Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| NetApp | Meta Platforms | ASML | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow The FY2026 10-K shows a real, durable lock but not an unassailable one. On the durable side: "Our cloud storage services are based on the same ONTAP data management software that underpins our on-premises ONTAP storage infrastructure offerings", and the same filing's income statement shows the company holding a gross margin near 71% across all three reported years - $4,433M on $6,268M in FY2024, $4,613M on $6,572M in FY2025 and $4,899M on $6,925M in FY2026 - while revenue grew from $6,268M to $6,925M and income from operations widened from 19% to 24% of net revenues. Holding that margin through the memory-cost shock the same filing discloses is the commercial evidence the lock is worth something. On the limiting side, the filing says competition "is intense", that in public cloud "customers may choose native cloud services that are consumed as operating expenses", and that "New competitors or alliances among existing competitors could emerge and quickly gain significant market share" - and IDC's 1Q26 external-storage tracker (Blocks & Files, 2026-06-16, cited on the AFF/ASA product row below) ranks NetApp second behind Dell, not first. | narrow The FY2025 10-K shows a real moat — 3.58 billion Family daily active people (December 2025 average, +7% YoY) and a 52% Family of Apps operating margin — but the same filing qualifies its durability on three fronts it discloses itself: it says "We face significant competition in every aspect of our business"; it names "competitive products and services, such as TikTok, that have reduced some users' engagement with our products and services"; and it discloses that since 2020 it has been "subject to a lawsuit by the FTC alleging that we violated antitrust laws" that "seeks ... divestiture or reconstruction of Instagram and WhatsApp." A moat a regulator is actively litigating to break up, and whose ad targeting depends on iOS/Android policies Meta does not set, reads narrow rather than wide. | wide ASML's FY2025 20-F states it "is currently the world's only manufacturer of EUV lithography systems" — an effective monopoly on the extreme-ultraviolet tools required to pattern leading-edge logic and memory chips. |
| Moat type | switching costs The FY2026 10-K makes the source of the advantage explicit and it is the cost of leaving the data-management layer, not a network or a patent estate. The same ONTAP software runs the on-premises arrays and the cloud services ("Our cloud storage services are based on the same ONTAP data management software that underpins our on-premises ONTAP storage infrastructure offerings"), and the AFF family "allows customers to connect to clouds for more data services, data tiering, caching, and disaster recovery". A customer's volume layout, snapshot and replication workflow and operating tools therefore carry from the array into Azure, AWS and Google rather than being abandoned at the cloud boundary — the filing describes NetApp as "the only provider of enterprise-grade storage services natively embedded in the world's largest public cloud providers", so the usual moment of escape is instead the moment the relationship renews. | network effects The 10-K Competition section describes a three-sided network in Meta's own words: it competes "to attract, engage, and retain people who use our products, to attract and retain businesses that use our free or paid business and advertising services, and to attract and retain developers who build compelling applications that integrate with our products," and elsewhere cites "the scale of our user, advertiser, and developer base." The same filing rules out an IP-based moat: "We do not believe that our proprietary technology is dependent on any single patent or copyright or groups of related patents or copyrights." | intangibles ip The durable advantage rests on decades of proprietary technology and IP — the 20-F describes ASML's April 2025 1,000-watt EUV light source as "built on 25 years of engineering advancements" — reinforced by an exclusive arrangement with Carl Zeiss SMT as its "sole supplier" of the critical optics no rival can source. |
| Leadership | co leader IDC's 1Q26 external enterprise storage systems tracker, as reported by Blocks & Files on 2026-06-16 (cited in full on the AFF/ASA product row below), ranks NetApp second worldwide behind Dell and ahead of Everpure, Huawei and HPE, attributing the placing to "its growing all-flash business and cloud-integrated data management". Second of five ranked vendors, in a market whose leader is someone else, is a shared front rank rather than an owned one - and the distinct claim NetApp makes in the FY2026 10-K is positional rather than volumetric: being "the only provider of enterprise-grade storage services natively embedded in the world's largest public cloud providers". | co leader Top-tier but shared: the 10-K reports 3.58 billion Family daily active people and $196.18 billion of 2025 advertising revenue, yet also states that TikTok has "reduced some users' engagement," that "each of Apple and Google have integrated competitive products with iOS and Android," and that Meta competes "with companies in the development and application of AI, particularly with respect to the development of frontier AI models." | clear leader Effectively 100% of the EUV market as the world's only EUV system maker; in the older DUV segment it "compete[s] primarily with Canon and Nikon" yet remains the leading supplier. |
