Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| ServiceNow | Equinix | Applied Digital | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | narrow The FY2025 10-K shows RPO of $28.2 billion, up 27%; customers above $5 million of ACV at 603, 502 and 420 as of December 31 2025, 2024 and 2023; revenue of $13,278 million, up 21%; and a 98% renewal rate for three years. That rate cannot prove durability: the filing computes it excluding "changes in price or users," says it "does not reflect increased or decreased purchases," and warns "period-to-period comparison of renewal rates may not be meaningful." The company also calls its market "characterized by fragmentation, low barriers to entry." Real switching costs plus compounding large accounts support narrow; wide would need durability proof this filing lacks. | wide The FY2025 10-K (filed 2026-02-11) grounds the advantage in an asset that took 27 years to assemble and that a competitor cannot buy: "Over our 27-year history, we have curated a diverse, industry-leading ecosystem of more than 500,000 interconnections", "over 10,500 customers, including 2,000+ network service providers and a leading market share of cloud-on ramps", across "280 data centers, in 77 markets in 36 countries", with "99.9999%+ operational uptime" delivered in 2025 and no single customer at 10% of revenue. Because the value of each IBX rises with who else is already inside it, incumbency compounds rather than decays. The counterweight is real and disclosed: Item 1A says "The global multi-tenant data center market is highly fragmented. It is estimated that we are one of more than 2,400 companies that provide these offerings around the world", and warns that competitors "may adopt aggressive pricing policies". That caps the pricing that the moat converts into, not its durability — the fragmentation sits in commodity space-and-power, while the interconnection density the filing describes has no comparable substitute. FY2025 revenue of $9.217B with operating margin recovering to 20.0% from 15.2% in FY2024 is consistent with the incumbency holding. | none The FY2026 10-K (filed 2026-07-29) shows contracted revenue, not a demonstrated competitive edge. About 1,410 MW is leased under 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable base terms worth about $36.2 billion, but only about 100 MW of the roughly 1.5 GW that is contracted and either operating or under construction was operating and earning revenue at May 31, 2026, and Item 1A says "lessees may have the right to terminate applicable leases if there are significant delays in construction." Item 1A also concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time," and the Competition section names 13 power-advantaged developers the company competes with. Signed leases give revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable advantage. |
| Moat type | switching costs The binding force is architecture and configuration. The filing describes "a multi-instance architecture that provides each customer with a dedicated application layer and database," an ITOM product that "maintains a single record of all IT configurable items," and products built to "integrate with existing workflows rather than replace them." Once that record and its integrations are configured, replacement becomes a re-platforming program — our inference, as the filing quantifies no switching cost. Not IP: it holds "over 2,000 issued U.S. and foreign patents" but is not "materially dependent on any single patent." Not network effects. | network effects The 10-K names the mechanism itself, twice and unprompted: "As more customers choose Equinix for high connectivity and performance reliability at the metro edge, it benefits their suppliers and business partners to colocate in the same data centers and connect directly with each other. This adjacency creates a network effect that attracts new customers while continuously enhancing our value proposition to existing customers", and in the Competitive Landscape section, "This ecosystem creates a network effect that improves performance and lowers the cost for our customers". The evidence is the count of participants rather than any patent or unit-cost claim — 500,000+ interconnections, 2,000+ network service providers, a leading share of cloud on-ramps, an Internet Exchange the filing calls "the largest global peering solution". Switching costs are a genuine second layer (fixed-duration contracts billed on space and power, physical cross connects into resident counterparties), but they are what holds a customer already inside the ecosystem; the reason to enter in the first place is who is already there. | none The 10-K claims three advantages: power-advantaged sites (it believes securing power and interconnection ahead of demand is 'the principal constraint on new HPC capacity and a core differentiator for us from many of our competitors'), a standardized 'franchise-style' design, and hyperscaler master service and master telecom service agreements 'that are difficult to obtain.' The filing does not show any of them to be durable. Its Competition section says competition 'centers on securing and developing sites with access to large-scale, reliable, and cost-competitive power and interconnection' and names 13 power-advantaged developers going after the same leases, and Item 1A concedes it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases are take-or-pay and non-cancellable, so a tenant leaving for convenience owes 'the full remaining contractual value,' but that is contractual lock-in on each lease rather than a moat source, so no moat type is assigned. |
