Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Applied Digital | Duolingo | AppLovin | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | none The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage. | narrow Wide is ruled out by the company's own Item 1A, which concedes "low switching costs" and that "Low barriers to entry allow start-up companies with lower costs and less pressure for profitability to compete with us." It sits well above none because Q4 DAUs grew 30% to 52.7M, DAU/MAU rose to 39.6% from 34.7%, and marketing took only 12% of FY2025 revenue, though that ratio was flat versus FY2024 and gross margin fell to 72.2% from 72.8%. It stays narrow rather than eroding because Q1 FY2026 DAUs and paid subscribers each grew 21%. | narrow The filing's own words support a narrow moat. Auctions run 'at vast scale and at microsecond-level speeds,' revenue is earned only 'when our advertisers achieve their return on advertising spend targets,' and FY2025 adjusted EBITDA margin was 82.3%. What limits the width: clients 'are not required to enter into long-term agreements' and 'Substantially all of the Company's contracts with customers are cancelable at any time'; the solutions 'primarily operate in the mobile app ecosystem and specifically mobile gaming'; and distribution runs through 'the Apple App Store, the Google Play Store, and Meta' while AppLovin relies 'in part on IDFA.' |
| Moat type | none The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned. | intangibles ip The intangible is the consumer brand, not patents: Item 1 says "For many, Duolingo has become synonymous with language learning" and that growth is "organic, primarily driven by word-of-mouth and brand buzz," while the IP section discloses only "two patent applications." Switching costs are ruled out by the filing's own "low switching costs" caption. The data-scale support is the filing's own characterisation, and the brand is admittedly damageable: an April 2025 AI memo "may have contributed to unfavorable publicity, adverse impacts on the Company's brand and social media presence, and a deceleration in user growth." | network effects Network effects, with a caveat. The 10-K states the loop: as more advertisers use the solutions 'we gain access to more data regarding users and user engagement,' 'further strengthening our scaled distribution,' and 'As our distribution grows, we gain better insights for Axon AI.' The mechanism is two-sided matching of advertiser demand to publisher supply, though much of the force comes from data-and-learning scale. It is not switching costs, since contracts are 'cancelable at any time,' nor intangibles or IP, since 'there can be no assurance that we will adequately protect our intellectual property or that it will provide any competitive advantage.' |
| Leadership | behind The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA). | clear leader Leadership holds within consumer app-based language learning, anchored on one externally checkable claim in Item 1: the app "is also the top-grossing app globally in the Education category on both Google Play and the Apple App Store," with "over 250 total language courses to more than 130 million monthly active users" as of 2025-12-31. The broader "leading market position" claim is the filing's own characterisation, and no third-party share statistic appears anywhere in the 10-K, so a band is recorded and no percentage transcribed. The band does not extend to assessment, literacy, math, music, chess or offline learning, where the filing claims no position. | at parity The filing discloses no share of any market, names 'Meta, Google, Amazon, and Unity Software' as competitors, and concedes rivals 'may have greater resources' and 'better technological or data analytics capabilities, or stronger brands or competitive positions in certain product segments.' Its one positional statement is parity language: 'We believe we compete favorably with respect to these factors.' Two unquantified points cut upward: Meta and Google are also clients, and MAX is called 'the preferred in-app bidding solution for many publishers worldwide.' |
| Pricing power | weak Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers. | weak Every mechanism is cost, mix or volume, never price. FY2025 gross margin fell to 72.2% from 72.8% on "increased AI costs used in features like Video Call" and an advertising mix shift; the Q1 FY2026 gain to 73.0% came from "continued reductions in per-unit AI costs," with margin guided to about 71.0% in Q2 and "approximately 69.0% by Q4." The filing concedes it "may not be able to fully offset such higher costs through price increases." Subscription revenue rose 44% to $873.4 million "primarily due to an increase in the average number of paid subscribers," and the cap is self-imposed: "We intentionally do not put our learning content behind a paywall." | strong Strong, with the mechanism shown. The 10-K states that 'Advertisers are charged dynamically based on their campaign goals , rather than a simple fixed price per impression or per action.' Growth composition is the evidence: FY2025 revenue +70% with 'the volume of installations increased 3% and net revenue per installation increased 72%'; H1 2026 +56% with per-installation revenue +75% against 'a decrease in the volume of installations of 10%.' Adjusted EBITDA margin was 82.3% in FY2025 and 84.2% in H1 2026, though payment is performance-contingent and contracts cancel at will. |
| Summary | Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage. | Duolingo's moat is essentially one asset — a consumer brand strong enough that the filing claims people "search for the term 'Duolingo' much more often than 'learn Spanish'" — sitting on real but not defensive scale. It converts into economics through organic acquisition: sales and marketing took 12% of FY2025 revenue while Q4 DAUs grew 30% to 52.7 million and DAU/MAU rose to 39.6% from 34.7%. It is not wide, because the company supplies both disqualifiers itself: "low switching costs" and "Low barriers to entry allow start-up companies with lower costs and less pressure for profitability to compete with us." Width and pricing power diverge: Duolingo will not price against its own free product, grows subscription revenue by adding subscribers ($873.4 million, up 44%), and guides gross margin down to roughly 69% by Q4 FY2026 "as AI feature use expands in our products." | One reportable segment: an AI-priced auction matching advertiser demand to publisher supply, where 'Revenue from Axon Ads Manager comprises substantially all of our revenue.' The filed flywheel is real - more advertiser spend yields more user-engagement data, 'further strengthening our scaled distribution,' which feeds Axon AI - and it converts: FY2025 revenue $5.48B, up 70%, at an 82.3% adjusted EBITDA margin, carried by price (net revenue per installation +72%) not volume (installations +3%). What the filing does not evidence is a lock. Contracts are cancelable at any time, revenue concentrates in mobile gaming, and the distribution and identifier layers belong to Apple, Google and Meta - two of whom are simultaneously named competitors and disclosed clients. Wide margins with no disclosed structural lock is narrow. |
| Chain position | Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. | A consumer AI application and net buyer of model inference. The filing ties its margin line directly to inference cost, attributing the FY2025 subscription gross-margin decline to "increased AI costs used in features like Video Call" and guiding margin to approximately 69.0% by Q4 FY2026 "as AI feature use expands," while the Q1 FY2026 beat came from "reductions in per-unit AI costs." | Demand-side AI ad platform: it monetizes third-party mobile-game publishers' inventory and sells outcomes to advertisers, so it sits downstream of Apple/Google app distribution and Apple's IDFA identifier layer and upstream of publisher monetization. Meta and Google are simultaneously named competitors and disclosed clients. Single reportable segment after the June 2025 Apps divestiture. |
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| Long-horizon vote | -0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.11 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |