Compare moats
Up to three covered companies, band by band. Every call is a curated editorial judgment, never a disclosed figure — and every band carries its cited basis.
| Cipher Mining | Iron Mountain | Fabrinet | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moat rating | none Cipher (renamed Cipher Digital Inc. on 20 February 2026) holds signed, credit-supported leases but has not yet shown that they amount to a durable advantage. Its 2025 Form 10-K (filed 2026-02-24) says "Through the end of 2025, our revenue has been derived from mining bitcoin". Its Q2 2026 business update (2026-08-04, Exhibit 99.1, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1819989/000181998926000038/q226_earningsxprxdraftxvf.htm) reported "Q2 2026 Revenue of $25 million", and its first HPC rent began only in August 2026 at Black Pearl. The 10-K's own risk factors describe a contested market. They say "There has been an increasing number of businesses constructing HPC data centers, which has resulted in increasing competition and pricing pressure that may cause us to reduce our pricing in order to remain competitive", that "our data centers are single-tenant properties", and that lessees "will have the right to terminate the lease if there are significant delays in the completion of construction". At Barber Lake, where the 10-K targeted Phase I delivery "by September 30, 2026", a September 2026 amendment, made "In connection with change orders and the continued evolution of tenant requirements", moved data-hall deliveries to the fourth quarter of 2026 through the first quarter of 2027. Under it, Cipher "will bear the first $359.3 million of costs in excess of the initial budgeted amount" (2026-09-25). There is real counter-evidence: a 15-year Amazon lease, a Google-backstopped Fluidstack lease whose contracted life a "leading AI lab" extended to 20 years, and a third lease with an investment-grade hyperscale tenant. Until that capacity is delivered and paying rent, though, a moat is not shown, so the band is none. | narrow Iron Mountain's physical-records franchise shows a real switching-cost advantage, but the FY2025 Form 10-K also describes a slowly shrinking need for it, and the growth businesses compete in open markets. On the advantage side, an independent record: the Department of Justice complaint published in the Federal Register on 2016-04-11 (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/04/11/2016-08210/united-states-v-iron-mountain-inc-and-recall-holdings-ltd-proposed-final-judgment-and-competitive) stated that "Iron Mountain is the largest RMS company in the United States" and that "Taken together, permanent withdrawal fees and other withdrawal restrictions make it difficult for a new RMS entrant to win customers away from existing RMS vendors." The 2025 10-K reports more than 740 million cubic feet stored, says "we have consistently experienced strong customer retention levels", and shows the Global RIM segment's Adjusted EBITDA margin at 44.7% in 2025 against 44.6% in 2024. On the limiting side, Item 1A says "Our Records Management and Data Management service revenue growth is being negatively impacted by declining activity rates as stored records and tapes are becoming less active and more archival" and "A significant shift by our customers to storage of data through non-paper or non-tape-based technologies, whether now existing or developed in the future, could adversely affect our businesses." In data centres the 10-K says it competes with "numerous data center developers, owners and operators, many of whom own properties comparable to ours". A strong, regulator-documented lock-in on a physical market the company itself expects only to hold steady, plus growth arms without that lock-in, is a narrow moat rather than a wide one. | narrow The FY2026 10-K grounds a real but bounded defence. On the defence side: Item 1 states that in the manufacturing services market "there are significant barriers to entry in our existing and target markets, including lengthy sales cycles, the need to demonstrate complex precision optical and electro-mechanical engineering and manufacturing capabilities to a prospective customer and the ability to protect a customer's intellectual property," and that qualification of a program "may take three to six months or longer to complete." On the limiting side, the same filing shows the protection does not reach price: gross profit was 12.0% of revenues in FY2026 against 12.1% in FY2025 and 12.4% in FY2024 even as revenue rose 35.7% to $4.64 billion, four customers each exceeded 10% of revenue (Cisco 19.9%, NVIDIA 16.3%, Nokia 10.7%, Amazon 10.5%), and "reliance on a small number of customers gives those customers substantial purchasing power and leverage in negotiating contracts with us." Sales are made on "individual purchase orders that have short lead times and are subject to revision or cancellation," so the qualified program is sticky while the contract is not. |