| Leadership | clear leader The call is scoped to IT service management. Apps Run The World's 2024 ITSM ranking (page dated 23 July 2025) places ServiceNow first at 44.4% share, ahead of Atlassian, BMC, GoTo and Ivanti, in an $11.4 billion market where the top ten hold 83.3%. Scale corroborates: about 8,700 customers, 29,187 employees, $13,278 million of revenue, $28.2 billion of RPO. References to "two decades partnering with enterprise customers" and process knowledge "that cannot be readily replicated" are the filing's own characterisation. Outside ITSM it is weaker: one of six Leaders in the 2025 Gartner LCAP quadrant, and tenth of ten in CRM behind Salesforce at 26.1%. | clear leader Leadership is claimed on interconnection, not on square footage, and the filing's own evidence is about density: "our position is unmatched in the industry" is supported by 2,000+ resident network service providers, "a leading market share of cloud-on ramps", 500,000+ interconnections and an Internet Exchange described as "the largest global peering solution", across 36 countries. The band is read against neutral, ecosystem-dense colocation, where that footprint has no direct analogue. It is deliberately not read against total data centre capacity: the same 10-K puts Equinix among "more than 2,400 companies" in a "highly fragmented" MTDC market, and Item 1A concedes the company must compete for land and power against "new market entrants" drawn in by AI. | behind The 10-K makes no leadership claim and gives no ranking or share figure. Item 1A concedes "We do not have the resources to compete with larger providers of similar products or services at this time" and that some rivals have "substantially greater liquidity and financial resources than we do." Its Competition section places APLD against established operators (Digital Realty, Equinix), hyperscalers that build their own capacity, independent developers and 13 named power-advantaged developers (IREN, Cipher Digital, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Riot, CleanSpark, HIVE, Core Scientific, Bitdeer, Galaxy Digital, Fermi, Keel Infrastructure, MARA). |
| Pricing power | moderate The filing discloses no average selling price, no net revenue retention and no pricing data, and the renewal rate is no proxy — it "does not reflect increased or decreased purchases" and excludes "changes in price or users." Revenue up 21%, the $5 million-plus cohort up about 20% annually and RPO up 27% are all consistent with expansion at flat pricing. Margins cut the other way: subscription gross profit fell to 80% from 82% with no stated cause, and professional services gross loss widened to 5% from 2%. One real lever is that "certain AI and data solutions include a consumption-based pricing component." | moderate Contract structure supports price: fixed-duration agreements billed on space and power plus per-connection interconnection fees, an installed base too physically entangled to move cheaply, and 99.9999%+ uptime in 2025 as the thing being paid for. FY2025 revenue of $9.217B grew about 5% on FY2024's $8.748B while operating margin recovered to 20.0% from 15.2%, so pricing and cost were at least held. But the filing itself refuses the strong band: competitors "may adopt aggressive pricing policies, especially if they are not highly leveraged or have lower return thresholds than we do. As a result, we may suffer from pricing pressure that would adversely affect our ability to generate revenues", and some rivals bundle communications or cloud services against bare colocation. Power procurement is a further pass-through risk the filing flags. Price is defended, not dictated. | weak Item 1A says "Due to the limited number of hyperscalers, we expect that a limited number of customers will continue to account for a high percentage of our revenue for the foreseeable future," and that if customers' equipment usage declines or they discontinue use of its facilities, APLD "may be compelled to lower our lease prices in some instances or risk losing a significant customer." One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. Take-or-pay, non-cancellable terms protect contracted revenue over the base term, and Note 19 reports a $39.1M HPC Hosting segment profit on $385.3M of segment revenue in FY2026, but those terms are agreed with a small group of concentrated buyers. |
| Summary | ServiceNow sells a workflow platform that sits on top of, rather than replaces, an enterprise's existing systems. Each customer gets a dedicated application layer and database, ITOM maintains a single record of all IT configurable items, and products integrate with existing workflows rather than replace them; once that record and its integrations span IT, HR and customer service, displacement becomes a re-platforming exercise. The evidence is in large commitments: $5 million-plus ACV customers rose from 420 to 502 to 603, and RPO reached $28.2 billion, up 27%, against $13,278 million of FY2025 revenue. The moat is bounded by a market the company itself calls fragmented with low barriers to entry, by larger rivals that can bundle or cut price, and by falling subscription gross margin, 82% to 80%. | Equinix is a network-neutral, multi-tenant colocation and interconnection REIT: it does not sell compute, it sells the metro-edge real estate where networks, clouds and enterprises physically meet. The FY2025 10-K describes the platform as "280 data centers, in 77 markets in 36 countries" serving "over 10,500 customers, including 2,000+ network service providers and a leading market share of cloud-on ramps", carrying "more than 500,000 interconnections" curated over 27 years, with 61% of 2025 revenue recognised outside the U.S. Revenue is structurally recurring — infrastructure offerings are "billed based on the space and power a customer consumes" under fixed-duration contracts generating MRR, interconnection is "billed based on the outbound connections from a customer" — and no customer reached 10% of 2025 revenue. AI enters the story as demand rather than as a product: the filing positions Equinix as the interconnect point for "model providers, data platforms, neoclouds and gateways", and pushes core hyperscale capacity into xScale, which is "developed and operated through our joint venture partnership arrangements". The bear case is in the company's own Item 1A. The MTDC market is "highly fragmented", Equinix being "one of more than 2,400 companies"; competitors "may adopt aggressive pricing policies"; the AI build-out invites "significant investments in the data center industry by both current competitors and new investors", after which "we could lose market share" and must "compete against certain of these competitors to secure the land and power needed for our expansion plans". Product extension has also failed before — the filing notes past offerings "have been or are being discontinued, including the Equinix Metal product". The honest reading: the interconnection ecosystem is close to unreplicable and the moat sits there; the capacity business around it is a capital race Equinix enters with scale but no immunity. | Applied Digital designs, builds and operates purpose-built, liquid-cooled HPC data centers, which it calls 'AI factories', and leases the capacity to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. At May 31, 2026 its 10-K lists five campuses (Polaris Forge 1-3 and Delta Forge 1-2) with about 1,410 MW contracted under roughly 15-year take-or-pay, non-cancellable leases worth about $36.2 billion over the base terms. The filing claims three sources of advantage: it controls power-advantaged sites, it uses a standardized 'franchise-style' design built to deliver about 150 MW in about 14 to 18 months, and it holds hyperscaler master agreements that are 'difficult to obtain.' The same document shows how early the company is. About 100 MW was operating and earning revenue. One customer was 59% of FY2026 revenue from continuing operations. It competes with Digital Realty, Equinix, hyperscalers that build their own capacity and 13 named power-advantaged developers, and it concedes that it lacks the resources to compete with larger providers. Signed leases give long-dated revenue visibility, but the filing does not show a durable competitive advantage. |
| Chain position | Enterprise workflow platform layered on top of customers' existing systems of record. It consumes public cloud capacity (named relationships with AWS, Google, Microsoft and NVIDIA) plus its own data centers, and reaches customers through a direct sales force, global system integrators (Accenture, Deloitte, EY, Infosys, KPMG) and resale partners. Microsoft is named as both partner and competitor. | Equinix is the neutral meeting point of the AI and cloud supply chain rather than a link in its manufacturing path: it houses other companies' compute and sells the adjacency between them. The 10-K places it between the network layer (2,000+ service providers), the cloud layer ("a leading market share of cloud-on ramps") and enterprise consumers who "assemble these capabilities into operational stacks", and describes an AI ecosystem "of model providers, data platforms, neoclouds and gateways" curated for enterprise AI demand. Core hyperscale training capacity sits beside that, not inside it, in xScale, built with JV partners so hyperscalers "add to their core hyperscale data center deployments and existing customer access points at Equinix". The revenue is therefore levered to AI's distribution and inference edge more than to training-cluster buildout. | Developer and landlord of power-advantaged, liquid-cooled AI data-center capacity, leased long-term to CoreWeave and investment-grade hyperscalers. |
| Products (share / barrier) |
|
|
|
| Long-horizon vote | +0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.38 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | -0.20 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |