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Compare moats

Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.

comparing Super Micro Computer×GlobalFoundries×SAP× maximum of 3 — remove one to swap
Super Micro Computer SMCI ai moat: latest change 2026-08-31 GlobalFoundries GFS ai moat: latest change 2026-02-27 SAP SAP ai moat: latest change 2026-02-26
Moat rating narrow

The FY2026 10-K describes a genuine but bounded advantage. On the asset side the filing claims a modular Server Building Block Solutions architecture, over 3,500 R&D employees, in-house design control over many sub-systems, and that Supermicro believes it is 'the only major server, storage, and accelerated compute platform vendor that designs, develops, and manufactures a significant portion of its systems in the United States.' Against that, the same filing calls its market 'highly competitive, rapidly evolving,' concedes that 'most of our competitors have longer operating histories, significantly greater resources, greater name recognition, or deeper market penetration,' reports intensified competition from 'predominantly Asia-based' entrants 'leading to pricing pressure,' and states that pricing pressure has produced 'a continued decline of average selling prices across our business and we expect that these historical trends will continue.' It also disclaims patent dependence outright. A durable-but-shallow advantage in time-to-market and integration, sitting on top of a commoditizing box business, is narrow rather than wide.

source: sec.gov

narrow

The FY2025 20-F gives a measured lock-in: approximately 63% of 2025 wafer shipment volume was single-sourced business - products GF says "can only be manufactured with our technology or cannot be manufactured elsewhere without significant customer redesigns" - and long-term agreements carried an aggregate remaining revenue commitment of approximately $11 billion at 31 December 2025, as "binding, multi-year, reciprocal minimum purchase and supply commitments". That advantage is bounded by admissions in the same filing: "some of our competitors may offer more advanced or differentiated technologies than we do and some have greater access to capital and substantially greater production capacity, research and development... including access to government subsidies"; China's mature-node "foundry capacity is expected to grow faster than expected demand at those nodes"; and GF "renegotiated a number of LTAs with certain of our customers, including in 2025, as a result of which some of our LTAs now have longer commitment periods... and some of our LTAs have lower pricing or volume commitments than originally negotiated". Gross margin of 24.9% in 2025 ($1,690m on $6,791m of net revenue) on essentially flat revenue is the economics of a position that is defended rather than uncontested.

source: sec.gov

wide

The 20-F describes a migration market made of SAP's own customers: RISE with SAP 'is targeted at our installed base customers and helps them on their journey from legacy ERP systems to SAP Business Suite' — an installed base so entrenched that moving WITHIN the vendor is a multi-year journey, with the Q2 2026 statement showing €22.9 billion of contractually committed cloud backlog, up 27%.

source: sec.gov

Moat type cost scale

The filing locates the advantage in design-and-manufacturing scale, not in IP or lock-in. It says the company manufactures the majority of its systems at its San Jose headquarters with assembly, test and QC also in Taiwan, the Netherlands and Malaysia, and that this structure lets it 'reduce time to delivery, mitigate the impact of tariffs and regional costs, and reduce overall manufacturing costs.' Its own list of principal competitive factors includes 'cost-effective design and manufacturing' and 'sufficient manufacturing capacity necessary to support market demand.' Intangibles are explicitly ruled out as the source: 'neither our business as a whole nor any of our principal businesses are materially dependent on a single patent,' with reliance placed 'primarily on trade secrets, technical know-how.' Switching costs are weak by the filing's own account: it 'typically sell[s] products pursuant to purchase orders rather than long-term purchase commitments,' and customers 'have, and others may in the future, cancel or defer purchase orders on short notice without incurring a significant penalty.'

source: sec.gov

switching costs

The filing rules out scale as the source: GF concedes competitors with "substantially greater production capacity, research and development" and its four fabs held roughly 2.8 million wafers per annum of installed capacity at end-2025 against a $6.8bn revenue base. The mechanism it names instead is the cost of moving a qualified design - "[g]iven the time and costs associated with moving a single-sourced product to a competitor, clients are more likely to continue awarding us single-source contracts for such products" - and it is quantified at approximately 63% of 2025 wafer shipment volume. It is contractually reinforced by the ~$11bn of remaining LTA revenue commitment, which GF says continues to matter "for certain longer term, more durable end markets, such as automotive", where 21% of 2025 net revenue ($1,410m) now sits.

source: sec.gov

switching costs

ERP is the system of record for a company's core processes; the 20-F's own strategy language — SAP Business Suite as 'the destination for all our customers,' with AI-enabled migration tools easing the journey off SAP's own legacy systems — is a switching-cost moat described from the inside.

source: sec.gov

Leadership at parity

The filing claims no market-share leadership and gives no share figure. It states 'we believe that we compete favorably with respect to most of these factors' while immediately conceding that 'most of our competitors have longer operating histories, significantly greater resources, greater name recognition, or deeper market penetration,' naming Cisco, Dell, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise and Lenovo plus ODMs Foxconn, Quanta Computer and Wiwynn. The one leadership claim it does make is narrow and structural — that it believes it is the only major vendor in its class manufacturing a significant portion of its systems in the United States — plus a stated goal (not an achievement) to 'be the first to market with superior product designs.' Competing favorably against larger, better-penetrated rivals without asserting share leadership is parity, not leadership.

source: sec.gov

fast follower

The 20-F places GF inside a group of "five major foundries (including four scaled pure-play foundries) that accounted for the vast majority of worldwide foundry revenue in 2025", naming TSMC first among key competitors along with UMC and SMIC, and separately conceding competitors with "more advanced or differentiated technologies than we do" and "substantially greater production capacity, research and development, marketing and other resources". GF does not compete for the leading edge at all; its stated pillars are differentiated RF, FDX, silicon photonics, power and feature-rich CMOS plus geographic diversity. That is an established, scaled participant operating inside a pace set elsewhere, not one setting it, and not one shut out of the top tier.

source: sec.gov

clear leader

Grounded in scale and position rather than an asserted share: the 20-F describes a market segment consisting of SAP's own legacy estates (RISE), and the Q2 statement shows Cloud ERP Suite revenue of €5.5 billion in a single quarter, up 25% — no competitor filing this site tracks describes an installed-base market of its own.

source: sec.gov

Pricing power weak

The filing states pricing pressure explicitly and repeatedly. 'Historically, these pricing pressures have led to a continued decline of average selling prices across our business and we expect that these historical trends will continue.' On large orders: 'Large orders are generally subject to intense competition and pricing pressure which can have an adverse impact on our margins and results of operations.' It concedes it has 'accepted customer orders with various types of component pricing protection' which 'increased our exposure to component pricing fluctuations and have adversely affected our financial results in certain quarters,' and that FY2026 industry supply constraints in memory, storage, GPUs and CPUs affected 'the pricing of these items.' Its stated remedy is aspirational rather than realized: it 'must continue to develop more advanced, differentiated products that command a premium.' The filing gives no gross-margin trend in Item 1/1A; margin appears there only as a downside — excess or obsolete inventory 'would reduce our gross margin.'

source: sec.gov

moderate

Gross margin was 24.9% in 2025 ($1,690m on $6,791m) versus 24.5% in 2024 ($1,651m on $6,750m) - held, not expanded, even though average shipment utilization across the global fabs rose from 77% to 86%, so most of the volume gain was absorbed rather than dropping through. The filing states outright that "the market prices for technology and services tend to fall over time, except in times of extreme supply shortage", and discloses LTAs renegotiated in 2025 to "lower pricing or volume commitments than originally negotiated". Against that, GF says wafer price "varies significantly across technology platforms" and that devices with "richer feature sets, higher performance, better yields and greater system-level integration... generally command higher wafer prices". Price-setting inside designed-in single-sourced sockets, price-taking at the competitive margin.

source: sec.gov

moderate

Q2 2026: total revenue up 9% with non-IFRS operating profit up 7% — profit growing slightly behind revenue, and the 2026 profit outlook 'updated to reflect dilutive impact from Dremio and Prior Labs acquisitions' rather than raised.

source: sec.gov

Summary

Supermicro's edge, as its FY2026 10-K frames it, is speed and integration built on a common modular parts bin: it works with NVIDIA, Intel and AMD to 'align the design of our new products with their product release schedules,' then 'quickly assemble a broad portfolio of solutions by leveraging common building blocks across product lines.' During FY2026 it pushed that advantage up a level, growing Data Center Building Block Solutions to 'more than ten key subsystems' — coolant distribution units, heat exchangers, power shelves, switching, management software — and deploying DLC-2 liquid cooling the filing credits with up to 98% per-rack heat capture and up to 40% lower data center power draw. But the filing's competition and risk discussion is candid that this sits inside a price-taking market: ASPs decline structurally, one customer exceeded 10% of net sales in FY2026, and ODMs 'benefit from their scale and very low-cost manufacturing' while increasingly selling their own brands.

