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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing Salesforce×ServiceNow×TE Connectivity× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
Salesforce CRM ai moat: latest change 2026-08-05 ServiceNow NOW ai moat: latest change 2026-08-05 TE Connectivity TEL ai moat: latest change 2025-11-10
Moat rating narrow

Salesforce's own language caps this at narrow: Item 1 calls its market "highly competitive, rapidly evolving and fragmented, and subject to changing technology with low barriers to entry." What holds it above none is scale and contract duration: $72.4B total RPO at 2026-01-31 versus $63.4B (+14%), current RPO $35.1B versus $30.2B (+16%), on revenue of $41.5B (+10%). But cRPO growth "was positively impacted by three percent" by currency, and total RPO "includes approximately $2.2 billion" from Informatica, acquired November 2025. Adjusted, the contracted base still outgrows revenue, but by less than the headline implies.

source: sec.gov

narrow

The FY2025 10-K shows RPO of $28.2 billion, up 27%; customers above $5 million of ACV at 603, 502 and 420 as of December 31 2025, 2024 and 2023; revenue of $13,278 million, up 21%; and a 98% renewal rate for three years. That rate cannot prove durability: the filing computes it excluding "changes in price or users," says it "does not reflect increased or decreased purchases," and warns "period-to-period comparison of renewal rates may not be meaningful." The company also calls its market "characterized by fragmentation, low barriers to entry." Real switching costs plus compounding large accounts support narrow; wide would need durability proof this filing lacks.

source: sec.gov

narrow

The FY2025 10-K's own Competition section undercuts any claim of insulation: 'The industries in which we operate are highly competitive, and we compete with thousands of companies that range from large multinational corporations to local manufacturers', competition is 'generally based on breadth of product offering, product innovation, price, quality, delivery, and service', and TE has 'experienced, and expect[s] to continue to experience, downward pressure on prices'. The same filing explicitly disclaims IP as the basis of its position: 'we do not believe that our competitive position or our operations are dependent upon or would be materially impacted by any single patent or group of related patents.' What TE does hold is durable rather than absolute — it calls itself 'one of the leading providers of advanced automobile connectivity solutions', its Industrial segment 'a leading supplier', and it converted that position into rising profitability across the same filing's three income statements (gross margin 31.5% of net sales in FY2023, 34.4% in FY2024, 35.2% in FY2025). A position that earns expanding margins into admitted price pressure is an advantage; one held against thousands of competitors and no decisive patent is not a wide one.

source: sec.gov

Moat type switching costs

Switching costs, with a caveat: the filing's clearest lock-in sentence is about rivals' customers, not its own. "Many prospective customers have invested substantial personnel and financial resources to implement and integrate their current enterprise software... may be reluctant or unwilling to migrate away" is a headwind to Salesforce's own growth. Evidence for its own base is architectural: Data 360 unifies data into "a single, governed source of truth," Agentforce runs on existing processes "without requiring customers to remove and rebuild," behind $72.4B of contracted revenue. Contracts run "typically 12 to 36 months" with no renewal obligation.

source: sec.gov

switching costs

The binding force is architecture and configuration. The filing describes "a multi-instance architecture that provides each customer with a dedicated application layer and database," an ITOM product that "maintains a single record of all IT configurable items," and products built to "integrate with existing workflows rather than replace them." Once that record and its integrations are configured, replacement becomes a re-platforming program — our inference, as the filing quantifies no switching cost. Not IP: it holds "over 2,000 issued U.S. and foreign patents" but is not "materially dependent on any single patent." Not network effects.

source: sec.gov

switching costs

The FY2025 10-K locates the advantage at the customer, not in patents. It describes 'close working relationships with many of our customers' whose 'relationships with them typically date back many years', and co-development as the mechanism: 'By working with our customers in developing new products and technologies, we believe we can identify and act on trends and leverage knowledge about next-generation technology across our products.' Roughly 75% of fiscal 2025 net sales were direct to manufacturers rather than through distribution, and the Transportation segment's products 'must withstand harsh conditions' — parts engineered in with the customer and built to survive the application, so the position sits inside the customer's design rather than in a purchase order. The filing rules the alternative out in its own words on intellectual property, so intangibles_ip is not the source; the 'thousands of companies' in Competition rules out efficient_scale.

