Compare moats

The filing's own words support a narrow moat. Auctions run 'at vast scale and at microsecond-level speeds,' revenue is earned only 'when our advertisers achieve their return on advertising spend targets,' and FY2025 adjusted EBITDA margin was 82.3%. What limits the width: clients 'are not required to enter into long-term agreements' and 'Substantially all of the Company's contracts with customers are cancelable at any time'; the solutions 'primarily operate in the mobile app ecosystem and specifically mobile gaming'; and distribution runs through 'the Apple App Store, the Google Play Store, and Meta' while AppLovin relies 'in part on IDFA.'

source: sec.gov

The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage.

source: sec.gov

The FY2026 10-K grounds a real but bounded defence. On the defence side: Item 1 states that in the manufacturing services market "there are significant barriers to entry in our existing and target markets, including lengthy sales cycles, the need to demonstrate complex precision optical and electro-mechanical engineering and manufacturing capabilities to a prospective customer and the ability to protect a customer's intellectual property," and that qualification of a program "may take three to six months or longer to complete." On the limiting side, the same filing shows the protection does not reach price: gross profit was 12.0% of revenues in FY2026 against 12.1% in FY2025 and 12.4% in FY2024 even as revenue rose 35.7% to $4.64 billion, four customers each exceeded 10% of revenue (Cisco 19.9%, NVIDIA 16.3%, Nokia 10.7%, Amazon 10.5%), and "reliance on a small number of customers gives those customers substantial purchasing power and leverage in negotiating contracts with us." Sales are made on "individual purchase orders that have short lead times and are subject to revision or cancellation," so the qualified program is sticky while the contract is not.

source: sec.gov

Network effects, with a caveat. The 10-K states the loop: as more advertisers use the solutions 'we gain access to more data regarding users and user engagement,' 'further strengthening our scaled distribution,' and 'As our distribution grows, we gain better insights for Axon AI.' The mechanism is two-sided matching of advertiser demand to publisher supply, though much of the force comes from data-and-learning scale. It is not switching costs, since contracts are 'cancelable at any time,' nor intangibles or IP, since 'there can be no assurance that we will adequately protect our intellectual property or that it will provide any competitive advantage.'

source: sec.gov

The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned.

source: sec.gov

The 10-K locates the stickiness in qualification rather than in patents or scale. Customers "do not purchase our services until they qualify the services and satisfactorily complete factory audits and vendor evaluations"; qualification "may take three to six months or longer"; production is transferred "copy-exact: the setup of a production process identical to the one used by our customer"; and the filing's own experience of changing a component source is that it "resulted in our customers or their end customers requiring requalification and validation of components, a process that can often be lengthy and has negatively impacted the timing of our revenue" — the same friction a customer would face moving the program elsewhere. The filing rules out an IP-based moat itself: "Historically, patents have not played a significant role in the protection of our proprietary rights," and any process improvement developed for a customer's product is "immediately assigned to that customer." The Thailand cost base is a genuine advantage but the filing warns it is not durable on its own — "Wage increases may impact our ability to sustain our competitive advantage and may reduce our profit margin."

source: sec.gov

The filing discloses no share of any market, names 'Meta, Google, Amazon, and Unity Software' as competitors, and concedes rivals 'may have greater resources' and 'better technological or data analytics capabilities, or stronger brands or competitive positions in certain product segments.' Its one positional statement is parity language: 'We believe we compete favorably with respect to these factors.' Two unquantified points cut upward: Meta and Google are also clients, and MAX is called 'the preferred in-app bidding solution for many publishers worldwide.'

source: sec.gov

The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA).

source: sec.gov

The leadership claim in the filing is the company's own qualitative assessment: "We believe we are a leader in manufacturing products for the optical communications market," and, on breadth of process technology, "Based on our experience with customers and our qualitative assessment of our capabilities, we believe we provide a broader array of process technologies to the optics industry than any other manufacturing services provider." The same Item 1 names a crowded field against it — "Benchmark Electronics, Inc., Celestica Inc., InnoLight Technology (Suzhou) Ltd., Jabil Inc., Sanmina Corporation, Venture Corporation Limited and Eoptolink Technology Inc., Ltd., as well as the internal manufacturing capabilities of our customers" — and no independent share ranking is given, so the record supports front-of-field standing but not sole primacy.

source: sec.gov

Strong, with the mechanism shown. The 10-K states that 'Advertisers are charged dynamically based on their campaign goals , rather than a simple fixed price per impression or per action.' Growth composition is the evidence: FY2025 revenue +70% with 'the volume of installations increased 3% and net revenue per installation increased 72%'; H1 2026 +56% with per-installation revenue +75% against 'a decrease in the volume of installations of 10%.' Adjusted EBITDA margin was 82.3% in FY2025 and 84.2% in H1 2026, though payment is performance-contingent and contracts cancel at will.

source: sec.gov

Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers.

source: sec.gov

Gross profit was 12.0% of revenues in FY2026, 12.1% in FY2025 and 12.4% in FY2024 — flat to down across three years in which revenue grew from $2.88 billion to $4.64 billion — and the FY2026 increase in gross profit is attributed to "sales volume and product mix," not price. Item 1 says so directly: "we expect the prices we charge for our manufactured products to decrease over time (partly as a result of competitive market forces)," with the offset coming from cycle-time, mix, yield and material-cost work rather than from rate. The risk factors add that customer consolidation gives buyers "increased leverage that may result in, among other things, decreases in our average selling prices," and that new competition "could result in price reductions for our services, reduced gross profit margins or loss of market share."

source: sec.gov

Demand-side AI ad platform: it monetizes third-party mobile-game publishers' inventory and sells outcomes to advertisers, so it sits downstream of Apple/Google app distribution and Apple's IDFA identifier layer and upstream of publisher monetization. Meta and Google are simultaneously named competitors and disclosed clients. Single reportable segment after the June 2025 Apps divestiture.

Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers.

A contract manufacturer sitting between optical components and the network and AI-datacenter OEMs whose brands ship the finished box. FY2026 revenue is 47.9% data center, 33.3% communications infrastructure and 18.8% automotive, industrial and other markets (FY2025: 46.2% / 30.7% / 23.1%), with Cisco, NVIDIA, Nokia and Amazon each above 10% of revenue. Fabrinet also integrates one layer down, designing and fabricating its own customized optics and glass — crystals, ferrules, precision glass tubing — at Fuzhou, China and Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, both for its own assemblies and for the merchant market, while volume manufacturing runs from the Pinehurst and Chonburi campuses in Thailand.

• Adjust Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
• AppLovin Ads (Axon Ads Manager) Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
• MAX Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
• Wurl Niche · Low source: sec.gov

• Blockchain data center hosting (Jamestown / Ellendale) Niche · Low source: sec.gov
• HPC data center leasing (Polaris Forge / Delta Forge AI factories) Challenger · Moderate source: sec.gov

• Automotive and medical sensors Niche · Moderate source: sec.gov
• Communications infrastructure optical products Top 3 · Deep source: sec.gov
• Customized optics and glass Challenger · Moderate source: sec.gov
• Data center optical modules and transceivers Top 3 · Deep source: sec.gov
• Industrial laser manufacturing Niche · Moderate source: sec.gov

Editorial prior, not backtested.

see exactly how it voted →

Editorial prior, not backtested.

see exactly how it voted →

Editorial prior, not backtested.

see exactly how it voted →