| Pricing power | moderate It holds price rather than raising it. On the figures filed with the FY2026 10-K, gross margin was 70.7% of revenue in FY2024 ($4,433M on $6,268M), 70.2% in FY2025 ($4,613M on $6,572M) and 70.7% in FY2026 ($4,899M on $6,925M) - flat across three years in which revenue grew from $6,268M to $6,925M - and it held that level while absorbing a component-cost shock. It is no stronger than that because the filing's own risk factor lists "competitive pricing, customer price sensitivity" and "pricing and discounting pressures" among the drivers of gross margin, and discloses that the company "experienced inflationary pressure and supply chain constraints beginning in the second half of fiscal 2026, resulting in increased costs for memory and other components, which have affected our gross margins" - a cost shock it is absorbing rather than fully passing on. | strong Ad-auction pricing, not list prices: the 10-K reports "the average price per ad increased by 9%" in 2025 after "an increase of 10% in 2024," driven by "an increase in advertising demand," alongside worldwide ARPP of $57.03 (+15%) and a 52% Family of Apps operating margin. The filing notes the gain was "partially offset by a higher number of ad impressions delivered ... in products, such as Reels, that monetize at lower rates." | strong FY2025 gross margin of 52.8%, up 1.5 percentage points year over year, with management guiding toward 56-60% by 2030 — consistent with monopoly pricing power on EUV tools. |
| Summary | NetApp sells storage hardware but the asset is ONTAP, the data-management software that has run its arrays for over three decades and now also runs inside the three largest public clouds as a first-party service. The FY2026 10-K organises the company into two segments, Hybrid Cloud (AFF and ASA all-flash arrays, AFX for AI workloads, FAS hybrid-flash, E/EF-Series, StorageGRID object storage) and Public Cloud (Azure NetApp Files, Amazon FSx for NetApp ONTAP, Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, Cloud Volumes ONTAP), and states that both rest on the same ONTAP software. That is the whole argument: an enterprise that has standardised its snapshots, replication and multiprotocol access on ONTAP carries those habits with it when it moves workloads to a hyperscaler, and NetApp is paid on both sides of the move. The evidence that the lock has commercial value is the margin's steadiness: across the three years the FY2026 10-K reports, gross margin sat at 70.7%, 70.2% and 70.7% of revenue ($4,433M on $6,268M, $4,613M on $6,572M, $4,899M on $6,925M) while revenue grew, and the filing's own percentage-of-revenue table shows no mix shift doing that work - product and services held near 46% and 54% of revenue throughout. The limits are equally in the filing. NetApp is second, not first: IDC's 1Q26 tracker puts it behind Dell in external enterprise storage, and the 10-K's competition section concedes that cloud providers are simultaneously partners and rivals, that consumption models "may reduce overall demand for our traditional on-premises offerings sold through a capital expenditure (capex) model", and that alternative architectures "may reduce or eliminate demand for some of our offerings". Component exposure is real too: the filing discloses "inflationary pressure and supply chain constraints beginning in the second half of fiscal 2026, resulting in increased costs for memory and other components, which have affected our gross margins", and names NAND among the components whose supply can tighten. This is a durable second place built on software stickiness, not a structural monopoly. | Meta's advantage is the size of the user-advertiser-developer network it monetizes, not proprietary technology: 3.58 billion daily active people across the Family of Apps produced $196.18 billion of 2025 advertising revenue at a 52% segment operating margin, and the 10-K attributes 2025's 9% rise in average price per ad to "an increase in advertising demand, which we believe is mostly due to ongoing improvements to our ad performance from our ad targeting and measurement tools." The filing is equally explicit about what limits that network: TikTok has "reduced some users' engagement," Apple's iOS changes "limit our ability ... to target and measure ads effectively," the April 2025 European Commission decision against its "subscription for no ads" model pushed EU users onto less personalized ads that are "less relevant and effective," and the FTC is seeking divestiture of Instagram and WhatsApp. Reality Labs, the intended next platform, lost $19.19 billion in 2025 on $2.21 billion of revenue and is expected "to continue to operate at a loss for the foreseeable future." | ASML is the sole producer of EUV lithography systems, the only tools able to pattern the most advanced logic and memory nodes, with a roadmap "intended to drive affordable scaling to 2030 and beyond" and a High-NA EUV (TWINSCAN EXE) platform on which customers "had run more than 400,000 wafers" by end-2025. That dominance is protected by 25 years of accumulated engineering IP and an exclusive lock on Carl Zeiss SMT optics that competitors cannot replicate. |
| Chain position | NetApp sits between the memory supply and the enterprise data centre. Upstream, the FY2026 10-K says "Third-party component costs make up a significant portion of our product costs" and singles out NAND as hard to manage "if supplies of certain components, including NAND, become limited relative to demand". Downstream, the hyperscalers are channel, partner and rival at once: the filing states "We both partner with and compete against cloud service providers through our cloud-based software and services offerings", while Azure NetApp Files, Amazon FSx for NetApp ONTAP and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes are delivered as those clouds' own natively embedded services. Distribution is a mix of direct sales and "an ecosystem of partners, including the leading cloud providers". | Demand-side anchor of the AI build-out: the 10-K reports $72.22 billion of 2025 capital expenditures and says Meta has "designed and built our own data centers and key portions of our technical infrastructure," funded entirely by the advertising business. | Upstream chokepoint of the AI chip supply chain: every leading-edge logic/DRAM wafer for AI accelerators is patterned on ASML EUV tools, making it the single indispensable equipment supplier to TSMC, Samsung and Intel. |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.17 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.42 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish Editorial prior, not backtested. |