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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing Teradyne×Fabrinet×Synopsys× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
Teradyne TER ai moat: latest change 2026-02-19 Fabrinet FN ai moat: latest change 2026-08-18 Synopsys SNPS ai moat: latest change 2025-12-22
Moat rating narrow

Real but bounded: the FY2025 10-K reports gross profit at 58.2% of total revenues, a level it records as a decrease - 'Gross profit as a percent of total revenues decreased by 0.3 points, primarily due to product mix' from 58.5% in 2024 - while a shared IG-XL test-program environment spans the FLEX and J750 families. Against that, the filing's own risk-factor heading is 'We are subject to intense competition' and it concedes that 'Some of our competitors have introduced or announced new products with certain performance characteristics that may be considered equal or superior to those we currently offer,' adding that it faces competition 'from emerging Asian companies and internal development at several of our customers.'

source: sec.gov

narrow

The FY2026 10-K grounds a real but bounded defence. On the defence side: Item 1 states that in the manufacturing services market "there are significant barriers to entry in our existing and target markets, including lengthy sales cycles, the need to demonstrate complex precision optical and electro-mechanical engineering and manufacturing capabilities to a prospective customer and the ability to protect a customer's intellectual property," and that qualification of a program "may take three to six months or longer to complete." On the limiting side, the same filing shows the protection does not reach price: gross profit was 12.0% of revenues in FY2026 against 12.1% in FY2025 and 12.4% in FY2024 even as revenue rose 35.7% to $4.64 billion, four customers each exceeded 10% of revenue (Cisco 19.9%, NVIDIA 16.3%, Nokia 10.7%, Amazon 10.5%), and "reliance on a small number of customers gives those customers substantial purchasing power and leverage in negotiating contracts with us." Sales are made on "individual purchase orders that have short lead times and are subject to revision or cancellation," so the qualified program is sticky while the contract is not.

source: sec.gov

wide

The FY2025 10-K positions Synopsys as 'a global leader in supplying the mission-critical EDA solutions' and, after the Ansys merger, 'the global leader in engineering S&A software' — two adjacent franchises the filing says now sit in one portfolio.

source: sec.gov

Moat type switching costs

The 10-K's Products section grounds the stickiness in test-program and capital reuse rather than in protected IP: the FLEX Test Platform runs 'The IG-XL™ software operating system which provides fast program development, including instant conversion from single to multi-site test', the J750 'shares the IG-XL software environment with the family of FLEX Test Platform systems,' and its instruments are 'coupled with a universal slot test head design that allows easy test system reconfiguration to address changing test needs.' The filing credits that versatility with making FLEX 'a widely used test solution at OSATs... allowing OSATs to leverage their capital investments.' The same 10-K expressly disclaims an IP-based moat: 'We do not believe that any single piece of intellectual property or proprietary rights is essential to our business.'

source: sec.gov

switching costs

The 10-K locates the stickiness in qualification rather than in patents or scale. Customers "do not purchase our services until they qualify the services and satisfactorily complete factory audits and vendor evaluations"; qualification "may take three to six months or longer"; production is transferred "copy-exact: the setup of a production process identical to the one used by our customer"; and the filing's own experience of changing a component source is that it "resulted in our customers or their end customers requiring requalification and validation of components, a process that can often be lengthy and has negatively impacted the timing of our revenue" — the same friction a customer would face moving the program elsewhere. The filing rules out an IP-based moat itself: "Historically, patents have not played a significant role in the protection of our proprietary rights," and any process improvement developed for a customer's product is "immediately assigned to that customer." The Thailand cost base is a genuine advantage but the filing warns it is not durable on its own — "Wage increases may impact our ability to sustain our competitive advantage and may reduce our profit margin."

source: sec.gov

switching costs

The 10-K describes EDA as 'mission-critical' software licensed mostly as network licences across a customer's whole design flow, with post-contract support providing 'frequent updates to maintain the utilization of the software due to rapid changes in technology' — a dependence that renews at every process node.

source: sec.gov

Leadership co leader

The 10-K opens by calling Teradyne 'a leading global provider of automated test equipment and robotics solutions' - a leading provider, not the leader - and its Competition section names Semiconductor Test rivals non-exhaustively: competitors 'include, among others, Advantest Corporation, SPEA S.p.A., and Cohu, Inc.' It discloses no share figure and warns that competitors' announced products 'may be considered equal or superior to those we currently offer,' which reads as shared leadership rather than a clear lead.

source: sec.gov

co leader

The leadership claim in the filing is the company's own qualitative assessment: "We believe we are a leader in manufacturing products for the optical communications market," and, on breadth of process technology, "Based on our experience with customers and our qualitative assessment of our capabilities, we believe we provide a broader array of process technologies to the optics industry than any other manufacturing services provider." The same Item 1 names a crowded field against it — "Benchmark Electronics, Inc., Celestica Inc., InnoLight Technology (Suzhou) Ltd., Jabil Inc., Sanmina Corporation, Venture Corporation Limited and Eoptolink Technology Inc., Ltd., as well as the internal manufacturing capabilities of our customers" — and no independent share ranking is given, so the record supports front-of-field standing but not sole primacy.

source: sec.gov

co leader

The 10-K claims global leadership in EDA while stating 'The EDA industry is highly competitive' and that Synopsys competes against other EDA vendors and against customers' own internally developed design tools.

source: sec.gov

Pricing power moderate

Gross profit was 58.2% of total revenues in 2025 against 58.5% in 2024, and the 10-K attributes the 0.3-point decline to product mix; product gross margin fell 0.8 points to 57.3%. The risk factor 'Our operating results are likely to fluctuate significantly' lists 'competitive pressures on selling prices' among factors that 'could impact future operations,' and the same list cites the tendency of customers to 'wait until late in a quarter to commit to purchase... or the hope of obtaining more favorable pricing from a competitor seeking the business' - margin is defended, not expanded.

source: sec.gov

weak

Gross profit was 12.0% of revenues in FY2026, 12.1% in FY2025 and 12.4% in FY2024 — flat to down across three years in which revenue grew from $2.88 billion to $4.64 billion — and the FY2026 increase in gross profit is attributed to "sales volume and product mix," not price. Item 1 says so directly: "we expect the prices we charge for our manufactured products to decrease over time (partly as a result of competitive market forces)," with the offset coming from cycle-time, mix, yield and material-cost work rather than from rate. The risk factors add that customer consolidation gives buyers "increased leverage that may result in, among other things, decreases in our average selling prices," and that new competition "could result in price reductions for our services, reduced gross profit margins or loss of market share."

source: sec.gov

moderate

The 10-K lists 'license terms, price and payment terms' among the principal competitive factors and states 'No single factor drives an EDA customer's buying decision'; licence fees depend on licence type, product mix and the number of copies licensed.

source: sec.gov

Summary

Teradyne sells the test step that sits between fabrication and shipment, and its hold on customers comes from platform continuity rather than patents. The FY2025 10-K describes one IG-XL software environment shared across the FLEX and J750 test families and a universal slot test head that lets a customer reconfigure a system to address changing test needs, which the filing credits with making FLEX widely used at OSATs because it lets them leverage their capital investments. The margin that continuity sits on is high but not rising: gross profit was 58.2% of revenue in 2025, which the filing records as a 0.3-point decrease from 2024 on product mix, with product margin down 0.8 points to 57.3% and service margin up 2.9 points to 62.9% - and the filing attributes that service gain to the May 2024 sale of the DIS business, not to the platform. It is a narrow moat, not a wide one: the filing names Advantest, SPEA and Cohu 'among others' in Semiconductor Test, warns of internal development at several customers, states that rival products may be 'equal or superior,' and discloses that the five largest direct customers rose to 44% of consolidated revenue in 2025 from 36% in 2024 - buyer power that caps how much of the platform advantage converts to price.

Fabrinet is the neutral outsourced factory for complex photonics. The FY2026 10-K describes a business that wins on qualification and IP hygiene rather than on product ownership: a "factory-within-a-factory" that physically segregates each customer's engineers and floor space, copy-exact line transfers, Telcordia-grade environmental qualification, and a claim that "there is no other manufacturing services provider with a similar breadth and depth of optical and electro-mechanical engineering and process technology capabilities that does not directly compete with its customers in their end-markets." That neutrality is claimed as a belief, not demonstrated — the filing's own framing is "we believe" — and Item 1 names the field it is measured against without characterising any of them: "Benchmark Electronics, Inc., Celestica Inc., InnoLight Technology (Suzhou) Ltd., Jabil Inc., Sanmina Corporation, Venture Corporation Limited and Eoptolink Technology Inc., Ltd., as well as the internal manufacturing capabilities of our customers." Once a program is qualified it tends to stay, and "in many cases, we are the sole outsourced manufacturing partner used by our customers for the products that we manufacture for them." What the moat does not buy is margin. Revenue grew 35.7% in FY2026 to $4.64 billion on the AI-datacenter build-out — data center products are now 47.9% of revenue — yet gross margin slipped to 12.0%, and Item 1 concedes the company expects "the prices we charge for our manufactured products to decrease over time." The two live erosion paths are named in the risk factors: customer consolidation that "may result in, among other things, decreases in our average selling prices," and customers who "acquired the capacity to manufacture products in-house." Concentration cuts both ways this year — FY2025 had two customers above 10% of revenue, FY2026 had four, so the book broadened even as its scale grew.

Synopsys sells the sign-off tools (PrimeTime static timing, IC Validator physical verification) and the silicon-proven IP that chip designs are built against, and the FY2025 Ansys merger added the multiphysics sign-off products (RedHawk-SC, Totem-SC) to the same portfolio, growing headcount about 40% to roughly 28,000.

Chain position

Back-end capital equipment: its testers sit between fabrication and shipment, and the 10-K states that AI related customer demand drove the majority of revenue in the second half of 2025, with Semiconductor Test at 79% of consolidated revenue.

A contract manufacturer sitting between optical components and the network and AI-datacenter OEMs whose brands ship the finished box. FY2026 revenue is 47.9% data center, 33.3% communications infrastructure and 18.8% automotive, industrial and other markets (FY2025: 46.2% / 30.7% / 23.1%), with Cisco, NVIDIA, Nokia and Amazon each above 10% of revenue. Fabrinet also integrates one layer down, designing and fabricating its own customized optics and glass — crystals, ferrules, precision glass tubing — at Fuzhou, China and Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, both for its own assemblies and for the merchant market, while volume manufacturing runs from the Pinehurst and Chonburi campuses in Thailand.

Design-and-IP layer feeding both the chip designers and, post-Ansys, the systems companies that simulate the products those chips go into.

Products (share / barrier)
  • Ansys simulation and analysis (Mechanical, LS-DYNA, HFSS, Fluent, Optics, RedHawk-SC) Leader · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Design IP (interface, foundation, security and embedded processor IP) Leader · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Digital Design Family (Fusion Compiler, IC Compiler II, PrimeTime, StarRC, IC Validator) Leader · Deep source: sec.gov
  • Manufacturing solutions (TCAD, Proteus mask synthesis, Yield Explorer, QuantumATK) Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Synopsys.ai AI-driven EDA (DSO.ai, VSO.ai, TSO.ai, Copilot) Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Verification Family (VCS, Verdi, VC Formal, ZeBu, HAPS) Leader · Deep source: sec.gov
Long-horizon vote +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.05 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.30 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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