| Moat type | none No moat source is demonstrated yet. Switching costs are the most likely candidate, since the leases are long (15 years at Black Pearl; Barber Lake now a 20-year contracted life) and each site has a single tenant. But the 10-K says tenant guarantees "will only be effective after rent commencement under such leases and are subject to certain limitations", and by August 2026 rent had begun at only one site. The advantages the 10-K claims are the company's own. It speaks of "industry-leading expertise in originating and securing industrial-scale, greenfield data center sites" and of securing West Texas land "on more favorable terms than in more established data center markets". The same document says "there is significant competition for power capacity and energized facilities". Intellectual property is modest: "four granted United States patents and one issued patent in Taiwan". With 66 full-time employees, Cipher has no scale advantage over the competitors it names: CoreWeave, Digital Realty, Equinix, Vantage Data Centers and Aligned Data Centers. | switching costs The advantage is the cost and friction of moving stored records. The 10-K's Item 1A says that "if we are successful in winning record storage customers from competitors, the process of moving their stored records into our facilities is often costly and time consuming", and its notes record payments made "to a customer in order to terminate the customer's storage of records with its current records management vendor" as customer inducements. The DOJ complaint (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/04/11/2016-08210/united-states-v-iron-mountain-inc-and-recall-holdings-ltd-proposed-final-judgment-and-competitive) describes the mechanism: "Customer contracts also often impose a cap on the number of boxes per month that a customer may permanently remove from a RMS vendor's facility, such that a switch to a new RMS vendor may take several months to complete", and a new vendor "will have to offer to pay the fees to induce the customer to switch". Scale helps, since the 10-K says "the majority of our competitors operate in only one market or region", but the filing's own account of what keeps customers is retention and the cost of leaving, which makes switching costs the primary source. | switching costs The 10-K locates the stickiness in qualification rather than in patents or scale. Customers "do not purchase our services until they qualify the services and satisfactorily complete factory audits and vendor evaluations"; qualification "may take three to six months or longer"; production is transferred "copy-exact: the setup of a production process identical to the one used by our customer"; and the filing's own experience of changing a component source is that it "resulted in our customers or their end customers requiring requalification and validation of components, a process that can often be lengthy and has negatively impacted the timing of our revenue" — the same friction a customer would face moving the program elsewhere. The filing rules out an IP-based moat itself: "Historically, patents have not played a significant role in the protection of our proprietary rights," and any process improvement developed for a customer's product is "immediately assigned to that customer." The Thailand cost base is a genuine advantage but the filing warns it is not durable on its own — "Wage increases may impact our ability to sustain our competitive advantage and may reduce our profit margin." |
| Leadership | fast follower No independent share or rank was found. The 10-K names CoreWeave, Digital Realty, Equinix, Vantage Data Centers and Aligned Data Centers as competitors, along with miners that have "signed leases with hyperscalers and HPC tenants": Hut 8, IREN, TeraWulf, Core Scientific and Applied Digital. Cipher has signed hyperscale-grade tenants (Amazon; Fluidstack with a Google backstop; a third investment-grade hyperscaler) but delivered its first HPC capacity only in August 2026 (Q2 2026 update). That makes it a fast follower. Its self-description as "a leading developer, owner, and operator of industrial-scale data centers" is the company's own claim and is not counted. | clear leader The band applies to records management, the Global RIM segment that produced $5,291,481 thousand of 2025's $6,901,737 thousand revenue. Independent evidence: the DOJ complaint published in the Federal Register on 2016-04-11 (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/04/11/2016-08210/united-states-v-iron-mountain-inc-and-recall-holdings-ltd-proposed-final-judgment-and-competitive) stated "Iron Mountain is the largest RMS company in the United States", with fiscal 2014 worldwide revenues of "approximately $3.1 billion", and called Recall, with 2014 revenues of "approximately $836.1 million", "the second-largest RMS company in the United States"; the FY2025 10-K lists property "acquired in connection with our acquisition of Recall Holdings Limited". The 2025 10-K adds, in the company's own words, that "the majority of our competitors operate in only one market or region". The independent source is from 2016 and covers the United States only. Iron Mountain did go on to acquire Recall, but the proposed final judgment in the same notice required it to divest "Recall RMS assets in all fifteen geographic markets identified in the Complaint", thirteen of them to Access CIG, which the notice called "currently the third-largest RMS provider in the United States", so Recall's business was not absorbed whole. This leadership does not extend to data centres, where the Global Data Center segment's $803,429 thousand of 2025 revenue compares with total revenue of $9,217,000,000 at Equinix (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1101239/000110123926000032/0001101239-26-000032-index.htm) and $6,112,692,000 at Digital Realty (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1297996/000110465926015365/0001104659-26-015365-index.htm) in stored fundamentals from their FY2025 10-Ks. | co leader The leadership claim in the filing is the company's own qualitative assessment: "We believe we are a leader in manufacturing products for the optical communications market," and, on breadth of process technology, "Based on our experience with customers and our qualitative assessment of our capabilities, we believe we provide a broader array of process technologies to the optics industry than any other manufacturing services provider." The same Item 1 names a crowded field against it — "Benchmark Electronics, Inc., Celestica Inc., InnoLight Technology (Suzhou) Ltd., Jabil Inc., Sanmina Corporation, Venture Corporation Limited and Eoptolink Technology Inc., Ltd., as well as the internal manufacturing capabilities of our customers" — and no independent share ranking is given, so the record supports front-of-field standing but not sole primacy. |
| Pricing power | weak The 10-K says competition "has resulted in increasing competition and pricing pressure that may cause us to reduce our pricing in order to remain competitive". It adds that if customers cut usage "we may be compelled to lower our prices or risk losing a significant customer". At Barber Lake, Cipher agreed to absorb "the first $359.3 million of costs in excess of the initial budgeted amount", with the tenant reimbursing "50% of any such costs above that amount" (2026-09-25, Exhibit 99.1, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1819989/000181998926000043/barberlakeleaseamendmentpr.htm). Its one input-cost edge is specific to mining: Odessa's power costs about 2.8 c/kWh under the Luminant contract, available "until at least July 2027". A landlord that concedes cost overruns to its tenants has weak pricing power. | strong In records, growth comes from price on steady volume. MD&A attributes Global RIM "organic storage rental revenue growth driven by revenue management" (organic storage rental growth of 5.4% in 2025), while Item 1A says volumes "were relatively steady in 2025" and "Our organic revenue growth has been positively impacted by our ability to effectively introduce, expand and monitor revenue management. If we are not able to continue and effectively manage pricing, our results of operations could be adversely affected". The segment's Adjusted EBITDA margin was 44.7% in 2025 against 44.6% in 2024. In data centres MD&A cites "improved pricing" and "a 620 basis point increase in Adjusted EBITDA Margin reflecting recent lease commencements, improved pricing and cost containment", to 51.8% from 45.6%. The limits: Item 1A says that on power costs "we may be limited in our ability to, or may not always choose to, pass these increased costs on to our customers", and the 2016 DOJ complaint (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/04/11/2016-08210/united-states-v-iron-mountain-inc-and-recall-holdings-ltd-proposed-final-judgment-and-competitive) found that where Iron Mountain and Recall met, they "competed aggressively against one another for customers, resulting in lower prices for RMS". Adjusted EBITDA margin is a non-GAAP measure, and the Q2 2026 release (https://s204.q4cdn.com/148941814/files/doc_financials/2026/q2/FINAL-Q2-2026-Earnings-Press-Release.pdf) shows it at 35.8% for the company against 36.7% a year earlier. | weak Gross profit was 12.0% of revenues in FY2026, 12.1% in FY2025 and 12.4% in FY2024 — flat to down across three years in which revenue grew from $2.88 billion to $4.64 billion — and the FY2026 increase in gross profit is attributed to "sales volume and product mix," not price. Item 1 says so directly: "we expect the prices we charge for our manufactured products to decrease over time (partly as a result of competitive market forces)," with the offset coming from cycle-time, mix, yield and material-cost work rather than from rate. The risk factors add that customer consolidation gives buyers "increased leverage that may result in, among other things, decreases in our average selling prices," and that new competition "could result in price reductions for our services, reduced gross profit margins or loss of market share." |
| Summary | Cipher built bitcoin mining data centres in Texas and is now developing single-tenant AI and HPC campuses for lease to hyperscalers. Its 10-K reports a portfolio of "4.2 gigawatts ("GW") of capacity across 10 sites". It lists a 15-year Amazon Web Services lease for about 300 MW of turnkey capacity at Black Pearl and a Fluidstack lease at Barber Lake (300 MW gross) under which Google "has agreed to backstop certain obligations of Fluidstack". It describes bitcoin mining at Odessa on a Luminant power contract at about 2.8 c/kWh. In 2026 it signed a third campus lease "with an investment-grade Hyperscale tenant" (Q1 2026 update, 2026-05-05), delivered first Black Pearl capacity in August "two months ahead of the original schedule" with rent commenced, and fully funded its Stingray development with a bond (Q2 2026 update). On 2026-09-25 it said Barber Lake's contracted life was extended from 10 to 20 years, taking contracted revenue at the site "from $3.8 billion to over $9 billion". The 10-K says Odessa was "the first bitcoin mining data center awarded the Management and Operations, or M&O, Stamp of Approval award from the Uptime Institute", which is independent recognition of how the company operates. Against this, the latest quarter's revenue was still bitcoin mining and fell to $25 million. The 10-K describes growing "competition and pricing pressure", single-tenant concentration, and termination rights for construction delays. The Barber Lake schedule was reset, and Cipher absorbs the first $359.3 million of cost overruns. Cipher's contracted pipeline is substantial, but a competitive advantage is not yet demonstrated, so it is rated as having no moat. That could change to narrow once its leased campuses are delivered and paying rent. | Iron Mountain stores and manages physical records for, per its