Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Super Micro Computer | GlobalFoundries | Apple | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow The FY2026 10-K describes a genuine but bounded advantage. On the asset side the filing claims a modular Server Building Block Solutions architecture, over 3,500 R&D employees, in-house design control over many sub-systems, and that Supermicro believes it is 'the only major server, storage, and accelerated compute platform vendor that designs, develops, and manufactures a significant portion of its systems in the United States.' Against that, the same filing calls its market 'highly competitive, rapidly evolving,' concedes that 'most of our competitors have longer operating histories, significantly greater resources, greater name recognition, or deeper market penetration,' reports intensified competition from 'predominantly Asia-based' entrants 'leading to pricing pressure,' and states that pricing pressure has produced 'a continued decline of average selling prices across our business and we expect that these historical trends will continue.' It also disclaims patent dependence outright. A durable-but-shallow advantage in time-to-market and integration, sitting on top of a commoditizing box business, is narrow rather than wide. | narrow The FY2025 20-F gives a measured lock-in: approximately 63% of 2025 wafer shipment volume was single-sourced business - products GF says "can only be manufactured with our technology or cannot be manufactured elsewhere without significant customer redesigns" - and long-term agreements carried an aggregate remaining revenue commitment of approximately $11 billion at 31 December 2025, as "binding, multi-year, reciprocal minimum purchase and supply commitments". That advantage is bounded by admissions in the same filing: "some of our competitors may offer more advanced or differentiated technologies than we do and some have greater access to capital and substantially greater production capacity, research and development... including access to government subsidies"; China's mature-node "foundry capacity is expected to grow faster than expected demand at those nodes"; and GF "renegotiated a number of LTAs with certain of our customers, including in 2025, as a result of which some of our LTAs now have longer commitment periods... and some of our LTAs have lower pricing or volume commitments than originally negotiated". Gross margin of 24.9% in 2025 ($1,690m on $6,791m of net revenue) on essentially flat revenue is the economics of a position that is defended rather than uncontested. | narrow Argued, not assumed. The FY2025 10-K does evidence a real moat in margin: total gross margin percentage rose 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025) in markets the same filing describes as characterised by 'aggressive price competition, downward pressure on gross margins.' But the filing bounds the claim itself: it concedes 'a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' it discloses no retention, active-device or installed-base figure anywhere (its only 'large installed bases of active devices' reference describes competitors), and it discloses that both of the highest-margin layers are already being cut down by force -- Apple is 'currently subject to a court order preventing it from imposing any commission or fee on certain purchases' on the U.S. App Store storefront, has had to open 'alternative methods of distribution for iOS and iPadOS apps, alternative payment processing' in the EU, and warns that a reversal on appeal in the Google search case could impose remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution.' A moat that earns 46.9% gross margin but whose most profitable layer is being narrowed by two courts and a regulator is narrow, not wide. |
| Moat type | cost scale The filing locates the advantage in design-and-manufacturing scale, not in IP or lock-in. It says the company manufactures the majority of its systems at its San Jose headquarters with assembly, test and QC also in Taiwan, the Netherlands and Malaysia, and that this structure lets it 'reduce time to delivery, mitigate the impact of tariffs and regional costs, and reduce overall manufacturing costs.' Its own list of principal competitive factors includes 'cost-effective design and manufacturing' and 'sufficient manufacturing capacity necessary to support market demand.' Intangibles are explicitly ruled out as the source: 'neither our business as a whole nor any of our principal businesses are materially dependent on a single patent,' with reliance placed 'primarily on trade secrets, technical know-how.' Switching costs are weak by the filing's own account: it 'typically sell[s] products pursuant to purchase orders rather than long-term purchase commitments,' and customers 'have, and others may in the future, cancel or defer purchase orders on short notice without incurring a significant penalty.' | switching costs The filing rules out scale as the source: GF concedes competitors with "substantially greater production capacity, research and development" and its four fabs held roughly 2.8 million wafers per annum of installed capacity at end-2025 against a $6.8bn revenue base. The mechanism it names instead is the cost of moving a qualified design - "[g]iven the time and costs associated with moving a single-sourced product to a competitor, clients are more likely to continue awarding us single-source contracts for such products" - and it is quantified at approximately 63% of 2025 wafer shipment volume. It is contractually reinforced by the ~$11bn of remaining LTA revenue commitment, which GF says continues to matter "for certain longer term, more durable end markets, such as automotive", where 21% of 2025 net revenue ($1,410m) now sits. | switching costs The 10-K locates the durable advantage in an integrated stack and its third-party ecosystem, not in patents: it names 'a strong third-party software and accessories ecosystem' among the principal competitive factors and states the Company 'designs and develops nearly the entire solution for its products, including the hardware, operating system, numerous software applications and related services,' while explicitly disclaiming IP as the source -- 'No single intellectual property right is solely responsible for protecting the Company's products and services' and the Company 'relies primarily on the innovative skills, technical competence and marketing abilities of its personnel.' The remedies now in force confirm the diagnosis negatively: the same filing describes being required to permit alternative distribution and alternative payment processing in the EU and being barred from charging commission on certain linked-out purchases in the U.S. -- remedies aimed squarely at lowering the cost of leaving Apple's rails, which is what a switching-cost moat is. |
| Leadership | at parity The filing claims no market-share leadership and gives no share figure. It states 'we believe that we compete favorably with respect to most of these factors' while immediately conceding that 'most of our competitors have longer operating histories, significantly greater resources, greater name recognition, or deeper market penetration,' naming Cisco, Dell, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise and Lenovo plus ODMs Foxconn, Quanta Computer and Wiwynn. The one leadership claim it does make is narrow and structural — that it believes it is the only major vendor in its class manufacturing a significant portion of its systems in the United States — plus a stated goal (not an achievement) to 'be the first to market with superior product designs.' Competing favorably against larger, better-penetrated rivals without asserting share leadership is parity, not leadership. | fast follower The 20-F places GF inside a group of "five major foundries (including four scaled pure-play foundries) that accounted for the vast majority of worldwide foundry revenue in 2025", naming TSMC first among key competitors along with UMC and SMIC, and separately conceding competitors with "more advanced or differentiated technologies than we do" and "substantially greater production capacity, research and development, marketing and other resources". GF does not compete for the leading edge at all; its stated pillars are differentiated RF, FDX, silicon photonics, power and feature-rich CMOS plus geographic diversity. That is an established, scaled participant operating inside a pace set elsewhere, not one setting it, and not one shut out of the top tier. | fast follower Apple leads on integration and margin rather than on units, and the filing says so: it 'has a minority market share in the global smartphone, personal computer, tablet and wearables markets,' while competitors have 'broad product lines, low-priced products, large installed bases of active devices, and large customer bases.' On the AI axis that defines this graph, Apple is following rather than leading -- it now licenses a rival's frontier models to power Siri (see the Apple Intelligence / Siri row and its citation) while pushing its own advantage down into silicon. |
| Pricing power | weak The filing states pricing pressure explicitly and repeatedly. 'Historically, these pricing pressures have led to a continued decline of average selling prices across our business and we expect that these historical trends will continue.' On large orders: 'Large orders are generally subject to intense competition and pricing pressure which can have an adverse impact on our margins and results of operations.' It concedes it has 'accepted customer orders with various types of component pricing protection' which 'increased our exposure to component pricing fluctuations and have adversely affected our financial results in certain quarters,' and that FY2026 industry supply constraints in memory, storage, GPUs and CPUs affected 'the pricing of these items.' Its stated remedy is aspirational rather than realized: it 'must continue to develop more advanced, differentiated products that command a premium.' The filing gives no gross-margin trend in Item 1/1A; margin appears there only as a downside — excess or obsolete inventory 'would reduce our gross margin.' | moderate Gross margin was 24.9% in 2025 ($1,690m on $6,791m) versus 24.5% in 2024 ($1,651m on $6,750m) - held, not expanded, even though average shipment utilization across the global fabs rose from 77% to 86%, so most of the volume gain was absorbed rather than dropping through. The filing states outright that "the market prices for technology and services tend to fall over time, except in times of extreme supply shortage", and discloses LTAs renegotiated in 2025 to "lower pricing or volume commitments than originally negotiated". Against that, GF says wafer price "varies significantly across technology platforms" and that devices with "richer feature sets, higher performance, better yields and greater system-level integration... generally command higher wafer prices". Price-setting inside designed-in single-sourced sockets, price-taking at the competitive margin. | strong The 10-K's own gross-margin table: total gross margin percentage 44.1% (2023) to 46.2% (2024) to 46.9% (2025), with Services at 75.4% versus Products at 36.8%, and iPhone net sales rising 'due to higher net sales of Pro models' -- mix moving up, not down. Held against the filing's own hedge that 'gross margins will be subject to volatility and downward pressure,' the realised trend is the stronger evidence. |
| Summary | Supermicro's edge, as its FY2026 10-K frames it, is speed and integration built on a common modular parts bin: it works with NVIDIA, Intel and AMD to 'align the design of our new products with their product release schedules,' then 'quickly assemble a broad portfolio of solutions by leveraging common building blocks across product lines.' During FY2026 it pushed that advantage up a level, growing Data Center Building Block Solutions to 'more than ten key subsystems' — coolant distribution units, heat exchangers, power shelves, switching, management software — and deploying DLC-2 liquid cooling the filing credits with up to 98% per-rack heat capture and up to 40% lower data center power draw. But the filing's competition and risk discussion is candid that this sits inside a price-taking market: ASPs decline structurally, one customer exceeded 10% of net sales in FY2026, and ODMs 'benefit from their scale and very low-cost manufacturing' while increasingly selling their own brands. | GlobalFoundries is a pure-play specialty foundry that deliberately does not contest the leading edge. Its FY2025 20-F frames the business around six differentiated technology lines - feature-rich CMOS, ultra-low-power CMOS (FinFET and FDX), silicon photonics, RF, power, and, new in 2025, processor IP via the MIPS acquisition - manufactured at four fabs in Malta NY, Burlington VT, Dresden and Singapore, which GF describes as making it "the only scaled foundry with a global manufacturing footprint spanning the United States, Europe, and Asia operating for more than a decade". The defence that shows up in the numbers is design lock-in rather than cost: approximately 63% of 2025 wafer shipment volume was single-sourced, and ~$11bn of long-term agreement revenue commitment remained at year-end. What limits it is visible in the same document - competitors with more capital, more capacity and, in some cases, more advanced technology; mature-node capacity in China expected to outgrow demand at 28nm and larger; TSMC, Samsung, Intel, Texas Instruments and UMC all building in the United States, Europe or Singapore, which erodes the geographic-diversity argument GF calls "one of our key advantages". Pricing reflects that balance: 2025 gross margin of 24.9% against 24.5% in 2024 even as shipment utilization rose from 77% to 86%, with some LTAs renegotiated to lower pricing. AI exposure is real but indirect - Communications, Infrastructure & Data Center was 11% of 2025 net revenue, and GF's AI content is optical interconnect, RF, sensing, power and edge processor IP rather than accelerator logic. | Apple's moat is usually asserted through the ecosystem; the FY2025 10-K neither quantifies nor claims retention, so the evidence has to be read elsewhere in the filing. Where it does show is mix and margin: Services reached $109.2B of $416.2B net sales (+14%) at a 75.4% gross margin against 36.8% on Products, so 26% of revenue delivered $82.3B of the $195.2B total gross margin, and iPhone grew 'due to higher net sales of Pro models.' That profit concentration is also the vulnerability the filing itself flags: Apple 'earns revenue from licensing arrangements with Google LLC and other companies to offer their search services on the Company's platforms,' arrangements 'currently subject to government investigations and legal proceedings' after Google was found to have violated U.S. antitrust laws on August 5, 2024 and the D.C. District Court ordered remedies on September 2, 2025 -- with the 10-K warning that a reversal on appeal could impose DOJ's proposed remedies 'prohibiting Google from offering the Company commercial terms for search distribution,' which 'could materially adversely affect the Company's ability to earn revenue from such licensing arrangements.' Apple never discloses the size of that payment in the filing -- the concentration is admitted but not measured. Alongside it, the App Store toll has already been reduced in both jurisdictions. What is not in dispute is the vertical integration: Apple designs the silicon and now the cellular modem, and uses 'custom components available from only one source.' Read together: a genuine, margin-visible switching-cost moat around an integrated stack, with its two most profitable layers under active legal reduction. |
| Chain position | Downstream system integrator: it converts third-party accelerators and CPUs (NVIDIA Blackwell/GB300 NVL72, AMD Instinct MI350, Intel Xeon 6) into validated racks, liquid cooling and full data-center building blocks sold to cloud service providers and enterprises. The AI angle is central, not incidental — the filing devotes a risk factor titled 'The AI industry has driven a significant portion of our recent success' and states 'A portion of the recent success of our server and storage solutions has been dependent on the integration of our products and services within the AI industry.' | Pure-play specialty foundry. Inputs are silicon and specialised SOI wafers bought under multiple long-term agreements with principal suppliers, "the largest of which is Soitec", plus externally sourced EDA tools and third-party IP. Output is finished semiconductor wafers, approximately 89% of 2025 net revenue, sold to fabless designers and IDMs and delivered through the GlobalSolutions ecosystem of IP providers, EDA vendors, OSAT partners and design-service firms; the remaining ~11% is photomasks, sourcing and post-fab services, and IP licence and royalty income. Manufacturing sits at four sites - Malta NY, Burlington VT, Dresden and Singapore - with roughly 239,000 square metres of clean room and about 2.8 million wafers per annum installed capacity at end-2025. Position in the AI chain is one step removed from accelerators: Communications, Infrastructure & Data Center was 11% of 2025 net revenue ($745m), with content in optical interconnect, RF front-ends, timing and power, alongside edge-AI processor IP from the MIPS acquisition. | Applications-layer name in the AI chain: the 10-K describes designing 'nearly the entire solution' and using custom components 'available from only one source,' making Apple a large, concentrated buyer of leading-edge silicon rather than a supplier of AI compute to anyone else. |
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| Long-horizon vote | -0.01 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.11 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish Editorial prior, not backtested. |