Skip to content

Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing Pfizer×Applied Digital×Super Micro Computer× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
Pfizer PFE ai moat: latest change 2026-02-26 Applied Digital APLD ai moat: latest change 2026-07-29 Super Micro Computer SMCI ai moat: latest change 2026-08-31
Moat rating eroding

The FY2025 10-K publishes the expiry schedule of its own protection. The Patents table dates the basic U.S. product patent on Eliquis ($7,961 million of 2025 revenue) to 2027, the Prevnar family's Prevnar 13 ($6,494 million for the family) to 2026, the Vyndaqel family ($6,380 million) to 2026 with a 2028 extension only pending, Ibrance ($4,122 million) to 2027, Xtandi ($2,194 million) to 2027 and Xeljanz ($1,087 million) to 2026 - against Total revenues of $62,579 million. The filing then states it anticipates 'a significant reduction of revenue from patent-based or regulatory exclusivity expiries in 2026 through 2030 as several of our in-line products experience these expirations, with the rate of the reduction of revenues from patent-based or regulatory exclusivity expiries expected to significantly accelerate over the next few years', and puts the 2026 instalment at $1.5 billion. A protection whose end dates the issuer tabulates product by product, and whose revenue effect it forecasts as accelerating, is being consumed on a clock it has already disclosed.

source: sec.gov

none

The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage.

source: sec.gov

narrow

The FY2026 10-K describes a genuine but bounded advantage. On the asset side the filing claims a modular Server Building Block Solutions architecture, over 3,500 R&D employees, in-house design control over many sub-systems, and that Supermicro believes it is 'the only major server, storage, and accelerated compute platform vendor that designs, develops, and manufactures a significant portion of its systems in the United States.' Against that, the same filing calls its market 'highly competitive, rapidly evolving,' concedes that 'most of our competitors have longer operating histories, significantly greater resources, greater name recognition, or deeper market penetration,' reports intensified competition from 'predominantly Asia-based' entrants 'leading to pricing pressure,' and states that pricing pressure has produced 'a continued decline of average selling prices across our business and we expect that these historical trends will continue.' It also disclaims patent dependence outright. A durable-but-shallow advantage in time-to-market and integration, sitting on top of a commoditizing box business, is narrow rather than wide.

source: sec.gov

Moat type intangibles ip

The filing locates the protection in the patent estate, not anywhere else. The Patents and Other Intellectual Property Rights section tabulates 'the patent rights we consider most significant in relation to our business as a whole, together with the year in which the basic product patent expires', and states that once protection is lost 'we typically lose market exclusivity on these products, and generic and biosimilar pharmaceutical manufacturers generally produce identical or highly similar products and sell them for a lower price.' The Competition section names patents as the thing rivals attack: 'several of our competitors operate without large R&D expenses and make a regular practice of challenging our product patents before their expiration', and 'Generic pharmaceutical manufacturers pose one of the biggest competitive challenges to our branded small molecule products because they can market a competing version of our product after the expiration or loss of our patent protection.' No network, switching cost or cost-curve advantage is claimed anywhere in the section.

source: sec.gov

none

The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned.

source: sec.gov

cost scale

The filing locates the advantage in design-and-manufacturing scale, not in IP or lock-in. It says the company manufactures the majority of its systems at its San Jose headquarters with assembly, test and QC also in Taiwan, the Netherlands and Malaysia, and that this structure lets it 'reduce time to delivery, mitigate the impact of tariffs and regional costs, and reduce overall manufacturing costs.' Its own list of principal competitive factors includes 'cost-effective design and manufacturing' and 'sufficient manufacturing capacity necessary to support market demand.' Intangibles are explicitly ruled out as the source: 'neither our business as a whole nor any of our principal businesses are materially dependent on a single patent,' with reliance placed 'primarily on trade secrets, technical know-how.' Switching costs are weak by the filing's own account: it 'typically sell[s] products pursuant to purchase orders rather than long-term purchase commitments,' and customers 'have, and others may in the future, cancel or defer purchase orders on short notice without incurring a significant penalty.'

source: sec.gov

Leadership co leader

The 2026 Pharma 50 (Drug Discovery & Development, published 31 March 2026, ranking pharmaceutical revenue only) places Pfizer third at $62.58 billion of FY2025 revenue inside a five-company band that runs from Johnson & Johnson's Innovative Medicine at $60.40 billion to Eli Lilly's $65.18 billion, with Merck & Co. at $65.01 billion and AbbVie at $61.16 billion in between - scale-equal to its nearest peers rather than ahead of them. The same piece attributes the top slot to Lilly's tirzepatide franchise, which it puts at $36.5 billion combined and says passed Keytruda as the world's best-selling drug; Pfizer's 10-K names no comparable single franchise, discloses no market-share position for any product, and concedes in Item 1A that 'some of our competitors may have competitive, technical or other advantages over us' and that it faces 'an increasing number of potential competitors worldwide, including from China, that have expanded R&D capabilities.'

source: sec.gov

behind

The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA).

source: sec.gov

at parity

The filing claims no market-share leadership and gives no share figure. It states 'we believe that we compete favorably with respect to most of these factors' while immediately conceding that 'most of our competitors have longer operating histories, significantly greater resources, greater name recognition, or deeper market penetration,' naming Cisco, Dell, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise and Lenovo plus ODMs Foxconn, Quanta Computer and Wiwynn. The one leadership claim it does make is narrow and structural — that it believes it is the only major vendor in its class manufacturing a significant portion of its systems in the United States — plus a stated goal (not an achievement) to 'be the first to market with superior product designs.' Competing favorably against larger, better-penetrated rivals without asserting share leadership is parity, not leadership.

