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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing Microsoft×Applied Digital×Cisco Systems× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
Microsoft MSFT ai moat: latest change 2026-07-29 Applied Digital APLD ai moat: latest change 2026-07-29 Cisco Systems CSCO ai moat: latest change 2025-09-03
Moat rating wide

The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) restates both structural mechanisms verbatim. On cost: the cloud business 'benefits from three economies of scale' — datacenters with 'significantly lower cost per unit than smaller ones', demand aggregation, and multi-tenancy that lowers maintenance labor. On ecosystem: 'A well-established ecosystem creates beneficial network effects among users, application developers, and the platform provider that can accelerate growth.' Both are load-bearing at the new scale — 'Microsoft Cloud revenue increased 27% to $214.4 billion' and 'Commercial remaining performance obligation increased 84% to $678 billion.' Rated wide but held below full confidence because the same filing still cautions that 'Barriers to entry in many of our businesses are low.'

source: sec.gov

none

The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage.

source: sec.gov

narrow

The FY2025 10-K shows a moat that still pays but no longer compounds: total gross margin of 64.9% and remaining performance obligations of $43,533 million (up 6%) against a Networking product category that fell from $34,570 million in fiscal 2023 to $29,229 million in fiscal 2024 to $28,304 million in fiscal 2025, and a product gross-margin bridge in which 'Product pricing' subtracted 1.6 percentage points. All of the reported category growth came from Splunk-carrying lines - Security +59% and Observability +26%. Real and durable, but bounded: narrow, not wide.

source: sec.gov

Moat type network effects

The FY2026 10-K keeps the ecosystem passage scoped to the firm: 'An important element of our business model has been to create platform-based ecosystems on which many participants can build diverse solutions. A well-established ecosystem creates beneficial network effects among users, application developers, and the platform provider that can accelerate growth.' That remains the one moat mechanism the filing asserts about Microsoft as a whole; the cost-of-scale passage stays scoped to 'our cloud business'.

source: sec.gov

none

The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned.

source: sec.gov

switching costs

The durable piece is the contracted annuity attached to installed equipment: total remaining performance obligations of $43,533 million, of which $21,961 million is services and $21,810 million is long-term (recognised beyond twelve months), carried at a services gross margin of 68.5% that has risen for three consecutive years from 66.4% and 68.1%. Customers keep paying for support on gear they already run.

source: sec.gov

Leadership co leader

The FY2026 10-K asserts leadership nowhere. Its AI offerings 'compete with AI products from hyperscalers, as well as products from other emerging competitors and other open-source offerings, many of which are also current or potential partners' — one of a small set at hyperscale in cloud and AI, an incumbent in productivity and PC operating systems.

source: sec.gov

behind

The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA).

source: sec.gov

co leader

The 10-K names no competitor and discloses no market share anywhere in Management's Discussion and Analysis. The positional facts it does give are scale and direction: Networking product revenue of $28,304 million in fiscal 2025 - by far the largest of its four categories - but down $6.3 billion from fiscal 2023, with channel partner financing volume falling from $32.1 billion to $27.1 billion to $24.9 billion across fiscal 2023-2025.

source: sec.gov

Pricing power strong

The FY2026 10-K reports 'Gross margin increased $31.6 billion or 16% with growth across each of our segments', with 'Microsoft 365 Commercial revenue ... mainly affected by a combination of continued installed base growth and average revenue per user expansion'. The honest caveat: gross margin percentage 'decreased slightly driven by continued investments in AI infrastructure and growing AI product usage', with Microsoft Cloud gross margin down to 66%.

source: sec.gov

weak

Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers.

source: sec.gov

moderate

The product gross-margin bridge attributes fiscal 2025's 0.2-point improvement to productivity (+2.0 points) and mix (+1.1 points) while 'Product pricing' subtracted 1.6 points; a legal dispute with a supplier cost a further 0.8 points. Total gross margin of 64.9% (product 63.7%, services 68.5%) is held by cost and mix, not by price.

source: sec.gov

Summary

One repeated model across segments — build a platform, attract developers and partners, monetize the ecosystem that forms — now compounding through the AI wave: FY2026 revenue rose 18 percent 'driven by growth in Microsoft Cloud', Azure and other cloud services grew 41 percent, and the commercial remaining performance obligation reached $678 billion, while the filing still concedes low barriers to entry in many businesses.

Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage.

The installed base still switches slowly - but the filing does not claim it is winning the AI datacenter on the strength of that base. The fiscal 2025 Networking decline is attributed to 'product shipments returning to normalized levels during the first half of fiscal 2025 from the elevated levels ... in the first half of fiscal 2024', to servers, and to 'a decline in campus switching' - normalisation, not disclosed share loss, so the whitebox/Arista thesis is not something this 10-K either confirms or denies. What the filing does disclose is the shape of the AI dollar Cisco is actually winning: Americas service provider and cloud growth 'driven by AI infrastructure revenue from webscale customers', funded by additional purchase commitments 'related to manufacturing Cisco Silicon One and other products to meet demand from webscale and other customers', which 'significantly increased our supply chain exposure, which has resulted in negative impacts to our product gross margin in recent periods and may result in further negative impacts in future periods'. Enterprise switching earns 63.7% product gross margin; webscale silicon costs margin to serve. The moat is intact where the annuity is and thin where the growth is.

Chain position

Hyperscale AI-infrastructure buyer and platform distributor: monetizes upstream compute through Azure, Microsoft 365 Copilot, and the developer ecosystem.

Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers.

Supplies networking into AI datacenters: the 10-K ties Americas service provider and cloud growth to 'AI infrastructure revenue from webscale customers' and to Cisco Silicon One manufacturing commitments.

Products (share / barrier)
  • Blockchain data center hosting (Jamestown / Ellendale) Niche · Low source: sec.gov
  • HPC data center leasing (Polaris Forge / Delta Forge AI factories) Challenger · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Cisco Silicon One and webscale AI infrastructure Challenger · Low source: sec.gov
  • Collaboration (Webex Suite, devices, Contact Center, CPaaS) Challenger · Low source: sec.gov
  • Networking (switching, routing, wireless, servers) Leader · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Observability (Splunk Observability Suite, ThousandEyes) Niche · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Security (Splunk TDR, SASE, network security) Top 3 · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Technical support and services Leader · Deep source: sec.gov
Long-horizon vote +0.35 at weight 0.20 · swarm bullish

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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-0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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+0.13 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

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