Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| CrowdStrike | Deere & Company | Pfizer | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow Narrow rather than wide because the FY2026 10-K argues both ways and its own risk factors are the harder side: it describes a self-reinforcing data advantage and says "we do not believe any of our competitors currently have a true platform offering equivalent to the Falcon platform", but the same filing calls the market for security and IT operations solutions "intensely competitive, fragmented", warns that "Competitive pricing pressure may reduce our gross profits", and still carries the July 19 Incident as having "had, and is expected to continue to have, an adverse effect on our business, sales, customer and partner relations, reputation" more than two years after it occurred. | narrow The independent evidence is a regulator's complaint, not a finding. The FTC, Illinois and Minnesota complaint filed 2025-01-15 (https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/DeereCoREDACTEDComplaintCaseNo325-cv-50017.pdf) alleges that "Deere is the world's leading manufacturer of agricultural equipment like large tractors and combine harvesters, and Deere enjoys a dominant share of large tractor and combine sales in the United States", that Deere "possessed monopoly and market power in the sale of Large Tractors and Combines in the United States", and that "There are substantial barriers to entry into the Large Tractor and Combine markets." The share figures behind those claims are redacted in the public version. Deere's FY2025 Form 10-K (fiscal year ended 2025-11-02, filed 2025-12-18) adds the company's own side of the edge: "John Deere's brand recognition is a competitive factor in North America and many other parts of the world", about 2,050 independent dealer locations in the U.S. and Canada, and parts "many of which are proprietary". The limits are in the same 10-K: "The agricultural equipment industry continues to change and is becoming even more competitive through the emergence and global expansion of many competitors", the industry "is also attracting non-traditional competitors, including technology-focused companies and start-up ventures", and construction and forestry (29% of fiscal 2025 equipment net sales) faces Caterpillar, Komatsu, Volvo and others. That supports a narrow rating, not a wide one. The dominance and entry barriers are a plaintiff's allegations, not findings, and the share figures are redacted. They cover U.S. large tractors and combines, inside a segment that was 45% of fiscal 2025 equipment net sales. Deere's own filing describes agriculture as becoming more competitive and construction and forestry as a contested market. | eroding The FY2025 10-K publishes the expiry schedule of its own protection. The Patents table dates the basic U.S. product patent on Eliquis ($7,961 million of 2025 revenue) to 2027, the Prevnar family's Prevnar 13 ($6,494 million for the family) to 2026, the Vyndaqel family ($6,380 million) to 2026 with a 2028 extension only pending, Ibrance ($4,122 million) to 2027, Xtandi ($2,194 million) to 2027 and Xeljanz ($1,087 million) to 2026 - against Total revenues of $62,579 million. The filing then states it anticipates 'a significant reduction of revenue from patent-based or regulatory exclusivity expiries in 2026 through 2030 as several of our in-line products experience these expirations, with the rate of the reduction of revenues from patent-based or regulatory exclusivity expiries expected to significantly accelerate over the next few years', and puts the 2026 instalment at $1.5 billion. A protection whose end dates the issuer tabulates product by product, and whose revenue effect it forecasts as accelerating, is being consumed on a clock it has already disclosed. |
| Moat type | network effects The 10-K states the mechanism directly: "The more data that is fed into our Falcon platform, the more intelligent the AI Security Cloud becomes, the stronger our ability to anticipate and counter evolving adversary tradecraft, and the more our customers benefit, creating a powerful network effect that increases the overall value we provide." | switching costs The FTC complaint (2025-01-15) places the advantage in the cost of leaving the installed fleet: "Equipment owners cannot switch from Deere agricultural equipment to other manufacturers' equipment without incurring significant costs", including "the cost of acquiring replacement equipment (often hundreds of thousands of dollars per machine), the cost of learning how to operate new equipment, and the cost of losing data generated by existing Deere equipment", plus the cost of making "mixed fleets" interoperable. The FY2025 10-K describes the assets that create this lock-in: a dealer network of about 2,050 U.S. and Canadian locations, proprietary parts for current and past products, and the John Deere Operations Center, which Item 1A says "stores substantial volumes of data with respect to our customers' operations". Patents are not the main source: the 10-K says it does "not regard any of our businesses as being dependent upon any single patent or family of patents." | intangibles ip The filing locates the protection in the patent estate, not anywhere else. The Patents and Other Intellectual Property Rights section tabulates 'the patent rights we consider most significant in relation to our business as a whole, together with the year in which the basic product patent expires', and states that once protection is lost 'we typically lose market exclusivity on these products, and generic and biosimilar pharmaceutical manufacturers generally produce identical or highly similar products and sell them for a lower price.' The Competition section names patents as the thing rivals attack: 'several of our competitors operate without large R&D expenses and make a regular practice of challenging our product patents before their expiration', and 'Generic pharmaceutical manufacturers pose one of the biggest competitive challenges to our branded small molecule products because they can market a competing version of our product after the expiration or loss of our patent protection.' No network, switching cost or cost-curve advantage is claimed anywhere in the section. |
| Leadership | co leader Co-leader rather than clear leader because the only claim of platform primacy available is the company's own ("we do not believe any of our competitors currently have a true platform offering equivalent"), while the same 10-K describes a fragmented market and lists seven distinct categories of competitor, from legacy antivirus to network security, cloud security, identity and legacy SIEM vendors. | clear leader The independent evidence covers U.S. large farm equipment. The FTC complaint (2025-01-15) states "Deere is the largest manufacturer of agricultural equipment in the United States" and alleges that for each fiscal year from at least 2012 to 2021 Deere's share of large tractors sold in the United States exceeded a figure that is redacted in the public version; the FTC press release of the same day (https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/01/ftc-states-sue-deere-company-protect-farmers-unfair-corporate-tactics-high-repair-costs) says Deere "maintains a dominant market share position across the large agricultural equipment market". These are a plaintiff's allegations. The band does not extend to construction and forestry, where the FY2025 10-K lists Caterpillar, CNH Industrial, Doosan Bobcat, Hitachi, Komatsu, Kubota, Liugong, SANY, Volvo and XCMG among global competitors and no independent share source was found. | co leader The 2026 Pharma 50 (Drug Discovery & Development, published 31 March 2026, ranking pharmaceutical revenue only) places Pfizer third at $62.58 billion of FY2025 revenue inside a five-company band that runs from Johnson & Johnson's Innovative Medicine at $60.40 billion to Eli Lilly's $65.18 billion, with Merck & Co. at $65.01 billion and AbbVie at $61.16 billion in between - scale-equal to its nearest peers rather than ahead of them. The same piece attributes the top slot to Lilly's tirzepatide franchise, which it puts at $36.5 billion combined and says passed Keytruda as the world's best-selling drug; Pfizer's 10-K names no comparable single franchise, discloses no market-share position for any product, and concedes in Item 1A that 'some of our competitors may have competitive, technical or other advantages over us' and that it faces 'an increasing number of potential competitors worldwide, including from China, that have expanded R&D capabilities.' |
| Pricing power | moderate The 10-K's risk factors state that "Competitive pricing pressure may reduce our gross profits" and that competing successfully may require "aggressive pricing", which is the company's own case against strong pricing power; the offsetting factor it cites is module consolidation on one sensor. | moderate The FTC complaint alleges pricing power in large tractors and combines, "shown directly through Deere's ability to raise prices, reduce output, and degrade quality in those markets", and says Deere's dealers "charge supracompetitive prices for restricted repairs". The reported numbers show a cyclical business: the third-party data site stockanalysis.com (https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/de/financials/) shows gross margin of 30.63% in fiscal 2023, 29.50% in fiscal 2024, 26.96% in fiscal 2025 and 25.18% for the twelve months to August 2026, and stored fundamentals from the 10-K show net income of $10,166 million (fiscal 2023), $7,100 million (fiscal 2024) and $5,027 million (fiscal 2025). Item 1A of the FY2025 10-K says Deere competes on "product performance, innovation, quality, distribution, sustainability, customer service, and price", that "Aggressive pricing or other strategies of competitors" or a failure "to price products competitively" hurt results, and that results suffer "if our customers are unwilling to accept price increases for our products". Alleged pricing power that still leaves margins falling with farm demand is moderate, not strong. | weak Price is the lever the filing shows moving against it. CMS selected Eliquis - which the 10-K says 'accounted for 13% of Total revenues in 2025' - for the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program, and 'its government-set Maximum Fair Price became effective January 1, 2026', with Ibrance and Xtandi following in 2027 and Xeljanz in 2028. In September 2025 Pfizer 'voluntarily agreed' with the U.S. administration to make certain U.S. prices 'more comparable to those in other developed countries' and to sell through the TrumpRx.gov platform 'at significant discounts to current retail prices'. Gross-to-net product revenue deductions rose to $36,374 million in 2025 from $30,048 million in 2023 while Total revenues fell to $62,579 million, and the IRA Medicare Part D Redesign alone 'negatively impacted our 2025 revenues by approximately $1 billion'. Lower U.S. net price is named as a drag on Vyndaqel, Ibrance, Xeljanz, Nurtec ODT and Lorbrena; every 2025 growth line the filing explains is attributed to demand, patient share or launch uptake, none to price. Cost of sales at 25.7% of revenues shows the manufactured margin is intact - what is not intact is the ability to set the price. |
| Summary | A single lightweight sensor collects enterprise data once and reuses it across 33 cloud modules, and the pooled telemetry trains the models every customer is then defended by — the 10-K calls this crowdsourced, high-fidelity data "cloud-scale AI" and treats it as the fundamental differentiator from competitors. | Deere makes agricultural, turf, construction, forestry and roadbuilding equipment and finances it through John Deere Financial. Per its FY2025 Form 10-K, Production & Precision Agriculture generated $17,311 million of net sales (45% of equipment operations net sales), Small Agriculture & Turf $10,224 million (26%) and Construction & Forestry $11,382 million (29%), within net sales and revenues of $45,684 million. The core of the moat is large farm machinery. The FTC's January 2025 complaint calls Deere "the largest manufacturer of agricultural equipment in the United States" and alleges a dominant share of U.S. large tractor and combine sales, substantial barriers to entry, and significant costs to switch away from a Deere fleet, including losing machine data. The 10-K adds brand recognition, about 2,050 U.S. and Canadian dealer locations, proprietary parts and the Operations Center data platform. The same structure is under legal attack: the FTC with several states, and a separate multidistrict class action, allege that Deere unlawfully restrained the market for repairing its own farm equipment by limiting repair resources, including its fully functional Service ADVISOR tool, to its authorised dealers. On 2026-07-08 the FTC and Illinois, Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin announced a settlement (https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/07/ftc-states-secure-settlement-deere-company-advancing-farmers-right-repair): a stipulated order, which has the force of law once the District Court approves it, requiring Deere for 10 years to make available to farmers and independent repair providers "repair resources equivalent to those Deere now makes available to Deere dealers". Item 1A also reports "slower than expected customer adoption of some of our precision technology solutions, and SaaS subscription services". Earnings are cyclical: the third-party data site stockanalysis.com shows gross margin falling from 30.63% in fiscal 2023 to 26.96% in fiscal 2025, and the 10-K reports PPA backlog down to about $4.0 billion from $5.2 billion as "demand has declined". An alleged dominant, high-barrier large-ag franchise, with repair-access litigation as the main threat to its aftermarket profits, supports a narrow moat. The dominance rests on a plaintiff's unproven allegations and covers one segment, and construction and forestry is a contested second leg. | Two clocks run in opposite directions inside the same company. The revenue base is near-dated: Eliquis, the Prevnar family, the Vyndaqel family, Ibrance, Xtandi and Xeljanz all carry U.S. basic product patents expiring 2026 or 2027 in the 10-K's own table, and the filing warns the resulting revenue loss will 'significantly accelerate over the next few years'. The replacement book is later-dated - Padcev and Lorbrena to 2033, Nurtec ODT and Litfulo to 2034, Prevnar 20 to 2035, Abrysvo, Cibinqo and Elrexfio to 2036, Comirnaty and Paxlovid to 2041 - but in 2025 it was still much smaller, and the two products with the longest patent runway are the two the filing says are shrinking fastest (Comirnaty down 20% and Paxlovid down 59% operationally). The 10-K's answer is purchased pipeline rather than defended position: it cites the Seagen and Metsera acquisitions as 'significant investments in obesity and oncology, respectively, which are extremely competitive therapeutic areas', while R&D expense itself fell 4% to $10,437 million. Excluding Comirnaty and Paxlovid the remaining business grew 6% operationally in 2025, which is the honest measure of what is being rebuilt underneath the expiries. A third pressure sits on top of the patent clock and is independent of it: government price-setting now reaches the largest product in the book. |
| Chain position | AI-native security platform — an adopter and reseller of AI rather than a supplier of AI infrastructure. | An AI adopter, not an AI vendor: Item 1A of the FY2025 10-K says Deere uses "automation software, digital tools, applications, and analytics on the S7 Series Combines and our See & Spray targeted spraying solution", maintains the Operations Center data platform, and leverages generative AI in its business processes, and warns that falling behind competitors' AI advances could hurt its competitive position. | Demand side of the AI chain, not a supplier into it. The 10-K lists 'Scale AI across our business' as one of four 2026 key priorities and describes 'expanding automation, data-driven decision making, and enterprise AI solutions', crediting 'enhanced digital enablement, including automation and AI' for part of the savings in its cost-realignment and R&D-simplification programs. It describes no AI model, tool or platform that Pfizer sells. |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | -0.17 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish Editorial prior, not backtested. |