FY2025 10-K, more than 240,000 customers in 61 countries, "including approximately 95% of the Fortune 1000", with "no single customer accounting for more than approximately 3% of revenue". Revenue was $6,901,737 thousand in 2025, of which the Global RIM segment contributed $5,291,481 thousand and the Global Data Center segment $803,429 thousand. The records business is the moat. Storage rental agreements "generally range from one to five years in length", the company says it has "consistently experienced strong customer retention levels", and a 2016 Department of Justice complaint described Iron Mountain as "the largest RMS company in the United States" and permanent withdrawal fees as a barrier to rivals winning customers. That lock-in shows up as pricing: MD&A attributes Global RIM storage growth to "revenue management" while Item 1A says volumes "were relatively steady in 2025". The threat is substitution: activity is declining as records become "less active and more archival", and a shift to non-paper storage "could adversely affect our businesses". The growth arms sit outside that moat. The company operated 31 data centers across 21 markets with 488 MW of capacity approximately 97% leased and a weighted average lease expiration of 10.3 years, counts "five of the largest global hyperscalers among our customers", and on 2026-08-05 reported data center leasing of 110 megawatts year to date and second-quarter revenue of $2.0 billion, up 18.5%. But in data centres it competes with operators owning "properties comparable to ours", and in asset lifecycle management with hyperscalers' own programmes. A durable switching-cost franchise in a market expected only to hold steady, funding growth businesses that compete on power, location and price, is a narrow moat. | Fabrinet is the neutral outsourced factory for complex photonics. The FY2026 10-K describes a business that wins on qualification and IP hygiene rather than on product ownership: a "factory-within-a-factory" that physically segregates each customer's engineers and floor space, copy-exact line transfers, Telcordia-grade environmental qualification, and a claim that "there is no other manufacturing services provider with a similar breadth and depth of optical and electro-mechanical engineering and process technology capabilities that does not directly compete with its customers in their end-markets." That neutrality is claimed as a belief, not demonstrated — the filing's own framing is "we believe" — and Item 1 names the field it is measured against without characterising any of them: "Benchmark Electronics, Inc., Celestica Inc., InnoLight Technology (Suzhou) Ltd., Jabil Inc., Sanmina Corporation, Venture Corporation Limited and Eoptolink Technology Inc., Ltd., as well as the internal manufacturing capabilities of our customers." Once a program is qualified it tends to stay, and "in many cases, we are the sole outsourced manufacturing partner used by our customers for the products that we manufacture for them." What the moat does not buy is margin. Revenue grew 35.7% in FY2026 to $4.64 billion on the AI-datacenter build-out — data center products are now 47.9% of revenue — yet gross margin slipped to 12.0%, and Item 1 concedes the company expects "the prices we charge for our manufactured products to decrease over time." The two live erosion paths are named in the risk factors: customer consolidation that "may result in, among other things, decreases in our average selling prices," and customers who "acquired the capacity to manufacture products in-house." Concentration cuts both ways this year — FY2025 had two customers above 10% of revenue, FY2026 had four, so the book broadened even as its scale grew. |
| Chain position | Cipher develops single-tenant, powered data-centre campuses for hyperscale and AI tenants: Amazon at Black Pearl, Fluidstack (backstopped by Google) at Barber Lake, and an unnamed investment-grade hyperscaler at a third campus. Meanwhile it winds down bitcoin mining. | In the AI build-out Iron Mountain is a landlord and a recycler. It leases data center capacity to hyperscale customers, with "five of the largest global hyperscalers among our customers", and its ALM business "provides hyperscale and corporate IT infrastructure managers with services and solutions that enable the decommissioning, data erasure, processing and disposition, and recycling or sale of IT hardware and component assets". Upstream, Item 1A says "We rely on third parties to provide power to our data centers" and that construction depends on "one or more design firms, general contractors, and associated subcontractors". | A contract manufacturer sitting between optical components and the network and AI-datacenter OEMs whose brands ship the finished box. FY2026 revenue is 47.9% data center, 33.3% communications infrastructure and 18.8% automotive, industrial and other markets (FY2025: 46.2% / 30.7% / 23.1%), with Cisco, NVIDIA, Nokia and Amazon each above 10% of revenue. Fabrinet also integrates one layer down, designing and fabricating its own customized optics and glass — crystals, ferrules, precision glass tubing — at Fuzhou, China and Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, both for its own assemblies and for the merchant market, while volume manufacturing runs from the Pinehurst and Chonburi campuses in Thailand. |
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| Long-horizon vote | -0.06 at weight 0.20 · swarm bearish Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.24 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. | +0.05 at weight 0.20 · swarm neutral Editorial prior, not backtested. |