Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Fabrinet | Applied Materials | Walmart | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow The FY2026 10-K grounds a real but bounded defence. On the defence side: Item 1 states that in the manufacturing services market "there are significant barriers to entry in our existing and target markets, including lengthy sales cycles, the need to demonstrate complex precision optical and electro-mechanical engineering and manufacturing capabilities to a prospective customer and the ability to protect a customer's intellectual property," and that qualification of a program "may take three to six months or longer to complete." On the limiting side, the same filing shows the protection does not reach price: gross profit was 12.0% of revenues in FY2026 against 12.1% in FY2025 and 12.4% in FY2024 even as revenue rose 35.7% to $4.64 billion, four customers each exceeded 10% of revenue (Cisco 19.9%, NVIDIA 16.3%, Nokia 10.7%, Amazon 10.5%), and "reliance on a small number of customers gives those customers substantial purchasing power and leverage in negotiating contracts with us." Sales are made on "individual purchase orders that have short lead times and are subject to revision or cancellation," so the qualified program is sticky while the contract is not. | wide The FY2025 10-K (filed 2025-12-12) grounds a wide moat on three reinforcing pillars: (1) scale IP — 'more than 23,500 active patents in the United States and other countries' and $3.57B of fiscal 2025 RD&E spend that 'must generally enable us to deliver new products and technologies before the emergence of strong demand'; (2) portfolio breadth — 'the semiconductor capital equipment industry's most comprehensive portfolio of products', letting Applied 'combine, co-optimize and integrate our technologies to develop highly differentiated solutions'; (3) an installed-base annuity — the AGS segment monetizes 'our large, global installed base of semiconductor and other equipment' with transactional and subscription services, spares and factory automation software, carrying a $7,141M backlog (48% of the company's $15,002M total) at fiscal year-end 2025. Company gross margin expanded three straight years (46.7% FY2023, 47.5% FY2024, 48.7% FY2025) while this played out. | narrow Graded on the Item 1A text this run could read from the FY2026 10-K, which is where the filing argues hardest against a wide band. It says "each of our segments competes for customers, employees, digital prominence, products and services" with local, regional, national and global physical, eCommerce and omnichannel retailers, social commerce platforms, wholesale club operators, retail intermediaries "and emerging agentic shopping tools and platforms," that "the omnichannel retail landscape is highly competitive and rapidly evolving, and the entry of new, well-funded competitors, or more rapid development of AI capabilities and agentic tools by these competitors ... may increase competitive pressures," and concedes that "for eCommerce and other internet-based businesses, newer or smaller businesses may be better able to innovate and compete with us" and that there "can be no assurance" Walmart can adopt AI "as quickly or effectively as our competitors." It also warns of retail consolidation producing rivals with "improved financial resources, improved access to merchandise, greater market penetration." The filing claims no market share, rank or scale advantage anywhere in the text available here, and its own competitive-landscape discussion sits in Item 1, which the cached read-through returned only as a cross-reference; a wider band would not be sourced. |
| Moat type | switching costs The 10-K locates the stickiness in qualification rather than in patents or scale. Customers "do not purchase our services until they qualify the services and satisfactorily complete factory audits and vendor evaluations"; qualification "may take three to six months or longer"; production is transferred "copy-exact: the setup of a production process identical to the one used by our customer"; and the filing's own experience of changing a component source is that it "resulted in our customers or their end customers requiring requalification and validation of components, a process that can often be lengthy and has negatively impacted the timing of our revenue" — the same friction a customer would face moving the program elsewhere. The filing rules out an IP-based moat itself: "Historically, patents have not played a significant role in the protection of our proprietary rights," and any process improvement developed for a customer's product is "immediately assigned to that customer." The Thailand cost base is a genuine advantage but the filing warns it is not durable on its own — "Wage increases may impact our ability to sustain our competitive advantage and may reduce our profit margin." | intangibles ip The 10-K itself names IP as the competitive foundation: 'Protection of our technology assets through enforcement of our intellectual property rights, including patents, is important for our competitive position', backed by 'more than 23,500 active patents' plus trademarks, know-how, trade secrets and copyrights, and $3,570M of fiscal 2025 RD&E ($3,042M inside Semiconductor Systems alone). A strong secondary switching-cost layer is also documented: the risk factors cite the difficulty of 'securing development-tool-of-record (DTOR) and production-tool-of-record (PTOR) positions with customers' as a decisive competitive factor — once a tool is the record tool for a node, displacement is the exception — and AGS service/spares revenue is tied to the installed base. | cost scale What the readable text does describe as durable is physical and logistical scale rather than lock-in or IP. It says Walmart sources "from a wide variety of domestic and international suppliers," that global sourcing is "an important factor in our financial performance," and that finding suppliers able to supply "in the large volumes we may demand" is itself a challenge; it describes a network of stores, clubs and distribution and fulfillment centers in which "many products available for purchase online can be picked up by the customer or member at a local Walmart store or Sam's Club, which provides additional customer traffic at such stores and clubs"; and it lists "supply chain automation and enhancements" among the investments backing the strategy. The first competitive lever it names is "the prices at which we sell our merchandise." The filing offers no intangibles or switching-cost claim beyond noting that protection of its trademarks, copyrights, domain names, patents and trade secrets "may not be available in every jurisdiction." |
