Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| AppLovin | Tokyo Electron | Oracle | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow The filing's own words support a narrow moat. Auctions run 'at vast scale and at microsecond-level speeds,' revenue is earned only 'when our advertisers achieve their return on advertising spend targets,' and FY2025 adjusted EBITDA margin was 82.3%. What limits the width: clients 'are not required to enter into long-term agreements' and 'Substantially all of the Company's contracts with customers are cancelable at any time'; the solutions 'primarily operate in the mobile app ecosystem and specifically mobile gaming'; and distribution runs through 'the Apple App Store, the Google Play Store, and Meta' while AppLovin relies 'in part on IDFA.' | narrow Integrated Report 2026 (issued 2026-09-15) documents strong positions across the line: by Tokyo Electron's own estimate it ranks No. 1 in diffusion furnaces, batch deposition, metal deposition, coater/developers, gas chemical etch and wafer probers, No. 2 in plasma etch and bonders and No. 3 in cleaning, and holds a "100% share" of coater/developers for EUV lithography; its installed base, industry-leading by its own estimate, is approximately 100,000 units, growing by approximately 4,000-6,000 units a year; and its 26,592 patents rank No. 1 in the semiconductor production equipment industry on the LexisNexis PatentSight+ database. Reported returns stayed high through a sales decline: gross profit margin stayed between 44.6% and 47.1% and ROE between 21.8% and 37.2% across fiscal 2022-2026, including fiscal 2024 when net sales fell to ¥1,830.5 billion. The share ranks, the EUV share and the installed-base lead are company estimates, not third-party data. | wide Oracle's FY2026 10-K (fiscal year ended May 31, 2026) describes an installed base in which "substantially all customers opt to purchase software support contracts when they purchase an Oracle software license"; that entrenchment shows up externally as the #1 DB-Engines database ranking (August 2026, first of 435 systems) and $638B of contracted Remaining Performance Obligations at Q4 FY2026 (press release, June 10, 2026) — a durable, multi-decade lock on mission-critical enterprise data layers. |
| Moat type | network effects Network effects, with a caveat. The 10-K states the loop: as more advertisers use the solutions 'we gain access to more data regarding users and user engagement,' 'further strengthening our scaled distribution,' and 'As our distribution grows, we gain better insights for Axon AI.' The mechanism is two-sided matching of advertiser demand to publisher supply, though much of the force comes from data-and-learning scale. It is not switching costs, since contracts are 'cancelable at any time,' nor intangibles or IP, since 'there can be no assurance that we will adequately protect our intellectual property or that it will provide any competitive advantage.' | intangibles ip The report calls its patent portfolio its "fifth strength" and says that "by supporting our other four strengths, it serves a vital role as the foundation" for medium- to long-term corporate value: 26,592 patents as of March 31, 2026, 1,415 inventions created in Japan and 345 overseas in 2025, and Clarivate Top 100 Global Innovators recognition for the fifth consecutive year. The other strengths rest on the same proprietary process know-how — co-created technology roadmaps that evaluate technologies "for the next four generations and beyond" with customers, "numerous development PORs" (process of record) in the frontend business, and the EUV coater/developer position — so proprietary process technology, reinforced by qualification in customers' process flows, is the moat source. | switching costs The core moat is the cost of moving mission-critical databases and back-office suites: the FY2026 10-K notes substantially all license customers attach support contracts and that Oracle's Multicloud Database offerings run Oracle AI Database inside other hyperscalers' clouds — monetizing the installed base even when the customer's infrastructure leaves; the KLAS 2026 EHR report shows the same dynamic in health IT, where roughly a third of Oracle Health customers want to leave but feel unable to do so. |
| Leadership | at parity The filing discloses no share of any market, names 'Meta, Google, Amazon, and Unity Software' as competitors, and concedes rivals 'may have greater resources' and 'better technological or data analytics capabilities, or stronger brands or competitive positions in certain product segments.' Its one positional statement is parity language: 'We believe we compete favorably with respect to these factors.' Two unquantified points cut upward: Meta and Google are also clients, and MAX is called 'the preferred in-app bidding solution for many publishers worldwide.' | co leader The CEO's message describes Tokyo Electron as "one of the world's leading suppliers of semiconductor production equipment" and states a "goal of becoming number one globally" — it does not claim to be the largest supplier overall — while by its own estimate it ranks No. 1 in six charted segments (diffusion furnace, batch deposition, metal deposition, coater/developer, gas chemical etch, wafer prober), No. 2 in plasma etch and bonders, and No. 3 in cleaning. | co leader Split by line: clear leader in database (DB-Engines August 2026 ranks Oracle #1 and Oracle-owned MySQL #2 of 435 systems); one of the largest enterprise-application vendors ($15.9B FY2026 SaaS revenue, competing with SAP, Salesforce, Workday and Microsoft per the FY2026 10-K); but in cloud infrastructure a ~4%-share fast-growing challenger behind Amazon (28%), Microsoft (20%) and Google (15%) per Synergy Q2 2026 data (The Register, 2026-08-01), and #2 in US acute-care EHR behind Epic (KLAS 2026). |
| Pricing power | strong Strong, with the mechanism shown. The 10-K states that 'Advertisers are charged dynamically based on their campaign goals , rather than a simple fixed price per impression or per action.' Growth composition is the evidence: FY2025 revenue +70% with 'the volume of installations increased 3% and net revenue per installation increased 72%'; H1 2026 +56% with per-installation revenue +75% against 'a decrease in the volume of installations of 10%.' Adjusted EBITDA margin was 82.3% in FY2025 and 84.2% in H1 2026, though payment is performance-contingent and contracts cancel at will. | moderate Gross profit margin held in a 44.6%-47.1% range over fiscal 2022-2026, including fiscal 2024's sales decline, but in fiscal 2026 it fell 1.8 points to 45.3% "due to factors such as higher raw material prices and increased labor costs" even as net sales reached a record, and the CEO lists "revising prices appropriately with respect to cost increases caused by inflation" among five initiatives needed to improve the operating margin. | moderate Strong in the installed base — the FY2026 10-K states substantially all license customers purchase support contracts, a recurring stream customers rarely drop — but the same 10-K lists "total cost of ownership" first among key competitive factors and describes intense competition across every segment; AI-infrastructure deals are won against hyperscalers and neoclouds, and Q4 FY2026 SaaS grew a moderate 10% versus 93% for IaaS (press release, June 10, 2026). |
| Summary | One reportable segment: an AI-priced auction matching advertiser demand to publisher supply, where 'Revenue from Axon Ads Manager comprises substantially all of our revenue.' The filed flywheel is real - more advertiser spend yields more user-engagement data, 'further strengthening our scaled distribution,' which feeds Axon AI - and it converts: FY2025 revenue $5.48B, up 70%, at an 82.3% adjusted EBITDA margin, carried by price (net revenue per installation +72%) not volume (installations +3%). What the filing does not evidence is a lock. Contracts are cancelable at any time, revenue concentrates in mobile gaming, and the distribution and identifier layers belong to Apple, Google and Meta - two of whom are simultaneously named competitors and disclosed clients. Wide margins with no disclosed structural lock is narrow. | Tokyo Electron makes wafer fab equipment for what its Integrated Report 2026 calls the "four key processes necessary for semiconductor scaling: deposition, coater/developer, etch, and cleaning", plus wafer probers and bonders for test and advanced packaging. The report grounds its edge in breadth and incumbency: leading share estimates in most of its segments, an estimated 100% share of EUV coater/developers, an installed base of approximately 100,000 units, industry-leading by its own estimate, feeding a Field Solutions business that sold ¥626.0 billion of parts, services, used equipment and modifications in fiscal 2026, and the industry's largest patent portfolio. Fiscal 2026 net sales were a record ¥2,443,533 million, but gross profit margin fell 1.8 points to 45.3% on higher raw material prices and labor costs, and operating margin fell 3.1 points to 25.6% as R&D expenses rose 11.1% to ¥277,866 million. China accounted for 34.1% of fiscal 2026 net sales, down from 41.7% the year before. | Oracle pairs the deepest switching-cost franchise in enterprise software — the #1-ranked database (DB-Engines, August 2026) plus Fusion/NetSuite back-office suites, with support attach near-universal per the FY2026 10-K — with a late but explosive push into AI cloud infrastructure: Q4 FY2026 IaaS revenue grew 93% to $5.8B and RPO reached $638B (up 363% YoY), mostly large-scale AI contracts (press release, June 10, 2026). The two reinforce each other via multicloud — Oracle Multicloud AI Database grew 404% in Q4 running inside rival clouds. The offsets: in cloud infrastructure Oracle is still a ~4%-share challenger behind AWS/Microsoft/Google (Synergy Q2 2026 data via The Register), the AI buildout drove FY2026 free cash flow to negative $23.7B, and the Cerner-based Oracle Health business has lost US hospital share for three straight years (KLAS 2026). |
| Chain position | Demand-side AI ad platform: it monetizes third-party mobile-game publishers' inventory and sells outcomes to advertisers, so it sits downstream of Apple/Google app distribution and Apple's IDFA identifier layer and upstream of publisher monetization. Meta and Google are simultaneously named competitors and disclosed clients. Single reportable segment after the June 2025 Apps divestiture. | Upstream equipment supplier to chipmakers: fiscal 2026 new-equipment sales of ¥1,775.4 billion went 59% to non-memory (logic, foundry, others), 31% to DRAM and 10% to NAND; by region, China took 34.1%, South Korea 22.3% and Taiwan 20.4% of net sales. | Supply-chain role in AI: OCI sells GPU compute for AI training and inference — the Q4 FY2026 press release attributes most of the $85B sequential RPO increase to large-scale AI contracts (some with customer-prepaid or customer-supplied GPUs totaling $75B) and guides FY2027 total revenue to $90B — making Oracle a primary capacity supplier to AI model builders. |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.11 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.30 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish Editorial prior, not backtested. |