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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing CrowdStrike×Applied Digital×Ambarella× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
CrowdStrike CRWD ai moat: latest change 2026-03-05 Applied Digital APLD ai moat: latest change 2026-07-29 Ambarella AMBA ai moat: latest change 2026-09-04
Moat rating narrow

Narrow rather than wide because the FY2026 10-K argues both ways and its own risk factors are the harder side: it describes a self-reinforcing data advantage and says "we do not believe any of our competitors currently have a true platform offering equivalent to the Falcon platform", but the same filing calls the market for security and IT operations solutions "intensely competitive, fragmented", warns that "Competitive pricing pressure may reduce our gross profits", and still carries the July 19 Incident as having "had, and is expected to continue to have, an adverse effect on our business, sales, customer and partner relations, reputation" more than two years after it occurred.

source: sec.gov

none

The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage.

source: sec.gov

none

Ambarella earns a solid gross margin on its vision chips but has not turned it into GAAP operating profit, and its own filing describes larger rivals and falling prices. The 10-K and 10-Q financial data (as carried in TradingPilot fundamentals) report gross profit of $231,266 thousand on revenue of $390,702 thousand in fiscal 2026 (year ended 2026-01-31), against an operating loss of $82,527 thousand. GAAP operating income was negative in every fiscal year from fiscal 2019 (a loss of $40,420 thousand) through fiscal 2026, including a loss of $154,560 thousand in fiscal 2024. The quarter ended 2026-07-31 still shows an operating loss of $8,143 thousand on revenue of $108,125 thousand (10-Q filed 2026-09-04). The 10-Q's risk factors say 'Many of our competitors are substantially larger'. They say third parties 'have licensed their technology, including image signal processing and computer vision IP, which potentially enables a greater number of competitors to offer competitive solutions', and that average selling prices 'have typically decreased over time and will likely do so in the future'. None rather than narrow, because in no fiscal year since 2019 has the design-win position produced a GAAP operating profit.

source: sec.gov

Moat type network effects

The 10-K states the mechanism directly: "The more data that is fed into our Falcon platform, the more intelligent the AI Security Cloud becomes, the stronger our ability to anticipate and counter evolving adversary tradecraft, and the more our customers benefit, creating a powerful network effect that increases the overall value we provide."

source: sec.gov

none

The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned.

source: sec.gov

none

The one durable mechanism the 10-Q (2026-09-04) describes is the design socket, and it cuts both ways. 'Once an OEM designs a competitor's device into its product, it becomes significantly more difficult for us to sell our SoC solutions to that OEM because changing suppliers involves significant cost, time, effort and risk for the OEM.' In OEM automotive and robotics, the filing says Ambarella faces 'certain competitive disadvantages in these markets relative to larger competitors that have significantly more resources and a longer history working with OEMs and ODMs'. The risk factors present socket stickiness as protecting whichever supplier wins, say rivals can license image-signal-processing and computer-vision IP, and name no lock specific to Ambarella.

source: sec.gov

Leadership co leader

Co-leader rather than clear leader because the only claim of platform primacy available is the company's own ("we do not believe any of our competitors currently have a true platform offering equivalent"), while the same 10-K describes a fragmented market and lists seven distinct categories of competitor, from legacy antivirus to network security, cloud security, identity and legacy SIEM vendors.

source: sec.gov

behind

The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA).

source: sec.gov

at parity

No independent ranking was found. The 10-Q (2026-09-04) names HiSilicon, Novatek, NVIDIA, Qualcomm and SigmaStar as primary IoT competitors. In the automotive camera market it names Horizon Robotics, Mobileye, Novatek, NVIDIA, Qualcomm, Renesas and Texas Instruments. It says many competitors have 'significantly better brand recognition and broader product offerings than us'. It does win sockets at named customers: its largest end customer in fiscal 2027 to date was Insta360 (Arashi Vision), and its top 10 end customers were 'approximately 67%' of fiscal 2026 revenue. It is one supplier among several, conceding scale and, in automotive and robotics, 'competitive disadvantages', so the band is at parity, not leading.

source: sec.gov

Pricing power moderate

The 10-K's risk factors state that "Competitive pricing pressure may reduce our gross profits" and that competing successfully may require "aggressive pricing", which is the company's own case against strong pricing power; the offsetting factor it cites is module consolidation on one sensor.

source: sec.gov

weak

Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers.

source: sec.gov

moderate

Gross profit has held at a steady share of revenue. The filed financial data (as carried in TradingPilot fundamentals) show $231,266 thousand on $390,702 thousand in fiscal 2026, $172,330 thousand on $284,865 thousand in fiscal 2025, and $62,416 thousand on $108,125 thousand in the quarter ended 2026-07-31. The 10-Q expects that average selling prices 'will likely' keep decreasing, 'which could harm our revenue and gross margins'.

source: sec.gov

Summary

A single lightweight sensor collects enterprise data once and reuses it across 33 cloud modules, and the pooled telemetry trains the models every customer is then defended by — the 10-K calls this crowdsourced, high-fidelity data "cloud-scale AI" and treats it as the fundamental differentiator from competitors.

Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage.

Ambarella designs video-processing and AI vision chips that camera and car makers build into their products at the design stage. It sells to ODMs and OEMs, largely through WT Microelectronics, which the 10-Q says accounted for 'approximately 70% of total revenue' in fiscal 2026. The filing ties future growth to expanding 'within the Internet of Things, or IoT, and automotive markets with our new artificial intelligence, or AI, SoC solutions' and to penetrating robotics and industrial markets. Revenue rose to $390,702 thousand in fiscal 2026 from $284,865 thousand in fiscal 2025, but losses continued. The site's filing reader could not extract the business section of the FY2026 10-K, so this profile rests on the latest 10-Q's risk factors and filed financial data.

Chain position

AI-native security platform — an adopter and reseller of AI rather than a supplier of AI infrastructure.

Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers.

Edge-device silicon: vision and AI SoCs designed into cameras and vehicles by ODMs and OEMs, sold mostly through the distributor WT Microelectronics.

Products (share / barrier)
  • Blockchain data center hosting (Jamestown / Ellendale) Niche · Low source: sec.gov
  • HPC data center leasing (Polaris Forge / Delta Forge AI factories) Challenger · Moderate source: sec.gov
Long-horizon vote +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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-0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.01 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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