| Leadership | co leader The leadership claim in the filing is the company's own qualitative assessment: "We believe we are a leader in manufacturing products for the optical communications market," and, on breadth of process technology, "Based on our experience with customers and our qualitative assessment of our capabilities, we believe we provide a broader array of process technologies to the optics industry than any other manufacturing services provider." The same Item 1 names a crowded field against it — "Benchmark Electronics, Inc., Celestica Inc., InnoLight Technology (Suzhou) Ltd., Jabil Inc., Sanmina Corporation, Venture Corporation Limited and Eoptolink Technology Inc., Ltd., as well as the internal manufacturing capabilities of our customers" — and no independent share ranking is given, so the record supports front-of-field standing but not sole primacy. | clear leader Self-declared basis, not an independent rank: the 10-K's opening sentence claims Applied 'is the leader in the materials engineering solutions used to produce virtually every semiconductor in the world' and repeatedly claims 'the semiconductor capital equipment industry's most comprehensive portfolio'. The filing names no competitor and states no market-share figure — it acknowledges rivals ranging 'from small companies that compete in a single region... to global, diversified companies' and says only that 'many of our products have strong competitive positions'. Leadership claim is scoped to materials engineering (Applied sells no lithography). | co leader The 10-K text available this run asserts no rank or share for Walmart. The band reflects two things the filing does say: that its strategy is meant to let it "maintain or grow our overall market position" across segments that already compete at global scale, and that it does not describe itself as ahead in the channels that matter most to it - "for eCommerce and other internet-based businesses, newer or smaller businesses may be better able to innovate and compete with us," and on AI adoption "there can be no assurance that these investments will deliver the anticipated benefits, or that we will be able to adopt and leverage these technologies as quickly or effectively as our competitors." Treat this band as bounded by the missing Item 1 competition discussion, not as a measured position. |
| Pricing power | weak Gross profit was 12.0% of revenues in FY2026, 12.1% in FY2025 and 12.4% in FY2024 — flat to down across three years in which revenue grew from $2.88 billion to $4.64 billion — and the FY2026 increase in gross profit is attributed to "sales volume and product mix," not price. Item 1 says so directly: "we expect the prices we charge for our manufactured products to decrease over time (partly as a result of competitive market forces)," with the offset coming from cycle-time, mix, yield and material-cost work rather than from rate. The risk factors add that customer consolidation gives buyers "increased leverage that may result in, among other things, decreases in our average selling prices," and that new competition "could result in price reductions for our services, reduced gross profit margins or loss of market share." | strong MD&A attributes the FY2025 gross-margin expansion explicitly to price: margin rose 1.2 points to 48.7% 'primarily driven by higher net revenue, favorable changes in customer and product mix, an increase in average selling prices, and lower material and manufacturing costs' — the third consecutive annual increase (46.7% FY2023, 47.5% FY2024, 48.7% FY2025), with Semiconductor Systems segment gross margin at 54.2%. Counterweight from the same filing: a 'highly concentrated customer base' (two customers ~19% and ~15% of net revenue) whose members 'may seek pricing, payment, intellectual property-related, or other commercial terms that are less favorable to us'. | weak The filing names price first among the ways it competes - "we compete in a variety of ways, including the prices at which we sell our merchandise" - and states that higher supplier labour and material costs may "adversely impact product margins ... that we are unable, or choose not, to pass on to our customers." It adds that macro conditions can "change the mix of products we sell to any one or more markets with a lower average gross margin" and "result in slower inventory turnover and greater markdowns of inventory." In health and wellness the price is set by counterparties, not by Walmart: "a large majority of our retail pharmacy net sales are generated by filling prescriptions for which we receive payment through established contractual relationships with third-party payers and payment administrators, such as private insurers, governmental agencies and pharmacy benefit managers," exposing it to "reductions in the third-party reimbursement rates for drugs." |
| Summary | Fabrinet is the neutral outsourced factory for complex photonics. The FY2026 10-K describes a business that wins on qualification and IP hygiene rather than on product ownership: a "factory-within-a-factory" that physically segregates each customer's engineers and floor space, copy-exact line transfers, Telcordia-grade environmental qualification, and a claim that "there is no other manufacturing services provider with a similar breadth and depth of optical and electro-mechanical engineering and process technology capabilities that does not directly compete with its customers in their end-markets." That neutrality is claimed as a belief, not demonstrated — the filing's own framing is "we believe" — and Item 1 names the field it is measured against without characterising any of them: "Benchmark Electronics, Inc., Celestica Inc., InnoLight Technology (Suzhou) Ltd., Jabil Inc., Sanmina Corporation, Venture Corporation Limited and Eoptolink Technology Inc., Ltd., as well as the internal manufacturing capabilities of our customers." Once a program is qualified it tends to stay, and "in many cases, we are the sole outsourced manufacturing partner used by our customers for the products that we manufacture for them." What the moat does not buy is margin. Revenue grew 35.7% in FY2026 to $4.64 billion on the AI-datacenter build-out — data center products are now 47.9% of revenue — yet gross margin slipped to 12.0%, and Item 1 concedes the company expects "the prices we charge for our manufactured products to decrease over time." The two live erosion paths are named in the risk factors: customer consolidation that "may result in, among other things, decreases in our average selling prices," and customers who "acquired the capacity to manufacture products in-house." Concentration cuts both ways this year — FY2025 had two customers above 10% of revenue, FY2026 had four, so the book broadened even as its scale grew. | Applied Materials describes itself in its FY2025 10-K as 'the leader in the materials engineering solutions used to produce virtually every semiconductor in the world', selling wafer-fab equipment across patterning, transistor and interconnect fabrication (deposition/etch for 3D transistors), optical and eBeam process control, and advanced packaging. Fiscal 2025 net revenue was $28,368M: Semiconductor Systems $20,798M at a 54.2% gross margin (up from 52.9% FY2024 and 52.0% FY2023), AGS services $6,385M, and Corporate and Other (including display equipment) $1,185M. Within Semiconductor Systems, foundry/logic was 67% of revenue, DRAM 26%, NAND 7%. The moat mechanics the filing documents: 23,500+ active patents and $3.57B annual RD&E that must land tools with customers 'during early-stage technology selection'; DTOR/PTOR tool-of-record incumbency (cited in risk factors as the hard-to-win competitive position); and an AGS installed-base annuity whose backlog ($7,141M) now rivals the equipment backlog. The filing is equally clear about the moat's edges: 'Substantial competition exists across all the segments of our business'; two customers were approximately 19% and 15% of fiscal 2025 net revenue; ~89% of revenue is from outside the United States; and U.S. export controls on China 'have limited the market for certain of our products and services, adversely impacted our revenues and increased our exposure to foreign and Chinese domestic competition'. | In the FY2026 10-K text readable this run, Walmart describes an "enterprise strategy, which combines traditional retail, membership models, marketplaces, financial services, health and wellness and other customer and business services into a series of interconnected assets to make it seamless for customers to interact with us," carried by stores, clubs and distribution and fulfillment centers that double as pickup and delivery nodes and by continuing investment in eCommerce, AI and supply chain automation. The filing sets its own limits on that: it calls the omnichannel landscape "highly competitive and rapidly evolving," warns that well-funded entrants and faster AI or agentic tooling by rivals may increase pressure, that smaller businesses may out-innovate it online, and that "a greater concentration of eCommerce sales, including increasing online grocery sales and the increasing role of AI-enabled platforms in product search, discovery, advertising and purchasing, could result in a reduction in the amount of traffic in our stores and clubs." On economics it concedes supplier cost increases it may be "unable, or choose not, to pass on to our customers," and it points investors to "advertising and other higher-margin initiatives (which are expected to help drive our operating income growth at a rate faster than net sales over the long term)" rather than to price. |
| Chain position | A contract manufacturer sitting between optical components and the network and AI-datacenter OEMs whose brands ship the finished box. FY2026 revenue is 47.9% data center, 33.3% communications infrastructure and 18.8% automotive, industrial and other markets (FY2025: 46.2% / 30.7% / 23.1%), with Cisco, NVIDIA, Nokia and Amazon each above 10% of revenue. Fabrinet also integrates one layer down, designing and fabricating its own customized optics and glass — crystals, ferrules, precision glass tubing — at Fuzhou, China and Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, both for its own assemblies and for the merchant market, while volume manufacturing runs from the Pinehurst and Chonburi campuses in Thailand. | Upstream chokepoint of the AI-compute supply chain: Applied's tools fabricate chips for 'artificial intelligence (AI) and data center servers' among other end markets, selling into foundry/logic (67% of Semiconductor Systems revenue), DRAM (26%) and NAND (7%). Concentration cuts both ways — two customers were ~19% and ~15% of FY2025 net revenue, ~89% of revenue is non-U.S., and the customer base is 'geographically concentrated, particularly in China, Taiwan and Korea', with U.S. export controls on China constraining the addressable market and feeding Chinese domestic-equipment competition (all per the FY2025 10-K). | A retailer that also intermediates: it sells its own sourced merchandise, hosts third-party marketplace sellers for whom it may provide "fulfillment, inventory management, tax collection, payment processing, content," sells digital advertising against that traffic, dispenses prescriptions under PBM and payer contracts, and offers financial services "including through our digital channels, stores and clubs, as well as our OnePay fintech venture." |
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| Long-horizon vote | +0.05 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.42 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.05 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |