Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Pfizer | Applied Digital | Lam Research | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | eroding The FY2025 10-K publishes the expiry schedule of its own protection. The Patents table dates the basic U.S. product patent on Eliquis ($7,961 million of 2025 revenue) to 2027, the Prevnar family's Prevnar 13 ($6,494 million for the family) to 2026, the Vyndaqel family ($6,380 million) to 2026 with a 2028 extension only pending, Ibrance ($4,122 million) to 2027, Xtandi ($2,194 million) to 2027 and Xeljanz ($1,087 million) to 2026 - against Total revenues of $62,579 million. The filing then states it anticipates 'a significant reduction of revenue from patent-based or regulatory exclusivity expiries in 2026 through 2030 as several of our in-line products experience these expirations, with the rate of the reduction of revenues from patent-based or regulatory exclusivity expiries expected to significantly accelerate over the next few years', and puts the 2026 instalment at $1.5 billion. A protection whose end dates the issuer tabulates product by product, and whose revenue effect it forecasts as accelerating, is being consumed on a clock it has already disclosed. | none The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage. | wide The FY2026 10-K competition section describes tool-level qualification lock-in as the structural fact of the industry: 'semiconductor manufacturers must make a substantial investment to qualify and integrate new capital equipment into semiconductor production lines. As a result, once a semiconductor manufacturer has selected a particular supplier's equipment and qualified it for production, the manufacturer generally maintains that selection for that specific production application and technology node as long as the supplier's products demonstrate performance to specification in the installed base.' The filing then sizes what that incumbency is worth: of 23,232,690 thousand dollars of FY2026 revenue, 8,347,202 thousand - about 36% - was customer-support-related revenue and other, which the same document defines as 'sales of customer services, spares, upgrades, and non-leading-edge equipment' sold back into the installed base. A qualified position plus a third of revenue annuitised against it is a durable barrier rather than a cyclical one. |
| Moat type | intangibles ip The filing locates the protection in the patent estate, not anywhere else. The Patents and Other Intellectual Property Rights section tabulates 'the patent rights we consider most significant in relation to our business as a whole, together with the year in which the basic product patent expires', and states that once protection is lost 'we typically lose market exclusivity on these products, and generic and biosimilar pharmaceutical manufacturers generally produce identical or highly similar products and sell them for a lower price.' The Competition section names patents as the thing rivals attack: 'several of our competitors operate without large R&D expenses and make a regular practice of challenging our product patents before their expiration', and 'Generic pharmaceutical manufacturers pose one of the biggest competitive challenges to our branded small molecule products because they can market a competing version of our product after the expiration or loss of our patent protection.' No network, switching cost or cost-curve advantage is claimed anywhere in the section. | none The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned. | switching costs The 10-K grounds the advantage in the cost of requalification, not in scale or patents: a customer that has qualified a competitor's tool is hard to win, and conversely Lam's own qualified positions persist for that application and node. The same section adds that the company must keep serving 'our installed base of customers through the delivery of high-quality and cost-efficient spare parts', naming the installed base as the asset being defended. |
| Leadership | co leader The 2026 Pharma 50 (Drug Discovery & Development, published 31 March 2026, ranking pharmaceutical revenue only) places Pfizer third at $62.58 billion of FY2025 revenue inside a five-company band that runs from Johnson & Johnson's Innovative Medicine at $60.40 billion to Eli Lilly's $65.18 billion, with Merck & Co. at $65.01 billion and AbbVie at $61.16 billion in between - scale-equal to its nearest peers rather than ahead of them. The same piece attributes the top slot to Lilly's tirzepatide franchise, which it puts at $36.5 billion combined and says passed Keytruda as the world's best-selling drug; Pfizer's 10-K names no comparable single franchise, discloses no market-share position for any product, and concedes in Item 1A that 'some of our competitors may have competitive, technical or other advantages over us' and that it faces 'an increasing number of potential competitors worldwide, including from China, that have expanded R&D capabilities.' | behind The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA). | co leader The 10-K claims position but not primacy: 'We believe we are in a strong position with our leadership and expertise in deposition, etch, and clean markets.' The same document names Applied Materials as primary competitor in deposition and Applied Materials, Hitachi and Tokyo Electron as primary competitors in etch, which is a shared-leadership structure rather than a clear single leader. |
| Pricing power | weak Price is the lever the filing shows moving against it. CMS selected Eliquis - which the 10-K says 'accounted for 13% of Total revenues in 2025' - for the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program, and 'its government-set Maximum Fair Price became effective January 1, 2026', with Ibrance and Xtandi following in 2027 and Xeljanz in 2028. In September 2025 Pfizer 'voluntarily agreed' with the U.S. administration to make certain U.S. prices 'more comparable to those in other developed countries' and to sell through the TrumpRx.gov platform 'at significant discounts to current retail prices'. Gross-to-net product revenue deductions rose to $36,374 million in 2025 from $30,048 million in 2023 while Total revenues fell to $62,579 million, and the IRA Medicare Part D Redesign alone 'negatively impacted our 2025 revenues by approximately $1 billion'. Lower U.S. net price is named as a drag on Vyndaqel, Ibrance, Xeljanz, Nurtec ODT and Lorbrena; every 2025 growth line the filing explains is attributed to demand, patient share or launch uptake, none to price. Cost of sales at 25.7% of revenues shows the manufactured margin is intact - what is not intact is the ability to set the price. | weak Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers. | moderate Real but bounded, and the filing is explicit that the recent gain was mix rather than price. Gross margin as a percent of total revenue rose 180 basis points to 50.5% in fiscal 2026 from 48.7% in fiscal 2025 (gross margin of 11,725,308 thousand dollars on revenue of 23,232,690 thousand, against 8,979,059 on 18,435,591; 7,052,791 on 14,905,386 in fiscal 2024), and the MD&A attributes that: 'Gross margin as a percentage of revenue increased in fiscal year 2026 compared to fiscal year 2025 largely due to favorable customer mix, partially offset by aluminum and steel tariff-related spend.' Against it, the same filing says manufacturers evaluate suppliers on 'overall cost of ownership', that the spares business competes with third-party spare parts providers, and that the customer list is a handful of very large buyers (Micron, Samsung, SK hynix and TSMC named as the most significant customers). |
| Summary | Two clocks run in opposite directions inside the same company. The revenue base is near-dated: Eliquis, the Prevnar family, the Vyndaqel family, Ibrance, Xtandi and Xeljanz all carry U.S. basic product patents expiring 2026 or 2027 in the 10-K's own table, and the filing warns the resulting revenue loss will 'significantly accelerate over the next few years'. The replacement book is later-dated - Padcev and Lorbrena to 2033, Nurtec ODT and Litfulo to 2034, Prevnar 20 to 2035, Abrysvo, Cibinqo and Elrexfio to 2036, Comirnaty and Paxlovid to 2041 - but in 2025 it was still much smaller, and the two products with the longest patent runway are the two the filing says are shrinking fastest (Comirnaty down 20% and Paxlovid down 59% operationally). The 10-K's answer is purchased pipeline rather than defended position: it cites the Seagen and Metsera acquisitions as 'significant investments in obesity and oncology, respectively, which are extremely competitive therapeutic areas', while R&D expense itself fell 4% to $10,437 million. Excluding Comirnaty and Paxlovid the remaining business grew 6% operationally in 2025, which is the honest measure of what is being rebuilt underneath the expiries. A third pressure sits on top of the patent clock and is independent of it: government price-setting now reaches the largest product in the book. | Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage. | Lam sells etch, deposition and clean tools into a per-node, per-application qualification process that its own 10-K says customers generally do not revisit once a supplier is qualified. The result is two linked economics, and the FY2026 filing splits them: systems revenue of 14,885,488 thousand dollars and customer-support-related revenue and other of 8,347,202 thousand, on total revenue of 23,232,690 thousand. The second line is the installed-base annuity - services, spares, upgrades and refurbished Reliant tools sold wherever Lam already holds the process step. The 10-K names Applied Materials as the primary competitor in dielectric and metals deposition, ASM International and Wonik IPS in ALD/PECVD, and Applied Materials, Hitachi and Tokyo Electron in etch, so this is shared rather than sole leadership. The live erosion risk is policy, not a rival product: China was 34% of revenue in both fiscal 2026 and fiscal 2025 (7,859,811 thousand dollars in FY2026, the largest single region), and the filing states that U.S. export controls on sales to customers in China, including entity listings of multiple customers, restrict sales of equipment and spare parts by U.S. suppliers and thereby 'provides an advantage to our international competitors that are not subject to these restrictions'. |
| Chain position | Demand side of the AI chain, not a supplier into it. The 10-K lists 'Scale AI across our business' as one of four 2026 key priorities and describes 'expanding automation, data-driven decision making, and enterprise AI solutions', crediting 'enhanced digital enablement, including automation and AI' for part of the savings in its cost-realignment and R&D-simplification programs. It describes no AI model, tool or platform that Pfizer sells. | Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. | Upstream wafer-fabrication-equipment supplier; the 10-K names Micron, Samsung, SK hynix and TSMC as its most significant customers across FY2024-FY2026, so Lam sits one step above the memory and foundry capacity that AI compute depends on. |
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| Long-horizon vote | -0.17 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish Editorial prior, not backtested. | -0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.30 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |