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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing Kioxia Holdings×SAP×TE Connectivity× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
Kioxia Holdings KXIAY ai moat: latest change 2026-06-24 SAP SAP ai moat: latest change 2026-02-26 TE Connectivity TEL ai moat: latest change 2025-11-10
Moat rating narrow

Kioxia's FY2025 Annual Securities Report (dated 2026-06-24) describes a real but bounded position. It records 'the limited number of major competitors in the flash memory business', and says its three manufacturing joint ventures with Sandisk let it 'make investments on a larger scale than if it were to invest alone and enjoy economies of scale in terms of capital expenditures and production efficiency'. Against that, the same Risk Factors section describes 'heavy global competition as advanced technologies are necessary for business execution', says 'in the flash memory market the Group's ability to decide prices is limited', that 'Some competitors possess technologies that the Group does not have, such as DRAM' and 'have greater financial strength than the Group', and records that the Group cut production from October 2022 to March 2024. Scale in a small field, not a barrier that protects Kioxia's returns through the cycle.

source: kioxia-holdings.com

wide

The 20-F describes a migration market made of SAP's own customers: RISE with SAP 'is targeted at our installed base customers and helps them on their journey from legacy ERP systems to SAP Business Suite' — an installed base so entrenched that moving WITHIN the vendor is a multi-year journey, with the Q2 2026 statement showing €22.9 billion of contractually committed cloud backlog, up 27%.

source: sec.gov

narrow

The FY2025 10-K's own Competition section undercuts any claim of insulation: 'The industries in which we operate are highly competitive, and we compete with thousands of companies that range from large multinational corporations to local manufacturers', competition is 'generally based on breadth of product offering, product innovation, price, quality, delivery, and service', and TE has 'experienced, and expect[s] to continue to experience, downward pressure on prices'. The same filing explicitly disclaims IP as the basis of its position: 'we do not believe that our competitive position or our operations are dependent upon or would be materially impacted by any single patent or group of related patents.' What TE does hold is durable rather than absolute — it calls itself 'one of the leading providers of advanced automobile connectivity solutions', its Industrial segment 'a leading supplier', and it converted that position into rising profitability across the same filing's three income statements (gross margin 31.5% of net sales in FY2023, 34.4% in FY2024, 35.2% in FY2025). A position that earns expanding margins into admitted price pressure is an advantage; one held against thousands of competitors and no decisive patent is not a wide one.

source: sec.gov

Moat type cost scale

The advantage the company itself names is scale and capital efficiency. The Annual Securities Report says the Sandisk joint ventures, which procure the production equipment installed at Kioxia's Yokkaichi and Kitakami plants and 'sell 50% of their products to the Group and 50% to the Sandisk Group', let it 'enjoy economies of scale in terms of capital expenditures and production efficiency'. At its 2026 Investor Day (2026-06-02) management said that 'by leveraging our world-leading economies of scale, we have maintained a lower cost per gigabyte than the industry average', on a slide that cites the TechInsights NAND Market Report Q2 2026 as its source. The filing describes its technology work (layer stacking for BiCS FLASH, the move to QLC) and names 'a decline in competitiveness in production efficiency per gigabyte' as a risk if it falls behind. It does not present that technology as protected IP that rivals cannot match.

source: kioxia-holdings.com

switching costs

ERP is the system of record for a company's core processes; the 20-F's own strategy language — SAP Business Suite as 'the destination for all our customers,' with AI-enabled migration tools easing the journey off SAP's own legacy systems — is a switching-cost moat described from the inside.

source: sec.gov

switching costs

The FY2025 10-K locates the advantage at the customer, not in patents. It describes 'close working relationships with many of our customers' whose 'relationships with them typically date back many years', and co-development as the mechanism: 'By working with our customers in developing new products and technologies, we believe we can identify and act on trends and leverage knowledge about next-generation technology across our products.' Roughly 75% of fiscal 2025 net sales were direct to manufacturers rather than through distribution, and the Transportation segment's products 'must withstand harsh conditions' — parts engineered in with the customer and built to survive the application, so the position sits inside the customer's design rather than in a purchase order. The filing rules the alternative out in its own words on intellectual property, so intangibles_ip is not the source; the 'thousands of companies' in Competition rules out efficient_scale.

source: sec.gov

Leadership at parity

TrendForce's 2Q26 NAND Flash ranking (2026-08-18) puts Kioxia fourth with revenue of about $10.72 billion. Its 13.6% share 'edged down', and it sits behind Samsung (29.3%), SK hynix Group and Micron, which moved up to third. TrendForce's 2Q26 enterprise SSD ranking (2026-09-01) also places it fourth, at $4.64 billion. On technology it is keeping pace: it began sampling the 332-layer 10th-generation BiCS FLASH on 2026-07-03, per its press release. The Annual Securities Report concedes that some competitors 'possess technologies that the Group does not have, such as DRAM' and 'have greater financial strength than the Group'. Kioxia is in the middle of a small group of peers.

source: kioxia-holdings.com

clear leader

Grounded in scale and position rather than an asserted share: the 20-F describes a market segment consisting of SAP's own legacy estates (RISE), and the Q2 statement shows Cloud ERP Suite revenue of €5.5 billion in a single quarter, up 25% — no competitor filing this site tracks describes an installed-base market of its own.

source: sec.gov

co leader

The FY2025 10-K claims leadership in qualified form and then names the peers who contest it. Transportation Solutions 'is a leader in connectivity and sensor technologies' and TE is 'one of the leading providers of advanced automobile connectivity solutions' — one of, not the — while the segment's 'major competitors include Yazaki, Aptiv, Sumitomo, Sensata, Honeywell, Molex, and Amphenol'. Industrial Solutions 'is a leading supplier of products that connect and distribute power, data, and signals' and 'competes primarily against Amphenol, Hubbell, Carlisle Companies, Integer Holdings, Molex, Omron, JST, and Korea Electric Terminal (KET)'. Amphenol and Molex appear on both lists, so TE shares the top of the interconnect market rather than owning it.

source: sec.gov

Pricing power weak

The Annual Securities Report states that 'in the flash memory market the Group's ability to decide prices is limited, and in the medium- to long-term selling prices on a bit basis may decline at a similar pace as in the past'. Current margins follow the market. The first-quarter FY2026 results attribute the revenue jump primarily to 'a significant increase in average selling prices (ASPs) resulting from strong demand from data center customers focusing on generative AI'. Gross profit was ¥1,380,066 million on revenue of ¥1,767,117 million, against ¥71,179 million on ¥342,799 million a year earlier. In the 2026 Investor Day Q&A management said it believes 'market pricing will continue to reflect those supply-demand conditions'.

source: kioxia-holdings.com

moderate

Q2 2026: total revenue up 9% with non-IFRS operating profit up 7% — profit growing slightly behind revenue, and the 2026 profit outlook 'updated to reflect dilutive impact from Dremio and Prior Labs acquisitions' rather than raised.

source: sec.gov

moderate

The FY2025 10-K states both halves plainly: TE has 'experienced, and expect[s] to continue to experience, downward pressure on prices. However, as a result of increased costs and tariffs, certain of our businesses implemented price increases in recent years.' Pass-through, not price-setting. The realised result is margin expansion rather than erosion — gross margin of 31.5% of net sales in FY2023, 34.4% in FY2024 and 35.2% in FY2025 per the same filing's income statements, and 36.5% ($5,319M on $14,573M) for the nine months to 26 June 2026 versus 35.3% a year earlier, with Q3 FY2026 GAAP operating margin of 19%, per the 22 July 2026 results release (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385157/000110465926085589/tel-20260722xex99d1.htm). Strong would require pricing that leads rather than follows cost; weak is contradicted by three years of expanding gross margin.

source: sec.gov

Summary

Kioxia calls itself 'a specialized flash memory manufacturer'. It makes BiCS FLASH 3D NAND at Yokkaichi and Kitakami in Japan through three manufacturing joint ventures with Sandisk, whose output is sold 50% to Kioxia and 50% to Sandisk. FY2025 (year to March 2026) revenue was ¥2,337.6bn: SSD & Storage ¥1,362.6bn, Smart Devices ¥760.0bn and Other ¥215.0bn, with the Apple group alone at 20.4% of sales. Its moat is scale in a concentrated industry. TrendForce ranks it fourth in 2Q26 NAND revenue with a 13.6% share, and in August 2026 the partners announced anticipated investments in Japan of over $31 billion through 2032, contingent on government support. The same filing sets out the limits: limited ability to set prices; rivals that also make DRAM and have more financial strength; China's government-supported push for domestic semiconductor production; and a joint-venture agreement effective until 2034, with no decision yet on whether it continues after that. First-quarter FY2026 gross profit was ¥1,380,066 million on revenue of ¥1,767,117 million, against ¥71,179 million on ¥342,799 million a year earlier. The company attributes the jump primarily to a significant increase in average selling prices.

SAP monetizes the stickiest software estate in enterprise computing twice over: a declining on-premise support stream and a growing cloud one, with the 20-F's 'flywheel' — Business AI enhancing Cloud ERP, which feeds Business Data Cloud, which fuels the AI — as the argument that the transition compounds rather than cannibalizes. The caveat is regulatory, in the filing's own words: the European Commission opened formal proceedings over on-premise maintenance and support policies, with suggested remedies market-tested in 2025 and 'pending final EC approval in 2026' — the moat's support-pricing half is under review.

TE Connectivity sells the connectors, terminals, sensors and cable-protection parts that, in its own framing, 'enable the distribution of power, signal, and data' — a component vendor, never a system or compute vendor. The FY2025 10-K puts the two reportable segments, Transportation Solutions (54% of net sales) and Industrial Solutions (46%), against a combined served market it estimates at roughly $200 billion, which tells you immediately that no single share number governs this business: the filing discloses no market share, says 'no single customer accounted for a significant amount of our net sales in fiscal 2025, 2024, or 2023', and states that because TE is 'not organized by product or service, it is not practicable to disclose net sales by product or service'. The defensible part is entrenchment. Parts get designed in with the customer and then qualified to survive automotive, aerospace, subsea and grid conditions; TE sells about 75% of net sales direct into ~130 countries; relationships 'typically date back many years'. That is a switching-cost moat, and the filing is unusually candid that it is not a patent moat — no single patent or group of patents is material to its competitive position. The limit is equally plain in the filing: highly competitive industries, thousands of competitors, and persistent downward price pressure, with Amphenol and Molex named as competitors in BOTH segments and Yazaki, Aptiv and Sumitomo heading the Transportation segment's competitor list. The evidence that the moat is nonetheless working is margin plus mix. Gross margin ran 31.5% / 34.4% / 35.2% of net sales across FY2023-FY2025, and in the nine months to 26 June 2026 gross margin was $5,319M on $14,573M of net sales (36.5%) against $4,419M on $12,513M (35.3%) a year earlier, while Q3 FY2026 GAAP operating margin was 19% and orders hit a record $5.7 billion, up 27% year over year. Growth has also rotated: digital data networks grew 34.2% in Q3 FY2026 (34.0% organic) and 48.8% over nine months, with the CEO naming 'increased momentum in AI in both the data center and across the broader energy infrastructure' — while sensors, an end market for which the 10-K makes no leadership claim at all, shrank 2.8% organically in the quarter. Narrow, not wide: a real toll on other people's platforms, collected under admitted price pressure.

Chain position

Upstream NAND flash and SSD supplier. The filing says much of its revenue 'depends on a limited number of customers and industries, such as major smartphone manufacturers and large IT companies, including hyperscalers that require SSDs'. The Apple group was 20.4% of FY2025 sales.

Layer-10 application incumbent embedding AI (Joule, Business AI) into the enterprise system of record.

TE is an upstream component supplier to the AI build-out, not a participant in compute. It sells 'connectivity and sensor solutions [that] enable the distribution of power, signal, and data to advance next-generation transportation, energy networks, automated factories, data centers enabling artificial intelligence', about 75% of it direct to manufacturers across roughly 130 countries. AI exposure runs through one end market: digital data networks was 28% of Industrial Solutions, and Industrial Solutions was 46% of fiscal 2025 net sales — so the datacenter line is a minority of a company still 54% transportation. That minority is where the growth now is: digital data networks net sales rose 34.2% in Q3 FY2026 and 48.8% over the nine months, and energy rose 34.4% in the quarter, the CEO tying both to AI momentum 'in both the data center and across the broader energy infrastructure' (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385157/000110465926085589/tel-20260722xex99d1.htm).

Products (share / barrier)
  • Business AI (Joule, Joule Agents, Business Data Cloud) Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Cloud ERP Suite (S/4HANA Cloud, BTP, LoB solutions) Leader · Deep source: sec.gov
  • On-premise software support Unknown · Deep source: sec.gov
Long-horizon vote -0.01 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

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+0.38 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

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+0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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