogentrix (5,500 MW) - extend the merchant gas side, not the nuclear scarcity. Only the 433 MW of uprates extends the moat asset. | narrow AMD's FY2025 10-K documents real but bounded advantages: approximately 7,200 U.S. patents and roughly 18,900 patent matters worldwide, an outright claim that 'We are the market share leader in semi-custom game console products,' and gross margin of 50% on revenue up 34% to $34.6 billion. The same filing sets the ceiling: 'Some of our competitors may possess stronger market positions, larger customer bases, more design wins, and greater financial, sales, marketing, and distribution resources than us'; Nvidia is named 'the discrete GPU market share leader'; and AMD relies on TSMC 'for the production of all wafers for microprocessor and GPU products at 7 nanometer (nm) or smaller nodes.' Advantages that are genuine, contested, and dependent on a shared foundry are narrow, not wide. |
| Moat type | intangibles ip MediaTek manufactures nothing itself -- its 2Q26 remarks describe 'deep design-technology co-optimization (DTCO) with TSMC' and close collaboration with advanced-packaging partners -- so the durable asset cannot be plant scale, and the remarks do not claim customer lock-in either. They locate it in a reusable design library: 'Building on our industry-leading IP portfolio, we offer best-in-class, pre-validated subsystems solutions for memory, I/O, and connectivity' -- which, the company says, 'largely reduces design complexity and shortens time to market for our data center customers'. The same remarks itemise 448G SerDes with a Co-Package Copper system solution, CPO development on TSMC's COUPE platform, and an end-to-end 3.5D platform with 'best-in-class 3.5D IP, packaging, and design flows,' and say design wins come 'backed by our industry-leading IPs, deep ecosystem partnerships, and proven execution capabilities'. The spending behind that library shows in the cost line: operating expenses of NT$47.4 billion in the quarter against NT$44.5 billion a year earlier, with the Q3 operating expense ratio guided at 31% plus or minus 2 points. It is the same library MediaTek re-amortises across mobile, edge and now data-center ASIC. | intangibles ip The intangibles are non-replicable regulatory assets rather than patents: six nuclear licences (Comanche Peak 2050/2053, Perry 2046, Davis-Besse 2037, Beaver Valley 2036/2047), fuel "contracted to support all our refueling needs through 2030", section 45U credits "recognizing the value of existing carbon-free nuclear power", and TXU Energy, sold "for over 20 years" and "registered and protected by trademark law". Read 45U as a floor, not moat strength: the 2025 credit was $220m against $545m in 2024, and it "provides increasing levels of support as unit revenues decline". Efficient scale does not apply. | intangibles ip The FY2025 10-K locates the durable asset in design IP rather than manufacturing: 'We rely on contracts and intellectual property rights to protect our products and technologies from unauthorized third-party copying and use,' with approximately 7,200 U.S. patents and about 18,900 patent matters worldwide spanning x86 EPYC/Ryzen CPUs, CDNA/RDNA graphics and the Versal/Zynq adaptive-SoC families, and it credits customer wins to 'our broad IP portfolio and leadership in design, integration and advanced packaging.' It is explicitly not cost_scale: AMD is fabless and 'utilize[s] Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (TSMC) for the production of wafers' — the same leading-edge foundry its merchant competitors use, so no manufacturing-scale advantage accrues to it. |
| Leadership | co leader Counterpoint has MediaTek ahead of every rival in all ten quarters of its public table -- 31% against Qualcomm's 23% and Apple's 19% in Q2 2026 -- but that count covers smartphone application processors only, and MediaTek's 2Q26 remarks put mobile phone at 41% of group revenue, no longer its largest business. Smart Edge Platforms is larger at 53%, and while the remarks claim 'continued market share gains across connectivity, computing and automotive products', no independent count of those positions appears in the sources used here. In data center MediaTek holds nothing yet: production of its first AI accelerator ASIC is scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2026, and 15% to 20% is a 2027 target raised from 10% to 15% a quarter earlier. Inside its core market the flagship tier is a stated plan rather than a claimed position -- a 2nm SoC launching in the third quarter and, 'together with ongoing engagements with global players, we will increase our presence continuously in the flagship smartphone market in 2027' -- while Counterpoint records MediaTek's premium-tier shipments declining on a 'slowdown in sales of Dimensity 9000 series powered devices.' | co leader Vistra describes itself as "one of the largest producers of power in deregulated markets in the U.S." with over 230 TWh generated, "one of the largest competitive power generators in the U.S. as measured by MWh of generation capacity", "one of the largest electricity generators in the U.S.", and "one of the largest competitive residential retail electricity providers". That hedged phrasing appears four times and is the strongest claim the filing makes. The 10-K names no competitor and assigns no rank, so co-leader is the ceiling the disclosure supports. | fast follower The FY2025 10-K itself places AMD behind the pace-setter in its two most important markets: 'Our principal competitor in the supply of discrete graphics is Nvidia, who is the discrete GPU market share leader,' and the risk factors state Nvidia 'leverages its market position in data center GPU, financial resources, and proprietary software ecosystem to promote its systems and influences customers who do business with us.' AMD is nonetheless executing 'an annual cadence of leadership for AMD Instinct solutions' and has won gigawatt-scale commitments (OpenAI, 6 GW) — following fast and closely, not setting the pace. |
| Pricing power | moderate The 2Q26 remarks describe price as cost pass-through rather than capture: 'As rising costs across the supply chain have become an industry-wide reality, we are taking pricing actions to ensure these increases are appropriately reflected in our product pricing', with the full-year aim, 'through our disciplined pricing strategy', to 'deliver our full year gross margin within the current quarter guidance range' -- holding a band, not widening it. The realised figures show that defence working: gross margin 46.2%, down 0.1 percentage points sequentially, with Q3 guided at 46% plus or minus 1.5 points. The 2.9-point year-over-year decline is not an erosion rate; the company states it 'was mainly due to a one-time benefit in the year-ago quarter.' Holding a mid-40s gross margin through a market the company expects to decline 'by about 15% in units this year' is genuine discipline, but passing rising costs through to defend a guided band is not the ability to price above it. | weak Vistra is a merchant price taker. Price formation rests on "the highest variable cost unit that clears the market", prices are "unpredictable and may fluctuate substantially", hedging markets have "limited liquidity after two to three years", and competing retailers "may offer different products, lower electricity prices and other incentives". ERCOT's $2,000/MWh figure is the low system-wide offer cap, applied conditionally when the peaker net margin exceeds three times CONE or under the PUCT Emergency Pricing Program, not a standing cap. PJM has "announced that it would propose" extending its capacity cap to 2028-29 and 2029-30, subject to FERC approval. | moderate FY2025 gross margin was 50%, up from 49% in 2024 per the 10-K — healthy and improving — but the same filing attributes average-selling-price pressure to competitors: Intel 'uses its microprocessor market position to price its products aggressively and target our customers and channel partners with special incentives. These aggressive activities have reduced and may reduce our unit sales and average selling prices for many of our products'. Pricing power is real but contested. |
| Summary | MediaTek is the largest supplier of smartphone application processors by units and has been for as long as Counterpoint's public quarterly table runs. Across all ten quarters it covers, Q1 2024 through Q2 2026, MediaTek is first every time and never below 31%, while the nearest rival never clears 30%; in Q2 2026 it holds 31% against Qualcomm's 23%, Apple's 19%, UNISOC's 13%, Samsung's 9% and HiSilicon's 5%. That is a real, independently counted position, and it is the only part of MediaTek's business for which such a count exists in the sources used here. The same table is the clearest evidence that the position is being defended rather than extended. MediaTek's share moves inside a 31% to 41% band across the ten quarters, and the top of that band has come down -- 41% in Q1 2024, 38% in Q1 2025, 33% in Q1 2026 -- while the 31% of Q2 2026 matches the lows already set in Q4 2024 and Q4 2025 rather than breaking them; measured like for like against the same quarter a year earlier the series runs 34%, 36%, 31%. Counterpoint records MediaTek's shipments falling more than 30% year-over-year in the quarter -- hit in the mainstream and entry tiers by the memory shortage, and in the premium tier by a slowdown in Dimensity 9000 series devices -- while Samsung's Exynos climbed to 9% on Galaxy S26 base variants and mid-tier A-series wins. MediaTek's own 2Q26 remarks show the gross line holding and the operating line not: gross margin of 46.2%, down 0.1 percentage points sequentially and guided at 46% plus or minus 1.5 for the third quarter, against operating income down 22.2% year-over-year on revenue up 1.2%, with operating expenses of NT$47.4 billion against NT$44.5 billion a year earlier. Unit leadership held while the return on it did not. What MediaTek re-uses is design IP. It manufactures nothing itself -- the remarks describe deep design-technology co-optimization with TSMC and close work with advanced-packaging partners -- and they locate the durable asset in a pre-validated library of memory, I/O and connectivity subsystems, 448G SerDes with a Co-Package Copper system solution, CPO development on TSMC's COUPE platform, and an end-to-end 3.5D platform. The spending behind that library is visible in the cost line: operating expenses of NT$47.4 billion in the quarter against NT$44.5 billion a year earlier, with the Q3 operating expense ratio guided at 31% plus or minus 2 points against a gross margin guided at 46% plus or minus 1.5 -- an operating cost base running near a third of revenue. That library is now pointed at two adjacencies. Smart Edge Platforms -- connectivity, computing, automotive and TV SoCs -- is now the larger business, at 53% of revenue in Q2 against mobile's 41%, and grew 26% year-over-year while mobile fell 20%. And the company says it has built its first AI accelerator ASIC for a major US cloud customer, with production scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2026. One adjacency is a target and one is a contribution, and this profile treats them as exactly that. The data center share figure of 15% to 20% is a 2027 target against a served market MediaTek itself sizes at US$80 billion, raised from 10% to 15% only one quarter earlier, and production of the first ASIC was still scheduled for the fourth quarter at the date of the remarks. The RTX Spark AI PC work is corroborated by NVIDIA's own announcement, which credits MediaTek with collaborating on the custom CPU design and contributing to its power efficiency, performance and connectivity -- but the superchip, its Grace CPU, its NVLink-C2C interconnect and its software stack are NVIDIA's, and the systems ship from PC makers, so what MediaTek holds is a design contribution rather than a franchise with a share to count. The claimed share gains in connectivity, computing and automotive carry no number and no third-party count. The honest reading is a company with one durable, independently verified franchise it is holding rather than extending, funding a credible but still unproven move into higher-value silicon on the strength of its IP portfolio. | Vistra's moat is one scarce asset wrapped in a commodity business. Six NRC-licensed nuclear units - 6,448 MW, licences running 2036-2053 - sit inside a 43,641 MW fleet that the 10-K says operates in the majority as "merchant" facilities with no long-term power sales agreements and no guaranteed rate of return. That block cannot be rebuilt by a rival, and is now partly de-risked by 20-year PPAs with AWS (1,200 MW from Comanche Peak) and Meta (2,609 MW from the PJM plants) plus section 45U credits. Everything else - 26,989 MW of gas, 8,743 MW of coal, the 5m-customer retail book - competes on price in markets Vistra does not set, against entrants the filing says keep building "despite relatively low power prices". The 2025 growth was gas M&A (Lotus, pending Cogentrix), which widens the commodity-exposed side. Narrow, for a specific reason: the moat is 15% of the fleet. | AMD's edge is architectural design IP executed on someone else's fabs. The FY2025 10-K describes a full-stack portfolio — EPYC server CPUs, Instinct AI accelerators, Ryzen client parts where 'AMD was the first company to integrate a dedicated neural processing unit (NPU) on the same SoC as an x86 CPU for AI PCs,' Radeon graphics, Pensando networking and Versal adaptive SoCs — backed by roughly 18,900 patent matters worldwide, and it discloses gigawatt-scale customer commitments (an October 2025 agreement with OpenAI 'to deploy 6 gigawatts of AMD GPUs,' first gigawatt on Instinct MI450). The same filing bounds that moat: Nvidia is 'the discrete GPU market share leader' and 'leverages its market position in data center GPU, financial resources, and proprietary software ecosystem'; Intel 'uses its microprocessor market position to price its products aggressively'; Arm architectures and customers who 'internally develop products to support similar AI workloads' are named as encroaching; and every wafer at 7 nm or below comes from TSMC. Revenue grew 34% in FY2025 with Data Center up 32%, but the filing's own competitive framing places AMD in the challenger seat rather than the entrenched one. |
| Chain position | A fabless designer sitting between its customers and the TSMC-centred manufacturing chain. The 2Q26 remarks describe 'deep design-technology co-optimization (DTCO) with TSMC' and close work with advanced-packaging partners to build 'high-performance ASICs across a broad range of very-large chip sizes using CoWoS and EMIB-T technologies' at nodes down to 2nm, and say MediaTek creates 'significant value beyond semiconductor by orchestrating other key components throughout the supply chain such as memory and substrate' -- a coordinator role as much as a design one. | Merchant IPP: sells energy, capacity and ancillary services into ISO/RTO spot and short-term wholesale markets (ERCOT, PJM, ISO-NE, NYISO, CAISO, MISO) and resells to ~5m retail customers. Emerging role as long-term nuclear offtake supplier to hyperscalers (AWS, Meta). Not a price setter at any link. | A fabless merchant-silicon designer sitting one layer above the foundries: the FY2025 10-K states AMD relies on TSMC 'for the production of all wafers for microprocessor and GPU products at 7 nanometer (nm) or smaller nodes' and primarily on GLOBALFOUNDRIES above 7 nm, with packaging and test performed by Asia-Pacific ATMP partners — so its cost, supply and cadence are inherited from partners it does not control. |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.05 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish Editorial prior, not backtested. |