source: sec.gov

Pricing power weak

Price is the lever the filing shows moving against it. CMS selected Eliquis - which the 10-K says 'accounted for 13% of Total revenues in 2025' - for the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program, and 'its government-set Maximum Fair Price became effective January 1, 2026', with Ibrance and Xtandi following in 2027 and Xeljanz in 2028. In September 2025 Pfizer 'voluntarily agreed' with the U.S. administration to make certain U.S. prices 'more comparable to those in other developed countries' and to sell through the TrumpRx.gov platform 'at significant discounts to current retail prices'. Gross-to-net product revenue deductions rose to $36,374 million in 2025 from $30,048 million in 2023 while Total revenues fell to $62,579 million, and the IRA Medicare Part D Redesign alone 'negatively impacted our 2025 revenues by approximately $1 billion'. Lower U.S. net price is named as a drag on Vyndaqel, Ibrance, Xeljanz, Nurtec ODT and Lorbrena; every 2025 growth line the filing explains is attributed to demand, patient share or launch uptake, none to price. Cost of sales at 25.7% of revenues shows the manufactured margin is intact - what is not intact is the ability to set the price.

source: sec.gov

weak

Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers.

source: sec.gov

weak

The filing states pricing pressure explicitly and repeatedly. 'Historically, these pricing pressures have led to a continued decline of average selling prices across our business and we expect that these historical trends will continue.' On large orders: 'Large orders are generally subject to intense competition and pricing pressure which can have an adverse impact on our margins and results of operations.' It concedes it has 'accepted customer orders with various types of component pricing protection' which 'increased our exposure to component pricing fluctuations and have adversely affected our financial results in certain quarters,' and that FY2026 industry supply constraints in memory, storage, GPUs and CPUs affected 'the pricing of these items.' Its stated remedy is aspirational rather than realized: it 'must continue to develop more advanced, differentiated products that command a premium.' The filing gives no gross-margin trend in Item 1/1A; margin appears there only as a downside — excess or obsolete inventory 'would reduce our gross margin.'

source: sec.gov

Summary

Two clocks run in opposite directions inside the same company. The revenue base is near-dated: Eliquis, the Prevnar family, the Vyndaqel family, Ibrance, Xtandi and Xeljanz all carry U.S. basic product patents expiring 2026 or 2027 in the 10-K's own table, and the filing warns the resulting revenue loss will 'significantly accelerate over the next few years'. The replacement book is later-dated - Padcev and Lorbrena to 2033, Nurtec ODT and Litfulo to 2034, Prevnar 20 to 2035, Abrysvo, Cibinqo and Elrexfio to 2036, Comirnaty and Paxlovid to 2041 - but in 2025 it was still much smaller, and the two products with the longest patent runway are the two the filing says are shrinking fastest (Comirnaty down 20% and Paxlovid down 59% operationally). The 10-K's answer is purchased pipeline rather than defended position: it cites the Seagen and Metsera acquisitions as 'significant investments in obesity and oncology, respectively, which are extremely competitive therapeutic areas', while R&D expense itself fell 4% to $10,437 million. Excluding Comirnaty and Paxlovid the remaining business grew 6% operationally in 2025, which is the honest measure of what is being rebuilt underneath the expiries. A third pressure sits on top of the patent clock and is independent of it: government price-setting now reaches the largest product in the book.

Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage.

Supermicro's edge, as its FY2026 10-K frames it, is speed and integration built on a common modular parts bin: it works with NVIDIA, Intel and AMD to 'align the design of our new products with their product release schedules,' then 'quickly assemble a broad portfolio of solutions by leveraging common building blocks across product lines.' During FY2026 it pushed that advantage up a level, growing Data Center Building Block Solutions to 'more than ten key subsystems' — coolant distribution units, heat exchangers, power shelves, switching, management software — and deploying DLC-2 liquid cooling the filing credits with up to 98% per-rack heat capture and up to 40% lower data center power draw. But the filing's competition and risk discussion is candid that this sits inside a price-taking market: ASPs decline structurally, one customer exceeded 10% of net sales in FY2026, and ODMs 'benefit from their scale and very low-cost manufacturing' while increasingly selling their own brands.

Chain position

Demand side of the AI chain, not a supplier into it. The 10-K lists 'Scale AI across our business' as one of four 2026 key priorities and describes 'expanding automation, data-driven decision making, and enterprise AI solutions', crediting 'enhanced digital enablement, including automation and AI' for part of the savings in its cost-realignment and R&D-simplification programs. It describes no AI model, tool or platform that Pfizer sells.

Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers.

Downstream system integrator: it converts third-party accelerators and CPUs (NVIDIA Blackwell/GB300 NVL72, AMD Instinct MI350, Intel Xeon 6) into validated racks, liquid cooling and full data-center building blocks sold to cloud service providers and enterprises. The AI angle is central, not incidental — the filing devotes a risk factor titled 'The AI industry has driven a significant portion of our recent success' and states 'A portion of the recent success of our server and storage solutions has been dependent on the integration of our products and services within the AI industry.'

Products (share / barrier)
  • Blockchain data center hosting (Jamestown / Ellendale) Niche · Low source: sec.gov
  • HPC data center leasing (Polaris Forge / Delta Forge AI factories) Challenger · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • AI and HPC rack-scale systems (Total IT Solutions) Challenger · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • DLC-2 direct liquid cooling and thermal subsystems Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Data Center Building Block Solutions (DCBBS) Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • SuperStorage and AI-optimized storage systems Unknown · Low source: sec.gov
  • Supermicro server management software suite Niche · Low source: sec.gov
Long-horizon vote -0.17 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish

Editorial prior, not backtested.

see exactly how it voted →

-0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

see exactly how it voted →

-0.01 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

Editorial prior, not backtested.

see exactly how it voted →