GlobalFoundries is a pure-play specialty foundry that deliberately does not contest the leading edge. Its FY2025 20-F frames the business around six differentiated technology lines - feature-rich CMOS, ultra-low-power CMOS (FinFET and FDX), silicon photonics, RF, power, and, new in 2025, processor IP via the MIPS acquisition - manufactured at four fabs in Malta NY, Burlington VT, Dresden and Singapore, which GF describes as making it "the only scaled foundry with a global manufacturing footprint spanning the United States, Europe, and Asia operating for more than a decade". The defence that shows up in the numbers is design lock-in rather than cost: approximately 63% of 2025 wafer shipment volume was single-sourced, and ~$11bn of long-term agreement revenue commitment remained at year-end. What limits it is visible in the same document - competitors with more capital, more capacity and, in some cases, more advanced technology; mature-node capacity in China expected to outgrow demand at 28nm and larger; TSMC, Samsung, Intel, Texas Instruments and UMC all building in the United States, Europe or Singapore, which erodes the geographic-diversity argument GF calls "one of our key advantages". Pricing reflects that balance: 2025 gross margin of 24.9% against 24.5% in 2024 even as shipment utilization rose from 77% to 86%, with some LTAs renegotiated to lower pricing. AI exposure is real but indirect - Communications, Infrastructure & Data Center was 11% of 2025 net revenue, and GF's AI content is optical interconnect, RF, sensing, power and edge processor IP rather than accelerator logic.

SAP monetizes the stickiest software estate in enterprise computing twice over: a declining on-premise support stream and a growing cloud one, with the 20-F's 'flywheel' — Business AI enhancing Cloud ERP, which feeds Business Data Cloud, which fuels the AI — as the argument that the transition compounds rather than cannibalizes. The caveat is regulatory, in the filing's own words: the European Commission opened formal proceedings over on-premise maintenance and support policies, with suggested remedies market-tested in 2025 and 'pending final EC approval in 2026' — the moat's support-pricing half is under review.

Chain position

Downstream system integrator: it converts third-party accelerators and CPUs (NVIDIA Blackwell/GB300 NVL72, AMD Instinct MI350, Intel Xeon 6) into validated racks, liquid cooling and full data-center building blocks sold to cloud service providers and enterprises. The AI angle is central, not incidental — the filing devotes a risk factor titled 'The AI industry has driven a significant portion of our recent success' and states 'A portion of the recent success of our server and storage solutions has been dependent on the integration of our products and services within the AI industry.'

Pure-play specialty foundry. Inputs are silicon and specialised SOI wafers bought under multiple long-term agreements with principal suppliers, "the largest of which is Soitec", plus externally sourced EDA tools and third-party IP. Output is finished semiconductor wafers, approximately 89% of 2025 net revenue, sold to fabless designers and IDMs and delivered through the GlobalSolutions ecosystem of IP providers, EDA vendors, OSAT partners and design-service firms; the remaining ~11% is photomasks, sourcing and post-fab services, and IP licence and royalty income. Manufacturing sits at four sites - Malta NY, Burlington VT, Dresden and Singapore - with roughly 239,000 square metres of clean room and about 2.8 million wafers per annum installed capacity at end-2025. Position in the AI chain is one step removed from accelerators: Communications, Infrastructure & Data Center was 11% of 2025 net revenue ($745m), with content in optical interconnect, RF front-ends, timing and power, alongside edge-AI processor IP from the MIPS acquisition.

Layer-10 application incumbent embedding AI (Joule, Business AI) into the enterprise system of record.

Products (share / barrier)
  • AI and HPC rack-scale systems (Total IT Solutions) Challenger · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • DLC-2 direct liquid cooling and thermal subsystems Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Data Center Building Block Solutions (DCBBS) Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • SuperStorage and AI-optimized storage systems Unknown · Low source: sec.gov
  • Supermicro server management software suite Niche · Low source: sec.gov
  • Business AI (Joule, Joule Agents, Business Data Cloud) Unknown · Moderate source: sec.gov
  • Cloud ERP Suite (S/4HANA Cloud, BTP, LoB solutions) Leader · Deep source: sec.gov
  • On-premise software support Unknown · Deep source: sec.gov
Long-horizon vote -0.01 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

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+0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

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+0.38 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral

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