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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing Tencent Holdings×CXMT×Applied Digital× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
Tencent Holdings TCEHY ai moat: latest change 2026-03-18 CXMT 688825.SS ai moat: latest change 2026-08-29 Applied Digital APLD ai moat: latest change 2026-07-29
Moat rating wide

The 2025 Annual Report reports combined MAU of Weixin and WeChat of 1,418 million at 31 December 2025, still growing 2% year-on-year and 0.3% quarter-on-quarter off a 1.4-billion-account base, while group gross margin rose to 56% from 53% and Marketing Services revenue grew 19% to RMB145.0 billion 'primarily driven by growth in pricing and ad impressions'. Rising price on a still-growing user base of that size is the signature of a wide moat, not a contested one.

source: static.www.tencent.com

none

CXMT's 2026 interim report (published 2026-08-29) names scale and IDM technology as core competencies, but also concedes gaps. It says that compared with the leading international manufacturers the Company 'still has a certain gap in overall scale, technology accumulation and customer resources' (与国际头部厂商相比,公司在整体规模、技术积累、客户资源等方面仍然存在一定差距). It describes its scale effect as 'gradually emerging' (逐步显现), and its gross-margin risk covers the case where the scale effect cannot materialise over the long term (公司规模效应长期无法显现). Its excess returns span a single shortage. The retained-earnings note shows an accumulated deficit of ¥36.65bn entering 2026, after ¥1.87bn of 2025 net profit attributable to the parent, and the first-half 2025 net loss attributable to shareholders was ¥2.33bn. Then first-half 2026 revenue rose 873.64%, which the report attributes to the global DRAM supply shortage, higher prices and sharply higher volumes, and the main-business gross margin reached 84.84%.

source: static.cninfo.com.cn

none

The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage.

source: sec.gov

Moat type network effects

The report attributes Marketing Services pricing growth to 'an increasing proportion of closed-loop ads (where the user clicks through to native transactional experiences, such as Mini Programs, Mini Shops, or Mini Games)' and describes growing engagement with Mini Shops, Mini Games and content Mini Programs 'by strengthening Weixin's commerce experience and content ecosystem' - merchants and developers building inside the user graph rather than beside it, which is a network effect rather than a switching cost or a scale cost advantage.

source: static.www.tencent.com

none

On the report's own evidence, no candidate moat source qualifies. Cost scale: the report calls DRAM a highly standardised product (高度标准化的产品) in which the cost advantage of scale is a core competency. But CXMT ranks fourth globally by capacity, and the report, calculating on sales, puts Samsung, SK hynix and Micron at 33.96%, 34.48% and 23.41% of the 2025 global DRAM market, so the scale advantage lies with the leaders. IP: it reports 4,484 domestic patents (3,744 of them invention patents) and 3,400 overseas patents as of 2026-06-30. Yet it describes its core technology as reaching 'international advanced level' (国际先进水平) and flags possible IP disputes with competitors. Switching costs: ¥133.48bn of ¥150.31bn first-half 2026 revenue went through distributors, who under the report's revenue note decide their own resale prices.

source: static.cninfo.com.cn

none

The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned.

source: sec.gov

Leadership clear leader

The only explicit leadership claims in the report are the Company's own: Tencent Video 'maintained its leading position in China's long-form video market' and Tencent Music 'extended its leading position in China's music streaming market'. Against a 1,418 million combined Weixin/WeChat MAU base, the report asserts leadership in the adjacent content markets and no competitor is named anywhere in it.

source: static.www.tencent.com

fast follower

TrendForce (2026-09-24) reports that CXMT's global DRAM revenue share rose to 9.5% in 2Q26 from 7.6% in 1Q26, 'placing it fourth behind Samsung at 39.4%, SK hynix at 24.9%, and Micron at 23.3%'. It is catching up through generation-skipping R&D. The interim report had its fifth process platform in customer certification, and a voluntary disclosure on 2026-09-21 announced that platform's mass production, adding that its products are not yet in scale sales and yields need time to ramp. TrendForce's listing analysis (2026-07-28) still says CXMT 'still trails Samsung, SK hynix, and Micron in advanced processes, product performance, yields, and certification by high-end customers'.

source: static.cninfo.com.cn

behind

The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA).

source: sec.gov

Pricing power strong

Group gross margin was 56% for 2025, up from 53%, with segment gross margins of 60% for VAS (from 57%), 58% for Marketing Services (from 55%) and 51% for FinTech and Business Services (from 47%); Marketing Services revenue growth is attributed 'primarily' to pricing, and the Chairman's Statement notes ad load 'remained at a much lower level than peers'' - price is rising with monetisation headroom still unused.

source: static.www.tencent.com

weak

CXMT is a price taker riding the cycle. The interim report attributes first-half revenue growth to the global DRAM supply shortage, rising prices and sharply higher volumes. It records industry prices between 2015 and 2025 as high as $7.89/GB and as low as $1.78/GB in first-half 2023, and it states that the continued steep price rise is not sustainable. Main-business revenue was ¥15.22bn against cost of ¥13.29bn in first-half 2025, and ¥150.04bn against ¥22.75bn in first-half 2026. Most sales go through distributors, who set their own resale prices.

source: static.cninfo.com.cn

weak

Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers.

source: sec.gov

Summary

The textbook answer holds, but not for the textbook reason. Weixin's value is that third parties transact inside it: the report ties Marketing Services growth to closed-loop ads landing in Mini Programs, Mini Shops and Mini Games, ties Business Services growth to 'higher eCommerce technology service fees, underpinned by growth in Mini Shops GMV', and reports that ad load 'remained at a much lower level than peers', so the graph is being monetised deliberately below capacity. On gaming regulation the record is thinner than the received narrative implies: a Hong Kong annual report carries no Risk Factors and no Competition section, and the only place game licensing appears is the Structure Contracts disclosure, where Circular 13 (2009) is discussed as a foreign-ownership question - PRC legal advisers say the arrangement does not violate existing law, while warning of 'substantial uncertainties regarding the interpretation and application' of it. So the disclosed regulatory exposure is structural (VIE legality) rather than an operating constraint on game approvals; the filing simply does not speak to approval throughput at all, and any moat claim resting on it would be unsourced.

CXMT (ChangXin) is a Hefei-based IDM that designs and fabricates DDR5 and LPDDR4X/LPDDR5/5X/LPDDR6 memory and sells DRAM wafers, chips and modules. Its 2026 interim report says it reached its fourth process platform through a 'generation-skipping' (跳代研发) R&D strategy, and that it ranks first in China and fourth globally by shipments and sales. First-half 2026 revenue was ¥150.31bn (DDR series ¥69.47bn, LPDDR series ¥78.19bn), with a main-business gross margin of 84.84%. TrendForce puts its 2Q26 DRAM revenue share at 9.5%, up from 7.6% in 1Q26. The position is real but recent. The report concedes gaps to the three leaders in scale, technology and customers. The customers it names are Alibaba Cloud, ByteDance, Tencent, Lenovo, Xiaomi, Transsion, Honor, OPPO and vivo. On 2026-06-08 the US Defense Department added its subsidiary ChangXin Memory to the Section 1260H list. TrendForce notes that export controls leave CXMT relying on DUV multiple patterning rather than EUV, and that its prospectus 'has not disclosed a clear mass-production timetable' for HBM. The report itself warns that the continued steep rise in DRAM prices is not sustainable (价格的持续大幅上涨不具备可持续性) as international makers add capacity.

Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage.

Chain position

Both a downstream AI deployer and an upstream supplier: the report says Tencent Cloud 'achieved profit at scale due to increased enterprise demand for AI workloads' while AI is also credited with improving its own ad targeting and game content production.

Upstream DRAM IDM selling wafers, chips and modules to server, smartphone, PC and automotive makers, mostly through distributors (¥133.48bn of ¥150.31bn first-half 2026 revenue).

Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers.

Products (share / barrier)
  • Blockchain data center hosting (Jamestown / Ellendale) Niche · Low source: sec.gov
  • HPC data center leasing (Polaris Forge / Delta Forge AI factories) Challenger · Moderate source: sec.gov
Long-horizon vote +0.42 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

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-0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish

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-0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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