Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Pfizer | Applied Digital | Walmart | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | eroding The FY2025 10-K publishes the expiry schedule of its own protection. The Patents table dates the basic U.S. product patent on Eliquis ($7,961 million of 2025 revenue) to 2027, the Prevnar family's Prevnar 13 ($6,494 million for the family) to 2026, the Vyndaqel family ($6,380 million) to 2026 with a 2028 extension only pending, Ibrance ($4,122 million) to 2027, Xtandi ($2,194 million) to 2027 and Xeljanz ($1,087 million) to 2026 - against Total revenues of $62,579 million. The filing then states it anticipates 'a significant reduction of revenue from patent-based or regulatory exclusivity expiries in 2026 through 2030 as several of our in-line products experience these expirations, with the rate of the reduction of revenues from patent-based or regulatory exclusivity expiries expected to significantly accelerate over the next few years', and puts the 2026 instalment at $1.5 billion. A protection whose end dates the issuer tabulates product by product, and whose revenue effect it forecasts as accelerating, is being consumed on a clock it has already disclosed. | none The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage. | narrow Graded on the Item 1A text this run could read from the FY2026 10-K, which is where the filing argues hardest against a wide band. It says "each of our segments competes for customers, employees, digital prominence, products and services" with local, regional, national and global physical, eCommerce and omnichannel retailers, social commerce platforms, wholesale club operators, retail intermediaries "and emerging agentic shopping tools and platforms," that "the omnichannel retail landscape is highly competitive and rapidly evolving, and the entry of new, well-funded competitors, or more rapid development of AI capabilities and agentic tools by these competitors ... may increase competitive pressures," and concedes that "for eCommerce and other internet-based businesses, newer or smaller businesses may be better able to innovate and compete with us" and that there "can be no assurance" Walmart can adopt AI "as quickly or effectively as our competitors." It also warns of retail consolidation producing rivals with "improved financial resources, improved access to merchandise, greater market penetration." The filing claims no market share, rank or scale advantage anywhere in the text available here, and its own competitive-landscape discussion sits in Item 1, which the cached read-through returned only as a cross-reference; a wider band would not be sourced. |
| Moat type | intangibles ip The filing locates the protection in the patent estate, not anywhere else. The Patents and Other Intellectual Property Rights section tabulates 'the patent rights we consider most significant in relation to our business as a whole, together with the year in which the basic product patent expires', and states that once protection is lost 'we typically lose market exclusivity on these products, and generic and biosimilar pharmaceutical manufacturers generally produce identical or highly similar products and sell them for a lower price.' The Competition section names patents as the thing rivals attack: 'several of our competitors operate without large R&D expenses and make a regular practice of challenging our product patents before their expiration', and 'Generic pharmaceutical manufacturers pose one of the biggest competitive challenges to our branded small molecule products because they can market a competing version of our product after the expiration or loss of our patent protection.' No network, switching cost or cost-curve advantage is claimed anywhere in the section. | none The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned. | cost scale What the readable text does describe as durable is physical and logistical scale rather than lock-in or IP. It says Walmart sources "from a wide variety of domestic and international suppliers," that global sourcing is "an important factor in our financial performance," and that finding suppliers able to supply "in the large volumes we may demand" is itself a challenge; it describes a network of stores, clubs and distribution and fulfillment centers in which "many products available for purchase online can be picked up by the customer or member at a local Walmart store or Sam's Club, which provides additional customer traffic at such stores and clubs"; and it lists "supply chain automation and enhancements" among the investments backing the strategy. The first competitive lever it names is "the prices at which we sell our merchandise." The filing offers no intangibles or switching-cost claim beyond noting that protection of its trademarks, copyrights, domain names, patents and trade secrets "may not be available in every jurisdiction." |
| Leadership | co leader The 2026 Pharma 50 (Drug Discovery & Development, published 31 March 2026, ranking pharmaceutical revenue only) places Pfizer third at $62.58 billion of FY2025 revenue inside a five-company band that runs from Johnson & Johnson's Innovative Medicine at $60.40 billion to Eli Lilly's $65.18 billion, with Merck & Co. at $65.01 billion and AbbVie at $61.16 billion in between - scale-equal to its nearest peers rather than ahead of them. The same piece attributes the top slot to Lilly's tirzepatide franchise, which it puts at $36.5 billion combined and says passed Keytruda as the world's best-selling drug; Pfizer's 10-K names no comparable single franchise, discloses no market-share position for any product, and concedes in Item 1A that 'some of our competitors may have competitive, technical or other advantages over us' and that it faces 'an increasing number of potential competitors worldwide, including from China, that have expanded R&D capabilities.' | behind The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA). | co leader The 10-K text available this run asserts no rank or share for Walmart. The band reflects two things the filing does say: that its strategy is meant to let it "maintain or grow our overall market position" across segments that already compete at global scale, and that it does not describe itself as ahead in the channels that matter most to it - "for eCommerce and other internet-based businesses, newer or smaller businesses may be better able to innovate and compete with us," and on AI adoption "there can be no assurance that these investments will deliver the anticipated benefits, or that we will be able to adopt and leverage these technologies as quickly or effectively as our competitors." Treat this band as bounded by the missing Item 1 competition discussion, not as a measured position. |
| Pricing power | weak Price is the lever the filing shows moving against it. CMS selected Eliquis - which the 10-K says 'accounted for 13% of Total revenues in 2025' - for the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program, and 'its government-set Maximum Fair Price became effective January 1, 2026', with Ibrance and Xtandi following in 2027 and Xeljanz in 2028. In September 2025 Pfizer 'voluntarily agreed' with the U.S. administration to make certain U.S. prices 'more comparable to those in other developed countries' and to sell through the TrumpRx.gov platform 'at significant discounts to current retail prices'. Gross-to-net product revenue deductions rose to $36,374 million in 2025 from $30,048 million in 2023 while Total revenues fell to $62,579 million, and the IRA Medicare Part D Redesign alone 'negatively impacted our 2025 revenues by approximately $1 billion'. Lower U.S. net price is named as a drag on Vyndaqel, Ibrance, Xeljanz, Nurtec ODT and Lorbrena; every 2025 growth line the filing explains is attributed to demand, patient share or launch uptake, none to price. Cost of sales at 25.7% of revenues shows the manufactured margin is intact - what is not intact is the ability to set the price. | weak Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers. | weak The filing names price first among the ways it competes - "we compete in a variety of ways, including the prices at which we sell our merchandise" - and states that higher supplier labour and material costs may "adversely impact product margins ... that we are unable, or choose not, to pass on to our customers." It adds that macro conditions can "change the mix of products we sell to any one or more markets with a lower average gross margin" and "result in slower inventory turnover and greater markdowns of inventory." In health and wellness the price is set by counterparties, not by Walmart: "a large majority of our retail pharmacy net sales are generated by filling prescriptions for which we receive payment through established contractual relationships with third-party payers and payment administrators, such as private insurers, governmental agencies and pharmacy benefit managers," exposing it to "reductions in the third-party reimbursement rates for drugs." |
| Summary | Two clocks run in opposite directions inside the same company. The revenue base is near-dated: Eliquis, the Prevnar family, the Vyndaqel family, Ibrance, Xtandi and Xeljanz all carry U.S. basic product patents expiring 2026 or 2027 in the 10-K's own table, and the filing warns the resulting revenue loss will 'significantly accelerate over the next few years'. The replacement book is later-dated - Padcev and Lorbrena to 2033, Nurtec ODT and Litfulo to 2034, Prevnar 20 to 2035, Abrysvo, Cibinqo and Elrexfio to 2036, Comirnaty and Paxlovid to 2041 - but in 2025 it was still much smaller, and the two products with the longest patent runway are the two the filing says are shrinking fastest (Comirnaty down 20% and Paxlovid down 59% operationally). The 10-K's answer is purchased pipeline rather than defended position: it cites the Seagen and Metsera acquisitions as 'significant investments in obesity and oncology, respectively, which are extremely competitive therapeutic areas', while R&D expense itself fell 4% to $10,437 million. Excluding Comirnaty and Paxlovid the remaining business grew 6% operationally in 2025, which is the honest measure of what is being rebuilt underneath the expiries. A third pressure sits on top of the patent clock and is independent of it: government price-setting now reaches the largest product in the book. | Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage. | In the FY2026 10-K text readable this run, Walmart describes an "enterprise strategy, which combines traditional retail, membership models, marketplaces, financial services, health and wellness and other customer and business services into a series of interconnected assets to make it seamless for customers to interact with us," carried by stores, clubs and distribution and fulfillment centers that double as pickup and delivery nodes and by continuing investment in eCommerce, AI and supply chain automation. The filing sets its own limits on that: it calls the omnichannel landscape "highly competitive and rapidly evolving," warns that well-funded entrants and faster AI or agentic tooling by rivals may increase pressure, that smaller businesses may out-innovate it online, and that "a greater concentration of eCommerce sales, including increasing online grocery sales and the increasing role of AI-enabled platforms in product search, discovery, advertising and purchasing, could result in a reduction in the amount of traffic in our stores and clubs." On economics it concedes supplier cost increases it may be "unable, or choose not, to pass on to our customers," and it points investors to "advertising and other higher-margin initiatives (which are expected to help drive our operating income growth at a rate faster than net sales over the long term)" rather than to price. |
| Chain position | Demand side of the AI chain, not a supplier into it. The 10-K lists 'Scale AI across our business' as one of four 2026 key priorities and describes 'expanding automation, data-driven decision making, and enterprise AI solutions', crediting 'enhanced digital enablement, including automation and AI' for part of the savings in its cost-realignment and R&D-simplification programs. It describes no AI model, tool or platform that Pfizer sells. | Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. | A retailer that also intermediates: it sells its own sourced merchandise, hosts third-party marketplace sellers for whom it may provide "fulfillment, inventory management, tax collection, payment processing, content," sells digital advertising against that traffic, dispenses prescriptions under PBM and payer contracts, and offers financial services "including through our digital channels, stores and clubs, as well as our OnePay fintech venture." |
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| Long-horizon vote | -0.17 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish Editorial prior, not backtested. | -0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.05 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |