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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing Cisco Systems×Applied Digital×SAP× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
Cisco Systems CSCO ai moat: latest change 2025-09-03 Applied Digital APLD ai moat: latest change 2026-07-29 SAP SAP ai moat: latest change 2026-02-26
Moat rating narrow

The FY2025 10-K shows a moat that still pays but no longer compounds: total gross margin of 64.9% and remaining performance obligations of $43,533 million (up 6%) against a Networking product category that fell from $34,570 million in fiscal 2023 to $29,229 million in fiscal 2024 to $28,304 million in fiscal 2025, and a product gross-margin bridge in which 'Product pricing' subtracted 1.6 percentage points. All of the reported category growth came from Splunk-carrying lines - Security +59% and Observability +26%. Real and durable, but bounded: narrow, not wide.

source: sec.gov

none

The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage.

source: sec.gov

wide

The 20-F describes a migration market made of SAP's own customers: RISE with SAP 'is targeted at our installed base customers and helps them on their journey from legacy ERP systems to SAP Business Suite' — an installed base so entrenched that moving WITHIN the vendor is a multi-year journey, with the Q2 2026 statement showing €22.9 billion of contractually committed cloud backlog, up 27%.

source: sec.gov

Moat type switching costs

The durable piece is the contracted annuity attached to installed equipment: total remaining performance obligations of $43,533 million, of which $21,961 million is services and $21,810 million is long-term (recognised beyond twelve months), carried at a services gross margin of 68.5% that has risen for three consecutive years from 66.4% and 68.1%. Customers keep paying for support on gear they already run.

source: sec.gov

none

The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned.

source: sec.gov

switching costs

ERP is the system of record for a company's core processes; the 20-F's own strategy language — SAP Business Suite as 'the destination for all our customers,' with AI-enabled migration tools easing the journey off SAP's own legacy systems — is a switching-cost moat described from the inside.

source: sec.gov

Leadership co leader

The 10-K names no competitor and discloses no market share anywhere in Management's Discussion and Analysis. The positional facts it does give are scale and direction: Networking product revenue of $28,304 million in fiscal 2025 - by far the largest of its four categories - but down $6.3 billion from fiscal 2023, with channel partner financing volume falling from $32.1 billion to $27.1 billion to $24.9 billion across fiscal 2023-2025.

source: sec.gov

behind

The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA).

source: sec.gov

clear leader

Grounded in scale and position rather than an asserted share: the 20-F describes a market segment consisting of SAP's own legacy estates (RISE), and the Q2 statement shows Cloud ERP Suite revenue of €5.5 billion in a single quarter, up 25% — no competitor filing this site tracks describes an installed-base market of its own.

source: sec.gov

Pricing power moderate

The product gross-margin bridge attributes fiscal 2025's 0.2-point improvement to productivity (+2.0 points) and mix (+1.1 points) while 'Product pricing' subtracted 1.6 points; a legal dispute with a supplier cost a further 0.8 points. Total gross margin of 64.9% (product 63.7%, services 68.5%) is held by cost and mix, not by price.

source: sec.gov

weak

Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers.

source: sec.gov

moderate

Q2 2026: total revenue up 9% with non-IFRS operating profit up 7% — profit growing slightly behind revenue, and the 2026 profit outlook 'updated to reflect dilutive impact from Dremio and Prior Labs acquisitions' rather than raised.

source: sec.gov

Summary

The installed base still switches slowly - but the filing does not claim it is winning the AI datacenter on the strength of that base. The fiscal 2025 Networking decline is attributed to 'product shipments returning to normalized levels during the first half of fiscal 2025 from the elevated levels ... in the first half of fiscal 2024', to servers, and to 'a decline in campus switching' - normalisation, not disclosed share loss, so the whitebox/Arista thesis is not something this 10-K either confirms or denies. What the filing does disclose is the shape of the AI dollar Cisco is actually winning: Americas service provider and cloud growth 'driven by AI infrastructure revenue from webscale customers', funded by additional purchase commitments 'related to manufacturing Cisco Silicon One and other products to meet demand from webscale and other customers', which 'significantly increased our supply chain exposure, which has resulted in negative impacts to our product gross margin in recent periods and may result in further negative impacts in future periods'. Enterprise switching earns 63.7% product gross margin; webscale silicon costs margin to serve. The moat is intact where the annuity is and thin where the growth is.

Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage.

SAP monetizes the stickiest software estate in enterprise computing twice over: a declining on-premise support stream and a growing cloud one, with the 20-F's 'flywheel' — Business AI enhancing Cloud ERP, which feeds Business Data Cloud, which fuels the AI — as the argument that the transition compounds rather than cannibalizes. The caveat is regulatory, in the filing's own words: the European Commission opened formal proceedings over on-premise maintenance and support policies, with suggested remedies market-tested in 2025 and 'pending final EC approval in 2026' — the moat's support-pricing half is under review.

Chain position

Supplies networking into AI datacenters: the 10-K ties Americas service provider and cloud growth to 'AI infrastructure revenue from webscale customers' and to Cisco Silicon One manufacturing commitments.

Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers.

Layer-10 application incumbent embedding AI (Joule, Business AI) into the enterprise system of record.

Products (share / barrier)
  • Cisco Silicon One and webscale AI infrastructure Challenger · Low source: sec.gov
  • Collaboration (Webex Suite, devices, Contact Center, CPaaS) Challenger · Low source: sec.gov
  • Networking (switching, routing, wireless, servers) Leader · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Observability (Splunk Observability Suite, ThousandEyes) Niche · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Security (Splunk TDR, SASE, network security) Top 3 · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Technical support and services Leader · Deep source: sec.gov
  • Blockchain data center hosting (Jamestown / Ellendale) Niche · Low source: sec.gov
  • HPC data center leasing (Polaris Forge / Delta Forge AI factories) Challenger · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Business AI (Joule, Joule Agents, Business Data Cloud) Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Cloud ERP Suite (S/4HANA Cloud, BTP, LoB solutions) Leader · Deep source: sec.gov
  • On-premise software support Unknown · Deep source: sec.gov
Long-horizon vote +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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-0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.38 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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