source: sec.gov

Leadership clear leader

Clear leader in the category as it exists today, runner-up in the one it is being rebuilt into. Per IDC's Worldwide Semiannual Software Tracker on 2025 data, Salesforce was first in worldwide CRM applications for a thirteenth consecutive year at 20.0% share, and first in Sales (fourteenth year), Customer Service (thirteenth), Marketing (seventh), model-driven application platform (eleventh) and Integration (fourth). These come from Salesforce announcing its own IDC results via a trade outlet, in translation, not IDC primary material. In the same tracker's new Agent Build and Deploy segment it ranked second at 17.5%, albeit as fastest-growing vendor.

source: sec.gov

clear leader

The call is scoped to IT service management. Apps Run The World's 2024 ITSM ranking (page dated 23 July 2025) places ServiceNow first at 44.4% share, ahead of Atlassian, BMC, GoTo and Ivanti, in an $11.4 billion market where the top ten hold 83.3%. Scale corroborates: about 8,700 customers, 29,187 employees, $13,278 million of revenue, $28.2 billion of RPO. References to "two decades partnering with enterprise customers" and process knowledge "that cannot be readily replicated" are the filing's own characterisation. Outside ITSM it is weaker: one of six Leaders in the 2025 Gartner LCAP quadrant, and tenth of ten in CRM behind Salesforce at 26.1%.

source: sec.gov

co leader

The FY2025 10-K claims leadership in qualified form and then names the peers who contest it. Transportation Solutions 'is a leader in connectivity and sensor technologies' and TE is 'one of the leading providers of advanced automobile connectivity solutions' — one of, not the — while the segment's 'major competitors include Yazaki, Aptiv, Sumitomo, Sensata, Honeywell, Molex, and Amphenol'. Industrial Solutions 'is a leading supplier of products that connect and distribute power, data, and signals' and 'competes primarily against Amphenol, Hubbell, Carlisle Companies, Integer Holdings, Molex, Omron, JST, and Korea Electric Terminal (KET)'. Amphenol and Molex appear on both lists, so TE shares the top of the interconnect market rather than owning it.

source: sec.gov

Pricing power moderate

Gross margin rises across the Item 7 table — gross profit of $32,255M on $41,525M of revenue, 78% of total revenues in FY2026 against 77% in FY2025 and 75% in FY2024 — yet MD&A denies price as the cause: growth "was primarily caused by volume-driven increases from new business," and "Pricing was not a significant driver of the increase in revenues for the period." Item 1A names consumption-based pricing among attrition factors, says Agentforce and Data 360 monetization "remain relatively new and uncertain," and concedes "limited experience with determining optimal pricing for our consumption-based contracts."

source: sec.gov

moderate

The filing discloses no average selling price, no net revenue retention and no pricing data, and the renewal rate is no proxy — it "does not reflect increased or decreased purchases" and excludes "changes in price or users." Revenue up 21%, the $5 million-plus cohort up about 20% annually and RPO up 27% are all consistent with expansion at flat pricing. Margins cut the other way: subscription gross profit fell to 80% from 82% with no stated cause, and professional services gross loss widened to 5% from 2%. One real lever is that "certain AI and data solutions include a consumption-based pricing component."

source: sec.gov

moderate

The FY2025 10-K states both halves plainly: TE has 'experienced, and expect[s] to continue to experience, downward pressure on prices. However, as a result of increased costs and tariffs, certain of our businesses implemented price increases in recent years.' Pass-through, not price-setting. The realised result is margin expansion rather than erosion — gross margin of 31.5% of net sales in FY2023, 34.4% in FY2024 and 35.2% in FY2025 per the same filing's income statements, and 36.5% ($5,319M on $14,573M) for the nine months to 26 June 2026 versus 35.3% a year earlier, with Q3 FY2026 GAAP operating margin of 19%, per the 22 July 2026 results release (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385157/000110465926085589/tel-20260722xex99d1.htm). Strong would require pricing that leads rather than follows cost; weak is contradicted by three years of expanding gross margin.

source: sec.gov

Summary

Salesforce is the incumbent of record in CRM applications and is paid like one: $41.5B of FY2026 revenue (+10%), 78% gross margin, $72.4B of contracted revenue not yet recognized, and first place in worldwide CRM for a thirteenth consecutive year at 20.0% share per IDC's tracker as announced by Salesforce. Enterprise data and workflow embedded through Data 360 and Agentforce is costly to unwind, and the agentic layer is deliberately built atop existing processes rather than requiring re-implementation. The limits are the company's own: it twice describes its market as having low barriers to entry, names AI-native startups whose solutions "may bypass traditional business process workflows or displace established user interfaces," ranks second at 17.5% in IDC's new Agent Build and Deploy segment, and concedes pricing did not drive FY2026 growth.

ServiceNow sells a workflow platform that sits on top of, rather than replaces, an enterprise's existing systems. Each customer gets a dedicated application layer and database, ITOM maintains a single record of all IT configurable items, and products integrate with existing workflows rather than replace them; once that record and its integrations span IT, HR and customer service, displacement becomes a re-platforming exercise. The evidence is in large commitments: $5 million-plus ACV customers rose from 420 to 502 to 603, and RPO reached $28.2 billion, up 27%, against $13,278 million of FY2025 revenue. The moat is bounded by a market the company itself calls fragmented with low barriers to entry, by larger rivals that can bundle or cut price, and by falling subscription gross margin, 82% to 80%.

TE Connectivity sells the connectors, terminals, sensors and cable-protection parts that, in its own framing, 'enable the distribution of power, signal, and data' — a component vendor, never a system or compute vendor. The FY2025 10-K puts the two reportable segments, Transportation Solutions (54% of net sales) and Industrial Solutions (46%), against a combined served market it estimates at roughly $200 billion, which tells you immediately that no single share number governs this business: the filing discloses no market share, says 'no single customer accounted for a significant amount of our net sales in fiscal 2025, 2024, or 2023', and states that because TE is 'not organized by product or service, it is not practicable to disclose net sales by product or service'. The defensible part is entrenchment. Parts get designed in with the customer and then qualified to survive automotive, aerospace, subsea and grid conditions; TE sells about 75% of net sales direct into ~130 countries; relationships 'typically date back many years'. That is a switching-cost moat, and the filing is unusually candid that it is not a patent moat — no single patent or group of patents is material to its competitive position. The limit is equally plain in the filing: highly competitive industries, thousands of competitors, and persistent downward price pressure, with Amphenol and Molex named as competitors in BOTH segments and Yazaki, Aptiv and Sumitomo heading the Transportation segment's competitor list. The evidence that the moat is nonetheless working is margin plus mix. Gross margin ran 31.5% / 34.4% / 35.2% of net sales across FY2023-FY2025, and in the nine months to 26 June 2026 gross margin was $5,319M on $14,573M of net sales (36.5%) against $4,419M on $12,513M (35.3%) a year earlier, while Q3 FY2026 GAAP operating margin was 19% and orders hit a record $5.7 billion, up 27% year over year. Growth has also rotated: digital data networks grew 34.2% in Q3 FY2026 (34.0% organic) and 48.8% over nine months, with the CEO naming 'increased momentum in AI in both the data center and across the broader energy infrastructure' — while sensors, an end market for which the 10-K makes no leadership claim at all, shrank 2.8% organically in the quarter. Narrow, not wide: a real toll on other people's platforms, collected under admitted price pressure.

Chain position

Applications-layer incumbent: sells enterprise CRM and agentic software to end customers across industries, consumes cloud infrastructure (third-party IaaS partners plus its own Hyperforce estate) and third-party LLMs, and sits upstream of no hardware supply chain. Exposure is to enterprise software budgets and to whether the agentic layer is captured by incumbent suites or AI-native entrants.

Enterprise workflow platform layered on top of customers' existing systems of record. It consumes public cloud capacity (named relationships with AWS, Google, Microsoft and NVIDIA) plus its own data centers, and reaches customers through a direct sales force, global system integrators (Accenture, Deloitte, EY, Infosys, KPMG) and resale partners. Microsoft is named as both partner and competitor.

TE is an upstream component supplier to the AI build-out, not a participant in compute. It sells 'connectivity and sensor solutions [that] enable the distribution of power, signal, and data to advance next-generation transportation, energy networks, automated factories, data centers enabling artificial intelligence', about 75% of it direct to manufacturers across roughly 130 countries. AI exposure runs through one end market: digital data networks was 28% of Industrial Solutions, and Industrial Solutions was 46% of fiscal 2025 net sales — so the datacenter line is a minority of a company still 54% transportation. That minority is where the growth now is: digital data networks net sales rose 34.2% in Q3 FY2026 and 48.8% over the nine months, and energy rose 34.4% in the quarter, the CEO tying both to AI momentum 'in both the data center and across the broader energy infrastructure' (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385157/000110465926085589/tel-20260722xex99d1.htm).

Products (share / barrier)
Long-horizon vote +0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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