Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| The Walt Disney Company | Applied Digital | Vistra | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | wide FY2025 10-K: a content library spanning approximately 100 years of production history — roughly 5,300 live-action film titles, 460 animated film titles plus deep episodic series holdings — feeds every segment (streaming, parks, consumer products, theatrical), and the physical parks portfolio (Walt Disney World, Disneyland, Disneyland Paris, Hong Kong Disneyland 48%, Shanghai Disney Resort 43%, Disney Cruise Line) is not replicable at comparable scale (sec.gov dis-20250927.htm, FY ended 2025-09-27). | none The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage. | narrow The 10-K states that "the majority of our facilities operate as “merchant” facilities without long-term power sales agreements" and that Vistra is "not guaranteed any rate of return on our capital investments". Against that, the scarcity is real: six NRC-licensed nuclear units totalling 6,448 MW, licences running 2036-2053, inside a 43,641 MW fleet, plus 20-year PPAs with AWS (1,200 MW) and Meta (2,609 MW). The 2025 gas additions - Lotus (2,600 MW, closed October 2025) and pending Cogentrix (5,500 MW) - extend the merchant gas side, not the nuclear scarcity. Only the 433 MW of uprates extends the moat asset. |
| Moat type | intangibles ip The moat is franchise IP and brands: the FY2025 10-K lists Disney, Pixar, Marvel, Star Wars and National Geographic as the top-level pillars of Disney+, and Mickey and Friends, Star Wars, Spider-Man, Disney Princess, Frozen, Avengers and Toy Story among the major licensed properties; the same IP is monetized across theatrical, streaming, parks and licensing windows (sec.gov dis-20250927.htm). | none The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned. | intangibles ip The intangibles are non-replicable regulatory assets rather than patents: six nuclear licences (Comanche Peak 2050/2053, Perry 2046, Davis-Besse 2037, Beaver Valley 2036/2047), fuel "contracted to support all our refueling needs through 2030", section 45U credits "recognizing the value of existing carbon-free nuclear power", and TXU Energy, sold "for over 20 years" and "registered and protected by trademark law". Read 45U as a floor, not moat strength: the 2025 credit was $220m against $545m in 2024, and it "provides increasing levels of support as unit revenues decline". Efficient scale does not apply. |
| Leadership | co leader Clear leader in its two profit engines — TEA's 2024 Theme Index ranks Disney Experiences the top park operator worldwide with Magic Kingdom #1 for 19 straight years (laughingplace.com, 2025-10-24), and the studio topped the 2025 global box office at $6.58B (Screen Daily, 2026-01-04) — but in total video Disney is second: Nielsen's April 2026 Media Distributor Gauge puts Disney at 10.3% of US TV viewing vs YouTube's 13.4% (MediaPost, 2026-06-25). Co-leader is the honest company-level band. | behind The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA). | co leader Vistra describes itself as "one of the largest producers of power in deregulated markets in the U.S." with over 230 TWh generated, "one of the largest competitive power generators in the U.S. as measured by MWh of generation capacity", "one of the largest electricity generators in the U.S.", and "one of the largest competitive residential retail electricity providers". That hedged phrasing appears four times and is the strongest claim the filing makes. The 10-K names no competitor and assigns no rank, so co-leader is the ceiling the disclosure supports. |
| Pricing power | strong Q3 FY26 (quarter ended June 2026, reported 2026-08-05): domestic Parks & Experiences operating income rose 27% on 11% revenue growth, and streaming operating margin expanded from 6.6% to 12.9% on 11% subscription revenue growth — margin expansion well ahead of volume in both engines (thedesk.net earnings summary). Counterweight: the FY2025 10-K notes MVPD consolidation may pressure linear carriage terms, so pricing power is concentrated in parks and DTC, not linear. | weak Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers. | weak Vistra is a merchant price taker. Price formation rests on "the highest variable cost unit that clears the market", prices are "unpredictable and may fluctuate substantially", hedging markets have "limited liquidity after two to three years", and competing retailers "may offer different products, lower electricity prices and other incentives". ERCOT's $2,000/MWh figure is the low system-wide offer cap, applied conditionally when the peaker net margin exceeds three times CONE or under the PUCT Emergency Pricing Program, not a standing cap. PJM has "announced that it would propose" extending its capacity cap to 2028-29 and 2029-30, subject to FERC approval. |
| Summary | Disney's moat is a century of franchise IP monetized through mutually reinforcing windows that competitors cannot assemble: the FY2025 10-K describes a library of ~5,300 live-action and 460 animated film titles built over approximately 100 years, distributed through streaming (Disney+ ~132M and Hulu ~64M paid subscribers as of 2025-09-27), linear networks, theatrical release and physical parks. The parks flywheel is the clearest expression: TEA's 2024 Theme Index (published 2025-10-24) again ranked Disney Experiences the top theme park operator worldwide, with Magic Kingdom the most-visited park for the 19th straight year. The studio led the 2025 global box office with $6.58B — its ninth #1 finish in a decade — driven by its own franchises (Zootopia 2 $1.48B, Lilo & Stitch $1.04B, Avatar: Fire and Ash) per Screen Daily (2026-01-04). The challenged edges are real: in Nielsen's Media Distributor Gauge for April 2026 Disney held 10.3% of total US TV viewing — second to YouTube's 13.4%, ahead of Netflix's 7.8% — and the 10-K flags MVPD consolidation pressure on linear carriage terms. But the Q3 FY26 report (2026-08-05) showed the model inflecting: revenue +7% to $25.25B, Experiences revenue +10% to $9.97B with domestic parks operating income +27%, and streaming operating margin expanding from 6.6% to 12.9% year over year. | Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage. | Vistra's moat is one scarce asset wrapped in a commodity business. Six NRC-licensed nuclear units - 6,448 MW, licences running 2036-2053 - sit inside a 43,641 MW fleet that the 10-K says operates in the majority as "merchant" facilities with no long-term power sales agreements and no guaranteed rate of return. That block cannot be rebuilt by a rival, and is now partly de-risked by 20-year PPAs with AWS (1,200 MW from Comanche Peak) and Meta (2,609 MW from the PJM plants) plus section 45U credits. Everything else - 26,989 MW of gas, 8,743 MW of coal, the 5m-customer retail book - competes on price in markets Vistra does not set, against entrants the filing says keep building "despite relatively low power prices". The 2025 growth was gas M&A (Lotus, pending Cogentrix), which widens the commodity-exposed side. Narrow, for a specific reason: the moat is 15% of the fleet. |
| Chain position | Content/IP owner at the top of the entertainment value chain: produces and owns franchise IP (Disney, Pixar, Marvel, Star Wars, National Geographic, 80%-owned ESPN), distributes it through owned channels (parks, Disney+, Hulu, ESPN DTC, ABC, theatrical), licenses it downstream to consumer-products makers and retailers, and is a major upstream buyer of sports rights (NFL, NBA, MLB, NHL, college football) — including the pending NFL Transaction exchanging a 10% ESPN stake for NFL Network assets (FY2025 10-K, sec.gov dis-20250927.htm). | Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. | Merchant IPP: sells energy, capacity and ancillary services into ISO/RTO spot and short-term wholesale markets (ERCOT, PJM, ISO-NE, NYISO, CAISO, MISO) and resells to ~5m retail customers. Emerging role as long-term nuclear offtake supplier to hyperscalers (AWS, Meta). Not a price setter at any link. |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.35 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | -0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.05 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |